Rule 60(a) Allows Clarifying a Writ of Possession to Cover the Entire Parcel When a Property Has Multiple 911 Addresses

1. Introduction

Ballinallee Properties, LLC et al. v. Shawn Mateo (Vt. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 2026) arises from a landlord–tenant/business-occupancy dispute over a single, unsubdivided parcel in Pownal, Vermont that carried two “911 addresses”: 2323 U.S. Route 7 and 2325 U.S. Route 7. Plaintiffs (Patrick Gray and Ballinallee Properties, LLC) sought possession and back rent; defendant Shawn Mateo (self-represented) counterclaimed.

After a bench trial, the Superior Court awarded plaintiffs a writ of possession and $39,000 in unpaid rent. Post-judgment, plaintiffs moved under V.R.C.P. 60(a) to clarify that the judgment and writ applied to both 911 addresses—asserting the omission of one address was an oversight that threatened enforceability and invited gamesmanship (moving from one address to the other).

The key issues on appeal were whether the trial court permissibly used Rule 60(a) to correct/clarify the property description without violating due process, and whether Mateo’s various procedural and evidentiary complaints warranted reversal.

Note: This decision is issued as an “Entry Order” by a three-justice panel; under the Court’s notice, such decisions are not precedential before any tribunal. Nonetheless, it provides a practical illustration of how Vermont courts apply Rule 60(a), appellate briefing requirements, and recusal standards.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. It held that:

  • The trial court acted within its Rule 60(a) authority to correct an oversight in the property description so the judgment and writ clearly covered the entire parcel known by both 2323 and 2325 U.S. Route 7.
  • Mateo received notice and an opportunity to oppose the Rule 60(a) motion; there was no due process violation.
  • Mateo’s counterclaims were, in fact, considered and rejected by the trial court.
  • Mateo waived a jury trial by failing to make a timely demand under V.R.C.P. 38.
  • Several appellate arguments were rejected as inadequately briefed for lack of record citations, and the Court would not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility.
  • Recusal was not required merely because Mateo claimed he was suing the trial judge in another matter.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Warner v. Warner, 2025 VT 70

The Court relied on Warner v. Warner, 2025 VT 70, ¶ 14 for the governing standard of review: whether to enter a corrected judgment is within the trial court’s discretion, reviewed only for abuse of discretion. This framing is critical—Mateo needed to show more than disagreement; he had to show the trial court’s Rule 60(a) correction fell outside permissible bounds.

2) In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294

The Court cited In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294, 297 (1988) for a recurring appellate principle: the appellant bears the burden to demonstrate error, and the Supreme Court will not “comb the record searching for error.” This precedent supported rejecting Mateo’s scattershot evidentiary complaints and references to documents (like a purported 2020 lease) without record citations.

3) Johnson v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 160

Alongside the briefing rules, the Court invoked Johnson v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 160, 164 n.* (1992) to justify declining to address contentions “so inadequately briefed” that they fail to meet V.R.A.P. 28(a) standards. The decision reinforces that self-representation does not relieve an appellant from minimum appellate presentation requirements.

4) Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485

The Court relied on Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485, 497 (1997) to explain why it would not reweigh evidence: credibility and persuasiveness determinations are for the trial court as factfinder. This directly undercut Mateo’s attempts to relitigate factual issues (including whether he purchased the property).

5) Lofts Essex, LLC v. Strategis Floor & Décor Inc., 2019 VT 82

To address Mateo’s claim that his agreement was with Gray personally rather than Ballinallee, the Court cited Lofts Essex, LLC v. Strategis Floor & Décor Inc., 2019 VT 82, ¶ 17, 211 Vt. 204 for the “clearly erroneous” standard applicable to factual findings: findings stand if supported by any credible evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. The contract’s first page listing Gray as Ballinallee’s agent supplied that credible evidence.

6) In re Vt. Sup. Ct. Admin. Directive No. 17, 154 Vt. 217

For recusal, the Court relied on In re Vt. Sup. Ct. Admin. Directive No. 17, 154 Vt. 217, 226 (1990), emphasizing the anti-manipulation rule: “A judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.” This precedent prevented litigants from manufacturing disqualification by filing collateral actions against the presiding judge.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Rule 60(a): correcting “clerical mistakes” and omissions

The centerpiece of the opinion is the Court’s approval of the trial court’s use of V.R.C.P. 60(a), which permits correction of “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission.”

