Date: Apr 9, 2026

Notice-of-Appeal Limits Appellate Jurisdiction; De Minimis Injury/Individualized Causation Defeat Detainee Excessive-Force Claims; Prisoner Must Provide Service Addresses

Introduction

Savage v. Dobbertin (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 2026) consolidated two pro se appeals brought by Tulsa County Jail detainee Marquice Donnell Savage against jail officials. The first appeal (No. 25-5067) challenged summary judgment on a Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim arising from an April 18, 2021 escort to restrictive housing. The second appeal (No. 25-5082) challenged dismissal of a separate civil-rights suit alleging racially motivated, baseless disciplinary and criminal proceedings—dismissed on procedural grounds for failure to timely serve defendants.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed in a nonprecedential Order and Judgment, but it articulated several recurring, practice-critical rules: (1) appellate jurisdiction is confined to the order(s) designated in the notice of appeal; (2) to defeat qualified immunity at summary judgment in an excessive-force case, a detainee must show more than de minimis injury and must tie the injury to each defendant’s own conduct; and (3) even when proceeding in forma pauperis, an unrepresented prisoner must provide the U.S. Marshal with service addresses, and cannot shift that burden to dismissed parties via discovery rules that do not apply.

Summary of the Opinion

Jurisdictional scope narrowed by the notices of appeal. Because Mr. Savage’s notices of appeal identified only (a) the qualified-immunity summary judgment for Officers Sanchez and Dobbertin and (b) the Rule 4(m) service dismissal as to Officers Dobbertin and Lowry, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to review arguments targeting other defendants and earlier dismissal orders.
No. 25-5067 (excessive force): affirmed summary judgment. Applying qualified-immunity standards, the court held the record did not show a constitutional violation by either Officer Sanchez or Officer Dobbertin. The only objectively confirmed injury was a superficial cut on Mr. Savage’s thumb, and he failed to link that injury to either officer’s individual actions.
No. 25-5082 (service): affirmed dismissal without prejudice. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing for untimely service where Mr. Savage failed to provide service addresses for the Marshal. His attempt to rely on Rule 26 initial disclosures failed because the case was exempt as an unrepresented prisoner action, and service on the sheriff did not effect personal-capacity service on the remaining officers.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Pro se litigants: liberal construction has limits

The panel reiterated that pro se filings are construed liberally, but the court will not act as counsel: Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). This framing mattered throughout: Mr. Savage’s briefs raised numerous issues, but the court required proper jurisdictional hooks, record citations, and legally supported theories.

2) Summary judgment record control and “blatantly contradicted” facts

The court recited the summary judgment lens and the “blatantly contradicted by the record” limitation: Markley v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 59 F.4th 1072, 1080 (10th Cir. 2023) and Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009). The mention is not decorative: surveillance video disproved Mr. Savage’s claim that he lacked a toilet in the holding cell, illustrating how objective evidence can narrow factual disputes and undercut liability theories.

3) Verified pleadings as summary-judgment evidence

The opinion relied on the rule that a verified complaint can function as an affidavit at summary judgment if it meets Rule 56 standards: Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003, 1019 (10th Cir. 2002). Even with that evidentiary benefit, Mr. Savage’s narrative failed because it did not attribute specific injurious acts to Sanchez or Dobbertin.

4) Notice of appeal designates (and limits) appellate jurisdiction

The jurisdictional centerpiece was Rule 3(c)(1)(B) and the Supreme Court’s statement that Rule 3 requirements are jurisdictional prerequisites: Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992). Applying that principle, the panel refused to entertain challenges to dismissals of other defendants and claims not covered by the notice—an important caution to litigants: broad briefing cannot expand a narrow notice of appeal.

5) Qualified immunity at summary judgment: burden shift and “heavy” two-part test

The panel recited the standard of review for summary judgment: N.H. Ins. Co. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC, 128 F.4th 1337, 1344 (10th Cir. 2025), and the qualified-immunity burden shift: Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 2015). It underscored that the record must “clearly demonstrate” the plaintiff’s satisfaction of both prongs: Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001).

6) Excessive force requires more than de minimis injury; individualized causation matters

For the injury requirement, the court quoted: Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1129 (10th Cir. 2007) (“some actual injury that is not de minimis”). For individualized attribution—especially in multi-defendant § 1983 cases—the panel relied on: Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 2011), emphasizing the necessity to specify “who is alleged to have done what to whom,” rather than using collective allegations.

7) Rule 4(m) service dismissal reviewed for abuse of discretion; plaintiff must provide addresses

The service ruling turned on the abuse-of-discretion framework: Espinoza v. United States, 52 F.3d 838, 840 (10th Cir. 1995) and Okla. ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 619 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2010). Substantively, the plaintiff bears responsibility to provide addresses to the Marshal: Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cir. 2007). This prevented Mr. Savage from converting a service failure into a fault of jail leadership or dismissed defendants.

