Section 61-8-343 “Driveway Yield” Negligence Per Se Is Not Automatic on Summary Judgment When Pre-Crash Circumstances Are Disputed

Murray v. Steinmetz, 2026 MT 89 (Mont. Apr. 28, 2026)

1. Introduction

Parties and posture. Zachary Murray (plaintiff/appellant) appealed from a Gallatin County jury verdict allocating 65% comparative negligence to him after his northbound motorcycle collided with a vehicle driven by Taylor Steinmetz (defendant/appellee) as she exited the Goodwill parking lot onto Simmental Way in Bozeman. Easterseals-Goodwill Northern Rocky Mountains had been added as a defendant but obtained summary judgment on duty; that ruling was not appealed.

Core dispute. Murray alleged Steinmetz failed to yield while entering a public roadway from a private driveway, invoking § 61-8-343, MCA and seeking negligence per se via partial summary judgment. Steinmetz defended on liability and asserted comparative negligence, emphasizing disputed facts about Murray’s speed, visibility, and maneuvering around stopped vehicles.

Issues on appeal. The Supreme Court of Montana addressed: (1) whether disputed facts barred a finding of negligence per se on summary judgment; (2) admissibility of a crash investigator’s causation opinion; (3) exclusion of post-accident traffic videos; and (4) denial of a new trial under M. R. Civ. P. 59(a).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed across the board. It held that, despite the driveway-yield language in § 61-8-343, MCA, material disputes about what occurred immediately before impact (relative positions, speed, visibility obstructions, and traffic behavior) made partial summary judgment on negligence per se improper. It further held that a highly experienced Bozeman crash investigator was properly allowed to give an opinion that Murray’s manner of passing stopped traffic was a direct cause of the crash. The Court also upheld exclusion of videos filmed weeks later for lack of foundation and affirmed denial of a new trial because no individual error—and thus no cumulative error—was shown.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Summary judgment, negligence, and “negligence per se” framing

  • Kipfinger v. Great Falls Ob. & Gyn. Assocs. (2023 MT 44): Provided the modern summary-judgment lens: de novo review, genuine issues must be “non-speculative,” and evidence is viewed favorably to the nonmovant.
  • Clark v. Eagle Sys., Inc. (279 Mont. 279, 972 P.2d 995 (1996)): Reiterated that summary judgment is an “extreme remedy” not substitutable for trial where material facts are disputed.
  • Fahrnow v. E-5 Oilfield Serv. (2025 MT 220): Emphasized negligence claims are often ill-suited for summary judgment and are appropriate only when “reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions.”
  • Giambra v. Kelsey (2007 MT 158): Supplied the negligence-per-se structure: a statutory violation can establish breach as a matter of law, contrasting with common-law negligence where breach is typically factual.

2) Right-of-way doctrine: “favored” vs. “disfavored” is not absolute

  • Tonner v. Cirian (2012 MT 314) and Roe v. Kornder-Owen (282 Mont. 287, 937 P.2d 39 (1997)): Used to frame Montana’s approach that right-of-way statutes facilitate orderly traffic but do not eliminate the need for lookout and reasonable care.
  • Spinler v. Allen (1999 MT 160): The Court’s principal analogy for refusing to convert a right-of-way statute into automatic negligence as a matter of law when the vehicles’ relative positions and pre-collision circumstances are contested.
  • Flynn v. Helena Cab & Bus Co. (94 Mont. 204, 21 P.2d 1105 (1933)): The foundational statement that the right-of-way privilege is “not inflexible and absolute” and depends, to some extent, on the vehicles’ relative positions and the presence of apparent danger.
  • Contreras v. Fitzgerald (2002 MT 208): Cited for the proposition that uncertainty about what occurred immediately preceding an accident can make summary judgment improper.

3) Expert testimony: qualification, reliability, and the “shaky but admissible” principle

  • State v. Villanueva (2021 MT 277): Restated the abuse-of-discretion standard for expert admissibility.
  • McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill. (2015 MT 222) and State v. Clifford (2005 MT 219): Supplied Montana’s three-part reliability frame—reliable field, qualified expert, and reliable application—while emphasizing liberal admissibility and adversarial testing via cross-examination.
  • Hulse v. Mont. Dep't of Justice (1998 MT 108) and Cottrell v. Burlington N. R.R. Co. (261 Mont. 296, 863 P.2d 381 (1993)): Quoted for the need for foundational knowledge and adequate basis for an opinion.
  • Beehler v. E. Radiological Assocs., P.C. (2012 MT 260) and Harris v. Hanson (2009 MT 13): Used to place “reliable application” disputes largely in the factfinder’s domain once the field and qualifications are established.
  • State v. Jay (2013 MT 79): Distinguished as a situation where an expert opinion lacked an evidentiary connection to the facts, risking jury confusion.
  • Hart-Anderson v. Hauck (239 Mont. 444, 781 P.2d 1116 (1989)) and the line of cases Perdue v. Gagnon Farms, Inc. (2003 MT 47), Hilsop v. Cady (261 Mont. 243, 862 P.2d 388 (1993)), Rude v. Neal (165 Mont. 520, 530 P.2d 428 (1974)), Foreman v. Minnie (211 Mont. 441, 689 P.2d 1210 (1984)), and Pachek v. Norton Concrete Co. (160 Mont. 16, 499 P.2d 766 (1972)): Provided the doctrinal anchor that an experienced investigating officer may opine on accident causation based on scene observations and interviews.

