Date: Aug 8, 2026

§ 52-190a Is Procedural, Not a Substantive Bar: Justice Ecker’s Call to Overrule Jarmie and Preserve Third-Party Negligence Claims

1. Introduction

Case: Ashworth v. Branford (Concurrence & Dissent by Ecker, J.)
Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
Date: August 4, 2026

Justice Ecker’s opinion addresses a stark consequence of Connecticut’s interpretation of General Statutes § 52-190a (the “good faith” certificate and expert “opinion letter” requirement in medical negligence cases). The underlying facts, as framed by the concurrence/dissent, involve a psychiatric patient who disclosed obsession, firearm ownership, and homicidal ideation toward an ex-girlfriend. After discharge without warning to the girlfriend, he allegedly murdered her the next day and then killed himself.

The key doctrinal issue is not whether Connecticut common law can recognize a duty to protect an “identifiable victim,” but whether § 52-190a—construed by Jarmie v. Troncale, 306 Conn. 578, 50 A.3d 802 (2012)—operates as a substantive bar preventing a nonpatient victim (or her estate) from bringing claims that depend on proof of professional/medical negligence. Justice Ecker concurs that the court must follow Jarmie absent a proper request to overrule it, but argues Jarmie is doctrinally unsound and should be overruled. He also dissents from the majority’s refusal to reach the merits of the plaintiff’s gross negligence count.

2. Summary of the Opinion (Ecker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

Concurrence (in result): Because Jarmie v. Troncale construes § 52-190a to bar nonpatient claims premised on a provider’s professional negligence, Justice Ecker agrees the plaintiff’s claims are barred to the extent they are “medical negligence” claims requiring proof of breach of a professional standard of care.
Call to overrule Jarmie: He argues Jarmie “gravely misconstrued” § 52-190a by converting a procedural screening statute into an unintended substantive prohibition on a broad class of third-party claims (including Tarasoff-type claims).
Dissent (gross negligence): He would not deem forfeited the plaintiff’s challenge to the striking of count seven (gross negligence), and—relying on Squeo v. Norwalk Hospital Assn., 316 Conn. 558, 113 A.3d 932 (2015)—would reverse the striking and allow the gross negligence claim to proceed.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. The controlling precedent under attack: Jarmie v. Troncale

Justice Ecker treats Jarmie v. Troncale, 306 Conn. 578, as the source of the “nonsensical results” that follow when § 52-190a is read to bar nonpatient medical negligence claims. He underscores two features diminishing Jarmie’s persuasive force:

Methodological thinness: The statutory analysis in Jarmie is described as truncated—three paragraphs overall with a “single conclusory sentence” on the statute—without the usual § 1-2z methodology or robust engagement with alternative interpretations.
Dictum concerns: Because Jarmie also held no duty existed at common law (the plaintiff was a “random pedestrian,” not an identifiable victim), Justice Ecker argues the § 52-190a discussion was unnecessary to the outcome and thus arguably dictum (citing Honulik v. Greenwich, 293 Conn. 641, 645 n.5 (2009)).

B. The court’s modern “course correction” on § 52-190a: Carpenter v. Daar overruling Morgan v. Hartford Hospital

Justice Ecker’s principal support comes from Carpenter v. Daar, 346 Conn. 80, 287 A.3d 1027 (2023), which overruled Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 21 A.3d 451 (2011). In Morgan, § 52-190a’s opinion letter defect was treated as a jurisdictional/service-of-process trap. Carpenter unanimously rejected that approach, emphasizing the legislature intended a “simple prelitigation documentation” of good faith, not “a trap” for meritorious suits.

Justice Ecker leverages Carpenter as a thematic guide: if § 52-190a should not be transformed into a jurisdictional bar, it likewise should not be transformed into a substantive bar against nonpatients. He also cites decisions counseling commonsense readings of the statute—Shortell v. Cavanagh, 300 Conn. 383 (2011) and Dias v. Grady, 292 Conn. 350 (2009)—as examples where the court avoided literal interpretations producing incongruent results.

C. The “best reading” alternative ignored by Jarmie: Plainville v. Wheeler Clinic, Inc.

Justice Ecker highlights Plainville v. Wheeler Clinic, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. HHB-CV-07-5004904 (December 11, 2008) (46 Conn. L. Rptr. 812), which concluded § 52-190a governs only malpractice actions initiated by patients and “does not speak” to nonpatient actions. For Justice Ecker, this “commonsense” construction shows that multiple plausible readings exist—making Jarmie’s single-word (“claimant”) fixation unjustified.

