Date: Apr 10, 2026

Second Circuit Reaffirms Absolute Immunity for Court-Integrated Actors and Enforces Waiver for Untimely Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s Report

Introduction

In Weilburg v. Fitzgerald (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2026) (summary order), pro se plaintiff-appellant Daro C. Weilburg appealed the Northern District of New York’s sua sponte dismissal of his federal civil-rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (and various federal criminal statutes). Weilburg alleged that three defendants— Carla Fitzgerald (Clerk of the Oneida City Court), George D. Annas (psychiatrist contractor), and Brendan Rigby (court-appointed defense counsel)—conspired in his state criminal case to forge a psychological evaluation order and falsify a mental-health evaluation report.

The appeal presented recurrent issues in prisoner/pro se civil-rights litigation: (i) whether criminal statutes supply private causes of action; (ii) how absolute immunity applies to court-affiliated actors; (iii) whether a court-appointed defense lawyer acts “under color of state law”; (iv) what factual specificity is required to plead conspiracy under §§ 1983 and 1985; and (v) the consequences of failing to timely object to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court properly dismissed Weilburg’s original complaint because:

the federal criminal statutes invoked (including 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 505) do not create private causes of action;
the court clerk and psychiatrist were absolutely immune from damages because the alleged acts were “integrally related” to a judicial proceeding;
the court-appointed defense attorney was not a state actor for § 1983 purposes, and conclusory allegations of joint action were insufficient;
the § 1985 conspiracy allegations were conclusory and did not plausibly allege a “meeting of the minds.”

As to the amended complaint (filed solely against Rigby), the court concluded Weilburg waived appellate review by failing to timely object to the magistrate judge’s report after receiving explicit notice that failure to object would preclude review; the court found no “interest of justice” basis to excuse the waiver.

Note: The disposition is a summary order and, as the panel noted, does not have precedential effect under Second Circuit rules, though it reflects the court’s application of established doctrine.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standard of review and pro se construction

Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 2015): The panel cited Milan for the rule that dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are reviewed de novo. This underscores that even though the dismissal was sua sponte at the screening stage, the appellate court independently evaluates legal sufficiency.
Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024): Cited for the principle that pro se filings are construed to raise the strongest claims they suggest. The citation frames the court’s analysis as already accounting for liberal construction—thereby emphasizing that the deficiencies were doctrinal and plausibility-based, not merely technical pleading errors.

2) No private cause of action under federal criminal statutes

Robinson v. Overseas Mil. Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1994): Used to confirm that 18 U.S.C. § 242 (a criminal civil-rights provision) provides no private right to sue.
Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972): Quoted for the “truism” that crimes are prosecuted by the government—supporting the categorical dismissal of claims predicated on criminal statutes (including 18 U.S.C. § 505).

3) Absolute immunity for judicial and functionally comparable acts

Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2009): The anchor case for two propositions: (i) judges enjoy absolute immunity for judicial acts, and (ii) non-judges may also receive absolute immunity when their acts are “functionally comparable” to judicial functions or “integrally related” to an ongoing judicial proceeding. The panel relied on Bliven to extend immunity to the clerk and psychiatrist because the challenged actions were tied to the criminal court’s evaluation process.

4) State action requirement and joint-action pleading under § 1983

Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 1997): Cited for the settled rule that court-appointed attorneys performing traditional advocacy functions do not act “under color of state law” and thus are generally not amenable to suit under § 1983 on that basis. This citation largely foreclosed Weilburg’s § 1983 theory against Rigby absent a viable joint-action allegation.
Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2002): Used to articulate the joint-action pathway—i.e., a private party can be liable under § 1983 if he “acted in concert with [a] state actor”—and to reject conclusory allegations of concerted action as insufficient. Ciambriello provided the pleading threshold Weilburg failed to meet.

5) Conspiracy pleading under § 1985 and plausibility

Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2003): Cited for the requirement that a § 1985 plaintiff provide a factual basis indicating a “meeting of the minds” (express or tacit) to achieve an unlawful end. The panel used this to characterize Weilburg’s allegations as conclusory.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Cited for the plausibility standard; the panel invoked Iqbal to explain that the complaint must plead facts permitting a reasonable inference of liability. This reinforced dismissal where Weilburg alleged document forgery and fraud in broad strokes without concrete, non-speculative facts tying defendants into an agreement.

6) Waiver of appellate review for failure to object to a magistrate judge’s report

Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993): The controlling waiver rule applied to the amended-complaint dismissal. Under Roldan, a failure to object timely waives further judicial review where the report clearly warns that objections are required and cites the relevant authority. The court applied the rule to a pro se litigant, emphasizing that adequate notice was provided and that even an extension did not cure the untimeliness. The court also referenced Roldan’s “interest of justice” safety valve, but declined to invoke it due to the lack of meritorious challenges.