4) Demonstrative evidence (videos) and “substantially similar” conditions

  • Henricksen v. State (2004 MT 20): Set the “manifest abuse of discretion” review standard for demonstrative evidence.
  • State v. Ingraham (1998 MT 156): Defined the probative purpose of demonstrative evidence (supplement and clarify) and the probative-versus-prejudicial balance.
  • Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (233 Mont. 515, 761 P.2d 401 (1988)): Central requirement that video be accurate, relevant, and a true representation of the scene at the time in question—or differences must be explained.
  • Leary v. Kelly Pipe Co. (169 Mont. 511, 549 P.2d 813 (1976)) and State v. Sharbono (175 Mont. 373, 563 P.2d 61 (1977)): Supported exclusion where the demonstrative depiction or experiment materially differs from the event conditions.

5) New trial, disclosure, cross-examination scope, and jury instructions

  • Steffensmier v. Huebner (2018 MT 173) and Willing v. Quebedeaux (2009 MT 102): Applied the “manifest abuse of discretion” standard to Rule 59 and defined “manifest” as obvious/evident/unmistakable.
  • Hawkins v. Harney (2003 MT 58) and Scott v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co. (240 Mont. 282, 783 P.2d 938 (1989)): Interpreted M. R. Civ. P. 26 expert disclosure through its purpose: minimize surprise and enable effective cross-examination.
  • Sharbono v. Cole (2015 MT 257): Reinforced that adequacy of disclosure is assessed with Rule 26’s anti-surprise purpose in mind.
  • Clark v. Bell (2009 MT 390), Breuer v. State (2023 MT 242), Green v. Hagele (182 Mont. 155, 595 P.2d 1159 (1979)), and United Tool Rental, Inc. v. Riverside Contracting, Inc. (2011 MT 213): Framed broad latitude in cross-examining experts and the trial court’s discretion over scope.
  • Peterson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2010 MT 187) and Murphy Homes, Inc v. Muller (2007 MT 140): Set standards for reviewing jury instructions as a whole and requiring a showing of prejudice.
  • State v. Himes (2015 MT 91), Vancos v. Mont. Dep't of Trans. (2024 MT 30), and State v. Hudson (2005 MT 142): Approved instructions that mirror statutory language where applicable.
  • Estate of Frazier v. Miller (2021 MT 85): Used to reject cumulative error absent identified individual error.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Negligence per se under § 61-8-343, MCA: the Court declines a rigid reading at summary judgment.
Murray argued § 61-8-343, MCA imposes an unqualified duty to yield to “all vehicles approaching,” such that any collision while entering from a driveway necessarily proves a statutory breach and thus negligence per se. The Court refused to treat the statute as self-executing in the summary-judgment posture because the pre-crash circumstances were meaningfully disputed: Steinmetz’s sightline was obstructed by a donation line; evidence conflicted on Murray’s speed; there was evidence Murray was close behind a truck (affecting visibility); and the parties disputed the vehicles’ relative positions immediately before Steinmetz entered the roadway.

Rather than announcing an “absolute duty” model for driveway entry, the Court integrated the long-standing “favored/disfavored” right-of-way framework: right-of-way privileges do not permit either driver to disregard reasonable care and obvious dangers. Drawing from Flynn v. Helena Cab & Bus Co., Spinler v. Allen, and Tonner v. Cirian, the Court treated the statutory yield duty as fact-sensitive when the record leaves room for different reasonable conclusions about whether, under the circumstances, the entering driver could perceive the approaching vehicle in time and whether the approaching driver maintained a proper lookout and reasonable speed.

Practical doctrinal move: The Court did not deny that a statutory violation can establish breach as a matter of law (Giambra v. Kelsey). Instead, it held that on this record it could not be determined as a matter of law that Steinmetz “violated” § 61-8-343, MCA because the key facts necessary to apply the statute (visibility, relative positions, approach conditions) were genuinely disputed.

