Rule 60 Limits Reaffirmed: No Relitigation Under 60(b)(6) and Heightened Proof for 60(d) “Independent Action” and “Fraud on the Court,” with Leave-to-File Warning

Introduction

In Bruzzese v. Bondi (2d Cir. Mar. 10, 2026) (summary order), pro se appellant Adam Bruzzese sought to reopen a long-final judgment arising from his 2009 reassignment within the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) from a law-enforcement role to a non-law-enforcement role. The original case, brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, ended in summary judgment for the government in 2016, and the Second Circuit affirmed in 2018.

Nearly eight years later—and after two prior unsuccessful efforts at post-judgment relief—Bruzzese invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), 60(d)(1), and 60(d)(3). He relied chiefly on a claimed 2023 episode in which an unnamed agent (“GS1”) was referred for a psychological fitness evaluation but later returned to a law-enforcement position. Bruzzese argued this showed pretext and a due process violation in his own reassignment.

The key issues on appeal were whether this motion satisfied the demanding standards for Rule 60(b)(6) “extraordinary circumstances,” Rule 60(d)(1) “grave miscarriage of justice,” or Rule 60(d)(3) “fraud on the court,” and whether continued repetitive filings warranted sanctions.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, it held:

  • Rule 60(b)(6) relief was unavailable because Bruzzese largely attempted to relitigate arguments previously raised and rejected, falling short of “extraordinary circumstances.”
  • Rule 60(d)(1) relief failed because Bruzzese did not demonstrate a “grave miscarriage of justice,” a standard even more demanding than Rule 60(b)(6).
  • Rule 60(d)(3) relief failed because the asserted “fraud” was merely a repackaged merits/pretext contention, not conduct that impaired the judiciary’s ability to adjudicate impartially.

The court also warned that continued duplicative or meritless appeals related to the 2009 reassignment could lead to a leave-to-file sanction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2009)
    Role in the opinion: Anchors the standard of review—Rule 60 rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion—framing the appellate posture as highly deferential.
  • Marco Destin, Inc. v. Levy, 111 F.4th 214, 219 (2d Cir. 2024)
    Role in the opinion: Confirms abuse-of-discretion review applies even when the district court grants or dismisses an independent action alleging “fraud on the court” under Rule 60(d)(3).
  • Cent. Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 2003)
    Role in the opinion: Supplies the noted exception: Rule 60(b)(4) motions (void judgments) are reviewed de novo. The panel emphasized Bruzzese did not invoke Rule 60(b)(4), undercutting his request for de novo review.
  • Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 88 F.4th 353, 361 (2d Cir. 2023)
    Role in the opinion: Reiterates that Rule 60(b)(6) requires “extraordinary circumstances,” providing the governing merits standard for the main ground Bruzzese pressed.
  • United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998)
    Role in the opinion: Defines the narrow availability of a Rule 60(d)(1) independent action—“only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice”—which the panel treated as a ceiling Bruzzese could not reach.
  • Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2023)
    Role in the opinion: Provides the operative definition of “fraud on the court” under Rule 60(d)(3): interference with the judicial system’s ability to adjudicate impartially, preventing full and fair presentation.
  • McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017)
    Role in the opinion: Supports liberal construction of pro se filings—yet the panel still found the arguments legally insufficient under Rule 60’s demanding standards.
  • Competex, S.A. v. Labow, 783 F.2d 333, 335 (2d Cir. 1986)
    Role in the opinion: Supplies the central limiting principle: “Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal.” This is the doctrinal hook for rejecting repeat efforts to reargue merits.
  • Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1325 (2d Cir. 1995)
    Role in the opinion: Clarifies that “fraud on the court” concerns conduct that seriously affects the integrity of adjudication, not ordinary disputes over evidentiary weight, credibility, or alleged pretext.
  • In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 1993)
    Role in the opinion: Authorizes a leave-to-file sanction against vexatious litigants; the panel used it to warn Bruzzese about future duplicative filings.
  • Bruzzese v. Lynch, 191 F. Supp. 3d 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) and Bruzzese v. Sessions, 725 F. App'x 68 (2d Cir. 2018)
    Role in the opinion: Provide the underlying merits backdrop—summary judgment rested on failure to show statutory disability/qualification and, alternatively, legitimate non-pretextual reasons for reassignment—context that made later “new comparator” framing look like merits relitigation.
  • Bruzzese v. Garland, No. 1 3-cv-5733, 2021 WL 1 964547 (E.D.N.Y. May 1 7, 2021 ), aff'd, No. 21-1448, 2022 WL 1669191 (2d Cir. May 26, 2022) and Bruzzese v. Dettelbach, No. 22-cv- 7948, 2023 WL 7448757 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-239, 2023 WL 7391658 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 2023)
    Role in the opinion: Establish that Bruzzese had repeatedly pursued post-judgment routes and that courts had already rejected the due process-themed theory, reinforcing the “no relitigation” rationale and motivating the sanctions warning.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Deferential review controls most outcomes.
    By selecting abuse-of-discretion review (and rejecting de novo review because Rule 60(b)(4) was not invoked), the panel set a high bar for reversal: it was enough that the district court applied the correct legal standards and reached a reasonable decision.
  2. Rule 60(b)(6): “extraordinary circumstances” cannot be satisfied by re-packaging merits arguments.
    The court treated Bruzzese’s reliance on the alleged 2023 “GS1” incident as functionally an attempt to revive the earlier pretext/due process narrative already litigated. Under Competex, S.A. v. Labow, Rule 60(b) cannot be used as an end-run around appeal or to reargue matters already resolved. Without genuinely exceptional circumstances, the motion fails under Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc..
  3. Rule 60(d)(1): independent actions are reserved for the rarest cases.
    Under United States v. Beggerly, the court emphasized that an independent action requires a “grave miscarriage of justice.” The panel reasoned that if Bruzzese could not meet the “extraordinary circumstances” threshold of Rule 60(b)(6), he necessarily could not satisfy the even more demanding Beggerly threshold.
  4. Rule 60(d)(3): “fraud on the court” targets corruption of the judicial process, not ordinary factual disputes.
    Applying Mazzei v. The Money Store and Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., the panel concluded that Bruzzese alleged, at most, evidence that might (in his view) better support a pretext argument. That is not an allegation that the government undermined the court’s impartial adjudicatory function (e.g., bribery, fabrication directed at the tribunal, or conduct that blocks the opponent from fully and fairly presenting the case).
  5. Prospective court-protection: warning of a leave-to-file sanction.
    Noting the repeated post-judgment attempts and “clearly meritless appeals,” the panel issued a warning grounded in In re Martin-Trigona—a step short of imposing restrictions, but designed to deter continued repetitive litigation.

