Rule 60(b)(6) as the Exclusive Gateway to Reopen a Closed Case (Not Rule 54(b))—and Belated United States v. Georgia Theories Are Not “Extraordinary Circumstances”

Case: Frederick Allen v. Joshua Stein (No. 24-1954)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date: January 23, 2026
Author: Judge King (joined by Judges Niemeyer and Harris)

I. Introduction

This decision is the latest installment in Frederick L. Allen and Nautilus Productions, LLC’s long-running effort to obtain federal relief for alleged copyright infringement by North Carolina officials and agencies arising from Allen’s photographs and videos created during the excavation of the shipwreck believed to be the Queen Anne’s Revenge (Blackbeard’s vessel).

After earlier Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court rulings held that the State and its officials were protected by sovereign and other immunities from Allen’s copyright claims, the litigation appeared closed. Allen nonetheless sought to revive the case through a post-judgment motion and a new constitutional theory: “as-applied” abrogation of sovereign immunity premised on United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (the “Georgia theory”).

The appeal presented three tightly connected issues: (1) the scope of appellate jurisdiction in an immunity-based collateral-order appeal; (2) whether the district court erred in 2021 by reopening a closed case and permitting the new Georgia theory; and (3) whether the district court’s 2024 denial of sovereign immunity on the revived Georgia-based copyright/due process claim could stand.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by reopening the litigation in 2021 under Rule 54(b), because the case had reached finality; only Rule 60(b) could potentially supply authority to reopen. The court further held that Rule 60(b)(6) relief was not justified: Allen’s reliance on a “new” theory drawn from the long-existing United States v. Georgia precedent did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances,” and Rule 15’s liberal amendment policy cannot dilute Rule 60(b)(6)’s stringent reopening standard.

Exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit reviewed (and reversed) the 2021 reopening order because it was the “sole and only seed” of the 2024 immunity denial. Having reversed the 2021 order, the court vacated as moot the district court’s 2024 ruling and all subsequent rulings, remanding with directions to close the litigation by dismissing the North Carolina defendants and all claims against them with prejudice.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The earlier immunity rulings that framed the “do-over” problem

  • Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018) (the “2018 Decision”). The Fourth Circuit previously held, among other things, that Congress had not validly abrogated state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement via the CRCA, and that various individual-capacity claims were barred by qualified and legislative immunity. The 2026 opinion treats this history as establishing that immunity questions had been litigated to completion and underscores the exceptional nature of the district court’s 2021 reopening.
  • Allen v. Cooper, 589 U.S. 248 (2020) (the “2020 Supreme Court Decision”). The Supreme Court affirmed the sovereign-immunity holding “across the board,” emphasizing that the CRCA aimed at uniform statutory remedies rather than preventing or redressing unconstitutional conduct. This affirmance is central to the Fourth Circuit’s insistence on finality and its skepticism toward reopening a case to pursue a theory not timely advanced.

2. The “Georgia theory” and why its age mattered under Rule 60(b)(6)

  • United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). Georgia recognizes that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity for claims based on state conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the district court permitted Allen to pursue a Georgia-style “as-applied” abrogation theory for copyright infringement framed as a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation. The Fourth Circuit did not reach the merits of whether Allen stated a Georgia-qualifying constitutional violation; instead, it held that waiting years to invoke a 2006 precedent does not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” warranting Rule 60(b)(6) reopening.

3. Appellate jurisdiction tools enabling review of the 2021 order

  • Jackson Creek Marine, LLC v. Maryland, 153 F.4th 423 (4th Cir. 2025). Reaffirmed that denial of sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, providing jurisdiction over the 2024 immunity denial.
  • Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) and Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Schs., 666 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 2012). Cited for the proposition that immunity denials are treated as “final decisions” for § 1291 purposes via the collateral order doctrine.
  • Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2006); Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 2018); Scott v. Fam. Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 2013); Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35 (1995). These cases supply the two-prong framework for pendent appellate jurisdiction and caution that it should be used sparingly.
  • Indus. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Dobson, 68 F.4th 155 (4th Cir. 2023); Altman v. City of High Point, N.C., 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003); Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2001); Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co., 95 F.4th 181 (4th Cir. 2024); Ealy v. Pinkerton Gov't Servs., Inc., 514 Fed. App'x 299 (4th Cir. 2013). These precedents support exercising pendent jurisdiction where issues are “inextricably intertwined” or necessary for “meaningful review.” The Fourth Circuit relied heavily on this line to justify reviewing the 2021 reopening order because it was foundational to the 2024 immunity denial.

