Rule 46 Sanctions for AI-Hallucinated Appellate Briefs: Counsel’s Nondelegable Duty to Verify Citations, Quotations, and Record Facts

I. Introduction

The petition arose from removal proceedings against Heriberto Perez-Castillo, a Mexican citizen who conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The administrative denial turned on (i) statutory ineligibility due to a “crime of domestic violence,” and (ii) failure to establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. On judicial review, the case became equally significant for a different reason: the court confronted a brief “riddled with AI hallucinations,” including fabricated quotations and distorted authorities, and addressed the professional obligations implicated by generative AI and outsourcing.

The parties were Perez-Castillo (petitioner) and the Acting Attorney General (respondent). Attorney Abdullah Salah entered as counsel of record in the Seventh Circuit. Attorney Farah Chalisa—an Illinois lawyer who did not appear—was retained by Salah to research and draft the opening brief and later to “correct” it.

The Seventh Circuit thus confronted two intertwined issues: (1) whether the immigration petition could succeed under settled cancellation-of-removal law; and (2) what discipline is appropriate where counsel files an appellate brief containing extensive AI-style fabrications and record misstatements.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Merits: Petition Denied

• The court denied review because Perez-Castillo waived any challenge to the Immigration Judge’s hardship determination before the BIA and did not challenge the BIA’s waiver finding in the Seventh Circuit.
• Even absent waiver, the hardship determination would survive deferential review.
• Independently, Perez-Castillo was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because his Illinois battery conviction (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1)), committed against his mother and siblings, constituted a “crime of domestic violence” under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

B. Attorney Conduct: Sanctions, Admonishment, Referral

• The court imposed a $5,000 fine on Attorney Salah under Fed. R. App. P. 46(c) for submitting two briefs containing hallucinated quotations/citations and record-contradicted facts, while admitting he did not review either brief for accuracy.
• The court declined to sanction Attorney Chalisa at that time (given uncertainty about Rule 46’s reach to a non-appearing lawyer and lack of demonstrated bad faith), but admonished her and referred the matter to the Illinois ARDC for potential investigation (including concerns about AI usage explanations and possible fee-splitting/consent issues).
• The court required one-year status reports (or within seven days of ARDC final action) and kept the show-cause order pending ARDC review.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shape the Opinion)

1. Immigration review, jurisdiction, and standards of review

• Santos Mendoza v. Bondi, 151 F.4th 900 (7th Cir. 2025): Used for the overall framework that cancellation of removal is discretionary; the applicant bears the burden to establish statutory eligibility; and post-Wilkinson courts have debated the precise deferential standard. The opinion leverages Santos Mendoza to underscore that failure to satisfy any statutory criterion (including hardship) defeats relief.
• Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S 328 (2022): Cited for limits on judicial review of agency factfinding under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). The court uses Patel to situate hardship and related findings in a highly deferential posture.
• Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): Cited for the proposition that mixed questions are reviewed deferentially in this immigration context. The Seventh Circuit uses Wilkinson as a backdrop for why the agency’s hardship conclusions are hard to overturn.
• Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845 (2026): The opinion treats this as decisive on standard of review for removal orders: mixed questions (like “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”) are reviewed for “substantial evidence,” with reversal only if any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. The Seventh Circuit explicitly relies on Urias-Orellana to resolve the post-Wilkinson “abstract debate” noted in Santos Mendoza.
• Munoz-Rivera v. Garland, 81 F.4th 681 (7th Cir. 2023): Supplies the waiver rule’s force in the Seventh Circuit—if an issue is not raised properly (and waiver is not challenged), denial follows.

2. “Crime of domestic violence” and the categorical approach in this circuit

• Caldera-Torres v. Garland, 66 F.4th 651 (7th Cir. 2023): Provides the two-step framework for “crime of domestic violence”: (i) whether the offense is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and (ii) whether the victim is within the domestic-relationship categories of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
• United States v. Shaffers, 22 F.4th 655 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Vesey, 966 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2020)): Cited for the proposition that Illinois battery under 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence,” satisfying the first prong of the domestic-violence removal bar.

These precedents allow the court to treat statutory ineligibility as straightforward: once the conviction and victim relationships are undisputed, cancellation of removal is barred as a matter of law.

3. AI hallucinations and the Seventh Circuit’s emerging discipline framework

• Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 164 F.4th 967 (7th Cir. 2026): Used as a limiting comparator—mere existence of some nonexistent quotations (in a pro se filing) did not automatically justify sanctions. The court contrasts that scenario with the pervasive fabrications here.
• Dec v. Mullin, 171 F.4th 940 (7th Cir. 2026): A key benchmark. There, the court issued an admonishment where errors were limited (standard-of-review section), likely copied, and did not misstate substantive law or facts, with counsel apologetic and accepting responsibility. The opinion uses Dec to justify a stronger response when hallucinations saturate substantive argument and record assertions.
• D'Ambrosio v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 25-2231, 2026 WL 1361951 (7th Cir. 2026): Cited as Seventh Circuit use of Rule 46 as a basis for an AI-related order to show cause, reinforcing doctrinal fit.

