Section 402(j)(5) Applies Only When Misinformation Causes a Failure to File—Not an Early Filing That Reduces Monthly Benefits

1. Introduction

In Paula Linden v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2025), Paula S. Linden sought to increase her ongoing Social Security retirement benefit after learning that filing at age 62 (before her full retirement age of 66) permanently reduced her monthly payment. Linden alleged that she filed early only because Social Security Administration (SSA) staff told her she would receive a “special” payment equivalent to what she would have received at age 66. She invoked the Social Security Act’s “misinformation provision,” 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5), asking the SSA to treat her as if she had filed at 66.

The key issue on appeal was statutory: whether § 402(j)(5) provides relief to a claimant who did file an application (but at an allegedly misinformed, disadvantageous time), or whether it is limited to claimants who failed to apply because of SSA misinformation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The court held that the plain text of 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5) covers only individuals who “failed as of any date to apply” for benefits due to SSA misinformation. Because Linden filed a valid application at age 62, she did not “fail” to apply, and the statute’s remedial scheme could not be used to reset her application date to age 66 to obtain higher monthly benefits.

Having resolved the case on statutory scope, the court declined to reach Linden’s challenge to the ALJ’s factual finding that she had not proven misinformation.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Taskila v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 819 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2016)
    Cited for the standard of review when the court of appeals reviews a district court’s review of an ALJ decision: whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and whether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. This framed the court’s two-track approach: de novo review of legal interpretation, deference to supported factfinding.
  • Cardew v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 896 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2018)
    Cited for the proposition that legal rulings—especially interpretation of statutes and regulations—are reviewed de novo. This was central because Linden’s claim turned on the meaning of the statutory phrase “failed as of any date to apply.”
  • Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)
    Cited to explain the non-binding but potentially persuasive weight of agency interpretations. The court relied on Skidmore-type respect to note that SSA regulations align with the court’s reading of § 402(j)(5), while emphasizing that such interpretations do not control when statutory text is clear.
  • Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)
    Quoted for the Skidmore principle that agency views may constitute “a body of experience and informed judgement” that can guide courts. The citation is used to situate the court’s use of SSA regulations as confirming evidence, not as a source that can expand statutory coverage beyond its text.
  • Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 590 U.S. 212 (2020)
    Cited for the interpretive rule that courts may not add words to a statute. The court used it to reject Linden’s effort to read “timely” into § 402(j)(5) (i.e., “failed to timely apply”), which would convert a “no application” remedy into a “wrong time” remedy.
  • Costello v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2007)
    Linden’s principal case. The Sixth Circuit distinguished it: in Costello, the claimant was misdirected to file under an ineligible ex-spouse’s record, producing an invalid application and effectively a failure to file a valid claim at all. The Sixth Circuit rejected Linden’s attempt to extract a broader rule that § 402(j)(5) applies even where a claimant filed a valid application; the opinion emphasizes that Costello does not establish (and has not been read to establish) that proposition.
  • Davis v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 867 F.2d 336 (6th. Cir. 1989)
    Cited to underscore that internal agency guidance (here, POMS) cannot override the text of a statute or regulation. This neutralized Linden’s reliance on POMS wording implying “timely” filing.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is text-first and remedial-scheme-driven.

