Rule 41(e)(2)(B) Authorizes Post-Expiration Off-Site Cellphone Extractions; Suppression Barred by Good Faith Absent Prejudice

I. Introduction

United States v. Javier Hernandez (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026) arises from a multi-year migrant-smuggling enterprise based in Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula. According to the government, conspirators smuggled migrants from Cuba to Mexico, held them at a compound (“La Finca”), extorted relatives for payment, and then moved paying migrants to the U.S.-Mexico border.

Javier Hernandez’s alleged role was largely logistical: he helped steal boats from Southwest Florida and piloted them across the Gulf to Mexico, where they were used to facilitate the smuggling venture (or sold/bribed to support it). He also transported stolen vehicles to Mexico, where altered identifiers enabled use, sale, or bribery. After a 12-day trial, a jury convicted him of five counts: (1) alien-smuggling conspiracy (8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I)); (2) conspiracy to transport stolen vessels (18 U.S.C. § 371, predicated on § 2312); (3) conspiracy involving altered VIN vehicles (18 U.S.C. § 371, predicated on § 2321); (4) substantive § 2321 trafficking offense; and (5) money-laundering conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)).

The appeal presented three clusters of issues: (i) suppression—whether the FBI’s second extraction of cellphone data (done after the warrant’s expiration date) was unlawful; (ii) sufficiency of the evidence on all counts; and (iii) guidelines errors, including loss amount, enhancements, and “Zero-Point Offender” relief.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. On suppression, it held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) permits off-site copying of electronically stored information after the warrant’s execution deadline, and a forensic “extraction” is “off-site copying.” The court also held that, even if a Rule 41 violation or warrant defect could be hypothesized, suppression would still be inappropriate because the agents acted in good faith and Hernandez showed neither prejudice nor intentional disregard as required by circuit precedent for Rule 41 suppression.

It further held the trial evidence sufficient on each conviction and found no reversible sentencing error, affirming the loss calculation and the challenged enhancements (including “special skills” for captaining a vessel on the high seas), and rejecting the “Zero-Point Offender” argument.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review framing the appellate posture

  • United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1 (11th Cir. 2022): supplied the mixed standard for suppression rulings (clear error for factfinding; de novo for legal application), setting the lens through which the Rule 41/Fourth Amendment dispute was assessed.
  • United States v. Hill, 119 F.4th 862 (11th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 697 (11th Cir. 1993)): reiterated the highly deferential sufficiency standard—viewing evidence and credibility inferences favorably to the verdict.
  • United States v. O'Steen, 133 F.4th 1200 (11th Cir. 2025): anchored the “any rational trier of fact” formulation for sufficiency review.
  • United States v. Martinez, 156 F.4th 1185 (11th Cir. 2025): delineated guidelines review (de novo legal/application; clear-error for factual findings), governing the loss and enhancement challenges.

2. Digital-warrant timing under Rule 41(e)(2)(B): persuasive authority and interpretive tools

  • Horenkamp v. Van Winkle and Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 1129 (11th Cir. 2005): justified giving “great weight” to Advisory Committee Notes, which the panel used to confirm Rule 41(e)(2)(B)’s practical design for digital forensics.
  • Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), and United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013): cited for the proposition that digital storage capacity and forensic complexity make electronic searches qualitatively different from ordinary physical searches—supporting the Advisory Committee’s choice not to impose a rigid, uniform off-site review/copying timeframe.
  • Olson v. Cnty. of Grant, 127 F.4th 1193 (9th Cir. 2025): used for the definitional proposition that an “extraction” is essentially a copy of a phone’s contents—supporting the conclusion that the FBI’s April 2021 extraction was “off-site copying.”
  • United States v. Cleveland, 907 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2018), and United States v. Whipple, 92 F.4th 605 (6th Cir. 2024): sister-circuit decisions directly approving post-deadline cell-phone extractions/analysis, reinforcing the Eleventh Circuit’s textual reading that the execution deadline does not govern off-site digital copying/analysis.
  • United States v. Carrington, 700 F. App'x 224 (4th Cir. 2017): provided an additional framework—electronic warrants are deemed executed when information is seized/controlled, not when later analyzed—supporting the idea that custody/control during the warrant period mitigates execution-timing concerns.
  • United States v. Vedrine, No. 20-13259, 2022 WL 17259152 (11th Cir. Nov. 29, 2022) (per curiam): distinguished as unpublished and factually inapposite (extraction there occurred within the deadline), so it did not constrain the panel’s resolution of late extraction.