4. Sources of sanctioning authority across courts

• District-court authorities (surveyed, not adopted as governing here): Zheng v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Nos., 813 F. Supp. 3d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2025); Disability Rights Miss. v. Palmer Home for Children, No. 1:24-cv-99-SA-DAS, 2025 WL 3691876 (N.D. Miss. 2025); Obi v. Cook County, No. 25-cv-3096, 2026 WL 1001481 (N.D. Ill. 2026). These illustrate that trial courts often proceed under Rule 11, § 1927, and inherent authority.
• Inter-circuit appellate comparisons: Amarsingh v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., No. 24-1391, 2026 WL 352016 (10th Cir. 2026) (Rule 38); Fletcher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 168 F.4th 231 (5th Cir. 2026) (Rule 46 and inherent powers); Whiting v. City of Athens, 170 F.4th 455 (6th Cir. 2026) (Rule 38 and inherent authority). The Seventh Circuit notes the lack of a unified approach and then selects Rule 46 as the best fit for counsel-of-record misconduct.

5. Rule 46 discipline: Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit foundations

• Camacho-Valdez v. Garland, 30 F.4th 675 (7th Cir. 2022): Supplies the Seventh Circuit’s articulation of Rule 46’s breadth and when it is invoked (conduct misleading the court or affecting other litigants).
• In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985): The foundational definition—“conduct unbecoming a member of the bar” includes conduct contrary to professional standards demonstrating unfitness or inimical to administration of justice.
• In re Lightfoot, 217 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2000): Provides the culpability spectrum—sanctions may follow misrepresentations or failures of inquiry even absent intent, including negligence or “egregious misjudgment.”
• In re Kelly, 808 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1986): Explains that while Rule 11 does not directly govern the court of appeals, its requirements help define “conduct becoming a member of the bar.”
• Monetary sanctions specifically: Waldon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 943 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2019) (Rule 46 sanctions for factual misrepresentations; collecting cases); Mays v. Chi. Sun-Times, 865 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1989) (fine for statements not grounded in fact/law); In re Galvan, 92 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 1996) (improper certifications and factual misrepresentations); In re Boyle-Saxton, 668 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2012) (order to show cause re fine).
• Related authority on misrepresentation: Klein v. O'Brien, 884 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2018) (cited alongside Waldon on sanctionable misstatements).

6. Inherent authority and discipline referrals

• Manez v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 533 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)): Establishes courts’ inherent authority to punish litigation abuse and investigate fraud on the court, reaching beyond attorneys formally admitted/appearing.
• Referral authority: Cnty., Mun. Emps.'s Supervisors' and Foremen's Union Loc. 1001 v. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 365 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2004) (disciplinary referrals); plus procedural reinforcement via Wade v. Soo Line R.R. Corp., 500 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2007) and United States v. Roti, 484 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2007) (forwarding materials; context for state disciplinary bodies).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Merits reasoning: denial on waiver and statutory bars

The court’s immigration merits analysis is intentionally short and structurally decisive:

• Waiver is dispositive. Because Perez-Castillo did not raise the hardship issue to the BIA (and did not challenge the BIA’s waiver finding on petition for review), the Seventh Circuit denies under Munoz-Rivera v. Garland. This reflects the appellate principle that courts review agency decisions on issues properly preserved.
• Hardship review would be deferential. Even if reached, hardship is a mixed question reviewed for substantial evidence under Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, and nothing compelled a contrary conclusion given available family support and the ordinary hardships associated with removal.
• Domestic-violence ineligibility is independently fatal. Applying Caldera-Torres v. Garland, the court treats Illinois battery under 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) as categorically a “crime of violence” (per United States v. Shaffers and United States v. Vesey) and the victims (mother and siblings) as qualifying domestic relations protected under Illinois law and within § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

2. Sanctions reasoning: why Rule 46 fits counsel of record

The court’s sanctions analysis is built on a professional-responsibility premise: signing and filing a brief is a certification that it is grounded in law and fact, and a nondelegable duty to the court.

• Nature and breadth of misconduct. The errors were not isolated or technical: fabricated quotations, mislabeled/nonexistent cases, incorrect legal propositions, and record-contradicted factual assertions. The court characterizes these as hallmarks of AI hallucinations, and distinguishes milder cases (Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't; Dec v. Mullin).
• Failure of inquiry is sanctionable even without intent. Borrowing from In re Lightfoot and In re Snyder, the court treats Salah’s admitted non-review as “egregious misjudgment” and “inimical to the administration of justice.”
• Notice aggravates culpability. After the court’s order flagging potential AI use and after oral argument questions, counsel still filed a revised brief that remained substantially unchanged and retained unsupported assertions and at least two hallucinated quotes. This supported a conclusion that the second filing could not be treated as innocent oversight.
• Rule 28 and professional-conduct overlay. The court links the deficient briefing to Rule 28 violations (citing McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC) and the court’s Standards for Professional Conduct (as discussed in Dec v. Mullin), emphasizing accurate citation and faithful presentation of the record.
• Sanction choice and proportionality. Invoking Camacho-Valdez v. Garland and the Seventh Circuit’s fine precedents (Mays v. Chi. Sun-Times, In re Galvan, Waldon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.), the court imposes a monetary fine but stops short of suspension/disbarment due to the absence of prior misconduct—while warning that future incidents could lead to disbarment.

