Second Circuit: NFA Registration and (Former) $200 Tax Do Not “Meaningfully Constrain” Second Amendment Rights Under Bruen Step One

United States v. DeFelice (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 2026)

I. Introduction

In United States v. DeFelice, the Second Circuit affirmed a Connecticut defendant’s conviction for possessing two unregistered short-barreled rifles and an unregistered suppressor in violation of the National Firearms Act (“NFA”), 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845, 5861(d), and 5871. The defendant, Nicholas DeFelice, pleaded guilty to the NFA count (Count Two) after the district court denied his motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds. He also appealed his sentence of twelve months and a day, arguing procedural and substantive unreasonableness.

The appeal raised two core questions:

• Second Amendment: Does the NFA’s registration requirement (and, at the time of the offense, its $200 tax) violate the Second Amendment after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen?
• Sentencing: Did the district court commit procedural error by considering state-law-illegal conduct and by relying on general deterrence after Congress later eliminated the NFA tax for certain items? Was the sentence substantively unreasonable?

The Second Circuit’s opinion is significant for its articulation of a threshold Second Amendment principle: under Bruen step one, regulatory measures such as paperwork, processing time, and non-prohibitive fees do not implicate the Second Amendment unless they meaningfully constrain the ability to keep and bear arms.

II. Summary of the Opinion

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1. Second Amendment framework and threshold “meaningful constraint” concept

• New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
  The court applied Bruen through the Second Circuit’s post-Bruen methodology. Notably, the panel disposed of the challenge at step one, emphasizing that not every firearms regulation implicates the Second Amendment’s “plain text.”
• Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024).
  Provided the Second Circuit’s articulation of the two-step Bruen inquiry and the sequencing: only if the regulated conduct is within the Second Amendment’s plain text does the analysis proceed to historical tradition (step two).
• N.Y. State Firearms Ass'n v. James, 157 F.4th 232 (2d Cir. 2025).
  This case supplied the key limiting principle that regulations concerning “means of acquiring, transporting, and storing” arms implicate the Second Amendment only if they “meaningfully constrain” the right. The panel borrowed both (i) the standing formulation (“traceable” and “redressable”) and (ii) the substantive threshold test for whether a regulatory scheme triggers step one.
• United States v. Gomez, 159 F.4th 172 (2d Cir. 2025).
  The court relied on Gomez twice: first, for how to correctly define the regulated conduct (not at “too high a level of generality”); second, for the proposition that the Second Amendment does not cover “any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever.”
• Gazzola v. Hochul, 88 F.4th 186 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)).
  The panel used these authorities to reinforce that some firearms regulations are “presumptively lawful,” especially where they do not threaten the right to acquire firearms. Heller’s language (including footnote 26) functioned as a doctrinal anchor for treating certain administrative conditions as outside the Amendment’s core protection.

2. NFA/suppressor decisions from other circuits (persuasive alignment)

• United States v. Peterson, 161 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2025).
  The Second Circuit cited Peterson for the proposition that NFA suppressor registration resembles a “presumptively constitutional . . . shall-issue regime” and for a concrete description of the registration requirements (application, fingerprints, photo). While the Second Circuit “assume[d] without deciding” that suppressors and short-barreled rifles are “arms,” it adopted Peterson’s analytical framing that registration alone does not necessarily implicate the Second Amendment’s plain text.
• United States v. Speed, 175 F.4th 272 (4th Cir. 2026).
  Used to support the same conclusion as Peterson—that the NFA’s suppressor-registration requirement survives a post-Bruen challenge—bolstering the Second Circuit’s view that its approach is consistent with an emerging appellate consensus.
• United States v. DeBorba, 177 F.4th 1005 (9th Cir. 2026).
  Cited for two points: (i) that NFA suppressor registration has been upheld post-Bruen, and (ii) that at least one circuit has gone further by concluding suppressors are not “firearm[s] covered by the Second Amendment.” The Second Circuit did not adopt that broader categorical holding but used it to reinforce the reasonableness of rejecting DeFelice’s claim.

