“Sanctions and/or Internal Policy” Wire-Cancellation Notices: Truth-in-Context and Qualified Privilege Defeat Florida Defamation Claims

I. Introduction

Monarch Air Group, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (11th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026) (per curiam) arises from JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s (“Chase”) mid-2020 decision to place Monarch Air Group, LLC and its principal, David Gitman (collectively, “Monarch”), on an internal anti-money-laundering (“AML”) “interdiction” list. After that designation, Chase canceled attempted wire transfers from Chase customers to Monarch and informed customers that it could not execute the transactions “due to Sanctions and/or Internal JPMC Policy.”

Monarch sued for defamation (slander, libel, and defamation by implication) and tortious interference, alleging the notice falsely implied Monarch was subject to sanctions or OFAC action and damaged Monarch’s business relationships. The district court granted summary judgment for Chase, and Monarch appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full, addressing: (1) enforcement of a local rule governing statements of material facts; (2) whether the notice is actionable defamation under Florida law (including truth and qualified privilege); and (3) whether post-judgment relief was warranted under Rule 60(b)(3) based on alleged discovery misconduct.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Local Rule compliance: The district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Monarch’s statement of undisputed material facts for repeated noncompliance with S.D. Fla. R. 56.1(b)(1)(B) (single-fact numbered paragraphs).
  • Defamation—truth: The cancellation notice “due to Sanctions and/or Internal JPMC Policy” was true when read in full context because “A and/or B” is true if either A is true or B is true; and it was undisputed the cancellations occurred due to internal policy.
  • Defamation—qualified privilege (alternative holding): Even assuming arguendo ambiguity or falsity, Chase’s communications to its customers were protected by qualified privilege, and Monarch produced no record evidence of express malice sufficient to defeat that privilege.
  • Rule 60(b)(3): The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief from judgment; Monarch failed to show by clear and convincing evidence both misconduct and that it was prevented from fully presenting its case.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Local rules, deference, and summary-judgment procedure

  • Reese v. Herbert and Clark v. Hous. Auth.: The panel emphasized “great deference” to a district court’s interpretation and application of its local rules. This deference drove the affirmance of the district court’s decision to strike Monarch’s filings after repeated noncompliance with S.D. Fla. R. 56.1.
  • Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc.: Provided the “clear error of judgment” benchmark for abuse-of-discretion review, framing Monarch’s burden as high and unmet.
  • Zaklama v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr.: Reinforced that litigants ignore local rules “at their own peril,” supporting the legitimacy of sanctions like striking a noncompliant statement of facts.
  • U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc.: Supported the court’s refusal to entertain Monarch’s changed position on appeal after counsel accepted responsibility for the filing defects in the district court.

2. Summary judgment and the appellate record

  • Athos Overseas Ltd. Corp. v. YouTube, Inc. and Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp.: The panel reiterated de novo review of summary judgment but limited appellate consideration to the evidence that was actually before the district court at the time of decision—undercutting Monarch’s reliance on materials not in the summary-judgment record.
  • Terrell v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affs.: Allowed affirmance “on any ground supported by the record,” which mattered because the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on truth (a ground not relied upon by the district court) and, alternatively, on qualified privilege.
  • Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc.: Used to reject Monarch’s unsupported assertions; neither district nor appellate courts must comb the record to find evidence a party fails to cite.

3. Florida defamation elements, truth-in-context, and implication

  • Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp: Supplied the five-element Florida defamation framework, including falsity as a required element. It also contains Florida’s modern articulation of defamation by implication, which the panel noted but did not reach because Monarch did not press the theory on appeal.
  • Kieffer v. Atheists of Fla., Inc.: Provided two key propositions: (a) a plaintiff must show a false statement; and (b) truth/falsity is assessed by reading the alleged defamation “in full context of its publication.” The “full context” principle was pivotal to the panel’s treatment of “Sanctions and/or Internal JPMC Policy” as a single proposition, not severable fragments.
  • Perry v. Cosgrove: Cited for the proposition that an ambiguous statement “reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning” may be actionable absent privilege—setting up the court’s alternative privilege analysis.
  • Sapuppo v. Allstate Fla. Ins.: Used to reject Monarch’s attempt to revive defamation by implication in reply; arguments not raised in an opening brief are forfeited.

