Section 1927 Sanctions for Duplicative Relitigation Motions and Recusal Limits Under § 455(a)

Case: Thomas O'Neal v. American Shaman Franchise Systems, Inc., et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: February 19, 2026
Disposition: Sanctions and denial of recusal affirmed (per curiam; “DO NOT PUBLISH”).

1. Introduction

This appeal arises out of post-judgment litigation following a business dispute over efforts to open and operate a Florida retail store selling hemp-derived CBD products. Plaintiff Thomas O’Neal sued multiple defendants. He later settled with three “Shaman Defendants” (American Shaman Franchise Systems, LLC; CBD American Shaman, LLC; and Shaman Botanicals, LLC), and obtained a default judgment against remaining defendants, including Brandon Carnes.

After attorney Kevin Graham substituted in as counsel, O’Neal initiated supplemental proceedings alleging, in substance, that the Shaman Defendants aided Carnes in avoiding enforcement through fraudulent transfers. The district court dismissed those claims as barred by the settlement release. Later, the Shaman Defendants prevailed on counterclaims for breach of the settlement’s release and non-disparagement provisions and obtained substantial attorney’s fees. A separate appeal addressed those merits issues. This appeal focuses on two collateral matters:

  • Sanctions: Whether the district court properly sanctioned Graham under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for filing duplicative motions that multiplied proceedings.
  • Recusal: Whether the magistrate judge should have been disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) based on alleged bias reflected in rulings and case management.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both the sanctions order and the denial of recusal.

  • § 1927 sanctions affirmed: The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Graham’s conduct “tantamount to bad faith” because he filed five motions (identified by docket numbers) that were “baseless, duplicative” attempts to relitigate issues already decided, thereby unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying proceedings. The sanction—$14,105—was limited to fees and expenses caused by those motions.
  • Recusal denial affirmed: O’Neal’s recusal request rested on adverse rulings and in-case comments, which, absent extrajudicial bias or “pervasive bias and prejudice,” do not satisfy the objective § 455(a) standard.

The court also treated as harmless any asserted error related to the district court’s observation that there were “competing interpretations” of Graham’s level of involvement in settlement negotiations, because no sanctions were imposed on that ground.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Sanctions Framework and “Tantamount to Bad Faith”

  • Schwartz v. Millon Air, Inc., 341 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2003)
    • Role in the opinion: Provided the governing elements for § 1927 sanctions—(1) unreasonable and vexatious conduct, (2) multiplying proceedings, and (3) sanctions capped by costs occasioned by the objectionable conduct—and reinforced that “something more than a lack of merit is required.”
    • How it influenced the outcome: The Eleventh Circuit used Schwartz to reject Graham’s attempt to reframe the sanctions as merely punishing losing arguments; instead, the sanctioned conduct was the repetitive, duplicative relitigation that multiplied proceedings.
  • Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2007)
    • Role in the opinion: Supplied the critical gloss that § 1927 requires conduct “so egregious” that it is “tantamount to bad faith,” and explained that bad faith may be shown where counsel knowingly or recklessly pursues frivolous claims or needlessly obstructs litigation; malicious intent is not required.
    • How it influenced the outcome: The court treated duplicative, baseless motions as objectively egregious obstruction—i.e., needless multiplication of proceedings—satisfying the “tantamount to bad faith” standard.

Recusal Standard and Limits

  • Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001)
    • Role in the opinion: Set the appellate standard of review—abuse of discretion—for recusal rulings under § 455.
  • McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1990)
    • Role in the opinion: Provided the objective test for § 455(a): whether a fully informed, objective lay observer would harbor significant doubt about impartiality, and the rule that rulings in the same or related case generally cannot support recusal absent pervasive bias.
    • How it influenced the outcome: The court used McWhorter to characterize O’Neal’s recusal motion as resting on ordinary judicial acts (rulings), which are insufficient without a showing of pervasive bias.
  • Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)
    • Role in the opinion: Confirmed that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis” for recusal, and that critical or even hostile in-court remarks typically do not establish bias absent an extrajudicial source or extreme showing.
    • How it influenced the outcome: Supported affirmance because O’Neal pointed to no extrajudicial bias; the record instead reflected the magistrate judge’s evenhandedness (including rejecting most sanctions grounds).

Harmless Error

  • Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396 (2009)
    • Role in the opinion: Anchored the harmless-error approach under 28 U.S.C. § 2111, directing appellate courts to disregard errors not affecting “substantial rights.”
    • How it influenced the outcome: Even if the district court’s observation about “competing interpretations” of Graham’s settlement involvement were mistaken, it was irrelevant to the sanctions imposed (which were based on duplicative motions), so no relief was warranted.

Related Proceeding

  • O'Neal v. Am. Shaman Franchise Sys., Inc., No. 24-10900, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 377792 (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 2026)
    • Role in the opinion: The panel clarified the scope of this appeal by identifying that the merits disputes (judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, denial of leave to amend) were addressed separately and were not before the court here.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Why the five filings supported § 1927 sanctions

The opinion’s central move is to distinguish meritlessness from vexatious multiplication. The magistrate judge (whose R&R the district court adopted) recommended sanctions on a narrow basis: Graham filed five motions (Docs. 279, 288, 398, 402, and 434) that were not merely unsuccessful, but duplicative—raising no new circumstances or arguments and attempting to relitigate decided issues.

