Rule 60(b)(4) Voidness Is Limited to Jurisdictional or Due-Process Defects; “Non-Party” Filings and Attorney Conflicts (If Unraised) Do Not Void the Judgment

1. Introduction

In Stacy Terry v. Matthew W. Robinett (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 2026) (per curiam; not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of (i) a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) motion seeking to set aside a final judgment as “void” and (ii) a Rule 59(e) motion seeking to alter the order denying Rule 60(b)(4) relief.

The case arose from a sprawling pro se lawsuit against fourteen defendants alleging violations of numerous federal and state legal provisions. A key factual/procedural thread involved the identity of an insurer: the plaintiff sued “Travelers Insurance,” while The Phoenix Insurance Company explained that “Travelers Insurance” was not a legal entity and that Phoenix issued the relevant “Travelers” policy. After amendments and motion practice, the district court dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice (notably, as a shotgun pleading and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). The dismissal was previously affirmed on direct appeal (Terry v. Robinett, No. 22-13004 (11th Cir. July 11, 2023)).

The present appeal concerned whether the final judgment was “void” because the district court allegedly relied on filings by Phoenix as a “non-party” (given the plaintiff’s attempt to remove Phoenix while retaining “Travelers Insurance”) and whether an alleged attorney conflict could void the judgment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Rule 60(b)(4) relief because the plaintiff did not show that the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction (subject-matter or personal) or for a due-process violation (lack of notice or opportunity to be heard).
  • The court also affirmed the denial of Rule 59(e) relief because the motion largely attempted to relitigate the Rule 60(b)(4) arguments and did not identify newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.
  • The plaintiff’s “conflict of interest” theory failed because it was forfeited—it was not raised in the Rule 60(b)(4) motion in the district court.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The decision is structured around well-settled standards governing void-judgment attacks and post-judgment reconsideration. Each cited authority supplies a specific gatekeeping principle:

1) Rule 60(b)(4): what makes a judgment “void”

  • Bainbridge v. Governor of Fla., 75 F.4th 1326, 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2023)
    The court used Bainbridge for (i) de novo review of Rule 60(b)(4) denials and (ii) the narrow definition of “void”: only fundamental defects—lack of jurisdiction (subject-matter or personal) or a due-process failure depriving notice or an opportunity to be heard—qualify. Bainbridge also supplied the key limitation that a judgment is not void merely because it may be erroneous.
  • United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010)
    Quoted via Bainbridge to reinforce that “voidness” is not an error-correction mechanism; even serious legal error typically does not render a judgment void absent the jurisdictional/due-process category of defect.
  • Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528-29 (2005)
    Cited for the proposition that the movant bears the burden to establish entitlement to Rule 60(b) relief—here, to prove voidness under Rule 60(b)(4).
  • Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014)
    Used to acknowledge liberal construction of pro se filings, while emphasizing that liberal construction does not eliminate the substantive requirements of Rule 60(b)(4).

2) Jurisdictional principles relevant to the “non-party filings” theory

  • United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)
    Cited for the “familiar law” that a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. This undercut the appellant’s theory that considering Phoenix’s submissions somehow stripped the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distribs., Inc., 787 F.2d 1468, 1471 (11th Cir. 1986)
    Used to frame personal jurisdiction in practical terms—participation in proceedings or service of process. The court reasoned that Phoenix’s filings did not negate personal jurisdiction over the parties who were served/participated.

3) Preservation/forfeiture of issues

  • Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)
    Cited to hold that issues not raised in the district court are generally forfeited—even by pro se litigants. This disposed of the newly raised “conflict of interest” claim.

4) Rule 59(e): limited grounds; no relitigation

  • PBT Real Est., LLC v. Town of Palm Beach, 988 F.3d 1274, 1287 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Provided both the abuse-of-discretion standard of review and the limited grounds for Rule 59(e): newly discovered evidence or manifest error of law/fact.
  • In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)
    Quoted via PBT Real Est. for the same limited Rule 59(e) grounds.
  • Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1313 (11th Cir. 2023)
    Cited for the rule that Rule 59(e) cannot be used to relitigate old matters or raise arguments/evidence that could have been presented earlier.
  • Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)
    Quoted via Berry for the same anti-relitigation principle.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The court’s central move: confining “voidness” to a narrow category

The court treated Rule 60(b)(4) as a structural safeguard, not a vehicle for correcting alleged litigation irregularities or legal mistakes. Under Bainbridge and Espinosa, a judgment is void only when the court lacked jurisdiction or when a due-process failure deprived a party of notice or an opportunity to be heard. Everything else—even potentially serious error—does not qualify.