Legal Reasoning

1) Jurisdiction: the notice of appeal is a hard boundary

The court treated the notices of appeal as defining the universe of reviewable issues. Mr. Savage sought to litigate earlier screening dismissals and other defendants’ dispositions, but the panel held it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to review” those matters because they fell outside the designated orders. This approach reinforces a strict but predictable regime: appellate courts cannot reach issues absent proper invocation of jurisdiction, even where the appellant is pro se.

2) Excessive force: failure on both “injury” and “personal participation”

The court’s qualified-immunity analysis was decisive at the first prong (constitutional violation). Although Mr. Savage alleged a violent escort and significant pain, the medical record reflected “no objective evidence” of injury to wrists/arms/ankle and only a half-centimeter superficial thumb laceration. The panel treated that as, at most, minimal injury and—critically—found no evidence tracing it to Sanchez’s or Dobbertin’s conduct.

The opinion thereby links two requirements that often operate together in detainee excessive-force cases: (a) a non-de minimis injury (or at least evidence of injury of constitutional significance under circuit law), and (b) individualized causation/personal participation. Even if Mr. Savage’s broader narrative might suggest force used by someone, his inability to differentiate Sanchez and Dobbertin from other officers—particularly from the officer he accused of tackling/strangling—prevented liability against these defendants in their individual capacities.

3) Service: procedural rules apply even in prisoner civil-rights litigation

The panel affirmed dismissal under Rule 4(m) because Mr. Savage did not provide service addresses for the Marshal. Two attempted workarounds failed:

Rule 26 initial disclosures: Mr. Savage argued a former defendant (Sheriff Regalado) should have provided addresses. The court agreed with the district court that there was no authority to compel disclosures from a dismissed party for unserved defendants, and in any event the case fell within the exemption for “an action brought without an attorney by a person in the custody of the United States, a state, or a state subdivision” (Rule 26(a)(1)(B)(iv)).
Rule 4(j)(2)(A) service on a “state”: Service on a chief executive officer can suffice for service on a state entity, but the remaining claims were against officers in their individual capacities, so personal service rules applied. Service on the sheriff did not accomplish service on Dobbertin/Lowry as individuals.

Impact

Although expressly “not binding precedent” (outside law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), the decision is a strong practical signal in three areas:

Appellate practice: A narrowly drafted notice of appeal can forfeit review of other adverse rulings. Parties must ensure the notice designates all judgments or appealable orders intended for review.
Jail-force litigation under § 1983: Plaintiffs opposing qualified immunity must marshal evidence of injury and must connect that injury to each defendant’s actions. Collective allegations against “officers” are vulnerable, especially where video and medical documentation constrain factual disputes.
Service mechanics in prisoner cases: Even when the Marshal effects service, the plaintiff must supply usable addresses. Courts are unlikely to transform discovery rules into a substitute for basic service obligations, particularly where the rules expressly exempt unrepresented prisoner actions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A defense protecting government officials from damages unless the plaintiff shows (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the violated right was “clearly established” at the time. At summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the burden once the defense is invoked.
De minimis injury: A harm so minor that, under circuit law, it is insufficient to support certain constitutional tort claims. Here, the only objectively identified injury was a superficial thumb cut, and the court treated the absence of more significant injury evidence as fatal on this record.
Individual capacity vs. official capacity: Individual-capacity claims seek to hold an official personally liable for their own conduct; official-capacity claims are effectively claims against the governmental entity. Service and liability rules differ, and serving a governmental leader does not automatically serve individual defendants sued personally.
Rule 4(m) dismissal (untimely service): Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) allows dismissal (typically without prejudice) if defendants are not served within the specified time. Courts review such dismissals for abuse of discretion, giving trial judges substantial leeway.
Rule 3(c) notice-of-appeal designation: The notice of appeal must identify the judgment or order being appealed. This is jurisdictional: if an order is not fairly designated, the appellate court may be unable to review it.

Conclusion

Savage v. Dobbertin reinforces three disciplined rules of federal civil-rights litigation and appellate procedure: (1) appellate jurisdiction tracks the notice of appeal, not the breadth of the briefs; (2) to overcome qualified immunity on an excessive-force claim, a detainee must show more than de minimis injury and must connect that injury to each defendant’s individual conduct; and (3) an unrepresented prisoner-plaintiff must still provide service addresses for the U.S. Marshal, and cannot rely on inapplicable disclosure rules or entity-service provisions to substitute for personal service on individual-capacity defendants.