4. Qualified privilege and “express malice” under Florida law

  • Nodar v. Galbreath: Served as the Florida Supreme Court anchor for qualified privilege and for the requirement that a plaintiff show express malice to overcome it—i.e., the primary motive was to injure the plaintiff.
  • Am. Ideal Mgmt., Inc. v. Dale Vill., Inc. and Thomas v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc.: Provided the five-element qualified privilege formulation applied by the district court (speaker’s interest/duty, listener’s corresponding interest, proper occasion, proper manner, and good faith), which the panel approved.
  • Block v. Matesic: Cited to acknowledge doctrinal variation (four- vs. five-factor tests) while supporting the district court’s choice of framework.
  • Bravo v. United States: Used for the principle that, in diversity-linked state-law issues, the relevant Florida DCA’s approach matters; the Fourth DCA had jurisdiction over the county where suit was filed.
  • Abraham v. Baldwin: Quoted via Nodar v. Galbreath to emphasize that privilege tracks the “subject matter of the communication” (here, explaining a canceled transaction), not the plaintiff’s preferred characterization of motivations.
  • Coogler v. Rhodes: Provided the classic rule that express malice may be inferred from the language itself or proven by extrinsic circumstances.
  • Brown v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc. and Loeb v. Geronemus: Served as contrasts to show what “express malice” can look like when inferred from extreme, personalized, and inflammatory language—unlike the neutral operational notice at issue.
  • In re Home Depot Inc.: Allowed the panel to consider new appellate arguments on an issue preserved below (express malice), distinguishing “new arguments” from “new issues.”

5. Rule 60(b)(3) standards and limits

  • Maradiaga v. United States and Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat'l Ins.: Established the narrow scope of Rule 60(b) review—focused on the propriety of denying relief, not relitigating the merits.
  • Rice v. Ford Motor Co.: Reinforced that reversal requires a compelling justification such that the district court was required to grant relief.
  • Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff's Off.: Provided the two-part Rule 60(b)(3) test: clear and convincing evidence of misconduct and a showing that it prevented full presentation of the case.
  • Scutieri v. Paige: Supported denial of Rule 60(b) relief where a party had opportunities before judgment to seek additional time or relief but did not.
  • Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. and Burnside v. E. Airlines, Inc.: Reiterated that Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for a timely appeal.
  • United States v. Renfro and Egan v. Freedom Bank: Used to reject attempts to indirectly obtain appellate review of magistrate discovery orders absent timely Rule 72(a) objections.
  • Federal's Inc. v. Edmonton Inv. Co.: Quoted for the principle that Rule 60 does not rescue counsel from deliberate litigation choices later revealed to be unwise.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Enforcing S.D. Fla. R. 56.1: striking noncompliant fact statements

The Eleventh Circuit treated the Local Rule 56.1 dispute as an institutional competence issue: district courts manage summary-judgment records through strict, structured fact statements to avoid “invective,” legal conclusions masquerading as facts, and multi-fact paragraphs that obscure what is truly disputed. Against that backdrop, the panel found it decisive that:

  • Local Rule 56.1(b)(1) expressly requires single-fact numbered paragraphs and authorizes striking noncompliant statements under Rule 56.1(d).
  • The district court provided notice, examples of defective paragraphs, an opportunity to cure, and a warning of no further amendments.
  • Monarch did not meaningfully cure the identified defects, supporting the conclusion that enforcement was neither arbitrary nor a “clear error of judgment.”
  • Monarch failed to explain how the stricken statement would have altered the summary-judgment outcome, undermining any claim of prejudice.

2. “Sanctions and/or Internal JPMC Policy” as non-actionable defamation: truth-in-context

The opinion’s most concrete defamation holding is its treatment of the “and/or” construction. Applying Kieffer v. Atheists of Fla., Inc., the panel insisted the statement must be read as a whole rather than surgically isolating “due to Sanctions.” The court then gave “and/or” a binary-logic reading drawn from Garner's Dictionary of Legal Usage and the Oxford English Dictionary:

  • “A and/or B” is true if A is true, B is true, or both are true.
  • Therefore, “A and/or B” is false only if both A and B are false.

Because it was undisputed that Chase canceled wires to Monarch due to “Internal JPMC Policy” (placement on an internal interdiction list), the statement could not be false as a matter of law, defeating an essential element of defamation under Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp.

Notably, the panel also cautioned (without deciding) that a different theory—defamation by implication—can in some circumstances attach to literally true statements, but Monarch did not properly pursue that theory on appeal.

3. Alternative holding: qualified privilege and failure to show express malice

Even assuming arguendo that a reasonable recipient could interpret the notice as indicating OFAC-type sanctions, the panel held the communication was qualifiedly privileged and Monarch could not show abuse by express malice.

