§ 432.070 and Sovereign Immunity Bar Municipal “Money Had and Received” Refund Suits Premised on Implied Waste-Service Obligations

1. Introduction

In State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. The Honorable Joseph P. Whyte (Mo. banc June 23, 2026), the Supreme Court of Missouri (en banc) issued a permanent writ of prohibition directing the circuit court to dismiss a putative class action brought by Christy Roberts against the City of St. Louis (the City).

Roberts sought refunds of monthly “solid waste services” fees paid since 2011, alleging the City unjustly retained those fees because it intermittently failed to collect recyclables and yard waste separately from garbage and ultimately terminated the program. After narrowing her pleadings, Roberts proceeded solely on a claim for “money had and received.”

The central issues were whether (1) sovereign immunity barred this non-tort, equitable refund claim against a municipality and (2) section 432.070 barred the suit because the asserted obligation amounted to an implied contractual promise not meeting statutory contracting requirements.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held the City is immune from suit. It concluded:

  • Sovereign immunity applies to equitable/non-tort claims (including “money had and received”) unless the plaintiff pleads and proves a clear waiver or recognized exception.
  • Section 432.070 bars quasi-contract/implied-in-fact theories used to impose obligations on a municipality absent an authorized, wholly executory, written, and properly subscribed contract; such noncompliant obligations are void.
  • Roberts’ theory did not allege an illegal exaction or statutory violation of the kind recognized in Karpierz v. Easley or Investors Title Co. v. Hammonds; instead it was, in substance, an implied-in-fact contract claim based on the City’s alleged representations and course of performance.
  • The proprietary function exception did not apply: “the collection of garbage by a city is a governmental function,” and charging a fee or potential resale/profit from recyclables does not transform the “generic nature” of solid waste management into a proprietary enterprise.

Accordingly, the preliminary writ of prohibition was made permanent.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Writ practice and immunity as protection from suit

  • State ex rel. Bailey v. Sengheiser, 692 S.W.3d 20 (Mo. banc 2024): supplied the standard for prohibition (prevent usurpation/excess of authority; prevent irreparable harm). The Court used this to situate prohibition as an appropriate vehicle.
  • State ex rel. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Crane, 708 S.W.3d 157 (Mo. banc 2025): emphasized prohibition is appropriate when a defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity—reinforcing that immunity is not merely a merits defense but a threshold bar.
  • State ex rel. Morales v. Alessi, 679 S.W.3d 467 (Mo. banc 2023): the Court relied on the proposition that “immunity from liability includes immunity from suit,” supporting immediate writ relief rather than post-judgment correction.
  • Ramirez v. Mo. Prosecuting Att'ys' & Cir. Att'ys' Ret. Sys., 694 S.W.3d 432 (Mo. banc 2024): provided de novo review for sovereign immunity questions.

B. Sovereign immunity as the default rule; pleading burden; legislative waiver

  • Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 476 S.W.3d 913 (Mo. banc 2016): framed sovereign immunity as the rule for public entities unless an express statutory exception or recognized common law exception applies (including proprietary function/consent).
  • Richardson v. City of St. Louis, 293 S.W.3d 133 (Mo. App. 2009): used for the principle that sovereign immunity is not an affirmative defense and plaintiffs must plead specific facts establishing an exception.
  • Bell v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 701 S.W.3d 614 (Mo. banc 2024): supported disregarding conclusory legal statements (relevant to Roberts’ bare assertion that sovereign immunity “is not a bar”).
  • Poke v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 S.W.3d 18 (Mo. banc 2022): anchored the requirement that waiver must be shown by a legislature’s express intent.

C. “Money had and received” and non-tort claims still face sovereign immunity

  • Kubley v. Brooks, 141 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. banc 2004): critical to the Court’s holding that sovereign immunity extends to non-tort actions, including “money had and received,” absent a waiver/exception. Kubley also framed what “sue and be sued” language can do (and what lesser language cannot).

