Sixth Circuit Precedent: § 2423(b) “Travel With Intent” Requires Intent to Engage in § 2243(a) Under-16 Sex Acts (Not Merely Under-18) When § 2243(a) Is the Chapter 109A Predicate

I. Introduction

United States v. Todd Allen Stafford (Sixth Cir. Sept. 11, 2026) arises from a federal prosecution of Todd Allen Stafford (59) after online communications and in-person meetings with “M.V.”, who was 15 but listed 18 on a hookup/dating app. A jury convicted Stafford of:

  • Count 1: coercion/enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), using Michigan third-degree CSC (MCL 750.520d(1)(a)) as the predicate “criminal offense.”
  • Counts 2 and 3: interstate travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), with “illicit sexual conduct” defined by § 2423(g)(1) and the charged chapter 109A predicate being 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a).

The appeal presented two core issue clusters: (1) for § 2422(b), whether the government must prove knowledge of the specific age threshold embedded in the state-law predicate offense (under 16) or only knowledge that the victim is under 18; and (2) for § 2423(b), what “intent to engage in … illicit sexual conduct” means when the definitional chain includes § 2243(a) (under-16 sexual act), including whether the jury instruction improperly reduced the intent requirement to “under 18.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit issued a divided, multi-opinion decision:

  • Count 1 affirmed (Judge Clay, joined by Judges Moore and White): the district court’s instructions were legally correct under Sixth Circuit precedent; the evidence was sufficient; and the district court did not abuse its discretion excluding explicit portions of the victim’s profile under Fed. R. Evid. 412.
  • Counts 2 and 3 vacated and remanded (Judge Moore, joined by Judge White; Judge White concurred separately; Judge Clay dissented): the jury instructions allowed conviction if Stafford “knew or had reason to know or thought” the person was under 18, but did not require intent directed to the § 2243(a) age element (under 16). The majority held that, when § 2243(a) supplies the chapter 109A content for § 2423(g)(1), § 2423(b) requires intent to engage in a sexual act with a person under 16.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Invited error, waiver, and plain error (Count 1 instruction challenge posture)

  • United States v. Sharpe: sets out the invited-error doctrine framework when a defendant jointly submits or fails to object to instructions.
  • United States v. Barrow: recognizes discretion to review invited error when “the interests of justice” so demand; also supplies the principle that appellate deviation from waiver is discretionary.
  • United States v. Myint: supports reviewing an invited instruction where the government shared responsibility in proposing it.
  • United States v. Stover and United States v. Vonner: govern plain-error review for unpreserved instruction challenges.

Judge Clay (on Count 1) used these cases to justify reaching the instruction issue despite joint submission, then applied plain-error review and found no error.

2. § 2422(b): predicate offense is not an “element,” and knowledge focuses on under-18 status

  • United States v. Hart: central Sixth Circuit authority that “the underlying [state] criminal offenses are not elements of the federal offense” under § 2422(b); the government must show the proposed activity “could be chargeable as a criminal offense.”
  • United States v. Deakins: construed similar “sexual activity for which any person can be charged” language (in § 2421) and rejected importing the predicate’s mens rea demands into the federal offense; described the relevant language in § 2421 and § 2422(b) as “identical.”
  • United States v. Buddi: “clarifying that § 2422(b) requires knowledge of a victim’s minor status” (under 18).
  • United States v. Langley (Eighth Circuit): invoked by Stafford but discounted as unpersuasive because it did not analyze the interpretive question (it resolved a factual sufficiency issue).
  • People v. Cash (Michigan): establishes that MCL 750.520d(1)(a) is strict liability as to the victim being under 16.

Together, Hart, Deakins, and Buddi supported the Count 1 holding: § 2422(b) requires knowledge the person is under 18, while the state predicate supplies illegality without becoming a federal “element” requiring matching mens rea.

3. Sufficiency of evidence standards (Count 1)

  • United States v. Sease: de novo review where a Rule 29 motion is preserved.
  • United States v. Davis and Jackson v. Virginia: the “rational trier of fact” standard and viewing evidence favorably to the prosecution.
  • United States v. Washington and United States v. Gallo: a single witness’s testimony can sustain a conviction.
  • United States v. Crumb: appellate courts do not reassess credibility determinations reserved for the jury.