  1. Textual trigger: “failed as of any date to apply” means no application was filed.
    The opinion treats “failed . . . to apply” as the operative condition. Because Linden did apply (online in 2014) and chose a benefits start date, she could not satisfy the statute’s threshold requirement. The additional phrase “as of any date” reinforces, in the court’s view, that the provision targets situations where someone never files after misinformation, not situations where someone files at one date but later wishes she had filed at another.
  2. Regulatory alignment: 20 C.F.R. § 404.633(a) confirms the “did not file at that time” concept.
    The court invoked 20 C.F.R. § 404.633(a), which describes relief when misinformation “caused [a person] not to file an application at that time.” Under Skidmore/Loper Bright framing, this regulatory language supports (but does not dictate) the court’s reading: the remedy is for a failure to file, not an allegedly suboptimal filing.
  3. Remedial structure: the deemed filing date cannot be used to “upgrade” a lawful early claim into a later, higher monthly benefit.
    The statute/regs provide a specific remedy: the SSA may deem an application filed on the later of (1) the misinformation date or (2) the date of entitlement. The court held that Linden became “entitled” at 62 (when she met eligibility for retirement benefits), not at 66 (full retirement age). Thus, even if Linden could clear the “failed to apply” hurdle, the remedy would not naturally reach her requested result—recasting her election as if she had first applied at full retirement age.
  4. Rejection of “timely” rewrite.
    Linden’s core reframing was that she “failed to timely apply” at age 66. The court rejected this as an impermissible addition of language (Romag) and as logically destabilizing: any claimant could point to a later date they did not file (e.g., 70) and claim the statute applies, effectively nullifying “failed . . . to apply.”
  5. Distinguishing Costello.
    The court cabined Costello v. Astrue to its facts: misinformation led to filing under an ineligible record, producing an invalid application and thus a functional failure to file a valid claim. Linden, by contrast, filed a valid retirement application at 62; she sought not restoration of missed payments but a permanent increase in monthly benefit.
  6. POMS cannot expand statutory scope.
    Even if POMS uses “timely,” the court held that guidance cannot override statutory/regulatory text (Davis). Moreover, the court read “timely” in POMS as consistent with filing by a deadline—not as authorizing a remedy whenever a claimant later regrets an earlier election.
  7. Policy logic consistent with text: prevent double recovery.
    The court explained the statutory design: misinformation relief exists to restore payments lost when a claimant does not file because SSA wrongly says they cannot. But early retirement generally trades more checks for smaller checks; allowing a claimant to keep early payments and also “reset” to higher full-retirement monthly amounts would create an overpayment relative to the program’s actuarial structure.

C. Impact

This decision strengthens a narrow, administrable boundary for § 402(j)(5) within the Sixth Circuit: the provision is a “missed-application” remedy, not an “early-election regret” remedy.

  • Limits misinformation claims where a valid application was filed.
    Claimants alleging they were talked into filing early (or choosing a particular start date) cannot use § 402(j)(5) to re-engineer their benefit amount upward absent a true failure to apply.
  • Consolidates textualism in SSA remedial provisions.
    The court’s reliance on plain text and its refusal to add “timely” signals that equitable instincts will not expand carefully delimited benefit remedies.
  • Confinement of Costello-type arguments.
    Litigants may still cite Costello v. Astrue when misinformation yields an invalid or misdirected application that is tantamount to no valid filing; but this opinion makes clear that filing a valid retirement application at an eligible age is a categorical obstacle to § 402(j)(5) relief in the Sixth Circuit.
  • Reduced litigation over factual misinformation where the statute forecloses relief.
    By holding that misinformation’s existence is irrelevant when the claimant did not “fail to apply,” courts can dispose of similar cases on legal grounds without extensive evidentiary hearings about alleged statements by SSA staff.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Full retirement age vs. early retirement
Filing before full retirement age generally reduces monthly benefits. The program is designed so that early filers receive more months of payments, but smaller amounts each month.
“Misinformation provision” (42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5))
A statutory fix for people who did not apply for benefits because an SSA employee gave them incorrect information that caused them not to file. It can allow SSA to treat the person as if they had applied earlier, so they can recover benefits they missed.
“Deemed filing date” remedy
If the provision applies, SSA pretends the person filed on a particular earlier date (as specified by the statute/regs). This is aimed at restoring missed payments, not redesigning benefit elections after years of receipt.
Substantial evidence vs. de novo review
“Substantial evidence” means enough evidence that a reasonable person could agree with the agency’s factual finding; courts generally defer to it. “De novo” means the appellate court independently reviews legal questions like statutory meaning.
POMS
The SSA’s internal manual (Program Operations Manual System). It guides agency staff but cannot override statutes or regulations.

5. Conclusion

Paula Linden v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. establishes a clear Sixth Circuit rule: 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5) provides relief only when SSA misinformation causes an individual to fail to apply for benefits—not when a claimant files a valid application but later alleges she would have filed later (or differently) absent misinformation. The opinion reinforces textual limits on Social Security remedies, treats regulations as confirmatory under Skidmore principles, and preserves the actuarial logic of early-vs.-full-retirement benefit design by preventing a retroactive “upgrade” in monthly payments after years of receipt.