Rule 56(d) Relief in the First Circuit: Summary Judgment Is Generally Premature When the Nonmovant Has Had No Meaningful Discovery Opportunity

1. Introduction

Cortes-Ramos v. Martin-Morales (1st Cir. June 12, 2026) is the First Circuit’s latest installment in Luis Adrián Cortés-Ramos’s long-running copyright dispute with Enrique Martin-Morales (Ricky Martin) arising from the “SuperSong” contest and Martin’s later release of “Vida.”

The appeal did not resolve whether Cortés owns enforceable copyright rights or whether any “assignment” to Sony occurred. Instead, the First Circuit focused on a procedural question with outsized practical consequences: whether the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment and invalidating Cortés’s copyright registration without permitting any meaningful discovery, despite repeated requests.

Key issues:

  • Jurisdiction vs. arbitration: whether an arbitration clause between Cortés and Sony deprived the federal court of jurisdiction, or required abstention/compelled arbitration with Martin.
  • Discovery and summary judgment: whether the district court prematurely “sw[ung] the summary judgment axe” without allowing discovery, and how flexibly Rule 56(d) should be applied when a litigant does not perfectly follow its formalities.
  • Registration invalidation: whether the district court’s invalidation of Cortés’s copyright registration could stand once summary judgment was vacated.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit:

  • Rejected Cortés’s jurisdiction/arbitration argument, reaffirming that arbitration agreements do not strip courts of jurisdiction and do not bind nonparties absent a basis to do so.
  • Vacated the grant of summary judgment for Martin, holding that the district court abused its discretion by proceeding to summary judgment without giving Cortés a “full and fair opportunity” for discovery.
  • Vacated the district court’s order invalidating Cortés’s copyright registration because it was premised on the same discovery-truncated record and summary-judgment disposition.
  • Remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to clarify discovery obligations and permit discovery related to key issues.

Chief Judge Barron dissented in part, arguing that Cortés did not properly preserve (or develop on appeal) a Rule 56(d) theory and that the majority improperly treated earlier filings as a functional Rule 56(d) request.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. The “registration prerequisite” background

  • Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 586 U.S. 296 (2019): supplied the registration timing framework that drove earlier procedural maneuvers (dismissal without prejudice to refile after registration). While not dispositive in 2026, it explains why this case reached yet another procedural posture and highlights the court’s sensitivity to technical gatekeeping rules that can block merits adjudication.
  • Prior First Circuit history in the same dispute: Cortés-Ramos v. Martin-Morales, 956 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2020); Cortés-Ramos v. Martin-Morales, 894 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2018); Cortés-Ramos v. Sony Corp. of Am., 889 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2018); Cortés-Ramos v. Sony Corp. of Am., 836 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2016). These earlier decisions framed the recurring contest-document/assent questions and underscored that repeated procedural dismissals had prevented ordinary discovery development—context the majority treated as important to “good cause” under Rule 56(d).

B. Arbitration does not defeat federal jurisdiction

  • Skirchak v. Dynamics Rsch. Corp., 508 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2007): reaffirmed for the panel that “[a]n agreement to arbitrate does not divest a court of its jurisdiction,” defeating Cortés’s threshold jurisdiction framing.
  • DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., PLC, 202 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2000): reinforced the “modern view” that arbitration clauses do not remove jurisdiction even if they may require courts to refrain from deciding arbitrable merits.
  • InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003): provided the controlling principle that compelling arbitration requires showing “the other party is bound by” the clause—fatal here because Martin was not shown to be bound.
  • Cortés-Ramos v. Martin-Morales, 894 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2018): specifically noted (again) that “Martin was not an intended third-party beneficiary” of the arbitration agreement, foreclosing any attempt to compel arbitration against him.

