A. Precedents Cited
Pegg v. United States, 147 F. App'x 886 (11th Cir. 2005)
The district court relied on Pegg for the proposition that Rule 41(g) motions must be brought in the district where the property was seized.
While unpublished, Pegg aligned with the textual reading of Rule 41(g) that the Eleventh Circuit adopted here. The appellate panel effectively
treated Pegg as consistent confirmation rather than the primary source of the rule, which the court grounded in Rule 41(g)’s “plain text.”
United States v. Howell, 425 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2005)
Howell supplied the standard of review: de novo for legal questions regarding denial of a Rule 41(g) motion and clear error for factual findings.
This framing mattered because the appeal turned on a legal interpretation of Rule 41(g)’s venue clause rather than contested facts.
Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1982)
Roofing was cited for the abuse-of-discretion review of transfer decisions and for the proposition that the decision whether to transfer under
venue statutes is committed to the district court’s “sound discretion.” This precedent undercut Sabatino’s argument that transfer was required.
Trinidad Foundry & Fabricating, Ltd. v. M/V K.A.S. Camilla, 966 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1992) and Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011)
These cases were invoked for a procedural principle: litigants who “chose to proceed” under a particular rule are held to that rule’s “strictures.”
Here, because Sabatino affirmatively filed under Rule 41(g), the court applied Rule 41(g)’s venue requirement instead of recharacterizing the motion
into some other procedural vehicle that might have allowed different venue arguments.
Cani v. United States, 331 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2003)
Cani was cited by analogy to clarify characterization: although the district court labeled its action as “lack of jurisdiction,” the Eleventh Circuit construed
the reasoning as concerning venue and treated the denial accordingly. The citation supports the appellate court’s willingness to look past labels to the substance
of the district court’s decision.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) and United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)
Jacobsen supplied the constitutional definition of a “seizure” of property: “meaningful interference” with possessory interests. This let the court reject
Sabatino’s attempt to reframe the event as merely a denial of access. Ventresca was used to connect Rule 41 to Fourth Amendment policy and reinforce
that Rule 41’s procedures implement constitutional search-and-seizure principles—relevant to why the Rule’s text is applied as written.
United States v. Giovanelli, 998 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1993) and Thompson v. Covington, 47 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 1995)
Sabatino relied on these out-of-circuit decisions to argue that post-conviction Rule 41 motions could be entertained in the district of trial.
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished them as predating the 2002 amendments to the Rule (then Rule 41(e), redesignated 41(g)) that explicitly require filing
in the district where the property was seized—rendering the earlier debate largely obsolete under the current text.
B. Legal Reasoning
1) Textual command: “must be filed in the district where the property was seized”
The court’s core reasoning was straightforward textualism: Rule 41(g) contains an explicit venue directive. Because the hard drives were taken while Sabatino
was in Colorado and the property was located there “at the time it was taken,” Colorado is where the seizure occurred for Rule 41(g) purposes.
The court treated this as dispositive regardless of the alleged involvement of Florida-based federal prosecutors or the later shipment of property to Florida.
2) “Seizure” includes denial of access that meaningfully interferes with possession
Sabatino argued the BOP “merely denied access.” Applying Jacobsen, the court held that a meaningful interference with possessory interests is enough to constitute a seizure.
This is significant because it prevents custodial or administrative actors from evading Rule 41(g)’s venue and protections by characterizing conduct as “access restriction”
rather than a “seizure.” The court further observed that, even on Sabatino’s own account, the drives were mailed from Colorado—an act consistent with seizure and control—
reinforcing that Colorado was the operative location.
3) Venue is not based on who ordered the seizure or where the property later sits
Sabatino’s primary venue theory was agency-based: a Florida AUSA allegedly authorized or directed the seizure, and the items were physically in Florida later.
The court rejected both theories as inconsistent with the Rule’s chosen anchor point: the place of seizure, not the place of decision-making or subsequent storage.
This reasoning promotes administrability: the seizure location is typically knowable and fixed, whereas the chain of command and later movement of evidence can be disputed.
4) Due process does not rewrite venue; alternative procedural paths remain
Sabatino contended he was effectively denied a remedy because of prison communication restrictions and counsel limitations in Colorado (including the lack of pro hac vice).
The court treated these as collateral practical burdens, not grounds to override Rule 41(g). If the restrictions create a due process problem, the court explained, the remedy is to challenge
the restrictions themselves, not to file in an improper forum. It also noted practical alternatives: Sabatino had previously sought modification of communication restrictions to add counsel,
and counsel could seek Colorado admission or coordinate with local counsel.
5) Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is discretionary and need not be sua sponte
Addressing the failure to transfer, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that § 1406(a) allows dismissal or transfer “in the interest of justice,” and that the transfer decision is discretionary
under Roofing. The court underscored two points: (i) it has “never required” sua sponte transfer instead of dismissal for improper venue, and (ii) Sabatino did not request transfer.
On those facts, refusing to transfer was not an abuse of discretion.
6) Venue vs. jurisdiction clarification
Although the district court used “lack of jurisdiction” language, the appellate court reframed the ruling as one grounded in venue. This distinction matters because jurisdictional defects
can be nonwaivable and conceptually limit judicial power, whereas venue rules are typically about proper location and can be cured by refiling or transfer.
By construing the ruling as improper venue, the panel kept the pathway open for Sabatino to refile in the correct district.