Rule 60(b)(1) Cannot Reopen Jurisdictional Findings After the Time to Appeal, or Serve as a Vehicle to Relitigate Admiralty Jurisdiction

Introduction

Thibodeaux v. Bernhard (5th Cir. June 22, 2026) arises from a dispute over access to Lost Lake, a small inland waterbody on private property in Louisiana that connects seasonally to the Atchafalaya River. Plaintiffs Devin Thibodeaux and Herby Angelle (the “Fishermen”) attempted to crawfish there and were cited for trespassing after Seth Bernhard contacted law enforcement. The Fishermen sued the property owners and related defendants (collectively, the “Bernhards”) asserting tort claims (including conversion and interference with crawfish harvest).

The pivotal early issue was federal subject-matter jurisdiction: whether the tort allegedly occurring on Lost Lake fell within admiralty jurisdiction. The district court found Lost Lake navigable for admiralty purposes, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed in an earlier appeal. After the case returned to the district court, the Bernhards later won summary judgment on the merits—but then sought to undo or revise the jurisdictional handling via a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) motion, arguing the district court “mistakenly” failed to substantively address their newly offered jurisdiction evidence during summary judgment.

The Fifth Circuit’s 2026 opinion addresses a narrow but recurring procedural question: when, if ever, Rule 60(b)(1) can be used to revisit jurisdiction-related factual findings already affirmed on appeal—especially after the time to appeal a later judgment has expired.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Bernhards’ Rule 60(b)(1) motion. Applying abuse-of-discretion review and the multi-factor framework from Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, the court held that the motion impermissibly attempted to:

  • use Rule 60(b) as a substitute for an untimely appeal of the summary judgment ruling;
  • obtain appellate review of issues not properly before the court on a Rule 60(b) appeal;
  • relitigate jurisdictional facts and arguments that had already been addressed (and affirmed) in the prior admiralty-jurisdiction appeal.

The panel emphasized that final judgments are not to be lightly disturbed, that summary judgment is a merits disposition, and that the Bernhards—despite prevailing on the merits—failed to demonstrate prejudice sufficient to justify reopening the matter.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Thibodeaux v. Bernhard, No. 23-30405, 2024 WL 3181458 (5th Cir. June 26, 2024)
    The prior appeal is central: it affirmed admiralty jurisdiction based on findings that (1) Lost Lake has been used commercially for crawfish harvesting on small watercraft; (2) seasonal access aligns with the most commercially viable period; and (3) a ten-to-twenty-foot drainage canal connects Lost Lake to the Atchafalaya River. The 2026 panel treats those affirmed findings as effectively settled for purposes of this Rule 60(b) attempt, refusing to “revisit” them through a post-judgment procedural vehicle.
  • Roberts v. Wal-Mart La., L.L.C., 54 F.4th 852 (5th Cir. 2022)
    Cited for the standard of review: Rule 60(b) rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, reinforcing the steep uphill climb for a movant on appeal.
  • Moore v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 864 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2013))
    Provides the stringent abuse-of-discretion framing: it is insufficient that granting relief would have been permissible; denial must be “so unwarranted” as to constitute an abuse.
  • Osborne v. Belton, 131 F.4th 262 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting In re Chamber of Com. of the U.S., 105 F.4th 297 (5th Cir. 2024))
    Supplies the classic three-part abuse-of-discretion formulation (clearly erroneous facts, erroneous law, or misapplication of law to facts).
  • Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 142 S. Ct. 1856 (2022)
    Clarifies that “mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1) includes judicial legal errors and factual errors. The Fifth Circuit accepts the breadth of “mistake,” but emphasizes that even if a “mistake” could be alleged, Rule 60(b) is constrained by finality concerns and cannot function as an appeal substitute.
  • Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981)
    The organizing test: eight factors balancing finality and justice. The court applies these factors to conclude the equities do not support reopening.
  • Williams v. Chater, 87 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1996)
    Establishes a key appellate boundary: an appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review. This directly defeats the Bernhards’ effort to obtain review of the earlier summary judgment treatment via a Rule 60(b) appeal.
  • Hill v. McDermott, Inc., 827 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1987)
    Recognizes that Rule 60(b)(1) may be used to correct judicial error when filed within the time for appeal (to avoid needless appeals), but the Fifth Circuit uses Hill to highlight the opposite implication here: filing after the appeal period undermines the request.
  • Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1985)
    The hard stop: Rule 60(b) cannot be used to extend the time for appeal. This is dispositive of the procedural maneuver the Bernhards attempted.
  • Halicki v. La. Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 1998)
    Cited to distinguish defaults/technical dismissals from merits adjudications, and for the proposition that summary judgment is a judgment on the merits—making post-judgment reopening less compelling under Seven Elves factor (5).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps.

