Rule 60(b) “Reasonable Time” Is Independent of the One-Year Cap: Five-Month Delay Without a Concrete Justification Is Untimely

I. Introduction

In Varondria Williams v. Edward J. Fay (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), pro se plaintiffs Varondria and Michael Williams appealed only the denial of post-judgment relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), not the underlying dismissal of their complaint.

The underlying suit arose from a residential mortgage serviced by Wells Fargo and involved the plaintiffs’ belief that a COVID-era loan modification and a later appraisal affected their obligation to pay private mortgage insurance (PMI). They sued an individual and several financial institutions, alleging federal statutory violations (including the Homeowners Protection Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act) and state-law claims. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding the Homeowners Protection Act’s PMI cancellation framework did not support the plaintiffs’ theory and that the loan modification did not change the relevant threshold analysis.

Five months after judgment, the Williamses sought relief under Rule 60(b), alleging “errors of law, mistake of facts, newly discovered evidence, denial of due process,” and more. The district court denied the motion as untimely and meritless, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Rule 60(b) relief under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The court held:

  • A Rule 60(b) motion must be filed “within a reasonable time,” and the one-year limit for subsections (1)–(3) is not a “safe harbor.” A motion can be untimely even if filed within one year.
  • On this record, a five-month delay was not “within a reasonable time” because the plaintiffs lacked an acceptable reason for waiting. Their asserted need for discovery was procedurally misplaced at the pleading stage, and the documents they claimed to be gathering were either irrelevant to the dismissal rationale or already in their possession.
  • Although Rule 60(b)(4) void-judgment challenges are not subject to the same timeliness restriction, the plaintiffs did not identify the narrow defects that render a judgment “void” (lack of jurisdiction, or deprivation of notice or an opportunity to be heard). Allegations of bias based solely on an adverse ruling do not make a judgment void.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standard of review and abuse of discretion

Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999), supplied the governing standard: denials of Rule 60(b) motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. This deference matters because the appeal did not reopen the merits of the dismissal; it focused on whether the district court’s handling of the post-judgment motion fell outside the range of permissible choices.

Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 628 (11th Cir. 2014), was used to define abuse of discretion as occurring when a court commits a clear error of judgment or applies the wrong legal standard. The panel framed its affirmance around the absence of clear error in treating the motion as untimely.

2. “Reasonable time” under Rule 60(c)(1)

BUC Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Yacht Council Ltd., 517 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008), provided the multi-factor, circumstance-specific approach to “reasonable time,” including prejudice and whether a good reason exists for not acting sooner. The opinion applies that framework by focusing on the plaintiffs’ proffered reasons for delay and finding them inadequate.

Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 771 F.3d 713, 737-38 (11th Cir. 2014), anchored the key timeliness holding: the Eleventh Circuit has deemed a five-month delay unreasonable where no “acceptable reason” for the delay was offered. The panel treated this case as a close factual analogue and used it as direct support for concluding that five months here—after a short dismissal order on a single ground—was not reasonable.

3. Discovery and pleadings-stage procedure

Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997), was cited for the proposition that discovery is not needed before a court rules on a motion to dismiss. The Williamses argued their delay was justified because they needed discovery after the district court considered materials beyond the pleadings. The panel rejected that premise: discovery is not a proper precondition to opposing dismissal on the pleadings.

Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 187 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 204, 223 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2025), addressed the “conversion” argument. The Williamses contended the district court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion by considering loan terms supplied by defendants. Under Swinford, however, a court may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss (without conversion) if they are central to the claim and undisputed. Because the plaintiffs attached portions of the loan agreement, defendants could attach the remainder, and the court could consider it at the Rule 12 stage.

4. The one-year cap is not a safe harbor

Padilla v. Smith, 53 F.4th 1303, 1311 n.22 (11th Cir. 2022), was used to rebut the plaintiffs’ core textual misunderstanding of Rule 60(c)(1). The Williamses argued that filing within one year necessarily satisfies timeliness. Padilla supports the opposite: a Rule 60(b) motion may be untimely even if filed within one year of the final order, because “reasonable time” is an independent requirement.