3. Standing, retroactivity, and the federal saving statute

• United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003) and 1 U.S.C. § 109 (the federal saving statute).
  These authorities drove the court’s standing holding. Even if the 2025 amendment eliminating the NFA tax could be characterized as a repeal affecting the statute of conviction, § 109 preserves penalties for offenses committed before the change unless Congress makes the amendment retroactive.
• Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
  Invoked to situate DeFelice’s retroactivity argument within the “deeply rooted” presumption against retroactive legislation—then used as a reference point for why Congress’s non-retroactive amendment did not assist him.
• Bell v. State of Md., 378 U.S. 226 (1964) and Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
  DeFelice argued the tax elimination effectively “legalized” his prior conduct. The court distinguished the civil-rights-era line of cases recognizing situations where legislation creates “substantive rights” to engage in previously unlawful activity. Here, the amendment removed a tax but did not create an affirmative right to possess unregistered NFA items; registration remained required.

4. Standard of review and sentencing doctrine

• United States v. McCray, 7 F.4th 40 (2d Cir. 2021).
  Provided the de novo standard for reviewing denial of a motion to dismiss and constitutional challenges.
• United States v. Jimenez, 895 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2018).
  Used to avoid classifying DeFelice’s claim as facial or as-applied; because no Second Amendment violation was found, broader hypotheticals were unnecessary.
• United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2008).
  These cases supplied the general abuse-of-discretion framework and definitions of procedural and substantive reasonableness.
• United States v. Davis, 82 F.4th 190 (2d Cir. 2023) and United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2007).
  Because DeFelice did not preserve certain sentencing objections, Davis and Villafuerte governed plain-error review and reaffirmed general deterrence as a proper § 3553(a) factor.
• United States v. Capanelli, 479 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2007).
  Used to reject the argument that the district court over-weighted deterrence; the weight assigned to a single § 3553(a) factor is largely unreviewable.
• United States v. DiMassa, 117 F.4th 477 (2d Cir. 2024).
  Provided the substantive-reasonableness boundary (“shockingly high” or otherwise unsupportable).
• In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2008) and United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996).
  These authorities underpinned the court’s conclusion that a newly raised “poverty” theory about the $200 tax was forfeited/abandoned because it was not briefed.
• United States v. Tribunella, 749 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1984).
  Supplied historical context: the NFA’s original aim to “achieve greater control and regulation of weapons that can be used in violent crimes.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Threshold standing ruling: the 2025 amendment does not supply an appeal path

DeFelice’s first move was to leverage a post-offense statutory change—Congress’s 2025 elimination of the $200 tax for registering certain NFA items—to argue the NFA is now constitutionally suspect and thus his conviction should fall. The court treated this as a standing problem.

Relying on United States v. Smith and the federal saving statute (1 U.S.C. § 109), the court held the penalties in effect at the time of the offense remain applicable unless Congress clearly makes the amendment retroactive. Because Congress did not, DeFelice could not show an injury “traceable” to the amended statute or “redressable” by a favorable ruling, as articulated in N.Y. State Firearms Ass'n v. James.

The court then rejected the attempt to characterize the tax repeal as a “legalization” of prior criminal conduct. Distinguishing Bell v. State of Md. and Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, the panel reasoned that reducing a tax to $0 does not create an affirmative right to possess unregistered NFA weapons; the registration requirement endures.

2. Merits: the claim fails at Bruen step one because the NFA did not “meaningfully constrain” the right

Moving to the statute in effect when DeFelice offended (2021), the panel followed the Second Circuit’s Bruen roadmap from Antonyuk v. James.

1. Properly characterizing the regulated conduct.
   Borrowing from United States v. Gomez, the court rejected DeFelice’s broad framing (“possession” of suppressors and short-barreled rifles). Instead, it defined the conduct as the NFA defines it: possession of unregistered short-barreled rifles and suppressors.
2. Assuming “arms,” then asking whether registration/tax triggers the Second Amendment’s plain text.
   The court assumed (without deciding) that both items are “arms,” citing United States v. Peterson. Even so, it held DeFelice failed to meet his step-one burden because the NFA’s requirements resemble ordinary administrative conditions—paperwork, fingerprints, photo, processing time—and a fee that was not shown to be prohibitive.

