Rule 7.7 Reciprocal Discipline: Selling v. Radford Is Inapplicable and Relitigation Is Barred; Disbarment for Reckless False Attacks on Judicial Integrity

1. Introduction

In STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. LOWERY, 2026 OK 50, the Oklahoma Supreme Court imposed reciprocal disbarment under Rule 7.7, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP) after the Illinois Supreme Court disbarred Oklahoma lawyer Margaret Jean Lowery for misconduct centered on false statements to a tribunal and reckless false public accusations against judges and the Illinois Supreme Court.

The key issues were (1) the scope of Oklahoma’s review in a reciprocal-discipline proceeding; (2) whether the respondent could use Oklahoma proceedings to relitigate Illinois findings by asserting jurisdictional, due process, ADA, evidentiary, and “fraud on the tribunal” claims; and (3) the appropriate sanction in Oklahoma given the Illinois disbarment, respondent’s prior Oklahoma discipline, and aggravating factors.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court disbarred Respondent in Oklahoma. It held that the Illinois disbarment record constituted prima facie evidence of professional misconduct and that Respondent’s filings in Oklahoma largely sought impermissible relitigation of issues already resolved in Illinois.

Substantively, the Court found Respondent’s conduct violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.2(a), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c), ORPC and Rule 1.3, RGDP, based on (a) a false statement in a pleading accusing Judge Gleeson of threatening her and (b) multiple social media posts recklessly asserting false, inflammatory accusations against Judge Gleeson, retired Chief Justice Anne Burke, and the Illinois Supreme Court.

Procedurally, the Court denied Respondent’s request for an evidentiary hearing, emphasizing that Rule 7.7 review is not a vehicle to retry the underlying foreign discipline. The Court also rejected Respondent’s reliance on Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917), concluding it does not apply to a state reciprocal discipline proceeding predicated on another state’s discipline.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Regulatory authority, standard of proof, and de novo review

  • State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Wintory, 2015 OK 25, 350 P.3d 131: Cited for Oklahoma’s responsibility to regulate the practice of law and, later, for the proposition that sanctions for lack of candor, misrepresentations, and false statements range broadly “from no discipline to disbarment.” This framed both the Court’s authority and the sanctioning spectrum.
  • State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Bellamy, 2012 OK 20, 273 P.3d 56: Used to reiterate that discipline is primarily for protection of the public and purification of the Bar, not punishment—an organizing principle later used to justify disbarment as protective rather than retributive.
  • State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Mansfield, 2015 OK 22, 350 P.3d 108: Cited for the requirement that charges be established by clear and convincing evidence.
  • State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Cooley, 2013 OK 42, 304 P.3d 453: Cited for de novo review of Rule 7 proceedings—important because the Court clarifies that “de novo” review in this posture does not mean relitigation of the foreign record.

Limits of Rule 7.7 hearings and the non-relitigation principle

  • State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Auer, 2016 OK 75, 376 P.3d 243: Central to the Court’s refusal to reopen factual disputes. The opinion relies on Auer’s rule that the purpose of an evidentiary hearing in reciprocal discipline is not to relitigate the facts but to assess whether the foreign discipline is unsupported by the evidence. This case supplies the doctrinal “gatekeeping” limiting what Respondent may contest.

Due process framing in Oklahoma discipline

  • State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Boyd, 2025 OK 30, 571 P.3d 105: Cited for Oklahoma’s due process baseline: sufficient notice of charges and an opportunity to respond. The Court uses Boyd to reject Respondent’s “locked out”/ADA/due process narrative by focusing on notice and opportunity—even if Respondent chose not to participate.

Attorney control of litigation and ADA accommodation requests

  • Watson v. Gibson Capital, 2008 OK 56, 187 P.3d 735: Cited to emphasize that while counsel remains counsel of record, counsel is “magjister litis—the master of the client’s litigation.” This supported denying Respondent’s requested ADA accommodations tied to filings and format because counsel bore responsibility, and the Court also noted Respondent’s extensive pro se filings as evidence she could comply.

Reciprocal discipline discretion and proportionality

  • State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Hyde, 2017 OK 59, 397 P.3d 1286 (quoting State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Patterson, 2001 OK 51, 28 P.3d 551): Provides the governing reciprocal-discipline principle: Oklahoma may impose the same, greater, or lesser discipline, and it seeks consistency with sanctions imposed for similar misconduct.