3. Why Chalisa was not sanctioned (yet) and why referral was ordered

• Rule 46 applicability uncertainty. The court stresses that Rule 46 applies to “an attorney who practices before” the court; Chalisa neither entered an appearance nor was admitted to the Seventh Circuit bar, and the court was reluctant to stretch Rule 46 in that posture (citing Gorokhovsky v. Stefantsova by analogy).
• Inherent power reserved for bad faith. Under Manez v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC and Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., sanctions could issue against non-appearing participants for bad-faith litigation abuse, but the record did not show fraud/bad faith by Chalisa at this stage.
• Referral justified by unresolved factual concerns. The court found Chalisa’s explanation (that a “grammar check” caused pervasive hallucinations) implausible and noted additional ethics issues, including potential fee-splitting/client-consent problems under Illinois rules. Hence the referral to the Illinois ARDC and the requirement of status reports.

C. Impact

• Appellate practice: verification is nondelegable. The opinion crystallizes a rule of courtroom governance: when you sign and file, you own the accuracy—regardless of outsourcing, co-counsel arrangements, or AI tools. The practical effect is to raise the baseline of diligence expected in appellate filings and to make “I didn’t draft it” an aggravating, not exculpatory, fact.
• AI usage: the duty is tool-neutral. The court does not forbid generative AI; it polices outcomes (fabrications) and process (failure to check). It implicitly signals that competent AI use requires human verification of quotations, citations, propositions, and record assertions.
• Sanctions architecture: Rule 46 as the Seventh Circuit’s primary lever. By selecting Rule 46 (rather than Rule 38 or inherent power) for counsel of record, the opinion provides a clearer roadmap for future Seventh Circuit AI-misuse discipline.
• Professional responsibility beyond the case. The ARDC referral highlights that AI-related filing failures can spill into state disciplinary processes, including inquiries into candor to tribunals and client-consent requirements for fee arrangements and outsourcing.
• Immigration litigation: merits remain bounded by waiver and categorical bars. On the merits, the case reinforces that cancellation of removal often turns on preservation (BIA waiver) and bright-line statutory ineligibility (domestic-violence convictions), limiting the role of equitable narrative in appellate review.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Cancellation of removal (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)): A discretionary form of relief for certain noncitizens who meet statutory prerequisites. If any prerequisite fails—e.g., a disqualifying conviction or failure to prove requisite hardship—relief is unavailable.
• “Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: A demanding standard requiring hardship substantially beyond that typically associated with removal. The qualifying relative (often a U.S. citizen spouse/child/parent) is the focal point.
• Waiver in immigration appeals: Issues generally must be raised to the BIA before a court of appeals will consider them. If the BIA finds waiver and the petitioner does not challenge that finding, the court typically denies.
• Substantial evidence review: A deferential standard: the court asks whether the record compels a contrary conclusion, not whether the court would decide differently.
• “Crime of domestic violence” analysis: The court applies a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the offense is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (often using categorical analysis), and (2) whether the victim relationship falls within § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
• AI “hallucinations”: Outputs that appear authoritative (cases, quotations, facts) but are invented or altered. Legally, the problem is not novelty of technology but the introduction of falsehoods into filings.
• Fed. R. App. P. 46(c): Gives courts of appeals authority to “discipline” attorneys for “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar,” including monetary sanctions, suspension, or disbarment.
• Inherent authority: Courts’ power to address abuses that threaten the integrity of proceedings, even when specific rules do not neatly apply—typically requiring bad faith for punitive sanctions.

V. Conclusion

On the immigration merits, Heriberto Perez-Castillo v. Todd W. Blanche is a waiver-and-statutory-ineligibility case: the petition fails because the hardship issue was waived before the BIA and because an Illinois battery conviction against family members constitutes a disqualifying “crime of domestic violence.” The opinion’s broader significance lies in professional discipline. The Seventh Circuit announces, in practical effect, that AI-related fabrication in appellate briefing is not a novel excuse but a familiar ethical breach: counsel of record must verify every quotation, citation, proposition, and record statement before filing, and outsourcing does not shift that responsibility. Applying Fed. R. App. P. 46(c), the court imposes a $5,000 fine, warns of potential future disbarment for повтор misconduct, and refers related questions to state disciplinary authorities—positioning Rule 46 as a central mechanism for appellate governance in the era of generative AI.