4. Finality, reopening, and the Rule 54(b) vs. Rule 60(b) boundary

  • Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 604 U.S. 305 (2025). Used to reinforce that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice can be “final” for Rule 60(b) purposes; here, it strengthened the conclusion that the case had ended and was not subject to Rule 54(b) revision.
  • Calderon v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 754 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2014) and Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950). Cited for what constitutes a “final decision” and the function of Rule 54(b) in permitting appeals before full final judgment—principles that undercut the district court’s Rule 54(b) reopening after the case had concluded.

5. Rule 60(b)(6) “extraordinary circumstances,” and why Rule 15 cannot dilute it

  • Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2011); Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950); Wells Fargo Bank, N.Z. v. AMH Roman Two NC, LLC, 859 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Welsh, 879 F.3d 530 (4th Cir. 2018); Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1993). These cases define Rule 60(b)(6) as a narrow “catchall” requiring “extraordinary circumstances,” and caution that Rule 60(b) cannot be an “inappropriate substitute for an appeal.” The Fourth Circuit applied these principles to reject reopening based on a theory Allen could have raised years earlier.
  • BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204 (2025) and Daulatzai v. Maryland, 97 F.4th 166 (4th Cir. 2024). These authorities supplied a critical doctrinal sequence: a party seeking to reopen a final judgment to amend must first satisfy Rule 60(b); only then may the court consider Rule 15(a). The Fourth Circuit held the district court unlawfully collapsed these standards by invoking Rule 15’s liberality to excuse the absence of Rule 60(b)(6) extraordinary circumstances.
  • Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advert., Inc., 974 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1992). Quoted for the principle that litigation cannot be pursued “one theory at a time.” The Fourth Circuit used this to characterize the reopening as unfair and inefficient—essentially a belated “do-over.”
  • Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2006) and Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41 (1957). The district court cited these to justify liberal amendment, but the Fourth Circuit explained that liberal amendment does not override Rule 60(b)(6)’s reopening gatekeeping.

6. Mootness and vacatur once the foundation fell

  • Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. City of Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2010); Holloway v. City of Va. Beach, 42 F.4th 266 (4th Cir. 2022); Goldman v. Brink, 41 F.4th 366 (4th Cir. 2022); Palmer v. Liberty Univ., Inc., 72 F.4th 52 (4th Cir. 2023). These cases supported the court’s decision to vacate as moot the 2024 ruling: once the 2021 reopening order was reversed, any merits review of the 2024 immunity denial would be advisory.

7. Related takings/doctrinal background (context, not the basis of reversal)

  • Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2014); Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 588 U.S. 180 (2019); Zito v. N.C. Coastal Res. Comm'n, 8 F.4th 281 (4th Cir. 2021). The district court’s 2021 decision relied on Knick to revisit takings analysis. In 2024, however, the district court dismissed takings claims as barred by sovereign immunity in light of Zito (which held Knick did not undermine Hutto for Eleventh Amendment purposes). The Fourth Circuit’s 2026 decision did not revisit these takings rulings because the appeal centered on the Georgia copyright/due-process revival and the impropriety of reopening.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction: why the court could reach the 2021 reopening order

The court first confirmed jurisdiction over the 2024 ruling because it denied sovereign immunity, an immediately appealable collateral order. The harder question was whether the panel could also review the 2021 order that reopened the case—an order previously found non-appealable in a prior attempt at appeal.

The panel avoided definitively resolving whether Rule 3(c)(4) “merger” principles apply to collateral-order appeals. Instead, it invoked pendent appellate jurisdiction: because the 2021 order was the “sole and only seed” of the 2024 immunity denial, the two were “inextricably intertwined,” and reviewing the 2021 order was necessary to meaningfully review the immunity dispute. In effect, the court treated the district court’s authority to be entertaining the 2024 immunity question at all as dependent on whether reopening in 2021 was lawful.

2. Finality and the Rule 54(b) error

The core procedural holding is crisp: Rule 54(b) permits revision of non-final interlocutory orders “before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Here, however, the litigation ended when (a) the district court implemented the Fourth Circuit’s 2018 mandate dismissing the state defendants, and (b) Allen voluntarily dismissed the last remaining defendant (Friends of QAR) in August 2020.

Because all claims against all parties were resolved, the case was final; there was no interlocutory order to revise in 2021. Therefore, relying on Rule 54(b) was legal error—and thus an abuse of discretion.

3. Rule 60(b)(6): why “extraordinary circumstances” were absent

Having found Rule 54(b) unavailable, the court assessed whether Rule 60(b) could have supported reopening. The panel concluded it could not, emphasizing:

  • The Georgia theory was not new. United States v. Georgia had existed since 2006—well before the lawsuit began—and Allen provided no compelling reason why it could not have been pleaded initially or pressed in the prior appellate cycles.
  • Rule 60(b)(6) is not a vehicle for second chances. The court treated Allen’s attempt as a “do-over” and invoked the principle that Rule 60(b) cannot substitute for an appeal or correct strategic choices to litigate “one theory at a time.”
  • Prejudice and the Rule 60(b) threshold were not properly analyzed. The district court’s approach effectively allowed reopening now and proving entitlement later, despite the required Rule 60(b) threshold showings (including that reopening would not unfairly prejudice the opposing party).