2) Why “non-party filings” did not create a jurisdictional defect

Terry’s theory was that Phoenix was not a party (given her pleadings posture) and therefore the district court’s reliance on Phoenix’s filings made the judgment void. The panel rejected this for three reasons:

  • Subject-matter jurisdiction remained intact. Even if one assumes a party-identification dispute, the court emphasized (via United States v. Ruiz) that federal courts may determine their own jurisdiction. Receiving or considering filings bearing on party identity and jurisdiction does not extinguish the court’s power to decide whether it can adjudicate the case.
  • Personal jurisdiction was not negated. The relevant inquiry is whether the court had authority over the parties—grounded in service or participation (citing Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distribs., Inc.). Phoenix’s participation via filings did not strip personal jurisdiction over served/participating defendants, nor did it constitute a voidness-level defect.
  • No due-process deprivation occurred. The panel focused on the practical due-process markers: Terry was served with Phoenix’s motion practice and filed responses of her own. Because she had notice and an opportunity to be heard, the due-process prong of Rule 60(b)(4) was not satisfied.

3) The forfeiture holding on attorney conflict allegations

Terry’s conflict-of-interest argument failed not on the merits but on procedure: she did not raise it in the district court in her Rule 60(b)(4) motion. Under Tannenbaum v. United States, pro se status does not exempt a litigant from preservation requirements. The panel thus treated the issue as forfeited.

4) Rule 59(e): why reconsideration was properly denied

The Rule 59(e) ruling followed straightforwardly from the Rule 60(b)(4) analysis. Applying PBT Real Est., LLC v. Town of Palm Beach and In re Kellogg, the panel reiterated that Rule 59(e) is available only for newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact. Under Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP (quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington), it cannot be used to relitigate the same points.

Because Terry’s Rule 59(e) motion largely repeated her “non-party filings” argument and did not present new evidence or a manifest error, denial was within the district court’s discretion.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is a clear application of a recurring Eleventh Circuit theme: Rule 60(b)(4) is exceptionally narrow. The practical implications include:

  • Litigation-irregularity arguments face a high bar post-judgment. Complaints that the district court considered filings by an allegedly improper participant will not translate into “voidness” without a concrete showing of jurisdictional absence or due-process deprivation.
  • Party-identity and misnomer disputes are not, by themselves, voidness defects. When an entity asserts that it is the real party behind a misidentified name (e.g., “Travelers Insurance” vs. “The Phoenix Insurance Company”), courts may consider submissions relevant to that question without thereby creating a Rule 60(b)(4) problem—especially where the opposing litigant has notice and responds.
  • Preservation remains critical even for pro se litigants. The forfeiture ruling signals that allegations such as attorney conflicts must be timely raised in the district court, not introduced later as a new ground for vacatur.
  • Rule 59(e) is not an appellate do-over. Once Rule 60(b)(4) is denied, Rule 59(e) cannot be used to repackage the same arguments absent new evidence or a true manifest error.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 60(b)(4) (“void judgment”): A judgment is “void” only when the court lacked the power to enter it (no jurisdiction) or when the process was fundamentally unfair (no notice or chance to be heard). It is not “void” merely because the court may have gotten something wrong.
  • Subject-matter jurisdiction: The court’s authority to hear the type of case presented (e.g., federal question, diversity). Courts may always determine whether they have it.
  • Personal jurisdiction: The court’s authority over the parties, typically established through service of process or voluntary participation.
  • Due process (notice and opportunity to be heard): At minimum, parties must receive notice of filings and a fair chance to respond. Service and the ability to file responses generally satisfy this baseline.
  • Forfeiture: If an argument is not presented to the district court at the proper time, an appellate court will usually not consider it later.
  • Rule 59(e): A narrow reconsideration tool used to correct manifest errors or consider truly new evidence, not to repeat arguments that already failed.
  • Shotgun pleading: A complaint so poorly organized or overly inclusive that it fails to give fair notice of the claims and their factual bases—often by lumping together defendants and allegations without clarity.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision underscores that void-judgment relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is confined to jurisdictional absence or a fundamental due-process failure. Allegations that a district court considered filings by an entity characterized as a “non-party”—especially where the movant received service and responded—do not meet that standard. The opinion also reinforces two procedural disciplines: (i) arguments not raised in the district court are forfeited, and (ii) Rule 59(e) cannot be used to relitigate points already rejected absent new evidence or a manifest legal/factual error.