Savage v. Dobbertin: Notice of Appeal Limits Appellate Jurisdiction; De Minimis Injury and Defendant-Specific Causation Defeat Detainee Excessive-Force Claims; IFP Prisoner Must Provide Service Addresses

Introduction

Savage v. Dobbertin (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 2026) consolidates two pro se appeals by Marquice Donnell Savage, a former pretrial detainee at the Tulsa County Jail, arising from two separate district-court actions. The defendants were various Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office jail officials.

The Tenth Circuit addressed three core issues:

  • Appellate jurisdiction: whether Mr. Savage could obtain review of district-court rulings and defendants not designated in his notices of appeal.
  • Qualified immunity / excessive force (No. 25-5067): whether the record supported a Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim against two remaining officers—Aaliyah Sanchez and Shyanne Dobbertin—after other defendants were dismissed.
  • Service of process (No. 25-5082): whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing claims against Dobbertin and Lowry for failure to timely serve under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed both judgments.

  • Scope of review: The court held it lacked jurisdiction to review issues outside the orders Mr. Savage designated in his notices of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B).
  • No. 25-5067 (excessive force / qualified immunity): Summary judgment for Officers Sanchez and Dobbertin was affirmed because Mr. Savage did not meet his burden to show (1) a constitutional violation and (2) clearly established law. In particular, the record showed at most a superficial thumb laceration and did not connect any non-de-minimis injury to the specific conduct of either remaining defendant.
  • No. 25-5082 (service): Dismissal without prejudice for failure to timely serve was affirmed. The court reiterated that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the U.S. Marshal with service addresses, and rejected Mr. Savage’s reliance on Rule 26 initial disclosures and Rule 4(j)(2).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Pro se litigation standards and record-based review

  • Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005): The court reiterated that pro se filings are construed liberally, but courts will not act as counsel by constructing arguments or searching the record. This principle supported the panel’s insistence that Mr. Savage identify defendant-specific evidence and provide supporting authority.
  • Markley v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 59 F.4th 1072 (10th Cir. 2023): Cited for the summary-judgment posture—facts are viewed favorably to the nonmovant, but only where supported by the record.
  • Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 584 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 2009): Reinforced the “blatantly contradicted by the record” limitation—courts need not accept a version of facts no reasonable jury could believe in light of indisputable record evidence (here, e.g., surveillance footage regarding the toilet in the holding cell).
  • Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 2002): Supported the district court’s (and the panel’s) practice of treating a verified complaint as affidavit evidence at summary judgment if it satisfies Rule 56 standards—important because Mr. Savage relied heavily on his verified allegations to oppose qualified immunity.

2) Appellate jurisdiction limited by the notice of appeal

  • Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992): The court invoked Smith to emphasize that Rule 3’s requirements are jurisdictional. This anchored the panel’s refusal to entertain challenges to orders/defendants not identified in the notices of appeal.

3) Summary judgment and qualified immunity framework

  • N.H. Ins. Co. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC, 128 F.4th 1337 (10th Cir. 2025): Provided the de novo standard for reviewing summary judgment.
  • Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2015): Supplied the two-part qualified-immunity burden-shift—once invoked, the plaintiff must show (1) a constitutional violation and (2) clearly established law.
  • Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2001): Emphasized the plaintiff’s “heavy” burden in qualified-immunity cases and the need for the record to “clearly demonstrate” both prongs.

4) Excessive force requires more than de minimis injury and requires individual attribution

  • Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007): The court relied on Cortez for the proposition that excessive-force claims require an “actual injury” that is not de minimis (physical or emotional). The panel treated the superficial thumb cut as, at most, the only objective injury shown, and found the evidentiary link to Sanchez/Dobbertin lacking.
  • Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011): Used to underscore a defendant-specific pleading/causation requirement in multi-defendant § 1983 suits: plaintiffs must identify “who did what to whom,” not rely on collective allegations. This case was pivotal to the panel’s reasoning that Mr. Savage’s narrative targeted the dismissed corporal for tackling/strangling and did not distinctly connect Sanchez or Dobbertin to actionable injury.

5) Rule 4(m) dismissals and service obligations in prisoner/IFP contexts

  • Espinoza v. United States, 52 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1995): Provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing dismissals for untimely service.
  • Okla. ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 619 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2010): Clarified what constitutes abuse of discretion (“definite and firm conviction” of clear error or exceeding permissible bounds).
  • Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2007): The key service precedent—“It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the United States Marshal with the address of the person to be served.” This directly supported affirmance of dismissal where Mr. Savage failed to supply service addresses.

Legal Reasoning

1) The notice of appeal as a jurisdictional gatekeeper

The panel drew a bright, procedural boundary: appellate review extends only to the judgment or appealable order designated in the notice of appeal. Even though Mr. Savage argued at length about other screening dismissals and other defendants (e.g., official-capacity claims and dismissals of additional parties), the court held those issues were outside the scope of the notices and thus outside the court’s jurisdiction.

The practical reasoning is administrative and constitutional: appellate courts cannot expand jurisdiction by the content of a brief when Rule 3’s jurisdictional prerequisites were not satisfied. The opinion demonstrates a disciplined enforcement of appellate “issue selection” through notice drafting.