Privilege. Using the Am. Ideal Mgmt., Inc. v. Dale Vill., Inc. / Thomas v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc. framework, the panel’s reasoning was functional:

  • Speaker/listener interests: A bank has an interest in informing its customers why a transaction was canceled, and customers have a corresponding interest in understanding why their wire failed.
  • Proper occasion/manner: The notice was sent only when a transaction was canceled, privately to the affected account holders, and without naming Monarch.
  • Good faith: The privilege analysis itself carries a presumption of good faith (as recognized in Florida cases), and Monarch’s record-based challenges did not create a genuine dispute on the point.

The panel also stressed a recurring appellate constraint: Monarch relied on categories of evidence not in the summary-judgment record, which cannot be used to overturn summary judgment under Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp..

Express malice. Under Nodar v. Galbreath, Monarch had to show the primary motive was to injure. The panel rejected two attempted routes:

  • Malice inferred from language: The notice was vague and operational, unlike the extreme and personalized accusations in Brown v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc. and Loeb v. Geronemus.
  • Malice from “knowing falsity”: Monarch cited no summary-judgment record evidence that Chase believed the notice was false when made; indeed, record testimony reflected Chase’s belief in its truth.

4. Rule 60(b)(3): late production and privilege disputes did not warrant reopening

Applying Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff's Off., the panel held Monarch failed at least the second prong: it did not show the alleged misconduct prevented full presentation of its case. The timing mattered: the alleged conduct occurred before summary judgment, yet Monarch did not seek practical remedies typically used to protect the record (e.g., additional time, supplementation, a stay pending resolution). Under Scutieri v. Paige and Maradiaga v. United States, Rule 60(b) is not a vehicle to revisit strategic choices or to relitigate discovery disputes after judgment.

C. Impact

  • Defamation risk in compliance-driven customer notices: The decision strengthens defenses for banks and other regulated intermediaries communicating transaction failures tied to “sanctions” screening and internal compliance rules—especially where the notice is couched in disjunctive “and/or” terms and internal policy is indisputably a cause.
  • Drafting takeaway: While the court called “and/or” “clumsy,” it treated it as logically meaningful. Institutions may view this as litigation insulation, but the opinion also implicitly underscores that clearer phrasing (“due to internal policy,” “due to compliance review,” etc.) reduces misinterpretation risk.
  • Privilege doctrine in bank-customer communications: The qualified privilege holding (as an alternative ground) reinforces that transactional explanations to customers—narrowly distributed and tied to a concrete operational event—fit comfortably within Florida’s privilege doctrine absent evidence of a motive to injure.
  • Procedural discipline in S.D. Fla. summary judgment practice: The affirmance of striking repeated noncompliant Rule 56.1 statements signals that parties should treat S.D. Fla. R. 56.1 as outcome-relevant. A record can be effectively lost if not presented in the rule’s required format.
  • Post-judgment relief is hard to obtain: The Rule 60(b)(3) portion underscores that even arguable discovery shortcomings rarely justify reopening absent a concrete showing that the moving party was actually prevented from presenting the dispositive issues.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified privilege: A legal protection that can bar defamation liability when a statement is made in a context where the speaker and listener share legitimate interests (e.g., a bank explaining a canceled transaction). It does not require the statement to be flattering—only appropriately made.
  • Express malice (Florida defamation privilege doctrine): Not the same as “actual malice” in constitutional defamation law. Here it means the speaker’s primary motive was to injure the plaintiff; negligence or even harshness is not enough.
  • Truth “in context”: Courts evaluate the meaning of the whole publication, not isolated phrases. A plaintiff cannot create falsity by extracting the most damaging fragment.
  • “And/or” logic: The construction is treated as inclusive: “A and/or B” is false only when both A and B are false.
  • Defamation by implication: A doctrine (recognized in Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp) where even literally true statements can be actionable if arranged or omitted in a way that implies a defamatory meaning. The panel noted it but did not apply it because it was not properly pursued on appeal.
  • Rule 60(b)(3): A mechanism to set aside a judgment for fraud/misrepresentation/misconduct, but only on a strong showing—clear and convincing evidence—and proof that the conduct actually prevented full presentation of the case.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms a practical, defense-favorable approach to defamation claims arising from compliance-related transaction notices. First, a notice stating a transaction was canceled “due to Sanctions and/or Internal JPMC Policy” was held true because internal policy indisputably caused the cancellation and “and/or” is not falsified merely because one alternative might be disputed. Second, even if ambiguity could be imagined, the bank’s limited, customer-directed notice was protected by qualified privilege, and Monarch failed to produce record evidence of express malice. Finally, the opinion underscores procedural rigor: local-rule compliance at summary judgment and timely, targeted requests for relief are often determinative, and Rule 60(b)(3) is not a fallback for missed opportunities.