4. The Rule 15 sequencing rule: reopening comes first, amendment second

The panel relied on BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman and Daulatzai v. Maryland to reaffirm that when a case is final, a court must not “balance” the strictness of Rule 60(b)(6) against Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard. Only after Rule 60(b)(6) is satisfied may a court even consider Rule 15(a). The district court’s contrary approach was independently erroneous.

5. Vacatur: why the 2024 immunity ruling became moot

Once the 2021 reopening order fell, the 2024 ruling (which presupposed a properly reopened case and a viable amended complaint posture) could not have any “practical effect on the outcome.” Under Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. City of Alexandria, deciding the 2024 sovereign-immunity merits would be advisory. The panel therefore vacated the 2024 ruling and subsequent rulings as moot and directed closure with prejudice as to the state defendants.

C. Impact

1. Stronger finality constraints on “revival” litigation strategies

The decision reinforces that once a case is fully concluded, Rule 54(b) is off the table. Litigants seeking to resurrect dismissed claims must confront Rule 60(b) directly, including its demanding Rule 60(b)(6) “extraordinary circumstances” standard.

2. Discouraging “theory shopping” after losing immunity appeals

By characterizing Allen’s effort as litigating “one theory at a time,” the court signals that parties—especially those suing states—should plead and preserve constitutional-abrogation theories early. Waiting until after definitive immunity rulings, and then returning with a new doctrinal framing, will rarely (if ever) qualify as extraordinary circumstances.

3. Pendent appellate jurisdiction in immunity collateral-order appeals

Practically, the decision gives state defendants a meaningful appellate tool: when a district court’s denial of immunity rests on a prior reopening order that arguably exceeded the court’s authority, the appellate court may review that foundational order via pendent appellate jurisdiction. This can prevent immunity-protected defendants from being forced through discovery and merits litigation based on an improperly reopened case.

4. Copyright litigation against states post-CRCA

Although the panel did not decide whether Allen’s Georgia theory would succeed on the merits, the procedural holding is consequential: Georgia-style as-applied abrogation theories cannot be held in reserve to be deployed after CRCA prophylactic-abrogation arguments fail. Plaintiffs must build any Georgia/actual-constitutional-violation theory into the case from the outset if they hope to survive sovereign immunity barriers.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Eleventh Amendment / sovereign immunity: A doctrine that generally prevents private parties from suing a state (or state agencies/officials in their official capacities) for damages in federal court unless the state consents or Congress validly abrogates immunity under a constitutional grant of power.
  • CRCA (Copyright Remedy Clarification Act): Congress’s attempt (via 17 U.S.C. § 511) to remove state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims. Prior decisions in this litigation held that the CRCA did not validly accomplish that across-the-board.
  • The “Georgia theory” (United States v. Georgia): A narrower route for abrogation: Congress may authorize suits against states where the complained-of conduct also constitutes an actual violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, Allen tried to reframe alleged infringement as a procedural due process violation to fit this pathway.
  • Collateral order doctrine: A narrow exception allowing immediate appeal of certain non-final orders—most notably denials of immunity—because waiting until final judgment would effectively destroy the immunity right (the right not to be sued).
  • Pendent appellate jurisdiction: A discretionary doctrine allowing an appellate court, in limited circumstances, to review additional issues not normally immediately appealable when they are tightly bound up with an appealable issue (here, the appealable immunity denial).
  • Rule 54(b) vs. Rule 60(b): Rule 54(b) lets courts revise certain non-final orders before the case is over. Rule 60(b) is for reopening after final judgment; Rule 60(b)(6) is the strict “extraordinary circumstances” catchall.
  • Vacatur for mootness: If an appellate ruling eliminates the foundation for a lower court order, reviewing the lower court’s merits may become purely advisory. The typical remedy is to vacate the now-moot portions so they have no legal effect.

V. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s 2026 decision is principally a finality-and-procedure ruling with major practical consequences: closed cases cannot be reopened under Rule 54(b); Rule 60(b)(6) demands truly extraordinary circumstances; and a plaintiff’s late decision to pursue a long-available theory—here, a Georgia-style as-applied abrogation route—does not qualify. The court further confirms that, in immunity collateral-order appeals, it may use pendent appellate jurisdiction to review foundational, non-appealable orders that made the immunity denial possible. The bottom-line directive—dismissal with prejudice and closure—underscores the judiciary’s commitment to finality where sovereign immunity has already been definitively adjudicated.