5. Void judgments under Rule 60(b)(4)

Bainbridge v. Governor of Fla., 75 F.4th 1326, 1335 (11th Cir. 2023), supplied the narrow definition of when a judgment is “void”: principally where the court lacked jurisdiction or where the party was deprived of notice or the opportunity to be heard. The panel used this limitation to reject the Williamses’ attempt to invoke Rule 60(b)(4) based on alleged judicial bias inferred from adverse rulings.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Scope of appeal: The court first emphasized that the Williamses did not challenge the underlying dismissal. That limited the inquiry to the Rule 60(b) denial and reinforced the high-deference abuse-of-discretion posture.
  2. Textual structure of Rule 60(c)(1): The panel read Rule 60(c)(1) conjunctively: a motion must be filed (a) within a reasonable time, and (b) for (1)–(3), no later than one year. The plaintiffs’ “within a year equals timely” argument failed because it collapses “reasonable time” into the one-year outer cap, contradicting both the text and circuit precedent.
  3. Application to the five-month delay: Using the BUC Int'l Corp. framework and the benchmark from Stansell, the panel concluded the delay was unreasonable given the simplicity of the dismissal (a short order resting on a single ground) and the lack of a legitimate explanation.
    • The claimed need for discovery was “procedurally improper” at the motion-to-dismiss stage (Chudasama), and the “conversion” theory was rejected under the central-and-undisputed-document doctrine (Swinford v. Santos).
    • The asserted efforts to identify the “actual note holder” did not justify delay because the note already identified Wells Fargo and, in any event, the point was irrelevant to the dismissal rationale. Likewise, “PMI-recalculation records” were already in their possession.
  4. Rule 60(b)(4) as a backstop—rejected: The panel acknowledged that void-judgment motions are not subject to the same timeliness restriction, but found no jurisdictional defect and no deprivation of notice or the opportunity to be heard (Bainbridge v. Governor of Fla.). Mere disagreement with the court’s ruling is not voidness.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision reinforces several practical rules that are likely to influence litigation behavior in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • No “one-year safe harbor”: Litigants cannot treat the one-year limit for Rule 60(b)(1)–(3) as presumptively timely. Courts may—and will—deny motions filed well within a year if the movant cannot justify the delay under the “reasonable time” requirement.
  • Promptness matters even after short, straightforward dismissals: When the underlying judgment rests on a clear, narrow ground, unexplained or weakly explained delays become harder to defend.
  • Guardrails on post-dismissal “discovery justifications”: Parties cannot excuse Rule 60(b) delay by asserting they needed discovery that is not available at the pleading stage, or by claiming “conversion” where the court considered central and undisputed documents.
  • Rule 60(b)(4) remains narrow: Allegations of bias or legal error do not transform a judgment into a “void” judgment; only foundational defects such as jurisdictional absence or denial of notice/opportunity to be heard qualify.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 60(b) motion: A request to set aside or reopen a final judgment for specific reasons (e.g., mistake, new evidence, fraud, void judgment, or other extraordinary reasons). It is not a second chance to argue the case.
  • “Within a reasonable time” (Rule 60(c)(1)): A flexible deadline that depends on context. Even if a motion is filed before the one-year outer limit, it can still be late if the movant waited too long without a good reason.
  • Motion to dismiss vs. summary judgment (“conversion”): Generally, if a court considers evidence outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss, the motion may be converted into one for summary judgment (triggering different procedures). But courts may consider documents that are central to the claim and undisputed without converting the motion—such as key contract documents referenced in the complaint.
  • Void judgment (Rule 60(b)(4)): A judgment is “void” only in rare situations—typically where the court had no jurisdiction or a party was denied basic due process (notice and an opportunity to be heard). A judgment is not “void” just because it may be wrong.

V. Conclusion

Varondria Williams v. Edward J. Fay underscores a strict, text-based approach to Rule 60(c)(1): the one-year cap for certain Rule 60(b) grounds does not guarantee timeliness; “reasonable time” is an independent requirement. A five-month delay can be unreasonable where the movant offers no concrete, procedurally valid reason for waiting, particularly when the claimed need for discovery is inconsistent with pleadings-stage practice and when the purported “new” materials are irrelevant or already available. The decision also reaffirms the narrow lane for Rule 60(b)(4): adverse rulings and accusations of bias, without jurisdictional or due-process defects, do not render a judgment void.