Date: Apr 9, 2026

Savage v. Dobbertin: De Minimis Injury and Defendant-Specific Causation as Gatekeepers for Pretrial Detainee Excessive-Force Claims; Strict Enforcement of Notice-of-Appeal and Rule 4(m) Service Duties

1. Introduction

Savage v. Dobbertin (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 2026) consolidates two pro se appeals by Tulsa County Jail detainee Marquice Donnell Savage against jail officials. The first appeal (No. 25-5067) challenged summary judgment on a Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim arising from a forced escort to restrictive housing after a verbal altercation. The second appeal (No. 25-5082) challenged dismissal of a separate civil-rights action for failure to timely serve two defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

The Tenth Circuit’s decision is styled as an “Order and Judgment” (nonprecedential except for law-of-the-case/res judicata/collateral estoppel), but it provides a tightly reasoned roadmap on (i) appellate jurisdiction limits driven by the notice of appeal, (ii) what a detainee must show to overcome qualified immunity on an excessive-force claim, and (iii) the plaintiff’s obligations to accomplish service in prisoner litigation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Jurisdiction narrowed by notice of appeal: The court held it lacked jurisdiction to review issues and defendants not designated in Mr. Savage’s notices of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B).
No. 25-5067 (excessive force / qualified immunity): Affirmed summary judgment for Officers Aaliyah Sanchez and Shyanne Dobbertin. The court concluded the record did not clearly demonstrate a constitutional violation attributable to either officer, emphasizing the lack of non-de-minimis injury and the failure to connect the alleged injury to the specific defendants’ conduct.
No. 25-5082 (service): Affirmed dismissal without prejudice of claims against Officer Dobbertin and Officer Lowry for failure to timely serve. The court found no abuse of discretion because it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to provide service addresses to the U.S. Marshal, and the case was exempt from initial disclosures.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Pro se construction—liberal, but not advocacy

The panel began with the familiar pro se principle from Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer: courts construe pro se filings liberally but “cannot take on the responsibility” of acting as counsel. This framing matters because the rest of the decision repeatedly places procedural and evidentiary burdens on the pro se appellant (notice of appeal precision, defendant-specific evidence, service).

Summary judgment fact rules and video/record contradiction

The court grounded its fact summary in Markley v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n (view evidence in the non-movant’s favor) but immediately qualified that approach with Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty.: where a party’s account is “blatantly contradicted by the record,” the court need not adopt it. This was applied when surveillance footage undercut Mr. Savage’s claim about bathroom access in the holding cell.

Verified complaint as evidence

To ensure the pro se plaintiff had the benefit of his sworn allegations, the panel relied on Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., which permits treating a verified complaint as an affidavit if it meets Rule 56 standards. Even with that evidentiary accommodation, the court found the record insufficient to overcome qualified immunity.

Notice of appeal as a jurisdictional boundary

The most consequential procedural holding is the court’s refusal to reach issues not designated in the notices of appeal, applying Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B) and quoting Smith v. Barry for the proposition that Rule 3’s requirements are “jurisdictional in nature.” The panel therefore declined to review multiple dismissals Mr. Savage argued in his briefs (e.g., dismissals of other defendants or claims), because they fell outside what he expressly appealed.

Qualified immunity framework on summary judgment

For the qualified-immunity analysis, the panel cited N.H. Ins. Co. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC (de novo review of summary judgment), then applied the Tenth Circuit’s qualified-immunity structure from Puller v. Baca: the plaintiff must show (1) a constitutional violation and (2) clearly established law. It reinforced the plaintiff’s “heavy two-part burden” with Medina v. Cram.

Excessive force requires more than de minimis injury

The panel relied on Cortez v. McCauley for the rule that an excessive-force claim requires “some actual injury that is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional.” On the record presented, the only objective injury identified by medical staff was a “half-centimeter, superficial laceration” to the thumb, and the court treated that as insufficient—especially because causation was not tied to either moving defendant.

Individual-capacity § 1983 liability demands defendant-specific conduct

The court quoted Brown v. Montoya for the importance—especially in § 1983 suits against multiple officials in their individual capacities—of alleging “exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom,” rather than relying on collective allegations. This principle did substantial work: even if force was used, Mr. Savage did not connect specific unlawful actions and resulting injury to Officers Sanchez or Dobbertin (as distinct from other officers).

Rule 4(m) dismissal and service obligations in prisoner cases

In the service appeal, the standard of review came from Espinoza v. United States (abuse of discretion), with deference defined by Okla. ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc.. On the merits, the key authority was Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary: it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the U.S. Marshal with the address of the person to be served. The panel used Fields to reject arguments that the court or a dismissed defendant had to solve the address problem for Mr. Savage.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Appellate jurisdiction: what you don’t designate, you can’t appeal

The court treated the notices of appeal as the outer boundary of its power. Although Mr. Savage briefed a wide array of grievances (screening dismissals, official-capacity rulings, dismissal of other parties for service failures), the panel applied Rule 3(c)(1)(B) strictly: only the orders he identified were reviewable. In doing so, the court conveyed a practice point with real bite in multi-order, multi-defendant litigation: an appellant must expressly capture each appealable decision intended for review, or the court will dismiss those issues for lack of jurisdiction rather than reach the merits.