D. Third-party duty contexts: Tarasoff/Cochran/Squeo lines

Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976): the archetype for duties to warn/protect identifiable victims of psychiatric patients. Justice Ecker’s core point is that it is implausible the Connecticut legislature silently rejected Tarasoff-type liability via a procedural statute.
Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325 (2019): used to illustrate how an overly literal § 52-190a reading would sweep too broadly (and how Connecticut recognizes duty issues in third-party medical harm contexts).
Squeo v. Norwalk Hospital Assn., 316 Conn. 558 (2015): central to the dissent portion. Squeo allowed a bystander emotional distress claim in the hospital-discharge context under a gross negligence standard. Justice Ecker argues it is incoherent to allow nonpatients’ derivative emotional-distress claims but bar nonpatients’ direct wrongful-death claims.

E. Connecticut’s identifiable-victim duty framework in mental health settings

Justice Ecker situates the case against Connecticut’s preexisting approach in psychiatric-danger cases: Fraser v. United States, 236 Conn. 625 (1996) and Jacoby v. Brinckerhoff, 250 Conn. 86 (1999), which recognized a limited duty tied to “identifiable victims” and imminent risk, while protecting therapeutic confidentiality. He emphasizes that § 52-190a should not be construed to create a sweeping “newfangled immunity” broader than even governmental-immunity exceptions (citing Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324 (2009) and Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 (1979)).

F. Florida as the model jurisdiction and interpretive comparator

A major pillar of Justice Ecker’s analysis is that § 52-190a was modeled on a Florida provision (now Fla. Stat. Ann. § 766.104). Under Connecticut’s “modeled statute” interpretive principle (citing State v. Carter, 350 Conn. 43 (2024)), Florida case law is “of great assistance and persuasive force.” He relies on:

Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995) (third-party duty context allowed; compliance with § 766.104 pleaded).
J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola, 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994) (third-party infectious-disease-type claim allowed).
Pavolini v. Bird, 769 So. 2d 410 (Fla. App. 2000) (explaining that if the person making the claim did not receive negligent care, they are not a “claimant” and thus are not required to comply with presuit requirements).
Musculoskeletal Institute Chartered v. Parham, 745 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1999) and Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1996) (Florida’s repeated resistance to constructions that unduly restrict access to courts).
Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446 (Fla. App. 1991) (Florida common law declining Tarasoff duty, underscoring that Florida did not use the statute itself to bar third-party claims).

G. Canons and interpretive authorities used to critique literalism

Justice Ecker invokes multiple interpretive principles and authorities to show why Jarmie’s claimant-based literalism is suspect: “elephants in mouseholes” (Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, 583 U.S. 416 (2018)); context matters (State v. John F.M., 285 Conn. 528 (2008); Blondeau v. Baltierra, 337 Conn. 127 (2020)); overbroad “no/any” language limited to the subject in view (United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892); Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)); statutes in derogation of common law strictly construed (Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10 (2004); Kumah v. Brown, 307 Conn. 620 (2013)); and the “dog that did not bark” legislative silence canon (Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991); applied in Connecticut in Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300 Conn. 1 (2011) and King v. Sultar, 253 Conn. 429 (2000)).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The statute’s function: procedural screening, not substantive immunity

Justice Ecker frames § 52-190a as a procedural statute enacted in Tort Reform I (P.A. 86-338) to deter frivolous malpractice suits by requiring a reasonable inquiry and a supporting opinion letter. He underscores modern authority recognizing malpractice claims remain common-law causes of action “procedurally circumscribed by statute” (citing Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 (2023); and also Corley v. United States, 11 F.4th 79 (2d Cir. 2021)). On this view, Jarmie erred by reading a substantive plaintiff-class limitation into a statute that otherwise regulates filing prerequisites.

B. Textual ambiguity created by multiple plausible readings

Justice Ecker argues the operative language—especially the phrase “negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant”—does not compel Jarmie’s conclusion. He posits at least three plausible constructions:

The “Plainville” construction: the statute targets patient-initiated malpractice claims and is silent as to nonpatient claims.
A strict literal construction (rejected as unworkable): the statute would sweep into ordinary negligence (even slip-and-falls), producing results the court itself has avoided in Dias and Shortell.
Jarmie’s construction: “claimant” equals plaintiff, so nonpatient medical-negligence-based claims are barred.

By demonstrating that the same textual approach used in Jarmie would also threaten ordinary negligence and informed-consent actions (see Shortell; informed consent treated as negligence in Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 278 Conn. 163 (2006)), he argues Jarmie’s literalism is selectively applied, signaling the need for a contextual, purpose-driven construction.

C. Structural/contextual cues: codification and neighboring statutes

Justice Ecker emphasizes that § 52-190a sits in Chapter 900 (“Court Practice and Procedure”) and is surrounded by other procedural provisions. This placement, and the broader usage of “claimant” across tort reform legislation, supports reading “claimant” as a drafting convention within a procedural framework, not as a hidden device to abolish a category of common-law claims.

