Date: Jan 21, 2026

Rule 60(b)(4) Void-Judgment Motions Must Be Filed Within a “Reasonable Time” Under Rule 60(c)(1)

1. Introduction

In Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, Chapter 7 Trustee for Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC (607 U.S. ___ (2026)), the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a longstanding split among the Courts of Appeals on a deceptively simple but high-stakes procedural question: whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1)’s requirement that a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time” applies to a motion asserting that a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4).

The dispute arose out of bankruptcy adversary litigation. Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC (in bankruptcy) sued Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. to collect about $50,000 in allegedly unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro attempted service by mail, but Coney Island contended service failed to comply with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(b)(3). Coney Island did not answer; the Bankruptcy Court entered a default judgment (2015). Over the next six years the Chapter 7 trustee pursued enforcement; in 2021 a marshal seized funds from Coney Island’s bank account to satisfy the judgment. Only then did Coney Island move under Rule 60 to vacate the judgment as “void” due to defective service (and thus lack of personal jurisdiction).

The Bankruptcy Court denied relief as untimely under Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” standard, and both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the circuit split.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court (Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson) held that Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” limit applies to motions brought under Rule 60(b)(4) claiming a judgment is void. Because Coney Island did not argue that its motion was filed within a reasonable time, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit without reaching whether service was in fact defective or whether any defect would render the judgment void.

Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, agreeing that Rule 60’s text and structure compel application of the reasonable-time requirement, but criticizing the majority for discussing potential due process implications not raised by the parties.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U. S. 260 (2010)
The Court acknowledged Espinosa’s statement that a “void judgment is a legal nullity,” but rejected the inference that “legal nullity” means an unlimited time to seek relief. The majority treated Espinosa as describing the character of voidness, not prescribing a perpetual reopening mechanism that overrides Rule 60’s explicit timing rules.
Kemp v. United States, 596 U. S. 528 (2022)
Kemp reinforced a textual and structural approach: “All [Rule 60(b) motions] must be filed ‘within a reasonable time.’” The majority used Kemp to underscore that Rule 60(c)(1) states a default timing rule for all 60(b) motions, with specified exceptions (e.g., the one-year cap for certain grounds), and that courts should not create an atextual carve-out for Rule 60(b)(4).
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694 (1982)
Coney Island relied on Insurance Corp. for the proposition that a defendant may ignore proceedings, accept default, and later collaterally attack the judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court read Insurance Corp. more holistically: it also recognizes that legal rights are frequently conditioned on compliance with procedural rules and that failure to raise objections timely can forfeit them. Thus, rather than supporting “no time limits,” Insurance Corp. supported the Court’s insistence that jurisdictional objections exist within a procedural framework.
Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334 (1853)
Cited as an example where relief from a jurisdictionally defective judgment was granted long after entry (11 years). The Court used Harris not as proof of an unlimited-time entitlement, but as evidence that late relief sometimes occurs—consistent with a flexible “reasonable time” inquiry, not inconsistent with it.
Stocking v. Hanson, 35 Minn. 207, 28 N. W. 507 (1886) and Smith v. Jones, 174 Cal. 513, 163 P. 890 (1917)
These authorities were used to rebut Coney Island’s claim of a historical consensus that void judgments could be attacked “at any time.” The Court pointed to decisions applying laches or time limits even where voidness was alleged, undermining the notion of a uniform historical rule.
Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U. S. 443 (2017)
Quoted for the interpretive principle that a rule’s “text and structure” take priority over other considerations. The Court invoked this to subordinate contested historical practice to Rule 60’s plain language.
BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230 (2021); Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562 (2011); Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. 374 (2021)
These cases were used to frame a methodology: policy, drafting history, and canons (including constitutional avoidance) do meaningful work only if the text is ambiguous. Where the language is clear, those tools cannot be used to rewrite the rule.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682 (2014) (Sotomayor concurrence)
Justice Sotomayor cited Hobby Lobby for the Court’s practice of not generally entertaining arguments not raised below or advanced by the parties, criticizing the majority’s discussion of possible due process concerns when the petitioner expressly disclaimed any constitutional challenge.
United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 (1906) (syllabus note)
Appears in the Reporter’s note explaining that a syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion; it is not substantive authority for the Rule 60 issue but reflects the Court’s publication conventions.
Circuit-split authorities identified by the Court
The Court highlighted the split by juxtaposing the Sixth Circuit’s approach with decisions often read to permit voidness attacks without a reasonable-time constraint, including: Austin v. Smith, V. T. A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., Rodd v. Region Constr. Co., Hertz Corp. v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Ceramica Europa II, Inc., United States v. One Toshiba Color Television (en banc), and Jackson v. FIE Corp.. Importantly, the Court noted that these authorities generally acknowledge tension with Rule 60’s text, a tension the Court resolved in favor of textual enforcement.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Textual holding: “A motion under Rule 60(b)” means what it says.
Rule 60(c)(1) states: “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.” A Rule 60(b)(4) motion is, by definition, “a motion under Rule 60(b).” The Court treated this as decisive. The opinion’s core move is to refuse any implied exemption for voidness absent textual support.
Structural confirmation: explicit exceptions imply no others.
Rule 60(c)(1) modifies the “reasonable time” default by imposing a one-year cap for Rule 60(b)(1)–(3) (mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud). The Court reasoned that, if the drafters intended an unlimited time principle for Rule 60(b)(4), the Rule would have said so—especially given that it already demonstrates how to vary timing rules expressly.
Rejecting “void judgment = no deadlines” as a category error.
The Court accepted that time does not transform a void judgment into a valid one, but held that this does not entail that a litigant has an unlimited procedural right to seek relief. Many legal errors remain errors forever, yet appellate and post-judgment systems impose deadlines. The relevant question is not metaphysical (“is it a nullity?”) but procedural (“what mechanisms and time constraints govern reopening?”).
No demonstrated constitutional entitlement to perpetual reopening.
The Court stated that to override Rule 60(c)(1)’s text, Coney Island would have needed to identify a governing principle (e.g., the Due Process Clause) requiring courts to hear voidness allegations at any time. Coney Island expressly disclaimed such an argument, and the Court found no basis to invent it. The opinion also flagged “extreme implications” if voidness attacks were exempt from time limits—such as effectively nullifying deadlines for notices of appeal (Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)) or petitions for certiorari (Supreme Court Rule 13) whenever subject-matter jurisdiction is later contested.
Service-based voidness concerns are addressed by flexibility, not by abolishing limits.
The Court acknowledged the intuitive argument that defective service may leave a defendant unaware of the case until enforcement. But the Court treated this as a reason to prefer a flexible “reasonable time” standard (which can account for late discovery), not a reason to erase timing altogether. In default-judgment settings, it “might be reasonable” not to move until enforcement efforts begin.
History and policy cannot overcome clear language.
The Court found no “historical consensus” for an unlimited-time rule. And even if history pointed one way, the “text and structure” of Rule 60 control. Similarly, policy concerns, drafting history, and constitutional avoidance have interpretive force only when ambiguity exists—and the Court found no ambiguity here.

