§2D1.1(b)(1) “Procurement-and-Proximity” Rule: Obtaining a Firearm for a Buyer En Route to a Drug Deal Supports the Dangerous-Weapon Enhancement

1. Introduction

In United States v. Augusto Reyes-Gonzalez (11th Cir. July 16, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a two-level “dangerous weapon” enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) where the defendant, a drug trafficker, procured and sold a 9mm pistol to a confidential source (“CS”) on the way to a methamphetamine transaction.

The core issue was whether the firearm—purchased and transferred during the broader trafficking relationship, and left in the vehicle during the subsequent drug exchange—was sufficiently connected to the drug offenses to qualify as “possessed” in connection with the offense (or relevant conduct), despite the absence of direct evidence about where the gun physically went during the drug handoff.

Parties: The United States (appellee) prosecuted; Augusto Rene Reyes-Gonzalez (appellant) challenged the enhancement. Reyes-Gonzalez pled guilty and received 253 months.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held the enhancement was properly applied because Reyes-Gonzalez possessed the firearm during conduct relevant to the offense. He obtained the gun en route to a planned drug transaction with the CS, and the district court permissibly inferred that the gun, drugs, and proceeds were in the same vehicle during the overall episode. The panel rejected the argument that the record required direct proof of the gun’s precise location during the drug exchange and distinguished United States v. Castro-Perez, 749 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2014) on physical-proximity grounds.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Gallo, 195 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1999): Cited both for standard of review and, importantly, for the four-part test allowing §2D1.1(b)(1) to apply based on another person’s possession (co-conspirator possession that is in furtherance, during membership, and reasonably foreseeable). In this case, the opinion references that framework while ultimately affirming on the defendant’s own relevant-conduct possession.
  • United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015): Supplies the “definite and firm conviction” articulation of clear-error review for factual findings.
  • Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Gibraltar Monetary Corp., Inc., 575 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2009): Used for the principle that findings are affirmed if “plausible” on the whole record—supporting deference to the district court’s inferences.
  • United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62 (11th Cir. 1995): Reiterates that the government can meet its burden by showing the firearm was present at the site of the charged conduct by a preponderance of the evidence—one recognized path to the enhancement.
  • United States v. Hunter, 172 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 1999): Confirms the alternative path: the enhancement may apply if the firearm was possessed during relevant conduct, not only at the precise scene of the charged offense.
  • United States v. Smith, 127 F.3d 1388 (11th Cir. 1997): Defines “relevant conduct” as acts part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction, supporting the court’s characterization of the gun sale as intertwined with the drug-trafficking relationship and episode.
  • United States v. Stallings, 463 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2006): Provides the burden shift: once the government shows possession/presence, the defendant must show the connection is “clearly improbable.”
  • United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1986): Supplies the oft-cited maxim that firearms are “a tool of the drug trade” and the “frequent and overpowering connection” between guns and narcotics, which the panel uses to support an inference linking protection/violence talk and firearm possession to trafficking.
  • United States v. Hansley, 54 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1995): Invoked for the proposition that proximity to places where drug-related conversations or activities occurred can sufficiently show firearm possession during the offense.
  • United States v. Castro-Perez, 749 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2014): A defense-favored out-of-circuit decision where the Tenth Circuit found “no physical relation” between a gun sale and drug trafficking. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished it because, here, the firearm was left in the vehicle during a drug transaction and thus had a spatial connection.
  • United States v. Foy, 641 F.3d 455 (10th Cir. 2011): Cited via Castro-Perez to illustrate the contrasting scenario where a vehicle firearm recovered in connection with cocaine-buy activity was sufficient to show possession by a preponderance.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in a familiar Eleventh Circuit §2D1.1(b)(1) sequence:

  1. Two recognized routes to the enhancement. The panel restates that §2D1.1(b)(1) may apply when (a) the firearm is present at the site of charged conduct, or (b) the firearm is possessed during relevant conduct connected to the offense of conviction (citing United States v. Hall and United States v. Hunter).
  2. Relevant-conduct framing of the firearm episode. The panel treats the firearm procurement as occurring within the drug-trafficking course of conduct because it happened “on the way to” a drug transaction with the same parties and within the ongoing trafficking relationship.
  3. Inference-based proof is sufficient. The defense emphasized a lack of direct evidence that the gun was close to drugs at the precise moment of exchange. The panel answered that direct evidence was unnecessary: the district court could draw reasonable inferences from the record, including that the CS would retrieve the gun, the parties left in the same car they arrived in, and therefore that “firearms, drugs, and drug proceeds were all in the same car at the same time.” Under United States v. Matchett and Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Gibraltar Monetary Corp., Inc., the inference was plausible and thus not clearly erroneous.
  4. “Clearly improbable” rebuttal not carried. After the government’s showing, the burden shifted under United States v. Stallings. The court held Reyes-Gonzalez’s alternative scenarios (e.g., the gun being parked “miles away”) did not make the connection “clearly improbable” given the episode’s sequence and the permissible inferences.
  5. Contextual linkage: violence/protection talk plus trafficking. The panel bolstered the nexus by referencing Reyes-Gonzalez’s statement about certain individuals who “don’t care to kill your ass” during the same drive in which the gun was procured, reading it—when paired with the trafficking discussions—as supporting a protective/trafficking connection consistent with United States v. Cruz and United States v. Hansley.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is a clear signal of how the Eleventh Circuit is prepared to treat mixed contraband transactions (guns plus drugs) under §2D1.1(b)(1):

  • Proximity can be vehicular and episode-based. A firearm kept in a vehicle while a drug exchange occurs may be enough when the record supports an inference that the vehicle remains part of the transaction’s logistics (arrival/departure, carrying proceeds/contraband).
  • Relevant conduct can capture “one-stop shop” dealing behavior. When a trafficker offers to supply “whatever you want” and then supplies a firearm as part of the same relationship and operational episode, courts may treat the gun conduct as part of the same course of conduct or scheme—even if the firearm was not explicitly discussed as “for” the conspiracy.
  • Defense rebuttals must do more than posit hypotheticals. The “clearly improbable” standard is difficult to meet; speculative alternative explanations (without record support) may not defeat the enhancement.
  • Doctrinal caution (CS vs. co-conspirator). The opinion references the Gallo co-conspirator-possession framework while discussing the CS’s possession. Because a CS is typically not a “co-conspirator,” future litigants may argue that portion is dicta or inapplicable; the holding, however, rests securely on the defendant’s own procurement/possession during relevant conduct.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Dangerous weapon enhancement” (§2D1.1(b)(1))
A two-level increase to the sentencing guidelines range if a firearm (or other dangerous weapon) was possessed in connection with drug trafficking, reflecting increased risk of violence.
“Relevant conduct”
Not just the exact charged act, but related acts that are part of the same course of conduct or common plan as the offense of conviction (here, the firearm procurement on the way to the drug deal).
“Preponderance of the evidence”
The government’s burden at sentencing: more likely than not.
“Clearly improbable” connection
Once the government shows possession/presence, the defendant must show it is clearly unlikely that the gun was connected to the drug offense—an exacting standard.
“Clear error” review
On appeal, factual findings stand unless the appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake occurred; if the district court’s view is plausible, it will be affirmed.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Augusto Reyes-Gonzalez affirms a practical, inference-friendly application of §2D1.1(b)(1): when a defendant procures a firearm for a buyer in the course of an ongoing drug-trafficking relationship and does so en route to a drug transaction, a district court may treat that firearm as possessed during relevant conduct, especially where the firearm and drugs are plausibly in spatial proximity (such as a shared vehicle during the transaction episode). The decision strengthens the government’s ability to prove the enhancement without a photograph-like chain of custody for the gun’s precise location, so long as the district court’s inferences are reasonable on the record.