Crucially, the panel applied a limiting principle from N.Y. State Firearms Ass'n v. James: only regulations that meaningfully constrain acquisition/possession implicate the Second Amendment’s plain text. The court characterized the $200 tax (unchanged since 1934) as, in DeFelice’s own words, “something short of a nuisance fee,” and emphasized that DeFelice did not argue (in briefing) that processing time or the tax impeded his ability to obtain arms. With no meaningful constraint shown, the court never reached Bruen’s history-and-tradition step two.

The opinion also disposed of a post-judgment “litigation position” argument: even if the Government shifted views on whether suppressors are “arms,” that did not alter the court’s independent conclusion that registration requirements did not meaningfully constrain DeFelice’s rights.

3. Sentencing: state-law-illegal conduct and deterrence were proper considerations

On procedural reasonableness, the panel held the district court permissibly considered DeFelice’s distribution of a 30-round magazine illegal under state law as evidence of his culpable mental state, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (broad sentencing information). The court also held general deterrence remained relevant under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) even after Congress eliminated the tax, because the registration requirement remains and deterrence addresses others tempted to evade it.

On substantive reasonableness, the panel rejected the claim that the district court relied “exclusively” on deterrence and emphasized, under United States v. Capanelli, that assigning weight to factors is largely discretionary. Applying United States v. DiMassa, it concluded the below-Guidelines term was not “shockingly high” or legally unsupportable.

C. Impact

• A step-one off-ramp for administrative gun regulations.
  DeFelice strengthens a Second Circuit approach that resolves certain Second Amendment challenges at Bruen step one—before historical analysis—by requiring challengers to show that an administrative scheme (paperwork, processing times, non-prohibitive fees) “meaningfully constrains” access to arms.
• Reinforced resilience of the NFA’s registration scheme post-tax repeal.
  The decision suggests that even after the 2025 elimination of the tax, NFA registration requirements are likely to be defended as constitutionally permissible “shall-issue”-like administration, consistent with United States v. Peterson, United States v. Speed, and United States v. DeBorba.
• Appellate gatekeeping via standing and § 109.
  By framing the post-amendment argument as a standing failure tied to the federal saving statute, the court narrows efforts to use non-retroactive firearms-law amendments to reopen pre-amendment convictions.
• Sentencing practice confirmation.
  The opinion reiterates that sentencing courts may consider state-law-illegal conduct as relevant background and that general deterrence remains a valid rationale where the underlying regulatory obligation persists.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Standing (“traceable” and “redressable”).
  A defendant must show the court can fix the claimed injury. If a later statutory amendment is not retroactive, striking it down or interpreting it favorably usually cannot undo penalties for earlier conduct, so the injury is not redressable through that amendment.
• Federal saving statute (1 U.S.C. § 109).
  When Congress repeals or amends a criminal statute, prior offenses generally remain punishable under the old law unless Congress clearly says the change applies retroactively.
• Bruen step one vs. step two.
  Step one asks whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct. If not, the challenge fails without any history inquiry. Step two (only if step one is satisfied) asks whether the regulation fits within the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
• “Meaningfully constrain.”
  A regulation implicates the Second Amendment only if it seriously interferes with acquiring or carrying arms—not merely because it imposes paperwork or a modest fee.
• “Shall-issue regime.”
  A licensing/registration system that issues approval upon satisfaction of objective criteria (forms, identification materials, etc.), rather than discretionary judgments. Such systems are often treated as less constitutionally burdensome than discretionary “may-issue” regimes.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness (sentencing).
  “Procedural” concerns the method (Guidelines calculation, considering proper factors, accurate facts). “Substantive” concerns the outcome (whether the sentence is excessively harsh or otherwise unsupportable).
• Plain-error review.
  If the defendant did not object in the district court, the appellate court corrects only clear, outcome-affecting errors that seriously undermine the fairness or integrity of proceedings.

V. Conclusion

United States v. DeFelice sets (and solidifies) an important Second Circuit threshold rule in post-Bruen litigation: NFA-style administrative requirements—registration, paperwork, processing, and a non-prohibitive fee—do not implicate the Second Amendment’s plain text unless the challenger shows they meaningfully constrain the right to keep and bear arms. The court also used the federal saving statute to foreclose reliance on a non-retroactive tax repeal and reaffirmed broad sentencing discretion to consider relevant conduct and to emphasize general deterrence where the regulatory duty remains.