Under Schwartz v. Millon Air, Inc., § 1927 requires “something more than a lack of merit.” The “something more” here was the repeat-play relitigation that needlessly consumed judicial and adversary resources. And under Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc., that pattern can be “tantamount to bad faith” on an objective standard—even without proof of malice—when counsel knowingly or recklessly persists in obstructive litigation tactics.

The panel’s reasoning is also notably appellate: Graham “fails to address” the key premise—that the motions were duplicative and baseless attempts to relitigate. Without confronting that premise (or explaining how such duplication could be reasonable), he could not show abuse of discretion.

B. Scope and cap of sanctions

Consistent with Schwartz v. Millon Air, Inc., the district court limited the sanction to fees “related to defending against” the five duplicative motions, awarding $14,105 rather than the >$200,000 sought. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that Graham did not argue on appeal that the amount exceeded the costs occasioned by the objectionable conduct—effectively leaving the cap issue uncontested.

C. Handling disputed statements about settlement involvement: harmlessness and restraint

The Shaman Defendants also sought sanctions based on alleged false statements about Graham’s involvement in settlement negotiations/drafting. The magistrate judge declined to find bad-faith misrepresentation because the evidence supported “competing interpretations.” The district court agreed and imposed no sanction on that ground.

On appeal, the court treated Graham’s challenge to the “competing interpretations” remark as immaterial to the judgment: even if the court “plainly misjudged” the evidence, any such error was harmless under Shinseki v. Sanders because it did not affect the sanction imposed.

D. Recusal: adverse rulings are not bias

Applying § 455(a)’s objective standard from McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Liteky v. United States, the panel held that O’Neal’s recusal request failed because it relied “entirely” on the magistrate judge’s rulings and comments within the case. Absent an extrajudicial source of bias or a record demonstrating “pervasive bias and prejudice,” judicial acts—especially when the judge rejected most requested sanctions— do not create a reasonable question of impartiality.

3.3 Impact

  • Reinforces a practical § 1927 boundary: The decision underscores that § 1927 exposure is heightened not merely by losing arguments, but by repetitive, duplicative filings that seek do-overs on decided issues without new facts or law. Put differently, relitigation-by-motion can itself supply the “egregiousness” needed for “tantamount to bad faith.”
  • Encourages calibrated sanctions requests and awards: The district court’s narrowing—from four asserted grounds to one, and from >$200,000 to $14,105— models proportionality and a causal approach (fees “related to” the objectionable conduct), which may reduce appellate vulnerability.
  • Limits strategic recusal efforts: The opinion reaffirms that recusal cannot function as a collateral appeal from adverse rulings. Parties seeking recusal must identify facts that would lead an objective observer to doubt impartiality, typically requiring more than case-bound decisions and criticisms.
  • Precedential weight: The opinion is marked “DO NOT PUBLISH,” so it is not binding Eleventh Circuit precedent under circuit rules, but it may still be cited for persuasive value depending on applicable citation rules and context.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (attorney multiplication sanctions): A statute allowing a court to make an attorney personally pay the extra attorney’s fees and costs caused when the attorney unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies proceedings. It is aimed at litigation conduct that wastes resources.
  • “Unreasonably and vexatiously” / “tantamount to bad faith”: In the Eleventh Circuit, § 1927 requires objectively egregious conduct—more than mere negligence or weak arguments—such as knowingly or recklessly persisting in frivolous or obstructive tactics.
  • “Duplicative motions”: Motions that re-raise issues already decided without new evidence, changed circumstances, or new legal authority. Courts often treat such filings as especially wasteful because they force repeated adjudication of settled matters.
  • Joint and several liability: Both the attorney and the client can be held responsible for the full amount of the sanction (the payor can seek contribution separately, but the opposing party can collect from either).
  • 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (recusal): Requires a judge to step aside when the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” judged from the standpoint of an objective, fully informed observer—not the disappointed litigant’s subjective view.
  • Extrajudicial bias: Bias originating outside the courtroom (e.g., personal relationship, outside statements). Under Liteky v. United States, in-case rulings and most in-case comments rarely qualify.
  • Harmless error (28 U.S.C. § 2111): Even if a court made a mistake, an appellate court will not reverse unless the mistake affected substantial rights or the outcome.
  • Report and Recommendation (R&R): A magistrate judge’s recommended findings and conclusions. The district judge decides whether to adopt them, often after considering objections.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms two stabilizing principles in federal litigation. First, § 1927 sanctions are properly imposed where counsel’s conduct goes beyond weak advocacy and crosses into objectively egregious obstruction—here, the repeated filing of baseless, duplicative motions aimed at relitigating decided issues, with sanctions limited to the fees caused by that conduct. Second, recusal under § 455(a) remains an objective inquiry, and adverse rulings and ordinary judicial criticism—without extrajudicial bias or pervasive prejudice—do not reasonably call a judge’s impartiality into question.