3. Rule 41 versus the Fourth Amendment; staleness and “reasonable time” concepts

  • United States v. Leick, 944 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2019), and United States v. Jarman, 847 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 2017) (with United States v. Shegog, 787 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1986)): supported the proposition that, independent of Rule 41, the Fourth Amendment requires execution within a “reasonable time,” with “reasonableness” tied to whether probable cause has dissipated (staleness).
  • United States v. Nicholson, 24 F.4th 1341 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1993)): supplied the Eleventh Circuit’s framework for when Rule 41 violations warrant suppression (prejudice or intentional disregard), and also invoked staleness concepts.

4. Exclusionary rule and good-faith doctrine

  • Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009): emphasized that exclusion is not automatic; deterrence is the touchstone.
  • United States v. Morales, 987 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 2021), quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011): framed the exclusionary rule as a prudential deterrence doctrine, not a personal right.
  • United States v. Taylor, 935 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2019), and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984): provided the “reasonably well trained officer” test and the classic good-faith architecture.
  • Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987): supported the proposition that objectively reasonable reliance on legal authority (statute/rule) ordinarily defeats suppression.
  • United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1992): noted as an example where the Eleventh Circuit has applied Leon-like good faith in a Rule 41 context, while the panel ultimately relied on Nicholson to foreclose suppression even assuming a Rule 41 problem.
  • United States v. Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1988), and United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1981): reinforced the “prejudice” requirement—suppression is unwarranted where the search would have occurred anyway under a properly obtained warrant and there is no abrasion attributable to the technical misstep.
  • Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): explained why Marx (former Fifth Circuit) is binding in the Eleventh Circuit.

5. Sufficiency and substantive elements across the counts

  • United States v. Foreman, 84 F.4th 615 (5th Cir. 2023): used as an elements reference point for the § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) conspiracy.
  • United States v. Iriele, 977 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2020): supported proving conspiracy membership via circumstantial evidence of acts furthering the scheme.
  • United States v. Collins, 854 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2017): supplied the Eleventh Circuit’s standard elements for § 371 conspiracy (agreement; knowing/voluntary participation; overt act).
  • United States v. Feldman, 936 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2019): supplied the elements for § 1956(h) money-laundering conspiracy.

6. Sentencing proof, jointly undertaken activity, and enhancements

  • United States v. Emanuel, 869 F.2d 795 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam): supported the court’s acceptance of an untested government proffer at sentencing where the defense offered no concrete rebuttal and did not seek to cross-examine an available witness.
  • United States v. Barry, 163 F.4th 1346 (11th Cir. 2026): emphasized the individualized findings requirement under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) when attributing co-conspirators’ conduct; the panel noted the district court “skipped” the step but found the record clearly supported scope/foreseeability.
  • United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1997), and United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2010): established that captaining a vessel on the high seas is a “special skill” under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3; the panel treated these cases as essentially controlling on the enhancement issue given Hernandez’s role piloting stolen boats across the Gulf.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The core holding: “off-site copying” includes later forensic extractions

The suppression dispute turned on the relationship between Rule 41(e)(2)(A) (execution within a specified time no longer than 14 days) and Rule 41(e)(2)(B) (for electronically stored information, the execution time refers to seizure/on-site copying, “not to any later off-site copying or review”). The panel’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