  1. Rule 60(b)(1) is broad in theory but narrow in function.
    Relying on Kemp v. United States, the court accepts that judicial mistakes of law or fact can fit within “mistake.” But the availability of the category does not determine entitlement to relief; the decision remains discretionary and is controlled by finality principles and the Rule 60(b) architecture.
  2. The Seven Elves balance favors finality here.
    Applying Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, the court acknowledges factors that marginally favor the Bernhards (notably liberal construction and timeliness in the abstract), but finds the overall balance strongly against relief because:
    • the Bernhards sought to disturb a final merits judgment (summary judgment with prejudice);
    • their motion functioned as a substitute for appeal and was filed after the time to appeal the summary judgment ruling expired;
    • the case was not a default or technical dismissal; the Bernhards had a full opportunity to litigate;
    • the “new evidence” largely repackaged arguments already rejected when admiralty jurisdiction was found and affirmed.
  3. Appellate posture and prejudice concerns foreclose the requested relief.
    The court invokes Williams v. Chater to reject the attempt to use a Rule 60(b) appeal to reach the underlying summary judgment reasoning. It then underscores that the Bernhards were, in fact, prevailing parties on the merits and sought relief because they disliked the jurisdictional framing—fearing future federal suits. The court treats that as an insufficient justification to reopen a final judgment, especially given their earlier opportunities to litigate jurisdiction and the prior appellate affirmation.

Impact

Although designated nonprecedential, the opinion reinforces several practically important constraints likely to influence litigants and district courts within the Fifth Circuit:

  • Rule 60(b)(1) is not an “appeal extender.” Parties who believe the district court committed legal error must appeal timely; waiting and styling the complaint as “mistake” risks near-certain denial under Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv. and related doctrine.
  • Jurisdictional relitigation through post-judgment motions is disfavored when the issue has been previously litigated and affirmed. Even when a party produces “new” jurisdiction evidence, the court signals skepticism where the evidence does not truly change the factual or legal landscape but repackages earlier contentions.
  • Prevailing-party Rule 60(b) motions face an equities problem. The panel’s emphasis that the Bernhards sought relief from a judgment “in their favor” suggests future movants will need a concrete, case-specific prejudice—not generalized fear of future litigation consequences—to justify reopening.
  • Admiralty-jurisdiction determinations, once affirmed, gain practical stability. The decision discourages iterative attempts to unsettle navigability/jurisdiction findings via collateral procedural avenues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 60(b)(1): A rule allowing a court to relieve a party from a final judgment due to certain kinds of mistakes (including some legal mistakes by the judge). It is not meant to replace a normal appeal.
  • “Mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1): After Kemp v. United States, “mistake” can include a judge’s legal error. But relief is discretionary and strongly limited by finality and the requirement that Rule 60(b) not be used to bypass appeal deadlines.
  • Abuse of discretion review: A highly deferential appellate standard. The appellate court does not decide whether it would have granted the motion; it asks only whether the denial was unreasonable in a way that violates governing standards.
  • Summary judgment “on the merits”: A final decision concluding the claims fail as a matter of law based on undisputed facts. Because it is not a mere procedural dismissal, courts are less willing to reopen it under Rule 60(b).
  • “Not a substitute for appeal”: If the real complaint is that the judge got the law wrong, the normal path is a timely appeal. Rule 60(b) cannot be used to obtain a second chance after the appeal window closes.
  • Admiralty jurisdiction (in this context): Federal jurisdiction over certain torts occurring on navigable waters. Here, Lost Lake’s seasonal connection and commercial use were pivotal to treating it as within admiralty jurisdiction—an issue affirmed in the 2024 appeal.

Conclusion

Thibodeaux v. Bernhard (5th Cir. 2026) crystallizes a procedural lesson: even though Rule 60(b)(1) can reach judicial “mistakes,” it cannot be used to reopen a finalized merits judgment to relitigate jurisdictional facts—particularly after the appeal deadline has passed and where the jurisdictional determination has already been affirmed. The Fifth Circuit’s application of Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, together with its reliance on Williams v. Chater and Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., underscores the strong preference for finality and the limited role of Rule 60(b) as an exceptional remedy rather than an alternate appellate track.