4. Rape-shield evidence exclusion under Fed. R. Evid. 412

  • United States v. Ogden: treated explicit online exchanges as “sexual behavior” covered by Rule 412.
  • United States v. Kettles: permitted inquiry into prior false assault allegations because the evidence targeted falsity, not sexual behavior itself; distinguished by the court because Stafford’s proffer relied on the victim’s sexual behavior to imply maturity/credibility.
  • United States v. Seymour: enforced Rule 412(c) procedural requirements; Stafford’s failure to follow them forfeited an in camera-hearing argument.
  • United States v. Kettles (again): also supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard phrasing used by the court (misunderstood law, clearly erroneous factfinding, or clear error of judgment).

5. The new precedential core: “intent” under § 2423(b) when § 2243(a) is the predicate through § 2423(g)(1)

The majority’s reversal on Counts 2 and 3 relied heavily on Supreme Court mens rea methodology and interpretive canons, and on circuit comparisons:

  • Flores-Figueroa v. United States and United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.: ordinary grammar presumptions that mens rea terms reach subsequent elements, especially where those elements separate innocence from criminality.
  • Rehaif v. United States: applied mens rea across statutory cross-references; reinforced the presumption of scienter for elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.
  • Tanzin v. Tanvir: invoked for text-first statutory interpretation.
  • United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co. and Carter v. United States: supplied doctrinal definitions of intent and the distinction between specific and general intent.
  • United States v. Daniels: Sixth Circuit’s earlier decision declining to extend “knowingly” to age in § 2423(a), distinguished by the majority as involving a different structure/context.
  • United States v. Murphy (Second Circuit): persuasive authority addressing § 2423(b) with § 2243(a) predicate; used to illustrate overbreadth/underbreadth implications and undercover-sting consequences.
  • United States v. Morgan (D.C. Circuit): relied on as the best textual argument against the majority’s approach via the surplusage concern created by § 2423(i)’s mistake-of-age defense.
  • Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, and Nielsen v. Preap: interpretive principles about surplusage and ordinary grammar.
  • Loper Bright Ents. v. Raimondo: cited for the directive to use “every tool” to determine best reading.
  • United States v. Angwin and United States v. Hochschild: Sixth Circuit examples highlighting that federal sex-crime intent statutes can apply in undercover contexts, reinforcing the majority’s view that intent must be anchored in the defendant’s mental state, not solely in external facts.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Count 1: § 2422(b) does not import the predicate offense’s age mens rea

The court’s Count 1 analysis operates with a clean separation: (i) the federal statute supplies the federal elements (including knowledge that the person is under 18, per United States v. Buddi), and (ii) the predicate state offense supplies the illegality of the proposed act but does not become an “element” that must be matched by the federal mens rea (per United States v. Hart and United States v. Deakins). Because MCL 750.520d(1)(a) is strict liability as to the under-16 fact (per People v. Cash), the jury instruction requiring: (a) M.V. was 13–15, and (b) Stafford knew M.V. was under 18, was legally sufficient.

2. Rule 412: “state of mind” and impeachment theories cannot be a backdoor to sexual predisposition

The court treated the explicit profile content as classic Rule 412 material under United States v. Ogden. It rejected Stafford’s “state-of-mind” framing because the inferential chain still depended on propensity reasoning (mature sexual content → sexually mature person → likely adult). It also rejected the attempt to use the sexual content itself as credibility impeachment, distinguishing United States v. Kettles, which concerned falsity rather than sexual behavior.

3. Counts 2 and 3 (new rule): under § 2423(b), intent must encompass the § 2243(a) under-16 element when § 2243(a) is the chapter 109A predicate via § 2423(g)(1)

Judge Moore’s majority opinion reframed the problem: § 2423(b) criminalizes otherwise innocent interstate travel only when coupled with a specific intent—“intent to engage in … illicit sexual conduct.” Because “illicit sexual conduct” in § 2423(g)(1) is defined as a “sexual act … with a person under 18 … that would be in violation of chapter 109A,” and the charged chapter 109A offense was § 2243(a), the majority concluded that the required intent must target the conduct that makes the act “illicit” in this prosecution: a sexual act with a person “under the age of 16.”

