Section 504 Child-Find Is Not Strict Liability: Plaintiffs Must Prove Discrimination (and IDEA Allows Reasonable Monitoring Before Reevaluation)

I. Introduction

In G. E. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2026) (unpublished), a minor student, G.E., by and through his parent S.B., sued the Williamson County Board of Education (“WCBOE”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The core dispute arose from G.E.’s anxiety, depression, and related mental-health diagnoses—manifesting primarily as chronic absenteeism and tardiness—and the parent’s contention that these facts triggered WCBOE’s “child-find” obligations to identify, evaluate, and provide disability-related supports earlier than it did.

Two issues ultimately reached the Sixth Circuit on appeal: (1) whether WCBOE violated Section 504’s child-find mandate in G.E.’s fifth and sixth grade years by not evaluating him for a 504 Plan; and (2) whether WCBOE violated IDEA child-find in seventh grade by not reevaluating him after learning of his partial hospitalization treatment and while providing homebound instruction.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. On Section 504, the court held that an alleged child-find lapse (a procedural duty) does not, by itself, establish liability; a plaintiff must still prove the elements of a Section 504 discrimination claim as articulated in Knox County v. M.Q.. Even construed as a failure-to-accommodate theory, G.E.’s claim failed because the record did not show WCBOE had sufficient notice of the need for specific accommodations (or that such accommodations were requested).

On IDEA, the court held WCBOE did not violate child-find in seventh grade by declining to immediately reevaluate after a recent eligibility meeting—particularly where WCBOE responded with homebound instruction and where parental noncooperation (including refusal to consent to evaluations) provided a rational justification for not proceeding with further evaluation.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standard of review and deference to the ALJ

  • L.H. v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep't of Educ.: The court reiterated the “modified de novo” standard in IDEA/Section 504 administrative appeals—district courts decide based on the preponderance of the evidence while giving the ALJ “due weight.”
  • Knox County v. M.Q.: Provided both the appellate review framework (clear error for facts, de novo for law) and the substantive template for Section 504 discrimination liability.

2. Section 504 child-find as procedural; liability still requires discrimination

  • M.G. ex rel. C.G. v. Williamson Cnty. Schs.: Recognized that Section 504 includes a child-find mandate (via regulation), helping frame the duty at issue.
  • P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist.: Cited for the proposition that child-find is procedural under Section 504; the Sixth Circuit leveraged this to distinguish “procedural violation” from “actionable discrimination.”
  • G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs. and Knox County v. M.Q.: These cases drove the dispositive point: “merely asserting” failures to follow Section 504 obligations or regulations (including child-find) is insufficient. Plaintiffs must satisfy the multi-element discrimination test; Section 504 is not treated as strict liability for procedural noncompliance.
  • Wilson v. Gregory: Used to identify the two recognized Sixth Circuit “pathways” to Section 504 liability in this context: intentional discrimination or failure to accommodate.

3. The “bad faith or gross misjudgment” debate, resolved by the Supreme Court

  • G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs.: Previously referenced the “bad faith or gross misjudgment” concept for some Section 504 educational claims.
  • Knox County v. M.Q.: Noted uncertainty about whether such a heightened culpability standard properly applies.
  • A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools: The opinion highlighted that the Supreme Court “rejected the bad-faith or gross-misjudgment standard,” but found it unnecessary to apply that development because G.E.’s Section 504 claim failed earlier—he did not show discrimination at all.

4. Notice/request principles for failure-to-accommodate

  • Carten v. Kent State Univ. (citing Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med.): Imported a practical rule into the K–12 setting: a public entity generally cannot be liable for failing to accommodate until it has sufficient notice—through diagnosis and/or an accommodation request—of both the disability and the need for accommodation.

5. Overlap between IDEA and Section 504 claims

  • Ja. B. v. Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ.: Confirmed that “section 504 protects a larger group of individuals” than IDEA, a point the panel acknowledged while still affirming based on pleading/briefing failures and the governing discrimination framework.
  • N.L. ex rel. Mrs. C. v. Knox Cnty. Schs., Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, and J.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Summit City Bd. of Educ.: Cited to support analyzing IDEA and Section 504 together where plaintiffs rely on the same facts and seek the same relief (and do not offer distinct evidence or a distinct liability theory for Section 504).
  • Grand v. City of Univ. Heights: Reinforced forfeiture: arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited—important here because G.E. attempted late-stage rehabilitation of the elements-based Section 504 showing.

6. IDEA child-find: scope, procedural harm, and timing of evaluations

  • Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist.: Used to describe the basic IDEA child-find structure (evaluate and, if eligible, develop an IEP).
  • Ja. B. v. Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. (quoting D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist.): Child-find does not require formal evaluation of every struggling student; schools may attempt interventions before referral/evaluation.
  • Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty. v. L.M.: Provided the Sixth Circuit’s formulation for actionable procedural IDEA violations (procedural failure that causes substantive harm) and the “clear signs/no rational justification” framing for child-find disputes.
  • M.G. ex rel. C.G. v. Williamson Cnty. Schs. (citing Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R.): Supported the proposition that after an initial evaluation and ineligibility finding, districts may have “a reasonable time” to monitor progress before deciding further evaluation is required.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Section 504: “Child-find violation” ≠ automatic liability

The panel’s central move was to separate procedural obligations (like child-find) from actionable discrimination under Section 504. Even if WCBOE should have identified and evaluated earlier, Section 504 remedies require proof that the student was “excluded,” “denied benefits,” or “subjected to discrimination” “solely by reason of” disability (per the elements in Knox County v. M.Q.). G.E.’s appellate framing—treating child-find noncompliance as sufficient by itself—collided with G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs. and Knox County v. M.Q., which reject “regulations-only” or “procedural-only” Section 504 liability theories.

