Rule 54(b) Limits on Interlocutory Review in Multi-Party Cases; Civil Conspiracy Liability Extends to Non-Tortfeasor Co-Conspirators

1. Introduction

Case: Ronald J. Hopkins, II, Rachel L. Abrams Hopkins, Sarah A. Abrams, and Langhorne Abrams v. Mary C. Sutphin
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Date: May 29, 2026

This appeal arises out of an intra-family dispute over control, management, and financial benefits associated with a closely held family business, Lewis Chevrolet Company. Mary C. Sutphin (plaintiff below) sued family members and related individuals (including corporate officers and employees) alleging various torts and fiduciary-type wrongdoing tied to the administration of a trust, corporate governance, and alleged diversion of benefits to one branch of the family.

Two issues dominated the Supreme Court’s review:

  • Appellate jurisdiction/finality: whether the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a circuit court order that dismissed only some claims against some parties—particularly where some defendants remained in the case and the order lacked a proper Rule 54(b) posture.
  • Civil conspiracy doctrine: whether a civil conspiracy claim may proceed against an alleged co-conspirator (Ronald Hopkins) even when no standalone tort claim remains pending against him personally, and whether the pleading met notice-pleading standards.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court issued a split disposition:

  • Jurisdiction (Abrams/Hopkins sisters): The Court held the ICA lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s interlocutory dismissal of certain claims against Sarah Abrams and Rachel Hopkins because Rule 54(b)’s requirements were not satisfied; those dismissals did not “completely dispose” of the claims in the action (the same claims continued against others) and were deeply intertwined with pending matters. The ICA’s contrary merits rulings were vacated for lack of jurisdiction.
  • Jurisdiction (Ronald Hopkins): The Court held the ICA did have jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s dismissal of Ronald Hopkins as a party. Although the circuit court did not use formal Rule 54(b) language, the order dismissed him entirely “with prejudice” and explicitly stated the dismissal was intended as final as to him, satisfying the “Durm-type” finality exception.
  • Merits (civil conspiracy vs Ronald Hopkins): The Court affirmed the ICA’s reinstatement of the civil conspiracy claim against Ronald Hopkins, rejecting the argument that civil conspiracy fails absent an independent tort claim pleaded against that particular co-conspirator. The Court further held the pleadings were sufficient at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage under notice-pleading standards, and that Cook v. Heck’s did not defeat the claim at this posture because the complaint permitted an inference that Hopkins acted for individual advantage.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and ICA’s role

  • Folse v. Rollyson (Syl. Pt. 1): Established the de novo standard when this Court reviews an ICA decision that itself reviewed a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. The Court used Folse to frame its posture: even though the case came through the ICA, questions of law (including jurisdiction and pleading sufficiency) are reviewed de novo.
  • Savarese v. Allstate Ins. Co. and Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L.: Quoted via Folse to reinforce de novo review of dismissal rulings and legal questions.

2) The final judgment rule and interlocutory appeals

  • James M.B. v. Carolyn M.: The Court relied on this case for the “axiomatic” obligation to examine appellate jurisdiction and for the formulation that a case is final only when it terminates litigation on the merits and leaves nothing but execution.
  • State v. Hensley: Used as a modern reaffirmation of the “rule of finality” grounded in West Virginia Code § 58-5-1(a).
  • Flanagan v. United States and United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., Inc.: Cited (through James M.B.) to explain the policy against piecemeal review.
  • Coleman v. Sopher: Cited for the idea that an appealable order must “end the case.”
  • Leeson v. Smith: Invoked to underscore that appellate jurisdiction is strictly bounded by statute and cannot be assumed where § 58-5-1 is not satisfied.
  • Aaron W. v. Evelyn W.: Cited for the ICA’s general lack of jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals under W. Va. Code § 51-11-4(d)(8).

