Rule 60 Is Not a Second Appeal; Parenting-Plan Amendments Require Statutory Threshold Showings and a Proper Record

1. Introduction

This appeal arises from post-decree litigation between Roberta Jean Scobee (a/k/a Roberta Jean White) and George Harrison White following their December 2022 dissolution decree in Yellowstone County. The parties had resolved property and parenting disputes and agreed Scobee would pay child support for two children beginning September 2021, with the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) calculating the amount. Scobee later consented to an administrative modification setting support at $314 per month per child, retroactive to September 2021.

After Scobee failed to pay, the District Court entered contempt-related enforcement orders (including a labor-detail sanction), which this Court previously affirmed. While that earlier appeal was pending and thereafter, Scobee filed multiple post-judgment motions—seeking Rule 60 relief, sanctions, emergency relief, enforcement, and parenting plan amendment—grounded in alleged parenting-time violations, newly located audio from a 2018 administrative child-support hearing, and alleged financial misrepresentations by White.

The Supreme Court addressed three core questions: (1) whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying parenting-related post-judgment requests; (2) whether denial of Rule 60 relief based on the newly found 2018 recording was an abuse of discretion; and (3) whether denial of relief based on alleged financial misrepresentations and an incomplete financial record was an abuse of discretion.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the District Court’s February 3 and February 26, 2026 orders denying Scobee’s post-judgment motions. It held:

• An appeal from denial of Rule 60 relief does not reopen review of the underlying decree or earlier orders; review was limited to whether the District Court abused its discretion in the two February 2026 rulings.
• Scobee’s Rule 60(b)(3) fraud-based attack on the 2022 judgment was untimely (filed more than one year after judgment) and substantively deficient (no showing of procurement fraud or interference with fair submission).
• Her request to amend the parenting plan failed to comply with the statutory amendment procedure (no adequate affidavit showing changed circumstances and best interests; no properly supported proposal as required), so denial without an evidentiary hearing was proper.
• The newly located 2018 hearing recording did not establish “mistake” or “fraud” under Rule 60, and—even accepting Scobee’s description—could not undermine the later 2022 settlement and 2024 administrative modification that independently set her child-support obligation.
• Financial-misrepresentation claims failed for lack of properly invoked statutory bases, lack of record support, and failure to identify a specific material misrepresentation that prevented fair litigation of the orders under review.
• The Court declined White’s request to label Scobee a vexatious litigant because the record lacked findings and development supporting a statewide prefiling restriction.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Although issued as a nonprecedential memorandum opinion, the Court’s analysis is built on settled Montana doctrine and emphasizes recurring procedural boundaries in post-judgment family litigation.

• Donovan v. Graff, 248 Mont. 21, 25, 808 P.2d 491, 494 (1991).
  The Court used Donovan to police the scope of appellate review: an appeal from denial of Rule 60 relief is not a substitute for a timely appeal of the underlying judgment. This principle anchored the Court’s refusal to re-litigate the December 2022 decree and various 2024–2025 orders.
• In re Marriage of Wagenman, 2016 MT 176, ¶ 8, 384 Mont. 149, 376 P.3d 121.
  Cited for the standard of review: in non-default contexts, denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, reinforcing the deference given to the trial court’s management of post-judgment motions.
• In re Marriage of Cline, 2026 MT 108, ¶ 16, 428 Mont. 158, ___ P.3d ___ and In re Marriage of Cline, ¶ 22.
  The Court invoked Cline both for parenting-plan review standards (abuse of discretion; findings for clear error; conclusions for correctness) and for the fraud/misrepresentation showing required under Rule 60(b)(3).
• In re Marriage of Handy, 2026 MT 90, ¶ 14, 428 Mont. 1, 588 P.3d 816 and In re Marriage of Handy, ¶¶ 16-20.
  Handy was central to distinguishing when an evidentiary hearing is mandatory in parenting plan modification disputes. The Court explained that Handy requires a hearing once the moving party satisfies the statutory “adequate cause” threshold; here, Scobee never met the threshold procedural requirements, so denial without a hearing was consistent with statute and Handy.
• Guill v. Guill, 2014 MT 316, ¶ 9, 377 Mont. 216, 339 P.3d 81.
  Cited for the standard governing parenting-plan decisions and supporting deference to district court discretion absent legal error or clearly erroneous findings.
• Jerome v. Jerome, 175 Mont. 429, 431, 574 P.2d 997, 998 (1978).
  Used to reinforce the appellate-record rule: the Supreme Court’s review is confined to the certified district court record, limiting reliance on appendix materials lacking record counterparts.
• In re Marriage of Weber, 2004 MT 211, ¶¶ 25-26, 322 Mont. 341, 96 P.3d 716.
  Supported the Court’s articulation of Rule 60(b)(3): the movant must show fraud/misrepresentation/misconduct that prevented a fair submission of the controversy leading to the judgment attacked.
• Roberts v. Nickey, 2002 MT 37, ¶ 22, 308 Mont. 335, 43 P.3d 263.
  Cited to reject the notion that later-occurring disputes can retroactively prove that an earlier stipulated judgment was procured by fraud.
• Wise v. Nirider, 261 Mont. 310, 316, 862 P.2d 1128, 1132 (1993) and Falcon v. Faulkner, 273 Mont. 327, 332, 903 P.2d 197, 200 (1995).
  These cases framed “fraud upon the court” narrowly as misconduct aimed at the judicial process itself that deprives the adversary of an opportunity to present her case; ordinary interparty fraud, “without more,” generally does not qualify.
• In re Estate of Johnson, 2024 MT 224, ¶ 28, 418 Mont. 198, 557 P.3d 36.
  Provided the Court’s lens for “mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1): ignorance or surprise must be genuine; later discovery of a recording of a hearing the movant attended does not constitute a qualifying mistake.
• In re Marriage of Hopper, 1999 MT 310, ¶ 26, 297 Mont. 225, 991 P.2d 960.
  Reinforced that a Rule 60(b)(3) fraud claim must identify specific false representations and explain how they prevented fair submission—requirements the Court found absent here.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Appellate scope and record limits