(B) Excessive force and qualified immunity: injury + causation + defendant specificity

The panel’s qualified-immunity disposition in No. 25-5067 turned on three linked deficiencies:

Non-de-minimis injury: By invoking Cortez v. McCauley, the court required evidence of an actual injury that is not de minimis. The medical record documented no objective injury to wrists/arms/ankle, and only a small superficial thumb cut hours later.
Causation tied to the moving defendants: Even if the thumb laceration could qualify as injury, the court emphasized the absence of record evidence tracing that injury to the conduct of Officers Sanchez or Dobbertin.
Individualized participation: Under Brown v. Montoya, collective allegations (“they slammed,” “they dragged”) are inadequate to impose individual-capacity liability. Mr. Savage’s own summary of events attributed the most severe conduct (tackling/strangling) to a different officer, and his allegations did not distinguish the roles of Sanchez and Dobbertin with sufficient precision.

With those gaps, Mr. Savage could not carry the Puller v. Baca / Medina v. Cram burden to show a constitutional violation (and, independently, that the law was clearly established as applied to the specific defendants’ conduct).

(C) Rule 4(m) service: responsibility remains with the plaintiff, even with U.S. Marshal service

In No. 25-5082, the panel’s reasoning was straightforward:

Rule 4(m) permits dismissal when service is not completed on time.
Under Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary, the plaintiff must provide addresses for service to the U.S. Marshal. Mr. Savage did not, so nonservice was attributable to him rather than to the court.
The court rejected the argument that Sheriff Regalado had to provide addresses via initial disclosures, noting both (i) no authority requiring a dismissed defendant to do so and (ii) the case was exempt from initial disclosures because Mr. Savage was an unrepresented prisoner under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B)(iv).
The attempt to treat service on the sheriff as service on individual-capacity defendants failed because Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2) concerns service on “a state,” and the remaining claims were individual-capacity claims.

Applying the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard from Espinoza v. United States and Okla. ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the panel found no “clear error of judgment” by the district court.

3.3. Impact

Sharper pleading-and-proof discipline in multi-officer incidents: The decision underscores that even when force is alleged, a plaintiff must present evidence tying a concrete injury to each individual defendant’s conduct, not merely to a chaotic group event. This tends to increase the importance of incident reports, medical timing, video, and defendant-by-defendant narratives in detainee excessive-force cases.
“De minimis injury” remains a meaningful filter in the Tenth Circuit: By foregrounding Cortez v. McCauley and relying heavily on the medical record’s lack of objective findings, the opinion reinforces that minor or uncorroborated harms may be insufficient to reach a jury—particularly when qualified immunity is invoked.
Notice-of-appeal precision is outcome-determinative: The court’s strict application of Fed. R. App. P. 3 signals that litigants—especially pro se appellants—must carefully identify each challenged order/judgment. Briefing an issue cannot cure an inadequate notice if the order is not designated.
Service logistics in prisoner litigation: The ruling reiterates that Marshal service does not relieve a prisoner of the duty to provide usable service information. Practically, plaintiffs must seek addresses through permissible discovery mechanisms (when available), court-approved procedures, or publicly available sources, rather than relying on opposing parties’ disclosures—especially given Rule 26(a)(1)(B)(iv).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A doctrine that shields government officials sued in their personal capacities unless the plaintiff shows both (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the violated right was “clearly established” at the time. In practice, it often forces plaintiffs to produce defendant-specific evidence early (at summary judgment) rather than rely on broad allegations.
Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the court decides there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The nonmovant must point to evidence in the record; a verified complaint can sometimes serve as affidavit-like evidence (Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc.), but conclusory or collective assertions may not suffice.
De minimis injury: A harm considered too minor to support an excessive-force claim under the cited Tenth Circuit standard (Cortez v. McCauley). The court treated the record here—showing no objective injury except a small superficial cut—as insufficient to support liability against the moving officers.
Individual-capacity vs. official-capacity claims: Individual-capacity claims seek to hold an official personally liable for their own actions; they require proof of that individual’s participation and causation. Official-capacity claims generally target the government entity and involve different service rules and liability theories. The service arguments failed in part because the remaining claims were individual-capacity claims, not claims against “the state” under Rule 4(j)(2).
Rule 4(m) dismissal: If a defendant is not served within the time allowed, the district court may dismiss without prejudice. Even when the U.S. Marshal performs service for an in forma pauperis prisoner, the plaintiff must provide the information needed to accomplish service (Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary).
Notice of appeal (Rule 3): The document that identifies what order/judgment is being appealed. If it does not designate a particular order, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review it—an inflexible rule reinforced here using Smith v. Barry.

5. Conclusion

Savage v. Dobbertin affirms two defense-favorable outcomes by combining strict procedural gatekeeping with demanding merits standards. Procedurally, the Tenth Circuit confined its review to the orders designated in the notices of appeal, treating Rule 3 compliance as jurisdictional. On the merits, it reaffirmed that overcoming qualified immunity in a pretrial detainee excessive-force case requires evidence of non-de-minimis injury and a clear, defendant-specific causal link between each officer’s conduct and that injury. Separately, it reinforced that a prisoner-plaintiff must provide service addresses to the U.S. Marshal and cannot avoid dismissal under Rule 4(m) by invoking initial disclosures that do not apply to unrepresented prisoner cases.