Safety-Valve Eligibility Requires Independent Judicial Factfinding (Not a Jury Verdict), but Deference Error May Be Harmless

Case: United States v. Roxanna Flores-Alvarado (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2026) (per curiam) (Not for Publication)
Posture: Appeal from the Northern District of Florida challenging (1) sufficiency of the evidence for cocaine conspiracy and possession-with-intent convictions and (2) denial of safety-valve relief at sentencing.

I. Introduction

Roxanna Flores-Alvarado was convicted of (a) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and (b) possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, after a traffic stop uncovered approximately four kilograms of cocaine in a vehicle she was driving with her boyfriend, Christian Mendez, as a passenger.

The core factual dispute at trial was knowledge: Flores-Alvarado maintained she believed Mendez was working in construction and did not know drugs were involved; the government relied heavily on circumstantial evidence (travel patterns, warning texts about police, photos, proximity to drugs, and testimony from cooperator Wuesley Pelaez-Vela) to show she knowingly and voluntarily joined the drug activity.

On appeal, Flores-Alvarado raised two issues:

• Sufficiency: whether the evidence proved she knew of and voluntarily joined the cocaine conspiracy (and knowingly possessed cocaine with intent to distribute).
• Sentencing legality: whether the district court erred by treating the jury’s verdict as binding when denying safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both the convictions and the 60-month sentence.

• Convictions affirmed: The court held that, viewing the evidence in the government’s favor, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Flores-Alvarado knowingly participated in the conspiracy and knowingly possessed cocaine with intent to distribute.
• Sentencing affirmed (harmless error): The court held the district court made a legal error by concluding it was bound by the jury’s verdict when assessing safety-valve eligibility, because safety-valve compliance requires independent judicial determination. The error was nonetheless harmless because the sentencing judge expressly stated that if the judge were the factfinder, the judge would find Flores-Alvarado knew she was involved in drug dealing—so the result would be unchanged on remand.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Sufficiency of the evidence framework

• United States v. Robertson (quoting United States v. Tinoco): Supplies the standard appellate lens—view evidence in the light most favorable to the government and credit verdict-supporting inferences.
• United States v. Defilippis, United States v. Trujillo (quoting United States v. Suba): Reiterates the controlling question—whether any rational trier of fact could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt; the government need not disprove every innocent hypothesis.
• United States v. Guevara (quoting United States v. Mieres-Borges): Confirms no special discounting of circumstantial evidence; direct and circumstantial evidence are evaluated under the same sufficiency test.
• United States v. Mendez: Adds the limiting principle—when relying on circumstantial proof, convictions must rest on reasonable inferences rather than speculation.

2. Elements of conspiracy and the “mere presence” caution

• United States v. Badolato: Provides the Eleventh Circuit’s familiar § 846 elements—(1) conspiracy, (2) knowledge, and (3) voluntary participation.
• United States v. Miranda: Establishes that mere presence/association is insufficient, but can be probative when combined with other evidence.
• United States v. Colston: Explains how juries may infer guilty knowledge—instrumentality to the plan, opportunities to learn the “critical fact,” and frequent contact with someone who knew it.

3. The defendant’s testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt if disbelieved

• United States v. Brown: Key doctrine—if a defendant testifies and the jury disbelieves the testimony, the jury may treat the denial as substantive evidence of guilt (the “opposite may be true” inference).
• United States v. Beaufils: Reinforces United States v. Brown in a modern Eleventh Circuit formulation.
• United States v. Murray and Globe Indem. Co. v. Richerson: Emphasize credibility allocation—juries can accept all, some, or none of a witness’s testimony.
• Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala.: Explains why former Fifth Circuit decisions like United States v. Murray and Globe Indem. Co. v. Richerson remain binding in the Eleventh Circuit.

4. Prosecutorial argument and curative instructions

• United States v. Almanzar and United States v. Verdeza: Supply the presumption that juries follow limiting instructions.
• United States v. Lopez (quoting United States v. Smith): States the remedial rule: improper statements in closing are often cured by instructing that lawyer arguments are not evidence.

