Section 1252(a)(2) Bars District-Court Review of USCIS Adjustment-of-Status Denials and Related Constitutional Claims Outside Removal Proceedings

Introduction

In Michelle Marie Darling v. Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of a suit challenging USCIS’s denial of an application for adjustment of status. Michelle Marie Darling, a Jamaican national, alleged that USCIS (1) unlawfully delayed adjudicating her adjustment application and (2) ultimately denied it in an unconstitutionally retaliatory and arbitrary manner.

The central jurisdictional questions were: (a) whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) strips federal-court jurisdiction to review USCIS adjustment-of-status denials made outside removal proceedings, and (b) whether Darling could invoke the constitutional-claims carveout in § 1252(a)(2)(D) to obtain judicial review in district court (and then on appeal) despite the jurisdictional bar.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit (unpublished, per curiam) affirmed the district court’s dismissal in full. It held:

  • § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars judicial review of USCIS’s discretionary denial of adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), regardless of whether the decision occurs in removal proceedings.
  • § 1252(a)(2)(D) does not restore jurisdiction in this posture because it permits review of constitutional claims or questions of law only when they are “raised upon a petition for review” in the court of appeals—i.e., typically in connection with removal proceedings and a final order of removal, not a direct district-court action.

Accordingly, neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit had jurisdiction to review Darling’s retaliation and “arbitrary and capricious” challenges to the denial.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Shaiban v. Jaddou, 97 F.4th 263 (4th Cir. 2024)

Shaiban served as the Fourth Circuit’s primary, case-dispositive authority on the “outside removal proceedings” issue. In Darling, the court treated Shaiban as foreclosing the argument that jurisdiction exists simply because USCIS’s decision occurred outside removal.

Two aspects of Shaiban mattered:

  • Textual breadth of § 1252(a)(2)(B): the jurisdictional bar applies “regardless of whether” the decision is made in removal proceedings—language the court treated as an explicit instruction that the bar is not confined to the removal context.
  • Reading Shaiban through Patel: although Patel v. Garland arose in removal proceedings and reserved the outside-removal question, Shaiban concluded that Patel “signaled” the bar’s broader reach.

By aligning Darling’s adjustment application under § 1255(a) with the category of discretionary relief protected from review, the panel effectively treated the jurisdictional question as already settled within the circuit.

Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022)

Patel supplied the Supreme Court’s interpretive framework for § 1252(a)(2)(B): the words “any” and “regarding” are expansive, and Congress meant to foreclose review of “any and all decisions relating to” discretionary relief, including factual determinations.

The Fourth Circuit relied on Patel in two ways:

  • Scope: the bar reaches broadly across decisions “relating to” discretionary relief, limiting courts’ ability to repackage factual disputes as reviewable claims.
  • Structural plausibility of a “closed door”: the panel echoed Patel’s observation that Congress may have intended to foreclose judicial review unless and until removal proceedings are initiated.

Thus, Patel supported the conclusion that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s enumeration of § 1255 relief is a strong jurisdictional command, not a mere channeling provision.

Lee v. USCIS, 592 F.3d 612 (4th Cir. 2010)

Lee v. USCIS controlled the second issue—whether § 1252(a)(2)(D) allows a “constitutional claim” to be heard in district court notwithstanding § 1252(a)(2)(B).

The panel reiterated Lee’s key holding: § 1252(a)(2)(D) is not a “jurisdictional bootstrap” into district court. Instead, it restores review only for constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed in the court of appeals—typically as part of removal proceedings.

Because Darling filed (and appealed) a district-court action rather than bringing a petition for review tied to a removal order, § 1252(a)(2)(D) did not apply, and jurisdiction remained barred.

Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22 (2025)

The panel invoked Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger for the foundational principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. In context, this framed the court’s approach as one of enforcing jurisdictional limits as written rather than expanding jurisdiction to avoid harsh outcomes.