Sanction comparators on dishonesty and attacks on judicial integrity

  • State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Akins, 1993 OK 78, 882 P.2d 1054: A comparator illustrating the seriousness of filing documents known to be false; the Court cites Akins for the duty not to present facts a lawyer knows are false, supporting severe sanctions for Rule 3.3 violations.
  • State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Durbin, 2025 OK 77, 579 P.3d 653: The most salient comparator. Durbin involved social media and public statements accusing judges and the judiciary of corruption and other grave misconduct, resulting in disbarment for violations including Rules 8.2(a), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c). The Court uses Durbin to demonstrate that reckless false public attacks on judicial integrity can warrant the profession’s highest sanction.
  • State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Moon, 2012 OK 77, 295 P.3d 1: Cited for the Court’s obligation to safeguard the public, the courts, and the profession, and preserve confidence in the bar—supporting the conclusion that disbarment is necessary where conduct undermines public trust.

Mitigation/aggravation framework

  • State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Kinsey, 2009 OK 31, 212 P.3d 1186: Reiterates protective (not punitive) goals of discipline.
  • State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Stewart, 2003 OK 13, 71 P.3d 1: Supports weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances to arrive at the appropriate sanction.

Respondent’s prior related discipline

  • State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Lowery, 2023 OK 54, 531 P.3d 99: The Court highlights that Respondent was previously reciprocally suspended for similar misconduct originating in Illinois—making the current case an escalation driven by repetition and failure to reform.
  • In the Matter of Margaret Jean Lowery, M.R. 031506, 2023: The initiating Illinois discipline that set the stage for Oklahoma’s earlier reciprocal action and later served as an aggravator showing a pattern of similar misconduct.

Respondent’s attempted reliance on federal reciprocal discipline doctrine

  • Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917): The Court’s most explicit “new law” clarification concerns Selling. While Selling articulates factors for federal courts considering disbarment predicated on a state disbarment, Oklahoma held Selling “is not applicable here” because this case involves state reciprocal discipline predicated on another state’s disbarment, governed by Oklahoma’s RGDP framework.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) The structure of reciprocal discipline under Rule 7.7

The Court treats the foreign discipline record—certified copies of the Illinois Supreme Court order and board recommendations—as prima facie evidence of misconduct. Rule 7.7 limits what the respondent may introduce: evidence only that the other jurisdiction’s discipline was not supported by the evidence or does not furnish sufficient grounds for discipline in Oklahoma. In line with State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Auer, the Court stresses the process is not meant to “retry” the foreign matter.

(B) Denial of an evidentiary hearing

Respondent sought a hearing, but the Court emphasized Rule 7.7(d) is discretionary (“may refer”) and found a hearing unnecessary because Respondent’s submissions were aimed at relitigation rather than demonstrating evidentiary insufficiency. The Court therefore denied the hearing request.

(C) Findings of misconduct under Oklahoma rules

Oklahoma mapped the Illinois findings onto Oklahoma’s ethics rules:

  • Rule 3.3(a)(1), ORPC (candor toward the tribunal): Respondent made a false statement in a pleading accusing Judge Gleeson of threatening to make her “homeless and living under a bridge,” which the Illinois factfinders rejected as false based on credible testimony.
  • Rule 8.2(a), ORPC (false/reckless statements about judicial integrity): Respondent’s pleading accusation and her social media posts recklessly impugned a judge, a retired chief justice, and the state supreme court.
  • Rule 8.4(c), ORPC (dishonesty/misrepresentation): The false pleading statement and false social media accusations were treated as dishonest conduct.
  • Rule 8.4(a), ORPC and Rule 1.3, RGDP: Derivative and catchall provisions capturing rule violations and conduct bringing discredit on the profession.

(D) Rejection of Respondent’s “void order” defenses (jurisdiction, due process/ADA, evidence, fraud)

The Court did not treat these as open-ended invitations to attack the Illinois process. It reviewed them to the extent necessary and found them meritless:

  • Jurisdiction: Illinois retained authority under Illinois rules; Respondent’s “retirement status” did not strip jurisdiction, particularly because she retained an active license elsewhere (Oklahoma), which Illinois rules treat as disqualifying for permanent retirement insulation.
  • Due process / ADA: Applying Oklahoma’s due process baseline from State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Boyd, the Court found Respondent had notice and an opportunity to be heard; the record reflected that remote participation was offered, and Respondent chose not to appear.
  • Sufficiency of evidence: Respondent’s claim that the ARDC did not prove ownership of the X account failed because the Illinois factfinders found she admitted making the posts.
  • Fraud on the tribunal: Respondent’s assertion that no certified transcripts existed was itself false; a certified transcript was in the record.