Importantly, the majority did not convert § 2423(b) into a “knowledge-of-age” statute. It treated “knowledge” as one way to prove intent (via United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.’s “practically certain” pathway), while preserving that intent can also be shown by “conscious desire”—critical for undercover-sting scenarios where there is no actual minor.

The instructional defect was therefore not semantic but elemental: by telling jurors that the government need only prove Stafford “knew or had reason to know or thought” the person was under 18, the charge permitted conviction without finding intent directed to the under-16 feature of § 2243(a). Under the majority, that mismatch required vacatur and remand for a new trial with correct instructions.

4. The dissent’s competing theory: “would be in violation” makes predicate age a purely external condition

Judge Clay’s dissent argued that the statutory phrasing “that would be in violation of chapter 109A” signals a conditional “state of being” independent of intent, and that Sixth Circuit cases like United States v. Deakins and United States v. Hart counsel against reading federal mens rea into predicate elements. On that view, the government needed intent only as to under-18 status, plus proof that the victim in fact satisfied § 2243(a)’s under-16 condition. The majority rejected this approach as inconsistent with ordinary meaning of “intent,” Supreme Court mens rea presumptions, and practical consequences.

C. Impact

  • Immediate doctrinal change in Sixth Circuit § 2423(b) prosecutions using § 2243(a): jury instructions must require the jury to find that, at the time of crossing state lines, the defendant intended a sexual act with a person under 16 (the § 2243(a) age element), not merely under 18.
  • Charging and litigation strategy: prosecutors must align indictment theory, proof, and instructions with the specific chapter 109A predicate used to supply “illicit sexual conduct” under § 2423(g)(1). Defense counsel gains a clearer, element-focused target for challenging instructions and sufficiency where the proof shows “minor” generally but not under-16 intent specifically.
  • Undercover operations: the majority’s intent framing (desire/practical certainty) helps preserve sting prosecutions conceptually, but demands careful proof of the defendant’s intended under-16 target. Vague “under 18” communications may become insufficient where § 2243(a) is the predicate.
  • Rule 412 practice: the decision reinforces that explicit profile/communications evidence will be treated as “sexual behavior,” and that “state of mind” rationales will not automatically avoid Rule 412 where the inferential route depends on sexual predisposition.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Predicate offense: the underlying crime the federal statute uses to define what makes the sexual activity “unlawful” or “illicit.” Here, § 2422(b) used Michigan’s MCL 750.520d(1)(a); § 2423(b) used “illicit sexual conduct” defined via § 2423(g)(1) and § 2243(a).
  • Mens rea (mental state): what the defendant must think/know/intend. “Knowledge” means awareness of a fact; “intent” targets a planned or practically certain result.
  • Specific-intent statute: a law that criminalizes an otherwise lawful act (like travel) only if done with a prohibited objective. That is why the scope of “intent” mattered so much for § 2423(b).
  • Strict liability (as to age): some sex-offense statutes do not require proof that the defendant knew the victim’s precise age. Michigan’s MCL 750.520d(1)(a), per People v. Cash, is strict liability on the under-16 fact.
  • Invited error / plain error: if a party helped propose an instruction, appellate review is constrained. “Plain error” is a high bar requiring clear, outcome-affecting mistake that harms the proceedings’ integrity.
  • Fed. R. Evid. 412 (rape shield): generally bars evidence offered to prove a victim’s other sexual behavior or sexual predisposition, with strict procedural prerequisites for exceptions.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Todd Allen Stafford does two important things. First, it reaffirms Sixth Circuit doctrine that for § 2422(b), the government need not prove the defendant’s awareness of age thresholds embedded in a predicate strict-liability state sex offense; it must prove knowledge the victim is under 18, plus that the proposed conduct would be criminal under the predicate law. Second—and most significantly as new, publication-worthy guidance—it holds that when § 2423(b) is prosecuted through § 2423(g)(1) with § 2243(a) as the chapter 109A predicate, the defendant’s intent must reach the conduct that makes the act “illicit” under that predicate: intent to engage in a sexual act with a person under 16. Because the jury in Stafford’s case was permitted to convict on an “under 18” intent theory alone, the Sixth Circuit vacated Counts 2 and 3 and remanded for new proceedings with properly framed instructions.