Scope of Employment Does Not Make a State Employee a “Named Insured” for UM/UIM When Driving a Personal Vehicle; § 27-7-2.1 Does Not Require UM/UIM to Track Liability Coverage

1. Introduction

In Cynthia A. Roberge v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (R.I. May 26, 2026), the Rhode Island Supreme Court answered two certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concerning uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage under a commercial auto policy issued by Travelers to the State of Rhode Island.

The plaintiff, Cynthia A. Roberge, a state employee, was injured in October 2018 while driving her personal vehicle within the scope of her employment after an underinsured motorist collision. She sought UIM benefits under the State’s Travelers policy. Travelers denied the claim because the policy’s UM/UIM coverage was limited to “Owned ‘Autos’ Only,” and her personal vehicle was not a covered auto.

The certified questions framed two core issues:

  1. Whether, in light of Martinelli v. Travelers Insurance Companies, an employee driving her own vehicle within the scope of employment must be treated as a “named insured” for UM/UIM despite contrary policy language.
  2. Whether Rhode Island’s UM statute, R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.1, and public policy are violated when a policy provides liability coverage to employees acting within the scope of employment for “Any ‘Auto’” but limits UM/UIM based on the auto involved.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court answered both certified questions in the negative.

  • Question 1: Neither Martinelli v. Travelers Insurance Companies nor Rhode Island law requires treating an employee as a UM/UIM “named insured” under an employer’s policy when the policy unambiguously identifies the employer as the named insured and limits UM/UIM coverage to certain covered autos.
  • Question 2: Section 27-7-2.1 and Rhode Island public policy do not compel an insurer to provide UM/UIM coverage to an employee injured in a non-covered auto merely because the employee would have liability coverage under the same policy while acting in the scope of employment.

A dissent would have answered Question 1 “yes,” reading the so-called “Martinelli exception” as broader and emphasizing Rhode Island’s tradition of liberal construction in UM/UIM matters.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. The “named insured” framework and employee coverage categories

The opinion situates the dispute within Rhode Island’s familiar class-I/class-II UM/UIM taxonomy:

  • Finch v. Centennial Insurance Company is cited (via the First Circuit’s description) for the distinction between “named insureds” (class-I) and “occupants of an insured vehicle” (class-II), and for the frequent use of these categories in employer fleet policy cases.

This classification matters because Roberge was neither (i) a named insured under the policy’s text, nor (ii) an occupant of a “covered ‘auto’” for UM/UIM at the time of injury.

B. The central precedent: Martinelli v. Travelers Insurance Companies

In Martinelli v. Travelers Insurance Companies, the Court denied UM/UIM benefits to a principal shareholder/general manager injured while a passenger in a non-insured vehicle. The policy unambiguously listed the corporation as the named insured, and the claimant was not occupying an insured vehicle.

The present Court treated Martinelli as establishing two key points:

  1. Rhode Island courts will not depart from unambiguous policy language identifying the named insured and defining who is insured for UM/UIM.
  2. The often-invoked “Martinelli exception” language (“It is conceivable that a shareholder or an employee who is injured while acting within the scope of his or her employment might be considered the named insured…”) was dictum that did not override the contract terms in Martinelli itself.

Here, the Court emphasized that adopting Roberge’s reading would effectively convert a vast class (roughly 17,000 state employees) into “named insureds” for UM/UIM regardless of the policy’s UM/UIM covered-auto designation—an outcome the Court found incompatible with the bargained-for policy structure.

C. The Court’s prior treatment of the “exception”: Medeiros v. Anthem Casualty Insurance Group

In Medeiros v. Anthem Casualty Insurance Group, decedents who owned 25% of closely held corporations were killed in a non-covered car while returning from a Red Sox game. This Court affirmed summary judgment for the insurers, stating there was “no evidence tending to show” the decedents fell within the hypothesized Martinelli scenario because they were not engaged in business-related activity.

The majority in Roberge used Medeiros to clarify that the “scope of employment” factor is not a stand-alone trigger that displaces policy text; rather, it is only potentially relevant in the narrow setting where the Court might even consider moving beyond the policy’s named-insured designation.