(E) Clarification regarding Selling v. Radford

Respondent attempted to import Selling’s three-factor federal reciprocal disbarment framework. The Court squarely held: Selling is not applicable because Selling governs federal bar disbarment predicated on a state disbarment, whereas this case concerns Oklahoma’s state reciprocal-discipline process predicated on another state’s disbarment and controlled by Rule 7.7, RGDP. Even so, the Court briefly addressed and rejected the types of defects Selling discusses (jurisdiction, due process, evidentiary support) on the merits.

(F) Sanction selection: why disbarment (and not another reciprocal variation)

Under State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Hyde (quoting State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Patterson), Oklahoma could match or vary from Illinois’s sanction. The Court chose to match it because of:

  • Gravity and persistence of the misconduct (false statements in court filings and widespread public accusations).
  • A strong aggravator: recency and similarity to Respondent’s prior discipline noted in State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Lowery, 2023 OK 54.
  • Lack of remorse, refusal to accept responsibility, and continued portrayal of herself as a victim rather than showing rehabilitation.
  • Risk of harm to individuals impugned and to the justice system’s legitimacy—echoing the concerns underpinning disbarment in State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Durbin, 2025 OK 77.

3.3. Impact

  • Reciprocal discipline is streamlined, not retriable: The opinion reinforces that Rule 7.7 review is limited; respondents cannot transform reciprocal proceedings into collateral attacks on another jurisdiction’s factual findings. The Court’s reliance on State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Auer makes the “no relitigation” principle central to Oklahoma reciprocal practice.
  • Selling v. Radford is not the governing framework for Oklahoma’s interstate reciprocity: The Court’s express inapplicability holding will likely be cited to reject attempts to federalize Oklahoma’s Rule 7.7 procedure.
  • Social media accusations against the judiciary carry severe professional risk: By aligning with State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Durbin, 2025 OK 77, the Court continues a trajectory where reckless false public attacks on judicial integrity—especially repeated after prior discipline—can warrant disbarment.
  • Repeat misconduct is a decisive aggravator: The Court treated the short interval between the prior reciprocal suspension and later similar misconduct as a powerful indicator of non-rehabilitation, increasing the likelihood that future cases will emphasize escalation when prior discipline fails to deter.
  • Procedural accommodation requests will be scrutinized against counsel’s role and demonstrated capacity: By invoking Watson v. Gibson Capital and noting Respondent’s extensive filings, the Court signals that accommodation arguments may be undermined where the record shows functional ability (or where counsel of record can comply).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Reciprocal discipline (Rule 7.7, RGDP)
A process where Oklahoma decides what discipline to impose after another jurisdiction has disciplined the same lawyer. Oklahoma does not automatically rubber-stamp the foreign result, but it starts from the foreign order as strong evidence and limits what may be contested.
“Prima facie evidence” in reciprocal cases
The certified foreign order and supporting reports are enough to establish misconduct unless the respondent shows a legally recognized reason Oklahoma should not follow it (e.g., truly unsupported evidence or insufficient grounds under Oklahoma rules).
Rule 3.3(a)(1) (candor to the tribunal)
Lawyers cannot knowingly make false statements to a court or tribunal. Filing a pleading with a false factual accusation can violate this rule.
Rule 8.2(a) (statements about judges)
Lawyers may criticize the judiciary, but they cannot make statements they know are false—or make them with reckless disregard for whether they are true—about a judge’s integrity or qualifications.
Rule 8.4(c) (dishonesty/misrepresentation)
Broadly prohibits dishonest conduct by a lawyer, including false accusations and misrepresentations in filings or public statements.
De novo review in discipline
Oklahoma independently evaluates the matter, but in reciprocal cases that independent evaluation occurs within Rule 7.7’s limited scope; it is not a complete redo of the other state’s trial.
Selling v. Radford
A U.S. Supreme Court case about when a federal court may disbar an attorney based on a state disbarment. Oklahoma held that framework does not govern Oklahoma’s state-to-state reciprocal discipline under Rule 7.7 (though similar fairness concepts may still be considered).

5. Conclusion

STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. LOWERY, 2026 OK 50, strengthens Oklahoma reciprocal discipline doctrine in three principal ways: (1) it reaffirms that Rule 7.7 proceedings are not for relitigation and hearings are discretionary and limited to evidentiary-support questions; (2) it expressly holds Selling v. Radford is inapplicable to Oklahoma’s interstate reciprocal discipline; and (3) it confirms that reckless false allegations impugning judicial integrity—especially repeated after prior discipline and accompanied by lack of remorse—can warrant disbarment to protect the public and preserve confidence in the justice system.