Rule 41(b)(3) Extra-District Warrants: Probable Cause That Activities Meet the Domestic-Terrorism Definition Suffices

1. Introduction

United States v. James Morgan (7th Cir. June 25, 2026) addresses the limits of a magistrate judge’s authority to issue a search warrant to be executed outside the magistrate’s district under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b). Federal agents sought a warrant in the Eastern District of Wisconsin based largely on Morgan’s social-media posts documenting homemade weapons and advocating violence. Officers executed the warrant on Morgan’s travel trailer when it was located in the Western District of Wisconsin and recovered six unregistered pipe bombs. Morgan was indicted for possession of unregistered destructive devices under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).

The appeal presented two core issues:

  1. Rule 41(b) authority/venue: whether the Eastern District magistrate judge could authorize a search of property located in the Western District under the domestic-terrorism exception in Rule 41(b)(3) (incorporating the definition of “domestic terrorism” in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)).
  2. Constitutionality of § 5861(d): whether the National Firearms Act’s registration-based offense exceeds Congress’s taxing power.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. On suppression, it held that the warrant affidavit provided ample basis—indeed, sufficient even under the higher probable-cause standard—to conclude the investigation involved “domestic terrorism” as defined by § 2331(5), thereby authorizing an extra-district warrant under Rule 41(b)(3). The court declined to decide whether Rule 41(b)(3) demands probable cause or a lower “reason to believe” showing because the affidavit satisfied probable cause.

The court also rejected Morgan’s Franks v. Delaware claim that omissions in the affidavit required suppression, finding the omitted information immaterial and no deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth.

On dismissal, the court held Morgan’s constitutional challenge to 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) was foreclosed by Sonzinsky v. United States and Seventh Circuit precedent (United States v. Lim; United States v. Copus), and that National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius did not undermine Sonzinsky.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and deference in suppression litigation

  • United States v. Yang: supplied the appellate framework—clear-error review for factual findings and de novo review for legal conclusions—plus the admonition that a finding is clearly erroneous only when the court has a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
  • United States v. Burnside: emphasized “special deference” to district-court credibility determinations, reinforcing why the panel was reluctant to disturb the trial court’s evaluation of the affidavit and related facts.

2) Rule 41 venue/authority analogies and the “reason to believe” debate

  • Matter of One Apple iPhone Smart Phone: a district court decision interpreting Rule 41(b)(3) to require “reason to believe” both that the matter involves a domestic-terrorism investigation and that related activities may have occurred in the issuing district. The Seventh Circuit found its reasoning “persuasive” but did not adopt its standard because probable cause was met.
  • United States v. Thorne (and United States v. Thorne, 169 F.4th 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2026)): used by One Apple iPhone as a source for the “reason to believe” formulation in Rule 41(b)(2) venue disputes; the Seventh Circuit treated Thorne as informative but not controlling on Rule 41(b)(3).
  • United States v. Bohannon: cited through Thorne for the articulation of “reason to believe” as requiring “specific and articulable facts” supporting an objective, particularized basis.
  • United States v. Jackson: provided the Seventh Circuit template for avoiding the precise “reasonable belief vs. probable cause” question when the affidavit satisfies probable cause anyway.
  • United States v. Reaves and United States v. Fields: invoked for the principle that the appellate court may affirm on any basis supported by the record, supporting the decision to proceed on a probable-cause assumption.

3) Probable cause definitions

  • Maryland v. Pringle: supplied the “totality of the circumstances” formulation and the idea that probable cause is probabilistic rather than susceptible to quantification.
  • United States v. Reichling: provided the Seventh Circuit’s description that probable cause requires only a “substantial chance” of criminal activity, not certainty and not a >50% probability.

4) Franks doctrine and material omissions

  • Franks v. Delaware: the controlling doctrine allowing suppression for deliberate/reckless falsehoods or omissions that are material to the probable-cause determination.
  • United States v. Harris: supplied the mixed standard of review in Franks disputes (clear error for factual findings; de novo for legal conclusions).
  • United States v. Woodfork: stated the two-part Franks test (material falsity/omission plus deliberate or reckless disregard) and characterized the defendant’s burden as “weighty.”