Niz- Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021)

The panel quoted Niz- Chavez v. Garland for the interpretive admonition that “no amount of policy-talk” can overcome “plain statutory” text. This served as a direct response to the equitable concern Darling raised—namely, that dismissal leaves her without recourse. The court treated that as a consequence Congress may choose, not a reason to rework the statute.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in a straightforward, text-first sequence tied closely to § 1252’s structure:

  1. Identify the relevant jurisdictional bar: § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) expressly removes jurisdiction over “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under § 1255 (adjustment of status).
  2. Reject the “outside removal” distinction: the statute’s text (“regardless of whether … made in removal proceedings”) and circuit precedent (Shaiban) foreclose an argument that non-removal USCIS decisions are reviewable.
  3. Address the constitutional-claim carveout: § 1252(a)(2)(D) restores review only for constitutional claims or questions of law “raised upon a petition for review” in the court of appeals. Under Lee v. USCIS, that restoration does not apply to a district-court complaint challenging a USCIS adjustment denial.
  4. Conclude no jurisdiction over either merits theory: Darling’s constitutional retaliation theory and her arbitrary-and-capricious/substantial-evidence framing could not bypass the jurisdictional limitations given the procedural posture.

Notably, the panel treated the jurisdictional analysis as dispositive and did not reach the underlying merits of whether the adjudicator acted with hostility, whether the denial was retaliatory, or whether USCIS appropriately assessed Darling’s explanation (including reliance on attorney advice).

Impact

Although the decision is unpublished and expressly “not binding precedent” in the Fourth Circuit, it illustrates how the circuit’s published decisions (Shaiban and Lee) operate in practice and signals likely outcomes for similarly postured cases.

Practical implications include:

  • Limited judicial pathways for USCIS adjustment denials: noncitizens denied adjustment by USCIS outside removal proceedings may find federal-court review categorically unavailable for fact-bound disputes and unavailable even for constitutional/legal claims unless properly channeled through a petition for review.
  • Framing claims as “constitutional” may not help in district court: the opinion reinforces that the carveout in § 1252(a)(2)(D) is not a general exception; it is a specific channel for review via petition for review.
  • Increased significance of procedural posture: whether a matter is (or becomes) connected to removal proceedings can determine whether any appellate review of legal or constitutional questions is available.

At a broader level, Darling underscores Congress’s (and courts’) shift toward restricting judicial review of discretionary immigration benefits and confining review to narrow, statutorily specified routes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjustment of status (§ 1255): a process allowing certain noncitizens already in the United States to become lawful permanent residents without leaving the country. The statute gives the government substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant it.
  • Jurisdictional bar (§ 1252(a)(2)(B)): a rule that certain immigration decisions—especially discretionary ones—are not reviewable by courts. If it applies, courts must dismiss without deciding whether the agency was right or wrong.
  • Carveout for constitutional claims/questions of law (§ 1252(a)(2)(D)): a limited “safety valve” allowing courts of appeals to review legal/constitutional issues, but only when brought in the correct procedural vehicle—“upon a petition for review” (typically tied to removal proceedings).
  • Petition for review: the formal mechanism for asking a federal court of appeals to review certain immigration decisions (commonly a final order of removal). It is distinct from filing a new lawsuit in district court.
  • Void ab initio: “void from the beginning.” In the case’s background, USCIS treated Darling’s second marriage (the basis of her earlier LPR grant) as legally invalid from inception after annulment, affecting downstream immigration benefits.

Conclusion

Darling applies and reinforces the Fourth Circuit’s established jurisdictional framework: federal courts lack jurisdiction to review USCIS’s discretionary denials of adjustment of status under § 1255 even outside removal proceedings, and § 1252(a)(2)(D) does not reopen district-court review of constitutional claims absent a petition for review. The decision’s significance lies less in new doctrine (it is unpublished) than in its clear demonstration that, under Shaiban v. Jaddou and Lee v. USCIS, many challenges to USCIS adjustment denials cannot be litigated in federal court unless they fit the statute’s narrow, removal-linked path for judicial review.