5. Safety valve: who decides, what is required, and how errors are reviewed

• United States v. Pulido: Used rhetorically to frame the parties’ mismatch: the government argued clear-error review (factfinding), while Flores-Alvarado alleged a legal misunderstanding (de novo review).
• United States v. Little: Recognizes deferential clear-error review for sentencing factfinding—relevant only if the issue were factual rather than legal.
• United States v. Dubois and United States v. Defilippis: Support de novo review for statutory interpretation and legal questions at sentencing.
• United States v. Mathews: Establishes the “authority misapprehension” principle—sentencing courts err when they believe they lack discretion/authority that the law actually grants.
• Pulsifer v. United States: Cited for the structural point that the safety valve enables courts to impose lighter terms.
• United States v. Brownlee: Treats truthfulness/completeness of a safety-valve proffer as a factual finding for the district court.
• United States v. Espinosa: Holds it is error for a district court to defer to the government on truthfulness; the court must make the determination.
• United States v. Sherpa: Persuasive (Ninth Circuit) support for the specific proposition that safety-valve compliance is a separate judicial determination not required to match a jury’s findings.
• United States v. Johnson (quoting United States v. Yate): Defines § 3553(f)(5) as an affirmative disclosure duty—defendant must truthfully disclose all information about the offense and relevant conduct.

6. Harmless-error review at sentencing

• United States v. Rodriguez: Notes the government typically bears the burden to show harmlessness.
• United States v. Adams and United States v. Graham: Recognize the appellate court’s ability to raise harmlessness sua sponte, especially where it is “patently obvious,” and caution when harmlessness is uncertain.
• United States v. Keene and United States v. Robles: Provide the operative harmlessness logic—when the district court’s stated reasoning makes the result on remand certain, an error that would not change the outcome is harmless.

7. Plain-error standard (unpreserved objections)

• United States v. Utsick (as quoted in United States v. Defilippis): Supplies the four-part plain error framework for issues not raised below, relevant to Flores-Alvarado’s challenge to the prosecutor’s closing argument.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the evidence was sufficient

Applying the sufficiency standard from United States v. Trujillo and United States v. Suba, the court treated the record as a collection of mutually reinforcing circumstantial facts rather than a single dispositive “smoking gun.” The opinion identifies multiple inference-supporting strands:

• Travel and logistics: evidence that she drove with Mendez during trips linked to cocaine procurement, including border/checkpoint evidence.
• Proximity and transport: she was driving when four kilograms were found behind the driver’s seat, near her child.
• Warning texts: messages like “Babe, cops are outside… Be careful,” which the jury could interpret as countersurveillance or awareness of illicit activity.
• Photos and hotel context: pictures of money; her presence in a hotel room associated with drug packaging; and communications among conspirators.
• Witness testimony: Pelaez-Vela’s account that she accompanied Mendez to McAllen and was present during drug-related discussions.
• Credibility and adverse inference from her testimony: under United States v. Brown and United States v. Beaufils, the jury could treat her blanket denial of knowledge as evidence supporting knowledge if disbelieved.

Critically, the court used United States v. Miranda to acknowledge that “mere presence” is not enough, but then treated her actions (driving, warnings, contextual photographs, and repeated proximity to drug-related conduct) as the “something more” that converts presence into probative participation. And consistent with United States v. Colston, the court emphasized opportunities to discover the “critical fact” (that drugs were involved) and close contact with someone who knew it (Mendez), allowing an inference of knowledge.

2. Prosecutor’s closing argument did not warrant reversal

Flores-Alvarado argued the prosecutor improperly reframed culpability as “unreasonableness” rather than knowledge/voluntary participation. Because no contemporaneous objection was made, the court invoked plain-error review per United States v. Defilippis.

The court then resolved the issue largely through the curative-instruction line: under United States v. Almanzar and United States v. Verdeza, juries are presumed to follow instructions that counsel’s arguments are not evidence; and under United States v. Lopez (quoting United States v. Smith), improper closing statements are typically cured by such instructions. That doctrinal move allowed the panel to avoid an extended inquiry into the precise phrasing of the rebuttal argument.

3. The safety-valve legal error—and why it did not matter here

The opinion’s most concrete legal clarification concerns the institutional role in safety-valve determinations. The district court denied relief because the jury found knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, and the judge believed the jury verdict was “binding” on the truthfulness element of § 3553(f)(5). The Eleventh Circuit held that was a legal mistake.

