SafeSport Arbitration Review: Investigative Reports and Hearsay May Support Discipline Without Violating Fundamental Fairness

1. Introduction

French v. U.S. Center for SafeSport (10th Cir. Apr. 3, 2026) arose from the U.S. Center for SafeSport’s decision to suspend its former president, Linda French, for five years (followed by a two-year probationary period). The Center concluded she violated internal rules by (i) failing to promptly report allegations of sexual abuse, (ii) retaliating against an employee for reporting abuse (by firing the employee), and (iii) failing to redact private identifying information when producing materials to Congress.

The SafeSport disciplinary determination was subject to arbitration under 36 U.S.C. § 220541(c)(1). The SafeSport Code required the arbitrator to give an investigative report “appropriate weight” (Rule 26(b)) and permitted consideration of hearsay (Rule 26(a)). After the arbitrator upheld the suspension, Ms. French sought to overturn the outcome in federal court; the district court confirmed the award, and she appealed.

The central appellate question was narrow: not whether SafeSport’s factual conclusions were correct, but whether the arbitrator committed prejudicial misconduct or failed to provide a fundamentally fair hearing—the limited grounds on which a federal court may set aside an arbitration award.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. It held that:

  • The arbitrator did not commit misconduct or deny a fundamentally fair hearing by considering the Center’s investigative report, even if it contained hearsay, because the SafeSport Code expressly allowed hearsay and required “appropriate weight” to the report.
  • The appellate court would not reweigh evidence or second-guess the arbitrator’s choice to credit the report over Ms. French’s testimony.
  • Ms. French did not establish unfairness based on the absence of a transcript/recording, particularly where the rules allowed her to request recording but she did not do so (Rule 28(g)(ii)).
  • The arbitrator did not shift the burden of proof; the arbitrator stated and applied a “preponderance of the evidence” standard with the Center bearing the burden.
  • The district court’s discussion regarding the absence of testimony from a former employee (Alistair Casey) did not render the proceedings unfair; and Ms. French’s arguments about not wanting that testimony undercut any claim of prejudice.

The panel emphasized that it was applying an intentionally deferential review typical of arbitration confirmation proceedings, and it declined to revisit credibility determinations or evidentiary weight.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion situates the dispute within well-established Tenth Circuit arbitration doctrine: courts do not decide whether the arbitrator got the “right” answer; they decide whether the arbitration process fell below minimum fairness or violated specific statutory vacatur grounds. The cited cases supply the legal scaffolding for that limited review.

THI of New Mexico at Vida Encantada, LLC v. Lovato, 864 F.3d 1080 (10th Cir. 2017)

The panel cited THI of New Mexico at Vida Encantada, LLC v. Lovato for the standards of appellate review of a district court’s decision confirming an award: de novo for legal questions and clear error for factual findings. This framing matters because it underscores that the appeal is not a second arbitration; it is a constrained review of the confirmation decision, itself bounded by arbitration law’s narrow vacatur standards.

Sterling Colo. Beef Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7, 767 F.3d 718 (10th Cir. 1985)

Sterling Colo. Beef Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7 is used for a core limitation: courts do not review “asserted errors” in witness credibility or the “weight to be given” testimony. In French, that principle foreclosed Ms. French’s attempt to re-litigate whether her live testimony should have been credited over the investigative report.

Amalgamated Butcher Workmen v. Capitol Packing Co., 413 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1969)

The opinion quotes Amalgamated Butcher Workmen v. Capitol Packing Co. (via Sterling) to reinforce the same point: arbitral factfinding—credibility and evidentiary weight—is generally insulated from judicial second-guessing. This line of authority provides the doctrinal answer to the appellant’s “the arbitrator relied on the wrong evidence” theory: that contention is ordinarily not a vacatur ground.

ARW Expl. Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995)

The panel cited ARW Expl. Corp. v. Aguirre for the “narrow standard of review” in arbitration challenges, particularly where the movant alleges procedural defects. In effect, ARW supports the opinion’s posture that only prejudicial procedural problems—those that compromise fundamental fairness—justify vacatur.

Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1994)

Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. supplies the court’s operative definition of a “fundamentally fair hearing”: (i) notice, (ii) opportunity to be heard and present relevant/material evidence and argument, and (iii) decisionmakers not infected with bias. The panel uses this definition to reject Ms. French’s claim that reliance on the investigative report and out-of-court statements (including Casey’s) automatically created unfairness. The focus is functional: whether she had a meaningful chance to present her position—not whether the arbitration mirrored trial procedures like cross-examination in every instance.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The court treated the SafeSport Code as controlling arbitral procedure

A key move in the reasoning is the court’s reliance on the parties’ agreed-upon procedural framework: the SafeSport Code. The arbitrator’s consideration of the investigative report was not an ad hoc choice; it was required by Rule 26(b), which directed the arbitrator to give the report “appropriate weight.” When the governing rules require a specific evidentiary input, arguing that the arbitrator committed “misconduct” by considering that input becomes difficult—particularly under the FAA’s narrow vacatur standards.