C. Rule 56(d) and “premature” summary judgment without discovery

  • Resol. Tr. Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198 (1st Cir. 1994): supplied the foundational description of Rule 56(d)’s purpose—preventing judges from “swinging the summary judgment axe too hastily” and emphasizing the rule’s protective function for parties needing discovery to oppose summary judgment.
  • Emigrant Residential LLC v. Pinti, 37 F.4th 717 (1st Cir. 2022): supplied the controlling “five elements” taxonomy—“authoritativeness, timeliness, good cause, utility, and materiality”—and the abuse-of-discretion standard. The majority treated these elements as flexible and capable of relaxation “to address the exigencies” of a case, especially when there has been no discovery.
  • In re PHC, Inc. S'holder Litig., 762 F.3d 138 (1st Cir. 2014): did the heaviest lifting. The majority relied on it for (i) the directive to construe Rule 56(d) requests generously and hold parties to the “spirit rather than its letter,” and (ii) the key proposition that “typically, when the parties have no opportunity for discovery, denying the Rule 56([d]) motion and ruling on a summary judgment motion is likely to be an abuse of discretion.”
  • Rivera-Almodóvar v. Instituto Socioeconómico Comunitario, Inc., 730 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2013): reinforced that Rule 56(d) should be applied “liberally.”
  • Out-of-circuit support for the “no discovery = likely error” principle: Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554 (3d Cir. 2015); Bailey v. KS Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 35 F.4th 397 (5th Cir. 2022); Vance By & Through Hammons v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145 (6th Cir. 1996); InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2020). The majority used these cases to show a broad consensus: summary judgment is generally improper when the nonmovant has had no discovery chance and has been seeking it.

D. Evidence control and the function of discovery

  • United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958): used to emphasize that discovery’s purpose is to make trial “less a game of blind man’s buff,” supporting the majority’s insistence that a party should not have to accept the opponent’s curated record.
  • Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332 (1st Cir. 1995): cited for the idea that access/control relationships can make it plausible that key information is effectively within a party’s reach—informing the majority’s view that Sony’s apparent cooperation with Martin made the no-discovery posture particularly unfair to Cortés.

E. Case-management discretion has limits

  • E. Food Servs., Inc. v. Pontifical Cath. Univ. Servs. Ass'n, 357 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004): acknowledged for the proposition that discovery is burdensome and subject to judicial control, but deployed to show the necessary balance—control is not license to deny basic fairness when one side lacks access.

F. Waiver and undeveloped argument (dissent-focused)

  • FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010): used by the majority in a different context to deem certain arbitration-award citations waived because they were “devoid of context or developed argument.”
  • Oliveras-Villafañe v. Baxter Healthcare SA, 140 F.4th 29 (1st Cir. 2025): invoked by the dissent to argue that Cortés failed to challenge an “independent ground” (clickwrap assent), thus leaving a basis to affirm. The majority, however, did not reach merits and vacated on the discovery issue alone.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdiction/arbitration: three framings, one result

The court treated Cortés’s arbitration theory as potentially advancing three different claims and rejected each:

  • Arbitration clause eliminates jurisdiction: rejected outright under Skirchak v. Dynamics Rsch. Corp. and DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., PLC.
  • Arbitration clause binds Martin: rejected under InterGen N.V. v. Grina because Cortés failed to show Martin was “bound by” the clause; reinforced by the earlier case-specific holding in Cortés-Ramos v. Martin-Morales, 894 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2018).
  • Abstention for prudential reasons: rejected because Cortés identified no doctrine justifying abstention, and he had not actually commenced arbitration against Sony.

The opinion’s notable addendum is its practical warning: even if arbitration remains an option, litigation results may have preclusive effect in later arbitration. The majority cited O'Connell v. Fed. Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 2d 223 (D. Mass. 2007), and flagged the possibility that this judicial case could bind later arbitral proceedings—one reason the court viewed discovery fairness as especially important.

B. Discovery and Rule 56(d): substance over form when discovery has been wholly absent

The district court granted summary judgment after expressly setting a schedule “[t]o avoid discovery,” denying a scheduling conference, and then faulting Cortés for not completing early discovery prerequisites (initial disclosures and meeting-and-conferring). The First Circuit held that this sequence produced an unfair and legally erroneous denial of a “full and fair opportunity” to develop facts.

The court’s key moves:

  • Functional Rule 56(d) request: Even though Cortés did not cite Rule 56(d) or attach the usual affidavit/declaration, the majority treated his motion to reconsider and repeated objections as a functional plea for Rule 56(d)-type relief. It aligned with the principle (from In re PHC, Inc. S'holder Litig. and Rivera-Almodóvar v. Instituto Socioeconómico Comunitario, Inc.) that courts should honor the rule’s “spirit rather than its letter.”
  • Five-factor test applied flexibly: Using Emigrant Residential LLC v. Pinti, the court found timeliness and good cause especially strong: Cortés sought discovery immediately and persistently, and the case involved “no discovery” at all.
  • No-discovery presumption: The majority leaned heavily on In re PHC, Inc. S'holder Litig. and sister-circuit cases to emphasize that granting summary judgment where “the parties have no opportunity for discovery” is “typically” an abuse of discretion.
  • Control-of-evidence concern: The court found it significant that affidavits and contest records—central to the “assent/assignment” theory—were introduced via Martin’s motion practice, without giving Cortés the ordinary tools (depositions, document requests, subpoenas with adequate time) to test completeness and credibility.