The panel grounded that conclusion in:

• Statutory text and structure: § 3553(f) repeatedly assigns findings to “the court,” and does not incorporate jury determinations.
• Supreme Court framing: Pulsifer v. United States describes the safety valve as a mechanism enabling courts to impose lighter terms.
• Eleventh Circuit authority on who decides: United States v. Espinosa (no deference to government) and United States v. Brownlee (truthfulness/completeness is for the district court) support the principle that the judge must decide.
• Persuasive reinforcement: United States v. Sherpa explicitly states safety-valve compliance is a separate judicial determination not required to match a jury’s findings.
• Legal-error framing: Under United States v. Mathews, a court commits legal error when it mistakenly believes it lacks authority to grant relief.

Even so, the panel affirmed on harmless-error grounds. The district court did not merely rely on the jury; it also stated on the record that if it were the factfinder it “would find” she knew she was assisting drug dealing. Under United States v. Keene and United States v. Robles, when the district judge’s stated view makes the remand outcome certain, the legal error does not affect substantial rights and is harmless. The panel also relied on its discretion to consider harmlessness sua sponte under United States v. Adams, noting harmlessness was “clear,” consistent with the cautionary framing in United States v. Graham.

C. Impact

1. Sentencing practice: safety valve is a judge’s call—even after a guilty verdict

The opinion reinforces (and operationalizes) a practical sentencing rule: safety-valve eligibility is not mechanically foreclosed by the jury’s guilty verdict. The sentencing court must independently decide whether the defendant met the affirmative disclosure obligation of United States v. Johnson (quoting United States v. Yate), even when that inquiry overlaps with contested trial facts (e.g., knowledge).

That said, the harmless-error affirmance also signals a litigation reality: where the sentencing judge clearly indicates the same adverse factual finding would be made independently, appellate relief may be unavailable even if the judge misstated the “bound by jury” rationale.

2. Trial strategy: defendant testimony can be a double-edged sword

The sufficiency analysis underscores the continuing importance of United States v. Brown: when a defendant testifies and denies knowledge, the jury’s disbelief may become affirmative evidence of guilt. In close knowledge cases built on circumstantial evidence, this doctrine can materially increase the risk of conviction.

3. Prosecutorial-argument challenges: instructions remain a powerful shield

The panel’s reliance on United States v. Almanzar, United States v. Verdeza, and United States v. Lopez suggests that absent a preserved objection and demonstrable prejudice, closing-argument complaints will often be neutralized by standard jury instructions.

Note on precedential weight: The decision is labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” which typically limits its binding precedential force. Nonetheless, its reasoning may be cited as persuasive authority and as an indicator of how the Eleventh Circuit applies established safety-valve and harmless-error doctrines to common trial-and-sentencing fact patterns.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Sufficiency of the evidence” review: The appellate court does not re-try the case. It asks only whether a reasonable jury could have convicted when viewing the evidence in the prosecution’s favor.
• Circumstantial evidence: Proof by inference (texts, travel patterns, photos, proximity), not direct admission. The law treats it as fully valid if the inferences are reasonable and not speculative.
• Drug “conspiracy” (21 U.S.C. § 846): An agreement to commit a drug offense plus knowledge of that agreement and voluntary participation. You do not need to handle drugs personally to be guilty.
• “Mere presence” doctrine: Being near criminals or drugs is not automatically guilt; but presence combined with actions that advance the scheme (driving, warnings, repeated involvement) can support conviction.
• Safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)): A statutory escape hatch from mandatory minimums for certain drug defendants who meet all criteria—including, importantly here, truthfully telling the government everything they know about the offense and related conduct.
• Harmless error: Even if a judge makes a legal mistake, an appellate court may affirm if the mistake would not change the result (e.g., the judge would deny relief anyway based on independent findings).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Roxanna Flores-Alvarado delivers two principal takeaways. First, convictions for drug conspiracy and possession may be sustained on layered circumstantial proof—particularly when the jury can reasonably infer knowledge from conduct and context and can treat a disbelieved denial as substantive evidence under United States v. Brown. Second, and more distinctly, safety-valve eligibility under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) requires independent judicial factfinding; a sentencing court errs by treating a jury verdict as “binding” on the safety-valve truthfulness inquiry. Yet the case also illustrates the limiting doctrine of harmless error: when the sentencing judge makes clear the same factual findings would be made independently, appellate courts may affirm despite the legal misstatement.