2) Qualified immunity: failure of proof on injury and personal participation

For No. 25-5067, the court applied the conventional qualified-immunity architecture (Puller/Medina) in a way that turned on evidentiary specificity: it was not enough to allege harsh treatment in the abstract. Mr. Savage needed record evidence that (a) he suffered a non-de-minimis injury and (b) that injury was caused by each defendant sued in an individual capacity.

Two factual anchors controlled the outcome:

  • Medical evidence: Two nursing evaluations shortly after the incident documented essentially no objective injury other than a minor thumb laceration.
  • Causation attribution: The record, including the verified complaint, did not sufficiently link even that laceration to Sanchez or Dobbertin as opposed to other actors.

The panel then layered on the Brown v. Montoya requirement that § 1983 individual-capacity liability demands defendant-specific conduct. In effect, the court treated “collective force” narratives as insufficient at the qualified-immunity stage where the remaining defendants’ discrete actions and the resulting injury are not clearly shown.

3) Service of process: plaintiff’s responsibility and inapplicability of proposed shortcuts

For No. 25-5082, the court found no abuse of discretion in dismissal under Rule 4(m) because Mr. Savage failed to provide addresses needed for service. The panel rejected two attempted workarounds:

  • Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures: The court reasoned there was no authority requiring a dismissed defendant (the sheriff) to provide addresses for unserved defendants; and, independently, Rule 26(a)(1)(B)(iv) exempts actions by an unrepresented prisoner from initial disclosures.
  • Rule 4(j)(2)(A) “chief executive officer” service: The court held this provision concerns service on a “state,” and could not substitute for personal-capacity service on individual officers—especially after official-capacity claims were dismissed.

Impact

1) Appellate practice impact: notices of appeal must be drafted with precision

The opinion’s most immediate doctrinal effect is procedural: litigants, especially pro se appellants, cannot rely on appellate briefing to bring in additional orders or parties if the notice of appeal designates only a subset. Future appellants in the Tenth Circuit should treat the notice of appeal as the definitive “table of contents” for appellate jurisdiction, particularly in multi-order, multi-defendant prisoner civil-rights cases where screening, service, and merits rulings occur in stages.

2) Civil-rights litigation impact: evidentiary linkage to each defendant is decisive under qualified immunity

Substantively, the opinion reinforces that qualified immunity is often resolved through (a) objective injury evidence and (b) individualized causation. Even where a plaintiff alleges aggressive handling, the absence of non-de-minimis injury evidence—and the inability to trace injury to specific defendants— can prevent the case from reaching a jury.

3) Rule 4(m) impact: IFP status does not eliminate the need to provide service information

The service ruling underscores a recurring prisoner-litigation constraint: even when the U.S. Marshal performs service, the plaintiff must supply usable identifying information (notably an address). Courts may dismiss without prejudice when plaintiffs cannot do so within Rule 4(m)’s timeframe, and litigants should not assume discovery-like mechanisms (initial disclosures) will supply that information.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: A protection for government officials sued personally. Once raised, the plaintiff must show both (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the law was “clearly established” at the time. If either part fails, the official wins on summary judgment.
  • De minimis injury: An injury so minor it generally cannot support an excessive-force claim (as framed here via Cortez v. McCauley). The opinion treated a tiny superficial cut as the only objective injury shown.
  • Individual-capacity liability under § 1983: You must show what each named defendant personally did that caused the constitutional harm. General statements that “they” did something are often insufficient, especially at summary judgment.
  • Rule 4(m) service deadline: Federal civil cases require defendants to be served within a set time. If service is not completed, courts may dismiss— commonly without prejudice—unless the plaintiff shows good cause or the court extends time.
  • Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures exemption: Many cases require early exchange of basic information, but lawsuits filed by unrepresented prisoners are exempt—so plaintiffs cannot rely on initial disclosures to obtain service addresses.
  • Notice of appeal designation: The appellate court can review only what the notice of appeal identifies. If an order or party is not designated, the appellate court may lack jurisdiction to review it.

Conclusion

Savage v. Dobbertin is a procedural-and-proof-focused decision with three key takeaways:

  • Appellate jurisdiction is bounded by the notice of appeal (Smith v. Barry; Rule 3(c)(1)(B)), and briefing cannot expand that boundary.
  • To overcome qualified immunity in an excessive-force case, a plaintiff must present record-supported, defendant-specific evidence of a non-de-minimis injury and causation (Cortez v. McCauley; Brown v. Montoya), not generalized allegations.
  • Failure to timely serve remains a valid basis for dismissal, and IFP/prisoner status does not shift the obligation to provide service addresses away from the plaintiff (Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary), nor does Rule 26(a)(1) cure that failure.

Although issued as a nonprecedential “Order and Judgment,” the opinion offers a clear, practical template for how the Tenth Circuit expects litigants to (1) preserve appellate issues through proper notices of appeal, (2) meet the evidentiary rigor demanded by qualified immunity, and (3) comply with Rule 4 service obligations.