5) Taxing power and the National Firearms Act

  • United States v. Burrows: provided de novo review for constitutional challenges to statutes.
  • Sonzinsky v. United States: the central Supreme Court precedent upholding the National Firearms Act as a valid tax even if it has regulatory effects; the Seventh Circuit treated it as controlling.
  • United States v. Lim and United States v. Copus: Seventh Circuit applications of Sonzinsky upholding NFA prosecutions (short-barreled shotgun; silencer/destructive device), foreclosing Morgan’s argument at the circuit level.
  • National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius: invoked by Morgan as a “functional” tax/penalty test; the Seventh Circuit rejected the claim that Sebelius undermined Sonzinsky and noted Sebelius cited Sonzinsky favorably.
  • Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. and United States v. Rush: cited for the rule that the Supreme Court does not overrule its precedents by implication; lower courts must follow directly controlling Supreme Court holdings.
  • United States v. Robinson: cited to explain that Morgan preserved a foreclosed argument for further review.
  • Sister-circuit examples were listed to show uniform agreement that the NFA is a valid tax: United States v. Dodge, United States v. Grier, United States v. Aiken, United States v. Gresham, United States v. Thompson, United States v. Village Center, United States v. Giannini, and United States v. Spoerke.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The Rule 41(b)(3) holding: domestic-terrorism facts can authorize an extra-district warrant

Rule 41(b)(1)–(2) generally tether a magistrate judge’s warrant authority to the magistrate’s district, with limited mobility-related exceptions. The government proceeded under Rule 41(b)(3), which expands authority “in an investigation of domestic terrorism” to issue a warrant for property outside the issuing district so long as the judge has authority “in any district in which activities related to the terrorism may have occurred.”

The court treated the key question as whether the affidavit—viewed holistically—supported the conclusion that Morgan’s conduct fit § 2331(5). It focused on the intent-like component in § 2331(5)(B) (“appear to be intended”) and found probable cause as to each alternative:

  • § 2331(5)(B)(i) (intimidate or coerce a civilian population): The court relied on Morgan’s targeted violent rhetoric toward civilians and groups (e.g., advocacy of using acid devices against perceived political enemies; racist and antisemitic threats), and his expressed desire to intimidate victims.
  • § 2331(5)(B)(ii) (influence government policy by intimidation or coercion): The court emphasized the nexus between his policy grievances and weapon-centered “call to arms,” including demonstrations of weapon-building and statements about making the government afraid.
  • § 2331(5)(B)(iii) (affect government conduct by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping): The court highlighted the plan to deploy chlorine gas against federal officers and the broader militia/weaponization theme.

Two additional elements—§ 2331(5)(A) (acts dangerous to human life that violate criminal law) and § 2331(5)(C) (occurring primarily within U.S. territory)—were treated as essentially undisputed given the described arsenal and threats.

Critically, the court separated protected speech from unprotected conduct without requiring that the speech itself be criminal: while acknowledging much rhetoric is protected, the affidavit documented weapon construction, operational intent, and threats tied to concrete capabilities, supporting a “substantial chance” the conduct met § 2331(5). That nexus supported Rule 41(b)(3) authority for the Eastern District magistrate judge to issue a warrant executed in the Western District.

2) The unresolved standard-of-proof question—and what the court effectively signaled

The opinion characterizes the Rule 41(b)(3) evidentiary threshold as a question of first impression in the Seventh Circuit, discusses out-of-circuit authority adopting a lower “reason to believe” threshold, and then declines to resolve the issue. Practically, however, the court’s reasoning provides a roadmap: if an affidavit establishes probable cause that the investigation concerns domestic-terrorism activities as defined in § 2331(5), the warrant will survive regardless of whether the ultimate standard is “reason to believe” or probable cause.