3.3. Impact

Uniform national rule for Rule 60(b)(4) timing.
The decision resolves the split by making clear that a “void judgment” challenge under Rule 60(b)(4) is not categorically exempt from Rule 60(c)(1). Litigants in circuits that previously treated voidness motions as essentially timeless must now litigate (and preserve) “reasonable time” questions.
Greater finality for default judgments, including in bankruptcy adversary proceedings.
Defaults are common in collection-style adversary proceedings, and judgments can sit for years before meaningful enforcement. This ruling strengthens the finality of such judgments by enabling courts to deny Rule 60(b)(4) relief if a defendant delays unreasonably after notice.
Fact-intensive “reasonable time” litigation will move to center stage.
Because the Court did not define “reasonable time,” lower courts will likely develop factors emphasizing when the movant received notice (e.g., demand letters, collection efforts), prejudice to the judgment creditor, and the defendant’s diligence after learning of the judgment. This may produce more evidentiary hearings on notice and delay than under the old “no time limit” approach.
Strategic consequences for defendants alleging defective service.
Defendants cannot treat voidness as a procedural “ace” to be played whenever enforcement becomes painful; once they have notice, delay carries risk. Conversely, the Court’s recognition that late discovery may justify later filing gives defendants a path to relief when they truly lacked notice for extended periods.
Doctrinal clarity without expanding constitutional holdings.
The majority’s discussion of due process implications may invite future litigants to test whether, in extreme cases (e.g., no notice for many years), due process constrains how “reasonable time” is applied. Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence signals skepticism about reaching such constitutional questions absent proper briefing and preservation—potentially shaping how future challenges are litigated.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 60(b)(4) (“void” judgment): A judgment is “void” (in the Rule 60(b)(4) sense) when the court lacked a fundamental prerequisite to enter it, commonly personal jurisdiction (often tied to valid service) or subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court in this case did not decide whether service was defective or whether any defect rendered the judgment void; it decided only the timing rule for bringing the claim.
Rule 60(c)(1) (“within a reasonable time”): This is a flexible deadline rather than a calendar date. It asks whether the movant acted with appropriate diligence given what they knew (or should have known), and given the surrounding circumstances (including prejudice to the other side). The Court held that this flexible deadline applies even to voidness challenges.
Default judgment: A judgment entered because the defendant failed to respond or appear. Defaults create special fairness concerns if the defendant never received proper notice, but they also create strong interests in finality once enforcement begins and time passes.
Service of process (Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(3)): Service of process is the formal delivery of the lawsuit papers that gives the court power over the defendant. In bankruptcy adversary proceedings, Rule 7004 permits certain forms of service by mail, but with specific requirements. If those requirements are not met, personal jurisdiction may be lacking.
Laches: An equitable doctrine that can bar relief when a party unreasonably delays and that delay prejudices the other side. The Court referenced historical cases showing that even “voidness” claims were not always immune from time-based defenses.

5. Conclusion

Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton establishes a clear procedural rule: a motion asserting that a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) remains subject to Rule 60(c)(1)’s requirement that it be filed “within a reasonable time.” The Court grounded this holding in Rule 60’s unambiguous text and confirming structure, rejecting a broad “legal nullity” theory that would effectively erase procedural deadlines for voidness-based attacks on judgments.

The decision strengthens finality while preserving flexibility: defendants who truly lack notice may still argue that later filing is “reasonable,” but those who sit on their rights after learning of a judgment risk forfeiting Rule 60(b)(4) relief. In bankruptcy and beyond, the center of gravity now shifts from categorical timelessness to a fact-bound inquiry into notice, diligence, and delay.