D. What counts as consent: “sue” vs “sue and be sued”

  • Bush v. State Highway Comm'n of Mo., 46 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. 1932); V.S. DiCarlo Const. Co. v. State, 485 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1972); State ex rel. New Liberty Hosp. Dist. v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. banc 1985); Palo v. Stangler, 943 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. App. 1997): cited to show that Missouri waiver cases typically involve a statute conferring power “to sue and be sued” upon a specific governmental entity—language absent from the City Code provision Roberts invoked.
  • Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Lawrence Cnty., Miller, 636 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. banc 1982): reinforced that the legislature determines whether and to what extent immunity is waived.
  • State ex inf. Hannah ex rel. Christ v. City of St. Charles, 676 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. banc 1984): used to underscore that municipal powers remain subject to statutory limitation—supporting the Court’s conclusion that a city charter cannot expand waiver beyond the legislature’s choices.

E. Section 432.070: municipal contracting limits and the bar on quasi-contract end-runs

  • Howard Cnty. Ambulance Dist. v. City of Fayette, 549 S.W.3d 1 (Mo App. 2018): stated the operative rule that contracts not meeting section 432.070 are void, reflecting statutory “immunity” from such claims.
  • Withers v. City of Lake St. Louis, 318 S.W.3d 256 (Mo. App. 2010): emphasized the statute protects municipalities, not claimants seeking to impose obligations; also supplied the principle that receipt of benefits does not create liability via estoppel/ratification/implied contract.
  • Bride v. City of Slater, 263 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1953) and Donovan v. Kansas City, 175 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. banc 1943): foundational cases rejecting implied contract, estoppel, and quasi-contract routes when section 432.070’s requirements are not met.
  • Mays-Maune & Assocs., Inc. v. Werner Bros., 139 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. App. 2004) and Goodyear v. Junior Coll. Dist. of St. Louis, 540 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. 1976): reiterated the uniform interpretation that section 432.070 precludes recovery on implied-contract theories (including quantum meruit).

F. Distinguishing “obligation arising out of law” from implied contract: the illegal-exaction pathway

  • Karpierz v. Easley, 68 S.W.3d 565 (Mo. App. 2002): allowed “money had and received” where police seized money in violation of Missouri’s Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act—an obligation arising from a statutory violation.
  • Investors Title Co. v. Hammonds, 217 S.W.3d 228 (Mo. banc 2007): permitted recovery of illegally overcharged court filing fees in violation of statute; the Court here used Hammonds (and its citation to Karpierz) to distinguish cases where the sovereign takes money unlawfully under a specific legal prohibition.

G. Governmental vs proprietary function

  • Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603 (Mo. banc 2008): supplied the governmental/proprietary definitions (common good vs benefit/profit to the municipal corporation).
  • Dallas v. City of St. Louis, 338 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1960): decisive statement that garbage collection is a governmental function.
  • State ex rel. Bd. of Tr's of City of N. Kan. City Mem'l Hosp. v. Russell, 843 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. banc 1992): provided the “generic nature” test and the legislative-motive lens; also supported the point that charging for services does not necessarily change the governmental character.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Threshold posture: prohibition as the enforcement mechanism

The Court treated the circuit court’s refusal to dismiss as an actionable exercise of jurisdiction in the face of immunity. Because sovereign immunity is immunity from suit (not merely from ultimate liability), prohibition is appropriate to stop further proceedings.

B. The plaintiff’s pleading failure and the insistence on an actual waiver/exception

Roberts’ petition asserted—conclusorily—that sovereign immunity does not bar “money had and received” and that the City acted in a proprietary capacity. Applying Richardson v. City of St. Louis and Bell v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., the Court discounted those legal conclusions and looked for specific, pleaded facts establishing a recognized exception or legislative waiver.

The Court then made an important doctrinal clarification: even equitable refund causes of action are barred unless clearly authorized. Citing Kubley v. Brooks, it reaffirmed that sovereign immunity extends beyond tort claims.

C. “Consent” arguments rejected: why “power to sue” is not “sue and be sued,” and why the City cannot self-waive

Roberts attempted to locate waiver in a City Code section authorizing the Collector to sue for unpaid fees. The Court rejected this as insufficient because it granted only authority to sue—without authorizing the City to be sued. The waiver cases she invoked all involved express “sue and be sued” language.

The Court further limited municipal self-waiver: even if the City Charter says the City may “sue and be sued,” the City cannot consent beyond what the legislature authorizes. This point tied municipal governance to statewide immunity policy, consistent with Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Lawrence Cnty., Miller and State ex inf. Hannah ex rel. Christ v. City of St. Charles.