3) Rule 54(b), certification, and “Durm-type” finality

  • Riffe v. Armstrong (Syl. Pt. 1 and Syl. Pt. 5): The Court used Riffe to restate the core Rule 54(b) mechanism (express “no just reason for delay” language makes partial dispositions immediately appealable) and to identify the extraordinary-writ pathway where a circuit court determines an order is not final.
  • Moats v. Preston County Commission: Referenced as the case that modified Riffe on other grounds, without altering the central Rule 54(b) propositions relied upon here.
  • Smith v. Buege: Noted for the “bright-line” approach that would require explicit Rule 54(b) language for appealability—used mainly as a historical contrast.
  • Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp.: Described as an early, flexible interpretation of Rule 54(b) (in a default-judgment context) and a root of West Virginia’s more liberal trajectory.
  • Durm v. Heck’s (Syl. Pt. 2): The controlling authority for the Court’s jurisdictional distinction. Under Durm, an order that fully disposes of liability as to a party can be appealable even without Rule 54(b) certification, if it “approximates a final order in its nature and effect.” The Court applied Durm to uphold jurisdiction over the appeal concerning Ronald Hopkins (dismissed entirely).
  • State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac Buick, Inc.: Cited to show Durm was extended beyond summary judgment to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.
  • Province v. Province: This decision provided the Court’s analytical framework for Rule 54(b) “finality” (complete disposition of at least one substantive claim) and “no just reason for delay” (overlap of facts/law and equities/efficiencies). The Court quoted Province extensively to emphasize (i) certification should be reserved for the “infrequent harsh case,” and (ii) without certification, appellate courts are forced into an ill-suited “dispatcher” role.
  • Bryan v. Big Two Mile Gas Co.: Reinforced the institutional preference for unitary proceedings and disfavor of fractured appeals.
  • Hubbard v. State Farm Indemnity Co.: Cited in footnotes as evidence of the confusion generated by “Durm-type” orders—particularly waiver and how interlocutory rulings interact with later appeals and reconsideration practice.
  • Sutphin v. Abrams and Sutphin v. Hopkins: Referenced to illustrate that piecemeal appellate activity had already occurred in this litigation, amplifying the Court’s efficiency concerns.

4) Civil conspiracy and related doctrines

  • Dunn v. Rockwell (Syl. Pt. 8 and Syl. Pt. 9): The source of the modern West Virginia articulation of civil conspiracy. The Court acknowledged that language in Dunn (“not a per se, stand-alone cause of action”) fueled the defendants’ argument that each conspirator must be independently liable for a tort.
  • Jane Doe-1 v. Corporation of President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Syl. Pt. 4): Treated as the clarifying authority. The Court relied on Jane Doe-1 to reject the “independent tort as to each conspirator” requirement and to emphasize that conspiracy can extend liability to those who shared a common plan but did not themselves commit the underlying tort.
  • Gosden v. Louis: Quoted (via Jane Doe-1) for the classic rationale of civil conspiracy: it expands the pool of potential defendants and can serve as a matter of aggravation affecting redress.
  • Mountaineer Fire & Rescue Equip., LLC v. City Nat’l Bank of W. Va.: Cited for West Virginia’s notice-pleading principle: a complaint need only give general notice of the nature of the claim.
  • Cook v. Heck’s: The key “intracorporate conspiracy” authority invoked by Ronald Hopkins. The Court distinguished it procedurally (directed verdict vs 12(b)(6)) and factually (the complaint allowed an inference of individual advantage rather than purely official corporate action).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The jurisdictional split: why Ronald Hopkins was different

The Court’s jurisdiction analysis turned on whether the appealed order had enough “finality” to qualify for immediate review under Rule 54(b) principles (including the Durm v. Heck’s exception). The Court treated the circuit court’s September 28, 2022 order as two different species of dispositions:

  • Complete party dismissal (Ronald Hopkins): The circuit court dismissed him entirely, with prejudice, and expressly stated the dismissal was intended as final as to him. Under Durm v. Heck’s, that approximated a final order in nature and effect, making the ICA’s review—and this Court’s further review—jurisdictionally permissible.
  • Partial claim dismissals against continuing parties (Sarah Abrams and Rachel Hopkins): Although some claims were dismissed “with prejudice,” those defendants remained in the case on other theories, and the dismissed claims overlapped with claims still pending against other defendants. The Court held Rule 54(b)’s prerequisites were not met because (i) the dismissed claims were not “completely disposed of” within the litigation as a whole, and (ii) there was strong “just reason for delay” given overlap and efficiency concerns.

The Court’s approach is notably institutional: it treats appellate jurisdiction as a structural constraint designed to prevent fragmented review. It also reflects an explicit skepticism of expanding Durm further in a system that now has (i) appeal by right and (ii) two appellate layers (ICA then Supreme Court), but the Court stopped short of overruling Durm.

2) Why the ICA’s merits decision had to be vacated (as to Abrams/Hopkins sisters)

Once the Court concluded the appealed matters concerning Sarah Abrams and Rachel Hopkins were interlocutory, it followed as a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction that:

  • the ICA “was without appellate jurisdiction” under W. Va. Code § 58-5-1(a) and W. Va. Code § 51-11-4(d)(8); and
  • its merits rulings as to those defendants were voidable and had to be vacated, restoring the circuit court’s order in those respects.