2) Crash investigator causation opinion: foundation and “assist the trier of fact.”
The Court upheld admission of crash investigator Williams’s opinion that Murray’s passing maneuver was a direct cause of the crash. It emphasized: (a) Williams’s extensive crash-investigation experience; (b) his timely on-scene investigation (inspection, interviews, photos); and (c) longstanding Montana precedent allowing trained investigating officers to opine on accident causation. The Court distinguished State v. Jay and Cottrell v. Burlington N. R.R. Co. as cases where the expert opinion lacked a sufficient factual nexus to the case. Any criticisms of the thoroughness of Williams’s investigation went to weight, not admissibility, and were properly tested by cross-examination and contrary evidence under McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill..

3) Post-crash videos: insufficient foundation because differences could not be explained.
Murray sought to admit videos his father recorded weeks later to illustrate traffic flow and conditions at the Goodwill exit. Applying Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., the Court held the foundational gap was decisive: Murray’s father was not a witness to the collision and could not reliably establish that the filmed conditions were a true representation of the crash-day conditions or explain differences (vehicle positions, whether cars were stopped/moving, presence of opposing traffic, spacing, and other variables). With other evidence available (eyewitnesses, scene photos, expert demonstratives), exclusion fell comfortably within trial-court discretion.

4) Rule 59(a) new trial: no “irregularity” materially affecting substantial rights.
The Court rejected Murray’s multiple asserted trial errors (expert rebuttal on the vault method; cross-examination about motorcycle safety recommendations; and jury instruction language). It held the vault-method testimony was not unfair surprise in context because the plaintiff’s expert had criticized the defense expert for not using the vault method, making the defense explanation “true rebuttal.” It held the cross-exam did not violate the lane-filtering in limine order because the questioning addressed the expert’s training organization’s safety recommendations, not § 61-8-392, MCA. And it upheld Jury Instruction 12—including § 61-8-326(1), MCA—because instructions are reviewed as a whole and statutory-language instructions are routinely approved where applicable.

C. Impact

1) Driveway-entry right-of-way disputes will more often reach juries.
The key practical effect is the Court’s signal that even where § 61-8-343, MCA applies on its face, litigants should not assume partial summary judgment on negligence per se will be available if there are genuine disputes about visibility obstructions, approach speed, relative positions, or other pre-impact dynamics. The decision strengthens the argument that “statutory duty” questions in traffic cases often cannot be cleanly separated from contested factual context.

2) Continued permissive stance toward experienced investigating-officer opinions.
By reaffirming Hart-Anderson v. Hauck and its progeny, the Court preserves a relatively accessible pathway for admitting causation opinions from experienced crash investigators—even where they are not formal “reconstructionists”—so long as they investigated promptly and can articulate an observational basis.

3) Demonstrative video evidence will be scrutinized for “explainable similarity,” not mere familiarity with the site.
The decision underscores that “substantially similar” foundation is not satisfied by general knowledge of an intersection; the proponent must be able to connect the demonstration to the time-in-question conditions or explain differences in a way that prevents misleading the jury.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Negligence per se: A shortcut to proving breach of duty by showing violation of a safety statute. It does not automatically win the case because causation and comparative negligence may remain, and the court must still be able to decide (without factual disputes) that the statute was violated as applied to the circumstances.
  • Favored vs. disfavored driver (right-of-way): The “favored” driver has priority, but not an unlimited license; both drivers must still keep a proper lookout and act reasonably when hazards are apparent.
  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling when no genuine dispute of material fact exists. If reasonable people could reach different conclusions from the evidence, the issue goes to the jury.
  • Expert admissibility (M. R. Evid. 702): The court asks whether the field is reliable, the witness is qualified, and the opinion is grounded enough to help the jury. Weaknesses typically affect weight (how persuasive it is), not admissibility.
  • Demonstrative evidence foundation: Videos/experiments must fairly depict the scene or conditions at the relevant time, or the differences must be explained so the jury is not misled.
  • Motion in limine: A pretrial request to exclude certain evidence or topics. Even with such an order, cross-examination may be permitted if it legitimately tests an expert’s stated credentials or the basis of opinions without violating the order’s core prohibition.
  • Rule 59 new trial & cumulative error: A new trial is granted only for substantial, outcome-relevant problems. “Cumulative error” generally requires actual individual errors to accumulate.

5. Conclusion

Murray v. Steinmetz reinforces a fact-centered approach to traffic negligence litigation in Montana. Even under a seemingly broad driveway-yield statute, the Court declined to impose negligence per se on summary judgment where visibility, speed, and relative positioning were disputed, aligning § 61-8-343, MCA with Montana’s longstanding principle that right-of-way doctrines are not absolute. The Opinion also reaffirms liberal admissibility of experienced crash-investigator causation opinions, tightens expectations for foundation of post-event demonstrative videos, and illustrates the high threshold for Rule 59 relief when alleged errors are either within the trial court’s discretion or non-prejudicial in the context of the full trial record.