D. Legislative history: Florida model and Connecticut’s late-stage substitution

The concurrence/dissent’s legislative-history argument is twofold:

Florida source statute: Because Connecticut borrowed the language from Florida, and Florida has not interpreted it to bar nonpatient claims, Connecticut should hesitate to ascribe a dramatically broader effect to the same words.
Connecticut enactment process: The good-faith certificate mechanism replaced a contemplated mandatory screening panel late in the legislative process. Justice Ecker argues it is implausible the legislature intended, without discussion, to achieve a sweeping substantive elimination of nonpatient claims—particularly given the extensive tort reform debates’ silence on that subject.

E. The dissenting portion: gross negligence and appellate forfeiture

Justice Ecker faults the majority for deeming the gross negligence issue inadequately briefed. He cites the preference for merits-based resolution and liberal construction of practice rules (quoting In re Taijha H.-B., 333 Conn. 297 (2019)).

On the merits, he views Squeo v. Norwalk Hospital Assn. as strongly implying that § 52-190a (even post-Jarmie) was not treated by the court as a categorical bar to nonpatient claims grounded in medical negligence, at least where gross negligence is alleged in a hospital discharge scenario. He also rejects the notion that Squeo is meaningfully distinguishable merely because bystander emotional distress is “derivative,” noting that § 52-190a’s text, as read in Jarmie, would still bar a nonpatient’s own “personal injury” claim regardless of its derivative label.

Finally, he addresses doctrinal tension about “gross negligence” in Connecticut—acknowledging statements that Connecticut does not recognize degrees of negligence (Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn. 314 (2005)), but pointing to contexts where a gross negligence standard has been defined and applied in medical settings (Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., 286 Conn. 789 (2008); and Squeo), and to the broader articulation of gross negligence as reckless indifference (C & H Electric, Inc. v. Bethel, 312 Conn. 843 (2014)).

3.3. Impact

Although Justice Ecker’s writing is not the court’s holding, it is a roadmap for future litigants and a signal to the legislature. Its likely impacts are:

Renewed pressure to revisit Jarmie: The opinion invites a properly briefed overruling request and supplies a full statutory and legislative-history argument that Jarmie misconstrued § 52-190a.
Reframing third-party cases: As long as Jarmie stands, plaintiffs may continue to plead around “medical negligence” (e.g., “ordinary negligence” theories), potentially distorting duty and proof standards. Justice Ecker argues this pressure has already skewed doctrine by discouraging expert-standard-of-care theories.
Gross negligence as a possible pathway: His treatment of Squeo suggests that gross negligence allegations in discharge-and-danger cases may be litigated even where professional-negligence-based claims are constrained—an important practical point for future pleadings and motions to strike.
Legislative invitation: The opinion highlights a statutory “gap” (how, if at all, § 52-190a should apply to nonpatient claims) and outlines two coherent solutions: exclude nonpatient claims from § 52-190a’s presuit requirements (Florida-style) or adopt a parallel common-law procedural requirement for uniformity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Medical negligence / medical malpractice: A common-law negligence claim requiring proof that a health care provider breached the applicable professional standard of care (usually via expert testimony). Justice Ecker stresses Connecticut’s statutes regulate procedure but do not create the cause of action.
§ 52-190a “opinion letter”: A presuit document from a “similar health care provider” stating there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and explaining the basis. It is meant to screen out frivolous suits.
Identifiable victim / imminent harm: A duty-limiting concept: providers (and sometimes government actors) may owe duties to specific, identifiable persons facing imminent harm, rather than to the public at large.
Tarasoff-type duty: A duty in some jurisdictions requiring mental health professionals to warn or protect identifiable third parties threatened by a patient. Justice Ecker argues it is unlikely Connecticut’s legislature silently eliminated such claims through a procedural statute.
Dictum: A statement not necessary to decide the case. Justice Ecker suggests Jarmie’s § 52-190a discussion may be dictum because the case was already resolved on no-duty grounds.
Gross negligence: Conduct markedly more blameworthy than ordinary negligence—often described as reckless indifference or “no care at all.” Justice Ecker argues the plaintiff adequately pleaded this in count seven and that Squeo supports letting such claims proceed in similar discharge contexts.

5. Conclusion

Justice Ecker’s concurrence/dissent portrays Ashworth as a cautionary example of how Jarmie v. Troncale has converted § 52-190a from a procedural screening mechanism into an unintended substantive barrier that can deny recovery to foreseeable, identifiable victims of professional negligence. Drawing on Carpenter v. Daar’s re-centering of § 52-190a’s purpose, on the alternative construction in Plainville v. Wheeler Clinic, Inc., and on Florida’s consistent treatment of the source statute (including Pavolini v. Bird), he argues Jarmie should be overruled when properly presented.

Separately, he would have reached the merits of the plaintiff’s gross negligence count and—guided by Squeo v. Norwalk Hospital Assn.—would allow that claim to proceed. The opinion thus functions as both a critique of a foundational interpretive precedent and a practical signal: future litigants challenging Jarmie must squarely brief overruling, and courts should not allow procedural statutes to be transmuted into silent immunities absent clear legislative direction.