3) Civil conspiracy: no requirement of an independent tort claim against each conspirator

On the merits, the Court’s principal doctrinal move was to treat Jane Doe-1 v. Corporation of President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as the operative clarification of the ambiguity left by Dunn v. Rockwell. The Court read West Virginia law to mean:

  • civil conspiracy requires an underlying wrongful act/tort causing injury, but
  • it does not require that each alleged conspirator be independently liable for committing that underlying tort themselves.

Functionally, conspiracy is treated as a liability-expanding doctrine: it allows recovery from those who shared a common plan for the tort’s commission even if their own conduct would not, standing alone, satisfy the elements of the tort.

4) Pleading sufficiency and the intracorporate conspiracy defense at the 12(b)(6) stage

The Court then addressed whether the complaint alleged enough as to Ronald Hopkins. Applying notice-pleading principles drawn from Mountaineer Fire & Rescue Equip., LLC v. City Nat’l Bank of W. Va., the Court held the allegations—though “not robust”—were sufficient to permit an inference of conspiracy given:

  • his managerial role within Lewis Chevrolet,
  • his familial relationships to alleged primary actors, and
  • alleged personal benefits from the scheme.

On Cook v. Heck’s, the Court refused to dispose of the claim at the pleading stage because Cook bars conspiracy only where agents act solely in an official capacity and not for individual advantage; here, the complaint allowed the contrary inference.

C. Impact

1) Tightening practical limits on ICA interlocutory review in multi-party litigation

The decision is a jurisdictional warning to litigants and the ICA: absent a truly final disposition (or a properly certifiable and properly certified partial final judgment), appeals that merely carve off slices of overlapping claims risk dismissal/vacatur for lack of jurisdiction. Even where a circuit court uses “with prejudice” language, that alone does not convert an otherwise intertwined, partial disposition into an immediately appealable order.

2) Reinforcing (while questioning) the continuing life of “Durm-type” appealability

The Court preserved Durm v. Heck’s in the near term—particularly for complete dismissals of parties—while openly questioning the doctrinal fit of liberal Rule 54(b) practice after the advent of an intermediate appellate court and appeals by right. The opinion’s extended critique suggests future litigants should not assume generous application of Durm beyond clear “party-out-of-the-case” scenarios.

3) Civil conspiracy claims: broader net for plaintiffs

By treating Jane Doe-1 v. Corporation of President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as dispositive, the Court strengthens plaintiffs’ ability to maintain civil conspiracy claims against peripheral actors who allegedly joined a common plan, even if the pleadings do not (or cannot) state the underlying tort directly against that actor. This is especially consequential in closely held business and fiduciary-adjacent disputes where control is exercised through networks of officers, relatives, and employees.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Final judgment rule (“rule of finality”): Appellate courts generally review only orders that finish the case (or finish the case as to a party/claim in a way the law treats as final). This avoids multiple, fragmented appeals.
  • Interlocutory order: A non-final order entered while the case continues in the trial court.
  • Rule 54(b): A mechanism that can make a partial judgment immediately appealable in multi-claim/multi-party cases if the trial court expressly finds “no just reason for delay” and directs entry of judgment; West Virginia also recognizes a limited “Durm-type” path where the order is effectively final as to a party.
  • “No just reason for delay”: A practical judgment about whether immediate appeal would cause inefficient, overlapping, piecemeal review—especially where the appealed issues are intertwined with pending ones.
  • Civil conspiracy: Not the “wrong” by itself; it is a doctrine that can make all participants in a common plan liable for the injury caused by the underlying wrongful act.
  • Intracorporate conspiracy doctrine (from Cook v. Heck’s): A corporation and its agents acting within their official roles are often treated as a single actor, which can defeat a “two or more persons” conspiracy requirement—but it may not apply where the agent is plausibly acting for personal advantage.
  • Notice pleading: West Virginia generally requires only enough factual content to give fair notice of the claim and its grounds; detailed proof is not required at the complaint stage.

5. Conclusion

The Court’s decision delivers two practical rules. First, the ICA (and this Court) lack jurisdiction to decide appeals from partial dismissals in multi-party cases when Rule 54(b)’s functional requirements are not met—particularly where dismissed claims overlap substantially with those still pending and the order does not approximate a truly final adjudication. Second, on the merits, the Court reaffirmed (through Jane Doe-1) that civil conspiracy may impose liability on those who joined a common plan even if they did not themselves commit the underlying tort, and it held that a sparsely detailed conspiracy pleading may survive dismissal under notice-pleading standards where role, relationship, and alleged personal benefit plausibly support an inference of concerted action.