D. Statutory UM/UIM purpose and limits

To interpret § 27-7-2.1, the Court invoked the standard interpretive approach described in:

  • In re J.T. (de novo statutory interpretation; consider policies and purposes)
  • Crenshaw v. State and Sosa v. City of Woonsocket (plain meaning controls when unambiguous)
  • Verizon New England Inc. v. Savage and Providence Teachers' Union Local 958, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hemond (effectuate legislative intent)
  • LMG Rhode Island Holdings, Inc. v. Office of McKee and Koback v. Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (avoid absurd results)

On UM/UIM policy and legislative purpose, the Court relied on:

  • Rueschemeyer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Bartlett v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co. (UM provisions interpreted in light of the statute’s public policy)
  • Malo v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company and Aldcroft v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York (statute’s purpose is to protect the named insured against economic loss from uninsured/hit-and-run motorists; policy defines who is an insured)
  • Henderson v. Nationwide Insurance Company and Ladouceur v. Hanover Insurance Co. (public policy favors coverage, but reasonable limitations protect insurers from unwarranted claims; coverage is not required “in virtually every circumstance”)

E. “Primary coverage” and “your own insurer” concept

The Court’s answer to Question 2 turned significantly on the statute’s linkage between UM/UIM obligations and primary coverage:

  • Brown v. Travelers Insurance Company is cited for the meaning of “primary coverage” (liability for the risk regardless of other coverage).
  • Van Hoesen v. Lloyd's of London and VanMarter v. Royal Indemnity Co. are cited for the proposition that the statute imposes a duty on the policyholder’s own insurer to provide coverage and ensures the injured insured is compensated by his or her own insurance company.

Those cases reinforced the Court’s view that Travelers was not being asked to perform the statute’s core function in Roberge’s circumstances because Roberge had her own USAA policy (with UM/UIM) covering the vehicle involved.

F. The dissent’s additional coverage-oriented authorities

Although the majority did not rely on them to expand coverage here, the dissent invoked a line of cases emphasizing liberal construction of UM/UIM protections, including:

  • Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Carrera (general principle favoring broad coverage)
  • DiTata v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (primary object is indemnification rather than defeat of claim)
  • Peerless Insurance Company v. Luppe (broad view of coverage for persons beyond named insured; quoting Mazzilli v. Accident & Casualty Insurance Co. of Winterthur, Switzerland)
  • LaPlante v. Honda North America, Inc. (avoid absurd or unjust result)
  • Tanner v. Town Council of Town of East Greenwich and Wilkinson v. Harrington (justice/fairness themes)

These authorities framed the dissent’s normative position that the “Martinelli exception” should operate to prevent denial of UM/UIM where the employee is undeniably on the job and effectively forced into using a personal car due to lack of fleet availability.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Question 1: Scope of employment does not override unambiguous named-insured and covered-auto terms

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps:

  1. Start with the policy text. The Travelers policy unambiguously listed the “State of Rhode Island” as the named insured and extended UM/UIM to “anyone occupying a covered ‘auto’” when the named insured is an organization. The State selected UM/UIM symbol “2” (“Owned ‘Autos’ Only”), and Roberge was driving her own vehicle.
  2. Constrain Martinelli’s dictum. The Court read Martinelli as not establishing a freestanding rule that any employee in the scope of employment becomes a UM/UIM named insured “despite policy language to the contrary.” Instead, the scope-of-employment language is treated as an untested hypothetical that does not displace plain contractual limits—particularly where adopting the plaintiff’s approach would massively expand UM/UIM exposure beyond what the State purchased and Travelers priced.

A key doctrinal move is the Court’s insistence that “scope of employment” is not “outcome determinative.” It may be a factor only if circumstances otherwise justify engaging the hypothetical discussed in Martinelli; it is not a mechanism to rewrite the policy’s definition of who is insured for UM/UIM.

B. Question 2: § 27-7-2.1 does not mandate UM/UIM for everyone who has liability protection under an employer’s policy

Roberge’s statutory argument was essentially parity-based: because she would have had $1,000,000 liability coverage under the Travelers policy while driving her own car for work (liability symbol “1” = “Any ‘Auto’”), she contended the statute required corresponding UM/UIM coverage.