Importantly, the First Circuit did not hold that discovery must be broad or unlimited; it held that some fair opportunity must exist—especially where the court’s own scheduling choices were “to avoid discovery.”

C. Vacatur of registration invalidation: downstream relief follows from procedural error

Because the district court invalidated Cortés’s Certificate of Registration on the premise that Cortés had assigned away the very rights he later registered, and because that premise was accepted on a record developed without discovery, the First Circuit vacated the invalidation order as well.

3.3. Impact

A. Practical rule for the First Circuit: do not fast-track to dispositive summary judgment to “avoid discovery” when the nonmovant has plausibly sought it

The opinion strengthens a litigant-protective, process-centered message:

  • When no discovery has occurred, district courts should treat requests for discovery time with special solicitude, because denying it and granting summary judgment is “typically” an abuse of discretion.
  • Rule 56(d) relief is not purely formalistic; a litigant’s filings may be treated as a functional equivalent of a Rule 56(d) request in extraordinary circumstances, particularly when the litigant has been vigilant and discovery has been wholly absent.
  • Courts must balance efficiency against fairness where one side effectively controls key evidence; motion practice cannot be used to “curate” a record immune from adversarial testing.

B. Litigation strategy consequences

  • For plaintiffs/nonmovants: this decision is a cautionary tale and a lifeline. It suggests leniency in extreme “no discovery” scenarios, but it simultaneously underscores that parties should still aim to comply with the “authoritative” Rule 56(d) model (affidavit/declaration specifying needed discovery) whenever possible to avoid a waiver argument like the dissent’s.
  • For defendants/movants: moving for summary judgment on an undeveloped record, especially after opposing discovery initiation, risks vacatur—even if the merits appear strong.
  • For district courts: case-management discretion exists, but “avoid discovery” cannot become a substitute for the Rule 56(d) fairness inquiry where the nonmovant has had no meaningful chance to obtain evidence.

C. Interplay with arbitration and preclusion

The court’s discussion hints at a broader systemic concern: if a judicial ruling—reached without discovery—could later preclude arbitration of the same core contract/assignment issues, then discovery denial in court can indirectly foreclose discovery in arbitration as well. That prospect heightens the importance of ensuring procedurally fair fact development before entering dispositive, potentially preclusive rulings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f))

Rule 56(d) lets a party opposing summary judgment ask the court to pause the decision and allow time for discovery if the party cannot yet present facts “essential” to oppose the motion. It is meant to prevent summary judgment from being granted simply because the relevant evidence is not yet available to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment

Summary judgment ends a case (or a claim) without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to win as a matter of law. Because it can terminate litigation early, courts are cautious about granting it before discovery reveals the facts.

Clickwrap agreement

A “clickwrap” agreement is an online contract where a user manifests assent by clicking “I agree,” even if the user does not actually read the terms (so long as the terms were reasonably presented). The opinion referenced this concept via Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2018).

Copyright “assignment”

An assignment transfers ownership of copyright from one party to another. If Cortés assigned his rights to Sony under the contest rules, he may lack “ownership of a valid copyright,” a necessary element of infringement. The First Circuit did not decide the assignment issue on the merits in this appeal; it held that the procedural path to deciding it was unfairly truncated.

Arbitration and jurisdiction

An arbitration clause generally means certain disputes must be resolved by an arbitrator rather than a court, but it does not eliminate a court’s power (jurisdiction) to hear a case. Also, arbitration clauses typically bind only the parties who agreed to them (and certain legally recognized related parties).

5. Conclusion

Cortes-Ramos v. Martin-Morales (1st Cir. 2026) establishes a process-centered precedent: when no meaningful discovery has occurred, and the nonmovant has vigilantly sought it, the First Circuit will scrutinize and often reject a rush to summary judgment, even if the nonmovant did not perfectly comply with Rule 56(d)’s formal affidavit requirements.

The decision does not vindicate Cortés on the merits of copyright ownership, contest-rule assent, or assignment. Instead, it reinforces that dispositive rulings—especially those with potential preclusive consequences and collateral effects (like invalidating a copyright registration)—should not rest on a record shaped by “avoid discovery” case management where one party plausibly lacks access to key evidence.