Rule 65B Cannot Be Used to Bypass Statutory Standing; Mandamus-Like Relief Under Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) Targets Nonperformance, Not Alleged Misperformance

Introduction

In ERDA Community Association, Inc. v. Baugh, 2025 UT 56, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether incorporation sponsors and allied individuals (the “sponsors”) could use a petition for extraordinary relief under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B to stop a large annexation—nearly 8,000 acres—out of the newly incorporated City of Erda and into Grantsville City.

The sponsors challenged (1) the statutory validity of Six Mile Ranch’s annexation petition (alleged noncompliance with Utah Code annexation requirements) and (2) the constitutionality of the 2020 annexation-code provision that permitted annexation activity affecting areas proposed for incorporation.

The district court dismissed for lack of standing. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, but on different grounds: the sponsors failed to fit their claims within Rule 65B’s limited function and prerequisites.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Statutory claims: The sponsors conceded they lacked statutory standing to enforce annexation-code requirements. The Court held they could not use Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) to circumvent that legislative limitation because they did not show the rule applies where an official has performed the required act but allegedly performed it incorrectly, and they did not establish that such relief is otherwise within the judiciary’s constitutional writ authority.
  • Constitutional claims: Rule 65B relief is available only where “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy” exists. Because Utah law allows constitutional challenges without statutory standing (as clarified in related Court of Appeals decisions), the sponsors had an available remedy via a declaratory judgment action; thus, extraordinary relief was barred.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Statutory standing and the “statutory claimant” framework

The decision rests heavily on recent Utah standing doctrine distinguishing statutory claims from constitutional/common-law claims:

  • Bleazard v. City of Erda, 2024 UT 17: The Court used Bleazard to reaffirm that when a claim is “based entirely” on alleged noncompliance with a statute, statutory standing is mandatory, meaning the plaintiff must fall within the class the legislature authorized to sue. The Court also relied on Bleazard to reiterate that declaratory relief does not evade that requirement when the claim is rooted in statute.
  • McKitrick v. Gibson, 2021 UT 48: Cited for the proposition that statutory standing is required for statutory claimants and is not “excused” by showing traditional or alternative standing.
  • Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78: Used to emphasize Utah courts “rarely, if ever” infer an implied private right of action, underscoring the Court’s reluctance to expand the legislatively authorized class of statutory enforcers.
  • Summit County v. Town of Hideout, 2024 UT 39: Cited to explain that a declaratory judgment plaintiff must have a “legally protectible interest,” and when the controversy is “rooted in statute,” that interest generally exists only if the legislature provided an express or implied right of action.

2) Rule 65B, mandamus lineage, and constitutional writ authority

The Court framed Rule 65B as procedural “machinery” implementing constitutionally granted writ power rather than as a source of substantive causes of action:

  • State v. Rippey, 2024 UT 45: Quoted to distinguish procedural rules from substantive law; rules cannot create private rights of action.
  • Patterson v. State, 2021 UT 52, and State v. Durand, 104 P. 760 (Utah 1908): Cited to locate extraordinary writ authority in the Utah Constitution and to highlight its historical pedigree.
  • State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88: Used to describe Rule 65B as a consolidated “repository” for extraordinary writs, replacing common-law forms without diminishing availability—but still requiring the petitioner to fit within the writ’s proper scope.
  • Hogs R Us v. Town of Fairfield, 2009 UT 21, and Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995): Cited to confirm that Rule 65B(d)(2) is the modern equivalent of mandamus, traditionally aimed at compelling performance of a legal duty.
  • State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Barrett, 2005 UT 88: Quoted for the mandamus limitation: courts may compel exercise of discretion but not dictate the outcome of discretionary judgment. (The Supreme Court did not fully adopt this framing here; it used it as context for the Recorder’s argument.)

3) The sponsors’ cited cases and why they did not carry the day

The sponsors argued that Utah courts can issue writs to “undo” actions, citing several cases. The Supreme Court distinguished them as procedurally and doctrinally inapposite:

  • Walker Bank & Tr. Co. v. Taylor, 390 P.2d 592 (Utah 1964): direct appeal from declaratory judgment, not Rule 65B(d)(2)(B).
  • Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986): direct appeal from injunction.
  • Cox v. Laycock, 2015 UT 20: writ under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) (abuse of discretion/jurisdiction), not (d)(2)(B).
  • Walker v. Weber County, 973 P.2d 927 (Utah 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Burr v. City of Orem, 2013 UT 57: writ under Rule 65B(c), not (d)(2)(B).
  • Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89: judicial review authorized by a specific statute (initiative context), not a demonstration that (d)(2)(B) broadly reopens statutory enforcement.

4) Constitutional claims and the availability of declaratory relief

For the constitutional claims, the Court treated recent Court of Appeals decisions as clarifying that lack of statutory standing does not bar constitutional challenges:

  • Erda Cmty. Ass'n v. Grantsville City, 2024 UT App 126: Held statutory standing applies only to statutory claims; constitutional claims proceed under traditional standing. The Supreme Court relied on this to conclude an adequate remedy existed outside Rule 65B.
  • Erda Cmty. Ass'n v. Grantsville City, 2024 UT App 161: Reached the same result, remanding constitutional claims for further proceedings.
  • Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18: Cited in a footnote for “alternative standing” (great public interest), part of the general standing vocabulary surrounding the litigation.