The Court first narrowed the playing field: only the February 3 and February 26, 2026 orders were properly before it. By applying Donovan v. Graff, the Court ensured that Rule 60 could not be used as an “end-run” around missed appellate deadlines for the 2022 decree or intermediate contempt-related orders. It also stressed that review is confined to the certified record under M. R. App. P. 8(1) and Jerome v. Jerome, curtailing attempts to expand factual assertions through an appendix alone.

B. Parenting-plan relief must be matched to the correct procedural vehicle

The Court organized Scobee’s parenting-related requests into three legally distinct categories, each with different standards:

• Rule 60 relief (retroactive attack on the 2022 judgment),
• Statutory amendment (prospective change based on post-plan events), and
• Enforcement (remedies for noncompliance with an existing plan).

This classification drove the outcome: Scobee’s “omnibus” filing did not satisfy the procedural and evidentiary prerequisites for any of the three pathways.

C. Rule 60(b)(3) attack on the 2022 parenting plan: time-bar and inadequately pleaded

Applying M. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), the Court held Scobee’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion was untimely because it was filed more than one year after the December 2022 judgment. Independently, the Court found no adequate showing under Rule 60(b)(3) as construed in In re Marriage of Weber and In re Marriage of Cline: Scobee did not identify a false representation made in the 2022 proceeding or explain how White’s conduct prevented fair presentation of her position.

The Court rejected “fraud upon the court” as a workaround, using Wise v. Nirider and Falcon v. Faulkner to emphasize that later plan violations are not fraud “directed at the judicial process” that undermines the integrity of the original adjudication.

D. Statutory amendment: failure to satisfy §§ 40-4-219 and 40-4-220, MCA

The Court applied the modification statutes with procedural rigor:

• Section 40-4-219(1), MCA requires a change in circumstances arising since the prior plan (or unknown at entry) and that amendment is necessary to serve best interests.
• Section 40-4-220(1), MCA requires an affidavit setting forth facts supporting the request; absent “adequate cause” shown by affidavits, the court must deny the motion without a hearing.
• Section 40-4-219(7), MCA requires a proposed amended parenting plan to be filed and served with the amendment motion, in addition to the affidavit required by § 40-4-220(1).

The Court held Scobee’s December filing failed these threshold requirements: it did not adequately plead the changed-circumstances and best-interest showings, did not clearly identify provisions to amend, did not include the required affidavit, and did not include a proposed amended plan. Therefore, In re Marriage of Handy did not compel an evidentiary hearing, because the statutory “adequate cause” gate was never opened.

Notably, the Court corrected (without reversing) an overbroad premise attributed to the District Court: it declined to adopt a categorical rule that “one missed weekend can never contribute to changed circumstances,” explaining that context matters—particularly whether conduct is part of a willful and consistent pattern under § 40-4-219(1)(a)(iv), MCA. The denial was affirmed on procedural insufficiency rather than an absolute view of the merits.

E. Enforcement: § 40-4-234, MCA, requires a developed, record-based request for remedies

While acknowledging facts suggesting inadequate cruise/travel communications and a conflict with Scobee’s weekend, the Court held Scobee did not present an enforcement theory sufficient for reversal because she did not:

• identify the specific plan provision to enforce,
• request a defined make-up schedule or specific statutorily authorized remedy, or
• establish an alleged broader pattern using materials demonstrably within the certified record.