The trial court found the judgment had “inadvertently misidentified” the property address. The Supreme Court agreed there was ample evidentiary support that:

  • the notice to quit referenced both 2323 and 2325 U.S. Route 7,
  • the town grand list treated the property as one lot, and
  • the litigation and requested relief always concerned possession of the whole parcel.

In functional terms, the Court treated the correction as aligning the written judgment with the adjudicated reality—avoiding a scenario where enforcement fails because the writ’s description is incomplete.

2) Due process: notice and opportunity to be heard

Mateo argued the clarification violated due process. The Court rejected this because he received notice of the Rule 60(a) motion and the court considered his opposition. The Court’s reasoning reflects a procedural due process baseline: when a post-judgment correction is sought, the opposing party must have a fair chance to respond—something the record showed occurred.

3) Jury trial waiver under V.R.C.P. 38

The Court enforced the rule-based waiver in V.R.C.P. 38(b), (d): failing to timely serve and file a jury demand constitutes waiver. The Court treated this as a straightforward procedural default rather than an equitable inquiry.

4) Appellate discipline: record citations and preserved objections

Several arguments failed not because they were impossible as a matter of law, but because they were not presented in a reviewable way:

  • claims of judicial bias or a “hard time” lacked specific rulings and record support;
  • hearsay complaints did not identify particular evidence, show objections below, or cite the record;
  • venue and other assertions were deemed inadequately briefed under V.R.A.P. 28(a).

The Court’s approach underscores that appellate review is not a general audit of the trial; it is a targeted review of alleged, supported errors.

5) Recusal: preventing litigant-driven disqualification

Applying In re Vt. Sup. Ct. Admin. Directive No. 17 via V.R.C.P. 40(e), the Court approved denial of recusal where the asserted basis was that Mateo was “suing the trial judge” elsewhere. The Court emphasized the systemic risk of allowing “an easy method of disqualification” that would permit manipulation of court assignment.

C. Impact

  • Enforceability of possession orders: The decision signals that Vermont trial courts may use Rule 60(a) to fix an incomplete property description in a writ of possession when the correction merely makes the written order match what was tried and decided—especially where a parcel has multiple common identifiers (like multiple 911 addresses).
  • Practical check against evasion: The Court implicitly validates trial-court efforts to prevent technical loopholes (e.g., “I’ll move from 2325 to 2323”) that would frustrate execution of judgments.
  • Appellate practice consequences: The opinion reiterates that inadequate briefing and missing record citations are often fatal, and that appellate courts will not reconstruct a party’s case.
  • Recusal motions: The decision reinforces that recusal cannot be created by filing or threatening collateral lawsuits against the sitting judge.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Rule 60(a) clerical mistake”: A fix to the paperwork (judgment/order record) to correct an oversight—like a missing or incorrect address—so the written judgment reflects what the court actually decided.
  • “Abuse of discretion” review: A deferential appellate standard. The appellant must show the trial court’s choice was outside the range of reasonable options, not merely arguably wrong.
  • “Writ of possession”: The court document authorizing law enforcement (often the sheriff) to restore possession of property to the prevailing party.
  • “Waiver of jury trial”: The right to a jury can be lost if a party does not request it on time in the manner required by procedural rules.
  • “Inadequately briefed” on appeal: If an argument lacks legal development, record citations, or preserved objections, the appellate court may decline to address it.
  • Recusal/disqualification: A judge steps aside only when legally required; a party cannot force recusal simply by suing the judge, because that would enable manipulation of the judicial process.

5. Conclusion

Ballinallee Properties, LLC et al. v. Shawn Mateo affirms a pragmatic application of V.R.C.P. 60(a): when a judgment and writ of possession inadvertently omit a key identifier (here, one of two 911 addresses for a single parcel), the court may correct the omission to ensure the judgment is enforceable and accurately describes the property interest actually adjudicated—so long as the opposing party receives notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Beyond Rule 60(a), the decision reinforces familiar but consequential procedural lessons: timely jury demands matter; appellate arguments must be supported with record citations; appellate courts do not reweigh credibility; and recusal cannot be manufactured by suing the presiding judge.