3) The Franks analysis: older “no imminent threat” assessments were immaterial given escalation

Morgan argued the affidavit omitted prior law-enforcement assessments (2019–2022) suggesting he posed no imminent or specific threat. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that these omissions were not material to the probable-cause/Rule 41(b)(3) analysis in December 2023, because the investigation reasonably viewed Morgan’s conduct as escalating and because later evidence (including threats about chlorine gas) changed the risk picture. The court also found no showing of deliberate or reckless deception by the affiant.

Notably, by affirming on the merits of probable cause, the court did not reach the good-faith exception question.

4) The NFA’s constitutionality: Sonzinsky remains controlling despite Sebelius

On the motion to dismiss, the court adhered to a straightforward hierarchy-of-authority analysis: Sonzinsky v. United States upheld the NFA as a tax; Seventh Circuit cases (United States v. Lim; United States v. Copus) applied Sonzinsky to similar prosecutions; and National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius did not overrule Sonzinsky (and in fact cited it as an example of “obviously regulatory measures” upheld as taxes). Under Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. and United States v. Rush, the panel refused to treat Sebelius as an implied overruling.

C. Impact

1) Expanded practical utility of Rule 41(b)(3) for cross-district searches in domestic-terrorism investigations

This decision will likely be cited to support cross-district warrants when: (a) the subject’s activities span districts (including via social media, travel, storage units, or mobile residences), and (b) the affidavit ties ideological threats to weapon acquisition/manufacture or other dangerous acts satisfying § 2331(5). Even without resolving the ultimate standard of proof, the court confirms that a well-developed affidavit meeting probable cause will validate Rule 41(b)(3) authority.

2) Guidance on drafting affidavits and litigating omissions

The Franks discussion signals that prior “no imminent threat” judgments—especially older, time-bound, or superseded by new evidence— may be deemed marginally relevant and not material. Defendants challenging omissions will need a tight causal showing that the omitted fact would have defeated the domestic-terrorism showing at the time of warrant issuance.

3) Continued stability of § 5861(d) prosecutions against taxing-power attacks

The court’s refusal to reopen NFA taxing-power questions reinforces the broad durability of Sonzinsky-based challenges, keeping § 5861(d) on firm constitutional footing in the Seventh Circuit (and aligning with the uniform view in other circuits the panel listed).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 41(b) “authority” vs. “probable cause”: A warrant needs probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found, but Rule 41 also limits where a magistrate judge can authorize a search. Rule 41(b)(3) is a venue/authority expansion for domestic-terrorism investigations.
  • “Domestic terrorism” under § 2331(5): Not a standalone federal charge in many situations, but a statutory definition used across federal law. It requires (A) dangerous, unlawful acts, (B) an apparent intent to intimidate civilians or influence/affect government, and (C) U.S.-territory locus.
  • “Appear to be intended”: The government need not prove subjective intent at the warrant stage; it must show objective indicators that the activities look intended to achieve one of § 2331(5)(B)’s purposes.
  • Probable cause: A “substantial chance,” not certainty, assessed under the totality of the circumstances.
  • Franks v. Delaware claim: A defendant must show (1) deliberate/reckless falsehood or omission and (2) materiality—i.e., that the corrected affidavit would not support probable cause (or the relevant required showing).
  • Tax vs. penalty (NFA context): Even if Congress uses a tax to influence behavior, it can remain a valid tax. Sonzinsky holds the NFA’s taxing structure is constitutional despite regulatory effect.

5. Conclusion

United States v. James Morgan reinforces that Rule 41(b)(3) can authorize an extra-district search warrant when an affidavit establishes, at least, probable cause that the investigation concerns “domestic terrorism” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). The decision also narrows the practical reach of omission-based suppression arguments in this context by treating older “no imminent threat” assessments as immaterial where later evidence suggests escalation. Finally, the opinion reaffirms—against Sebelius-based reframing—that challenges to 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) under the taxing-power theory remain foreclosed by Sonzinsky v. United States and binding circuit precedent.