Impact

Although designated nonprecedential, the order is a clear application of entrenched Second Circuit and Supreme Court doctrine that:

  • Rule 60(b)(6) is not a vehicle to re-try or reframe old theories after final judgment, especially where prior post-judgment efforts have been denied.
  • Rule 60(d)(1) independent actions remain extraordinarily narrow; courts will not allow litigants to relabel “new evidence” or “unfairness” arguments as a “grave miscarriage of justice” absent exceptional systemic concerns.
  • Rule 60(d)(3) requires process-corrupting misconduct, not merely an argument that the opposing party acted pretextually in the underlying employment decision.
  • Repeated, duplicative appellate filings risk leave-to-file restrictions—an increasingly common docket-management tool for vexatious litigation.

Practically, litigants seeking to reopen judgments based on later-arising comparators (like “GS1”) should expect courts to scrutinize whether the claim is truly about integrity of the adjudication (Rule 60(d)(3)) or instead about the merits of the underlying employment decision (not a proper Rule 60 target).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 60(b)(6) (“extraordinary circumstances”)
A “catch-all” reopening provision used only when something truly exceptional makes it unjust to leave the judgment in place. It does not permit a second round of arguments that could have been raised on appeal or were already rejected.
Rule 60(d)(1) (“independent action”)
A separate, rarely successful pathway to undo a judgment. The Supreme Court limits it to preventing a “grave miscarriage of justice”—something far more serious than a claimed legal or factual error.
Rule 60(d)(3) (“fraud on the court”)
Not ordinary fraud between parties. It refers to conduct that corrupts the judicial process itself—interfering with a court’s ability to decide impartially (for example, fabrication aimed at the tribunal, bribery, or comparable misconduct that prevents a fair presentation).
Abuse-of-discretion review
A deferential appellate standard. The appellate court will affirm unless the district court applied the wrong law or made a decision outside the range of reasonable outcomes.
Leave-to-file sanction
A restriction requiring a litigant to obtain permission before filing further papers, used to curb repetitive, vexatious, or meritless litigation.

Conclusion

Bruzzese v. Bondi reinforces a strict boundary around post-judgment relief: Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used to relitigate rejected theories, and Rule 60(d)(1) and (d)(3) demand proof of extraordinary systemic injustice or adjudicatory corruption—not merely additional support for a pretext argument. The Second Circuit’s accompanying warning underscores that persistent, duplicative efforts to reopen a finalized employment judgment may lead to filing restrictions to protect the court’s processes.