2. Section 504: failure-to-accommodate failed on notice and record proof

The court then considered (charitably) whether the record could sustain a failure-to-accommodate theory—e.g., an “exposure plan” for school phobia. But it found an evidentiary gap: recommendations from Vanderbilt Behavioral Health and Lifecare were not shown to have been provided to the district, and the record reflected only generalized communications (“having some anxiety,” “feeling overwhelmed”) without a concrete request for school-based therapeutic accommodation. Under Carten v. Kent State Univ. and Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med., the district could not be said to have “refused” an accommodation it did not know was needed or being requested, particularly where many absences were attributed to physical illness and the parent did not document that absences were primarily anxiety-driven.

3. IDEA: no duty to immediately reevaluate after a recent eligibility meeting

On IDEA, the court treated the seventh-grade timeline as decisive: WCBOE held an IEP eligibility meeting in September 2019 and found G.E. ineligible. When his condition worsened and he entered partial hospitalization, WCBOE responded with homebound instruction. The panel relied on Ja. B. v. Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. and M.G. ex rel. C.G. v. Williamson Cnty. Schs. to conclude that child-find does not compel immediate reevaluation when the district reasonably pursues alternative interventions and monitors progress—especially shortly after a complete evaluation. The court adopted as persuasive the “reasonable time to monitor” approach from Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R..

4. IDEA: parental refusal/limited cooperation as “rational justification”

The court also emphasized consent and cooperation. IDEA evaluations require parental consent, and the record reflected refusals to permit a psychological evaluation and difficulty scheduling the Section 504 meeting the IEP team intended to conduct. Citing Ja. B. v. Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., the court treated this as a rational justification undermining any claim that WCBOE was “negligent” or lacked justification for not reevaluating during seventh grade.

C. Impact

1. Section 504 litigation: clearer boundary between “procedural” and “discrimination”

The decision reinforces a practical pleading-and-proof rule in the Sixth Circuit: plaintiffs cannot obtain Section 504 relief by proving only that a district missed a procedural step like child-find. They must fit their case within recognized discrimination frameworks (intentional discrimination or failure to accommodate) and develop the record accordingly. This will likely push future plaintiffs to (a) plead the Knox County v. M.Q. elements explicitly, (b) develop evidence of notice and requested accommodations, and (c) articulate causation (“solely by reason of” disability) with greater precision.

2. IDEA child-find: “reasonable monitoring” gains further traction

While unpublished, the opinion adds weight to the notion (supported by M.G. ex rel. C.G. v. Williamson Cnty. Schs. and Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R.) that districts may monitor and attempt interventions after an eligibility determination rather than reflexively reevaluating upon every escalation—particularly when the district is actively delivering an interim educational remedy (here, homebound instruction).

3. Consent disputes: documentation and process matter

The court’s rationale signals that where parental refusal or delay materially limits evaluation, districts that document requests, attempted scheduling, and proposed assessments will be better positioned to defend against child-find challenges. Conversely, parents seeking to establish liability will need to show not only escalating need but also that the district had sufficient information and feasible means to evaluate—and unjustifiably failed to do so.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Child-find: A school district’s duty to identify, locate, and evaluate students who may have disabilities and may need special education (IDEA) or accommodations (Section 504).
  • Section 504 Plan vs. IDEA IEP: A 504 Plan provides accommodations ensuring equal access; an IEP is a specialized plan requiring IDEA eligibility and “specially designed instruction.”
  • Procedural vs. substantive violation: A procedural violation is failing to follow required steps (like timely evaluation). A substantive violation concerns the quality/denial of educational benefit or discriminatory exclusion.
  • Failure to accommodate: A type of disability discrimination where a public entity could reasonably provide adjustments but refuses, resulting in impaired access/benefit.
  • Modified de novo review: The court independently reviews the record but still gives “due weight” to the administrative factfinding.
  • Homebound instruction: Educational services provided outside the school building (often at home) when a student cannot attend traditional school for medical or other reasons.

V. Conclusion

G. E. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. affirms two connected principles. First, in the Sixth Circuit, an alleged Section 504 child-find violation is not itself enough to establish liability; plaintiffs must prove discrimination under the established elements-based framework, typically via intentional discrimination or failure to accommodate, supported by evidence of notice and refusal. Second, under IDEA, a district that has recently evaluated a student and responds to worsening circumstances with an alternative educational intervention (such as homebound instruction) is afforded a reasonable period to monitor progress, particularly where parental consent and cooperation constrain further evaluation.