5) Appellate briefing adequacy as a decisive limiter

The Court also grounded its holding in the sponsors’ failure to develop a legally supported theory fitting their request within Rule 65B or constitutional writ power:

  • Pinder v. Duchesne Cnty. Sherriff, 2020 UT 68: Conclusory arguments do not satisfy the requirement for reasoned analysis.
  • Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2: Failure to give adequate attention to an issue usually fails the burden of persuasion.

Legal Reasoning

1) The statutory-claims pathway: “no remedy” is not enough—Rule 65B must fit

The sponsors’ core statutory predicament was undisputed: they were not among those the annexation code authorizes to sue, so they lacked statutory standing. The Court accepted the consequence—they had no ordinary civil remedy for statutory enforcement—but held that this absence did not automatically open the door to extraordinary relief.

The Court required a second, independent showing: that the requested writ fell within Rule 65B(d)(2)(B)’s text or within constitutional writ power. The sponsors invoked Rule 65B(d)(2)(B), which is triggered where a person “has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office.” But the City Recorder had performed the duty: she reviewed the petition and certified it. The sponsors’ complaint was not nonperformance; it was alleged misperformance (misinterpretation/misapplication) and they sought an order requiring the opposite result (withdraw certification; reject petition).

The Court held the sponsors did not demonstrate that “failed to perform” encompasses “performed but incorrectly,” and they did not supply an alternative theory grounded in the scope of “all extraordinary writs” under the Utah Constitution. The Court emphasized that Rule 65B is not a vehicle to create a right of action and that any broader constitutional-writ argument demanded historical and doctrinal support (which the sponsors did not provide).

2) The constitutional-claims pathway: Rule 65B is barred when declaratory relief is available

Rule 65B is available only where “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available.” The Court concluded the sponsors had such a remedy: a declaratory judgment action raising constitutional challenges. This conclusion was driven by the doctrinal boundary clarified in Bleazard v. City of Erda and operationalized in the Court of Appeals’ two Erda Cmty. Ass'n v. Grantsville City decisions: statutory standing does not govern constitutional claims.

Because the sponsors could litigate constitutionality without statutory standing, they could not satisfy Rule 65B(a)’s threshold requirement. The Court therefore affirmed dismissal of constitutional claims under Rule 65B without reaching whether the sponsors in fact had traditional standing.

3) Open Courts argument acknowledged but rejected for lack of common-law foundation

The sponsors argued that if the annexation code’s limitations eliminated their ability to sue, it violated the Open Courts Doctrine (Utah Const. art. I, § 11). The Court rejected the argument as undeveloped on a critical predicate: the sponsors did not demonstrate that the specific extraordinary-writ remedy they sought existed at common law. Without establishing an abrogated common-law remedy, the open-courts theory could not succeed.

Impact

  • No “end-run” around statutory standing via Rule 65B(d)(2)(B): Litigants excluded from statutory enforcement schemes cannot assume extraordinary writ practice will supply an alternative enforcement mechanism. They must fit within the writ’s traditional function and/or the constitution’s understood scope.
  • Sharper distinction between nonperformance and misperformance for (d)(2)(B) petitions: While the Court did not definitively hold that (d)(2)(B) can never address misperformance, it signaled that petitioners must squarely argue (textually and historically) why “failed to perform” reaches allegedly incorrect performance—especially when the requested writ effectively orders a different discretionary/legal determination.
  • Constitutional challenges remain available notwithstanding statutory standing barriers: The Court reinforced the post-Bleazard landscape: statutory standing restricts statutory claims, not constitutional claims. As a result, constitutional challenges should typically proceed through ordinary civil actions (e.g., declaratory judgment), not Rule 65B, because an “adequate remedy” exists.
  • Briefing discipline as outcome-determinative: The decision underscores that extraordinary writ litigation—already constrained—will fail if petitioners do not provide the historical/doctrinal analysis needed to justify expansion or application of writ power beyond the rule’s plain terms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Statutory standing
A threshold requirement for statutory claims: even if you are harmed, you cannot sue to enforce a statute unless the legislature authorized you (expressly or impliedly) to be among those who may sue.
Traditional standing
The constitutional minimum for many claims: injury, causation, and redressability. Utah courts apply this to constitutional challenges (as the Court of Appeals explained in the related cases).
Rule 65B / extraordinary relief
A procedural pathway for writ-type relief (mandamus, prohibition, etc.), available only when there is no other adequate remedy. It is not a substitute appeal or a catch-all tool to review any alleged legal error.
Mandamus (Rule 65B(d)(2))
Historically, an order compelling an official to carry out a legal duty. The Court treated the sponsors’ request as outside the heartland of mandamus because the official had acted; the dispute was about correctness.
“Plain, speedy and adequate remedy” (Rule 65B(a))
If you can get meaningful relief through an ordinary lawsuit (like declaratory judgment for constitutional claims), extraordinary relief is unavailable.
Constitutional writ authority
The Utah Constitution grants courts power to issue extraordinary writs. But to invoke that power beyond the rule’s plain language, a petitioner must explain—often historically—why the constitution’s term “all extraordinary writs” includes the specific relief requested.

Conclusion

ERDA Community Association, Inc. v. Baugh clarifies two practical rules for Utah public-law litigation. First, Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) cannot be treated as a general-purpose mechanism to enforce statutory requirements when the legislature has withheld statutory standing; petitioners must show the official truly “failed to perform” a required act, or must convincingly ground broader relief in the constitution’s writ power. Second, constitutional challenges are not blocked by statutory standing and therefore ordinarily must proceed through standard civil remedies—making Rule 65B unavailable because an adequate remedy exists.