7) Record on appeal and denial of extra-record submissions

Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271 (2d Cir. 2002): Cited alongside Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 to deny Weilburg’s motion to file exhibits, reflecting the standard appellate principle that the record is generally confined to materials before the district court.

Legal Reasoning

Screening dismissal framework (§ 1915(e)(2)(B)): The court reviewed de novo and assessed whether the pleadings stated a claim, including whether they sought relief from immune defendants or relied on non-cognizable legal theories.
Eliminating non-cognizable criminal-statute theories: By applying Robinson and Conn. Action Now, the court treated claims based on criminal provisions as legally defective at the threshold, regardless of the alleged misconduct’s seriousness.
Absolute immunity as a functional, proceeding-linked doctrine: Relying on Bliven’s “integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding” formulation, the panel concluded that actions attributed to the clerk and psychiatrist (relating to orders/evaluations in a criminal case) fell within absolute immunity from damages. This step effectively removed two defendants even if the alleged documents were erroneous or improper, because immunity turns on function and nexus to judicial proceedings rather than the correctness of the act.
§ 1983 and the “under color of state law” barrier for defense counsel: Rodriguez foreclosed treating a court-appointed defense lawyer as a state actor when performing traditional legal functions. The only remaining route would be plausible allegations of joint action with state actors. Ciambriello required more than conclusory assertions, which the complaint lacked.
§ 1985 conspiracy requires factual “meeting of the minds” allegations: Webb and Iqbal together set a two-part burden: allege agreement (not parallel conduct or suspicion) and do so with enough factual content to make the inference plausible. Weilburg’s claim—asserting forged orders and false reports—did not supply concrete facts showing agreement among the three defendants.
Procedural forfeiture on the amended complaint: Independently of the merits, Roldan’s waiver rule barred appellate review of the amended-complaint dismissal because Weilburg failed to object by the extended deadline after receiving explicit notice. The court then declined to excuse waiver “in the interest of justice” given the absence of a meritorious basis to challenge dismissal.

Impact

Although non-precedential, the decision illustrates several practical and doctrinal consequences likely to recur:

Immunity remains a potent early-stage defense at screening: The “integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding” rationale signals that damages claims against court clerks and court-involved professionals (including evaluators) will often be dismissed at the outset when the alleged conduct is embedded in court-ordered processes.
Court-appointed counsel are typically not § 1983 defendants: Absent well-pleaded facts showing joint action with state officials, claims against defense counsel will fail on the state-action requirement.
Conspiracy pleading demands concrete facts: General allegations of forgery/falsification, without facts showing agreement and coordinated action, will not satisfy Iqbal/Webb standards.
Procedural discipline is outcome-determinative: The waiver holding underscores that missing an objections deadline—especially after receiving explicit notice and an extension—can foreclose appellate review, even for pro se litigants.
Appellate record limits are strictly applied: Attempts to add exhibits on appeal are commonly denied, reinforcing that factual development must occur in the district court.

Complex Concepts Simplified

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (screening dismissal): When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss at any time if the case is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from immune defendants—often before defendants appear.
Private cause of action: Not every law allows private lawsuits. Many criminal statutes authorize only government prosecution. A civil plaintiff cannot recover damages by citing a criminal code section unless Congress created a civil remedy.
Absolute immunity: A complete shield from damages liability for certain functions closely tied to the judicial process. The focus is on the role/function and its connection to judicial proceedings, not whether the act was correct.
“Under color of state law” (state action): § 1983 applies to constitutional violations carried out by state actors. Defense attorneys—even if appointed by the court—are usually treated as private actors when doing ordinary defense-lawyering.
Joint action / acting in concert: A private person can sometimes be treated like a state actor if he and state officials jointly carried out the unconstitutional act—but the complaint must allege specific facts showing coordinated action, not just suspicion or labels.
§ 1985 conspiracy and “meeting of the minds”: To plead a conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating an agreement (explicit or tacit) among defendants to achieve an unlawful goal. Mere allegations that multiple people were involved are not enough.
Waiver for failure to object to a report and recommendation: If a magistrate judge issues a report and warns that objections are required by a deadline, failing to object on time generally forfeits appellate review of those issues.

Conclusion

Weilburg v. Fitzgerald reaffirms (in non-precedential form) several entrenched principles: federal criminal statutes typically do not supply private civil remedies; absolute immunity broadly protects court-integrated functions from damages claims; court-appointed defense counsel are not state actors absent well-pleaded joint action; conspiracy claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 require concrete factual allegations meeting Iqbal’s plausibility standard; and failure to timely object to a magistrate judge’s report—after clear notice—can waive appellate review. The case’s overarching lesson is that civil-rights claims arising from criminal proceedings must navigate both substantive immunities/state-action limits and strict procedural requirements, particularly at the § 1915 screening stage.