D. Section 432.070 as the decisive statutory barrier to implied obligations

The Court treated the case as substantively contractual: Roberts alleged the City collected fees while failing to deliver separative recycling/yard waste services she believed were included. Because there was no pleaded, compliant written contract meeting section 432.070’s formalities, the Court applied the established rule that claimants may not repackage barred contract claims as quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, or “money had and received.” The Court relied on Bride v. City of Slater, Donovan v. Kansas City, and Withers v. City of Lake St. Louis to prevent that end-run.

E. Distinguishing statutory-illegality refund claims (Karpierz/Hammonds)

Roberts invoked Karpierz v. Easley and Investors Title Co. v. Hammonds to argue “money had and received” can proceed where obligations “arise out of law.” The Court agreed with the principle but found it inapplicable: those plaintiffs pleaded that the sovereign took money in violation of a statute.

Here, Roberts did not plead that section 260.215 (or any statute) required separate recycling and yard waste collection, nor that the City lacked statutory authority to impose the fee, nor that it failed to provide “regular solid waste collection and disposal services.” Her theory therefore did not arise from a statutory violation; it arose, if at all, from implied assurances and expectations—precisely what section 432.070 disables as a basis for municipal liability.

F. Proprietary function rejected: solid waste management remains governmental

The Court applied State ex rel. Bd. of Tr's of City of N. Kan. City Mem'l Hosp. v. Russell to focus on the “generic nature” of the activity and legislative motive. It held solid waste management is aimed at public health and safety and thus is governmental, aligning with Dallas v. City of St. Louis. Charging a fee or the possibility of selling recyclables does not convert the function into a proprietary, profit-seeking enterprise, just as charging for hospital services did not change the hospital’s governmental character under Russell.

3.3 Impact

  • Refund class actions against municipalities face a higher “statutory violation” threshold. Plaintiffs seeking repayment of fees will need to plead a clear statutory or constitutional illegality (an “obligation arising out of law”), not merely disappointing performance, misleading communications, or partial non-delivery of an understood service package.
  • Section 432.070’s reach is reaffirmed in modern municipal-fee litigation. The decision strengthens the doctrinal wall against converting public-service fee disputes into quasi-contract restitution claims.
  • Municipal code/charter language will be scrutinized for actual waiver authority. “Power to sue” provisions are not waiver; and even “sue and be sued” language in local charters cannot expand waiver beyond legislative authorization.
  • Governmental-function classification is reinforced for solid waste services (including recycling/yard waste components). Future plaintiffs will have difficulty framing such programs as proprietary merely because fees are charged or revenues may be generated.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Writ of prohibition: An extraordinary order from an appellate court stopping a lower court from acting outside its authority. Here, it stops the circuit court from continuing a case the Supreme Court deems barred by immunity.
  • Sovereign immunity: The default rule that you cannot sue the government (including many public entities) unless the legislature clearly allows it or a recognized exception applies.
  • “Money had and received”: A restitution claim seeking return of money the defendant should not keep “in equity and good conscience.” Missouri law still subjects this claim to sovereign immunity when the defendant is a public entity.
  • Quasi-contract / implied-in-fact contract: Ways courts sometimes enforce obligations without an express written contract. Section 432.070 largely prevents using these theories to impose liability on municipalities unless strict contracting formalities are met.
  • “Obligation arising out of law” vs. contract: If a statute forbids the government from collecting a charge (illegal fee), a refund claim may proceed (as in Hammonds). If the claim is that the government didn’t deliver what you believed it promised, that is treated like a contract-type claim and can be barred by section 432.070.
  • Governmental vs. proprietary functions: Governmental functions serve the public welfare (immunity typically applies); proprietary functions resemble private business activities (immunity may not apply for municipalities). The Court held solid waste management is governmental.

5. Conclusion

State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Whyte fortifies two interlocking shields for Missouri municipalities: sovereign immunity as the default bar to suit and section 432.070 as a statutory prohibition against imposing municipal liability through implied or quasi-contractual theories. The Court distinguished permissible refund actions grounded in statutory illegality (Karpierz v. Easley, Investors Title Co. v. Hammonds) from barred claims premised on implied service expectations, and it reaffirmed that solid waste collection—including recycling/yard waste components—remains a governmental function. The practical takeaway is that municipal fee refund litigation must be anchored in a clear legislative waiver or a concrete statutory violation, not equitable disappointment with service delivery.