The Court rejected that position based on two statutory anchors:

  • Primary coverage linkage. The statute’s structure (including the definition in § 27-7-2.1(c)(1)) ties the obligation to provide UM/UIM to a policy providing primary coverage for the insured motor vehicle. Travelers was not the primary insurer of Roberge’s personal vehicle; USAA was.
  • “Persons insured under the policy” limitation. Section 27-7-2.1(a) requires UM/UIM “for the protection of persons insured under the policy.” The Court relied on Malo v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company for the proposition that the statute does not mandate which class of persons must be insured; that designation is left to the policy’s terms (so long as they are not otherwise unlawful).

In short, the Court treated UM/UIM as a statutory floor for those whom the policy insures and for vehicles for which the policy is primary—not as a mandate that UM/UIM must extend as far as liability coverage in every commercial-auto configuration.

3.3. Impact

A. Clarification (and narrowing) of the “Martinelli exception” in practice

This decision substantially limits the practical force of the “Martinelli exception” by making explicit that:

  • unambiguous policy language remains controlling; and
  • being in the scope of employment does not itself transform an employee into a UM/UIM named insured.

While the Court did not formally “overrule” the Martinelli dictum, it effectively cabins it, signaling that expansion beyond text-based insured classes will be highly unlikely—especially in large-employer settings where the economic implications of deeming all employees “named insureds” would be dramatic.

B. Validation of split-symbol commercial policies (liability broader than UM/UIM)

The Court’s approval of the State’s selection of broader liability coverage (“Any ‘Auto’”) but narrower UM/UIM coverage (“Owned ‘Autos’ Only”) confirms that Rhode Island law permits sophisticated insureds to purchase UM/UIM on a narrower covered-auto basis than liability coverage—without automatically triggering statutory or public policy invalidation.

C. Litigation forecasting: focus on “covered auto” designations and “primary coverage” mechanics

Future disputes will likely concentrate less on generalized public policy arguments and more on:

  • covered-auto symbols and their interaction with UM/UIM endorsements;
  • the policy’s organizational-insured provisions (“anyone occupying a covered auto”);
  • the “temporary substitute” clause (and what “out of service” means); and
  • whether the employer policy is “primary” as to the vehicle involved.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Named insured vs. insured (class-I vs. class-II)

  • Named insured (class-I): the person or entity listed on the declarations page (here, the State of Rhode Island). Named insured status often carries broader UM/UIM protection.
  • Insured occupant (class-II): someone covered because they are occupying a vehicle that the policy covers for UM/UIM (here, coverage depended on being in a “covered ‘auto’”).

Covered-auto symbols

Commercial auto policies often use numeric “symbols” to define what vehicles are covered for each coverage part:

  • Symbol “1” (“Any ‘Auto’”): very broad; can include employee-owned autos for liability in many business-use scenarios.
  • Symbol “2” (“Owned ‘Autos’ Only”): narrower; generally limited to autos owned by the named insured (here, state-owned vehicles).

In this case, the State bought broader liability (symbol “1”) but narrower UM/UIM (symbol “2”), and the Court enforced that distinction.

Primary coverage

“Primary coverage” is the insurance that pays first for a given vehicle/risk. The Court read § 27-7-2.1 as primarily ensuring that a person’s own auto policy provides UM/UIM protection for that person’s vehicle—rather than making a non-primary commercial policy pay UM/UIM for an employee’s personal car.

5. Conclusion

The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s answers to the certified questions establish a clear rule for employee UM/UIM claims under employer commercial auto policies:

  • Scope of employment does not override unambiguous UM/UIM limitations. An employee driving a personal vehicle for work is not thereby converted into a UM/UIM “named insured” under the employer’s policy, despite the employee’s work status.
  • Section 27-7-2.1 does not require UM/UIM to match liability’s breadth. A policy may provide liability coverage for “Any ‘Auto’” while limiting UM/UIM to owned/covered autos, without violating the statute or public policy—particularly where the employee’s personal auto policy is the primary UM/UIM protection for that vehicle.

The dissent highlights a competing, equity-driven approach grounded in Rhode Island’s tradition of liberal UM/UIM construction, but the majority opinion decisively prioritizes policy text, covered-auto designations, and the statute’s primary-coverage orientation.