(b) Hearsay objections carried little force because the rules permitted hearsay

Ms. French characterized the investigative report as hearsay and argued it should not have been considered. The court answered in a rule-based way: the SafeSport Code (Rule 26(a)) permitted consideration of hearsay. In arbitration, evidentiary rules are often relaxed by agreement or by arbitral rules; the panel treated that contractual/rule-based choice as dispositive for purposes of assessing “misconduct” or “fundamental fairness.”

(c) No transcript/record created an appellate vacuum, and the court refused to fill it

Ms. French emphasized she testified and disagreed with the report, but the court noted there was no recording/transcript. Critically, the opinion points out she had the option to request recording (Rule 28(g)(ii)) and did not. Without a record, the appellate court could not compare testimony with the report—and even if it could, Sterling would bar reweighing credibility and evidentiary weight. The combination of (i) no record and (ii) deference to arbitral factfinding effectively foreclosed this line of attack.

(d) The burden-of-proof “shift” argument failed on the face of the award

The panel rejected the contention that the arbitrator shifted the burden to Ms. French because the arbitrator expressly stated the Center needed to “prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence” and applied that standard. This is a straightforward application of the principle that an alleged procedural flaw must be real and prejudicial—not merely a disagreement with how the arbitrator evaluated the evidence.

(e) The Casey cross-examination theory did not establish fundamental unfairness

Ms. French argued that the investigative report included out-of-court statements by former employee Alistair Casey and that she lacked an opportunity to cross-examine him. The panel addressed the district court’s reasoning about subpoena/absence of testimony and concluded no prejudice was shown—indeed, Ms. French’s assertion that she did not want Casey to testify made the complaint “self-defeating.” The court’s treatment reflects a pragmatic view of fairness: if the party neither sought the witness’s testimony nor wanted it, the alleged inability to cross-examine is unlikely to amount to a denial of fundamental fairness.

3.3. Impact

Although the disposition is labeled an “Order and Judgment” and “not binding precedent” (except under law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), the opinion has persuasive implications in three interconnected areas:

  • SafeSport disciplinary arbitrations: The decision signals judicial comfort with SafeSport’s model that centers the investigative report and permits hearsay. Parties challenging SafeSport discipline will likely face an uphill battle if the arbitrator followed Code-based procedures and articulated the correct burden of proof.
  • FAA vacatur boundaries in “quasi-administrative” sport governance: The opinion reinforces that even when allegations are serious and consequences significant, federal courts remain constrained by 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) and “fundamental fairness,” not free-ranging review of evidentiary sufficiency.
  • Practical litigation incentives: The court’s emphasis on the absence of a transcript/record (where recording was available upon request) encourages future parties to create a record if they anticipate judicial review. Without it, appellate arguments about what testimony showed (or how it undercut an investigative report) are structurally weakened.

In short, the opinion tends to fortify the finality of SafeSport arbitral outcomes when the process aligns with the SafeSport Code and when the complaining party cannot demonstrate concrete, prejudicial procedural denial.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Arbitration confirmation: After an arbitrator decides, the winning party can ask a federal court to “confirm” the award, turning it into a court judgment. Courts usually confirm unless a narrow statutory ground for vacatur is proven.
  • 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (prejudicial misconduct): A ground to vacate an award if the arbitrator’s procedural handling was unfair in a way that harmed a party (for example, refusing to hear material evidence without justification). It is not a license to reargue the merits.
  • Fundamentally fair hearing: Not a full trial with all courtroom rules. Under Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., it generally means notice, a meaningful chance to present evidence/argument, and neutral decisionmakers.
  • Hearsay in arbitration: “Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth. Courts often exclude hearsay at trial, but arbitration rules frequently allow it. Here, the SafeSport Code expressly permitted it (Rule 26(a)).
  • “Appropriate weight” to an investigative report: This does not necessarily mean the report is automatically dispositive, but it does mean the arbitrator is directed to consider it meaningfully. The court treated compliance with this instruction as consistent with fairness and the agreed rules.

5. Conclusion

French v. U.S. Center for SafeSport reinforces a rule of practical importance in SafeSport and similar rule-governed arbitrations: when the governing code requires consideration of an investigative report and permits hearsay, an arbitrator’s reliance on that report—without more—does not constitute “misconduct” or deny a “fundamentally fair hearing.” The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning is anchored in deference to arbitral process, the parties’ adopted procedural rules, and the limited vacatur grounds recognized under federal arbitration law. The opinion’s broader message is that challenges framed as evidentiary disputes (weight, credibility, or preference for live testimony over investigative materials) will rarely succeed absent a concrete showing of prejudice and procedural unfairness.