The Court expressly left the door open: nothing in the decision bars a properly supported prospective enforcement or amendment motion grounded in admissible evidence of later conduct.

F. The newly found June 2018 administrative hearing recording: no “mistake,” no “fraud,” no prejudice

The District Court could not play the USB recording due to IT restrictions, but assumed it existed and accepted Scobee’s description. The Supreme Court affirmed denial of Rule 60 relief because:

• No mistake under Rule 60(b)(1): Scobee attended the 2018 hearing and thus had firsthand knowledge; later locating a recording did not constitute qualifying ignorance/surprise as discussed in In re Estate of Johnson.
• No fraud under Rule 60(b)(3): Scobee did not identify specific false statements about the hearing, who made them, why they were false, and how they prevented fair submission, consistent with In re Marriage of Hopper and In re Marriage of Cline.
• No prejudice even if the recording contained statements about household expenses: the operative obligations arose from the 2022 settlement and the January 11, 2024 administrative modification setting the support amount and retroactivity; the 2018 discussion could not negate those later agreements.

Importantly, the Court avoided deciding a broader evidentiary question—whether a court may decline to consider material evidence solely due to technological incompatibility—because the lack of materiality/prejudice made that issue unnecessary.

G. Alleged financial misrepresentations: lack of invoked statutory basis, lack of record, lack of specificity

Scobee argued White’s disclosures understated income compared to documents suggesting substantial assets or business interests. The Court affirmed denial because she did not:

• invoke the statutory post-judgment nondisclosure/perjury remedies in §§ 40-4-252(6), MCA and 40-4-253(5), MCA in the motions underlying the February orders,
• identify a qualifying declaration containing perjury or a judgment affected by it,
• show the relevant C-1 through C-4 materials were filed/admitted and presented to the District Court in the motions under review, or
• identify a specific knowingly false statement and explain its role in a particular support calculation or District Court ruling.

The Court also underscored a substantive accounting point: “annual income” and measures like gross receipts, partnership allocations, capital accounts, equity, and total assets are different metrics; alleging disparity alone does not establish fraud.

H. Vexatious litigant request: insufficient record for statewide restriction

White sought a statewide prefiling approval requirement. The Court declined to entertain the request because there were no findings or developed record to support that extraordinary remedy.

3.3 Impact

This memorandum opinion is explicitly noncitable and does not create precedent. Still, it illustrates durable procedural lessons likely to shape litigant and trial-court behavior:

• Post-decree motions must be carefully “channeled”: Rule 60, statutory modification, and enforcement are distinct remedies with distinct prerequisites.
• Threshold statutory compliance matters: a court may deny modification without a hearing when the moving papers do not satisfy §§ 40-4-219 and 40-4-220, MCA—consistent with the statutory “adequate cause” framework discussed in In re Marriage of Handy.
• Rule 60 is not an appellate reset button: Donovan v. Graff continues to limit collateral attacks on final decrees and forecloses indirect review of unappealed orders.
• Record discipline is outcome-determinative on appeal: parties must ensure documents and factual claims are properly filed, admitted, and cited in the certified record.
• Materiality and prejudice gate Rule 60 relief: even potentially relevant “new evidence” will not justify reopening if later stipulations and orders independently control the legal obligation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 60(b) relief: a limited tool to set aside a judgment for specific reasons (e.g., mistake, fraud). It is not a way to re-argue the case or fix an expired appeal deadline. Fraud-based motions under Rule 60(b)(3) generally must be filed within one year of judgment.
• “Fraud upon the court”: not ordinary dishonesty between parties. It refers to serious misconduct that corrupts the judicial process itself—so the other side cannot fully present a case.
• Parenting plan “amendment” vs. “enforcement”: amendment changes the rules going forward and requires statutory showings of changed circumstances and best interests, supported by an affidavit and a proposed amended plan; enforcement keeps the existing plan and seeks remedies for violations.
• “Adequate cause” for a hearing: under § 40-4-220(1), MCA, the court looks first to the affidavits. If they do not show enough to justify a hearing, the court must deny the motion without taking live testimony.
• Certified record: the official set of documents and exhibits filed and considered in the trial court. Appellate courts generally cannot rely on new documents attached to briefs if they were not part of that record.

5. Conclusion

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed denial of Scobee’s post-judgment motions because the requests did not fit—procedurally or evidentially—within the governing frameworks for Rule 60 relief, statutory parenting-plan modification, or enforcement. The Court reinforced that Rule 60 cannot substitute for a timely appeal; that parenting-plan amendment requires strict compliance with §§ 40-4-219 and 40-4-220, MCA; and that appellate review is constrained by the certified record. Even while acknowledging that isolated parenting-time issues may matter depending on context, the Court held the filings before it did not satisfy the threshold showings needed to trigger hearings or relief, leaving future properly supported prospective motions available.