  1. Textual fit: the court treated a forensic “extraction” as “a copy of the [phone’s] memory module,” i.e., “off-site copying.” Because the second extraction occurred at the FBI’s Miami Field Office (not on-site at seizure), it squarely fell within Rule 41(e)(2)(B)’s category of copying that may occur after the warrant’s date.
  2. Purpose and practicality: relying heavily on the 2009 Advisory Committee Notes, the panel emphasized that encryption, booby traps, storage volume, and lab workload can prevent completion within the warrant period; the Rules deliberately avoid a national presumptive timeline for off-site copying/review to prevent constant extension motions.
  3. Rejection of “copies-of-a-copy” limitation: the defense theory that Rule 41(e)(2)(B) allows only duplication of already-extracted data was rejected as textually unsupported and conceptually implausible; “review” was also read broadly (with reference to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY) to suggest permissible later examination of the digital contents.

2. Rule 41 cannot trump the Fourth Amendment—but no Fourth Amendment “stale execution” claim was made

The panel cautioned that Rule 41’s permissive structure does not displace the Fourth Amendment’s independent “reasonable time” requirement (citing United States v. Leick and United States v. Jarman). But Hernandez did not argue that probable cause became stale before the second extraction. The panel also observed why reasonableness would likely be satisfied here: the government controlled and preserved the device, and the relevant conduct ended by 2019, so delay would not plausibly dissipate probable cause in the way it might for a changing physical location.

3. Alternative holding: even if a violation existed, suppression would be unavailable

The court provided two independent suppression backstops:

  • Good faith (Leon/Herring/Davis/Taylor): the agents obtained a warrant, performed an initial extraction the next day, took manual photographs as a workaround, and later used improved software to complete the extraction. The panel held that a “reasonably well trained officer” would not have known the later extraction was illegal—especially given Rule 41(e)(2)(B)’s text.
  • Rule 41-only suppression limits (Nicholson/Gerber): even assuming a technical Rule 41 violation, suppression requires either (i) prejudice (the search might not have occurred or would have been less abrasive) or (ii) intentional and deliberate disregard. The panel found neither: probable cause would have supported a reissued warrant of identical scope, and nothing suggested deliberate disregard.

4. Sufficiency of the evidence: conspiratorial knowledge and participation proved primarily by admissions and cooperator testimony

Across the counts, the panel applied ordinary conspiracy principles: agreement plus knowing participation (and overt acts for § 371). It found the record contained direct admissions (FBI interview), corroborating communications (WhatsApp and cell-site location data), and co-conspirator testimony establishing Hernandez’s knowledge and willful participation. Citing United States v. Iriele, it reaffirmed that circumstantial evidence and actions that further the conspiracy can suffice to prove membership.

5. Sentencing: loss estimate, risk-of-harm, and special-skills findings sustained

On loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, the panel endorsed the district court’s “reasonable estimate” approach, emphasizing multiple high-value boat valuations (including insurance payout values and testimony about market value), plus additional stolen vehicles. It also approved the district court’s consideration of an unchallenged proffer, invoking United States v. Emanuel.

For U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6), the panel upheld the finding that Hernandez could foresee substantial risk of death/serious injury given evidence of abusive extortion practices and dangerous migrant transport conditions. It added an important doctrinal note: under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), courts must make individualized findings about the scope of jointly undertaken criminal activity (citing United States v. Barry), but found the record clearly supported scope and foreseeability despite the district court’s abbreviated explanation.

For U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, the panel treated United States v. Calderon and United States v. De La Cruz Suarez as controlling authority that captaining a vessel on the high seas is a “special skill,” easily satisfied by repeated solo Gulf crossings.

C. Impact

The opinion’s most durable effect is its published clarification of how Rule 41(e)(2)(B) functions in the digital context:

  • Operational clarity for digital forensics: in the Eleventh Circuit, a later “extraction” performed off-site after a warrant’s deadline is not automatically untimely where seizure/control (or initial copying) occurred within the warrant period and the copying/review is within the warrant’s scope.
  • Defense litigation pivot: challenges framed purely as “expired warrant” Rule 41 timing arguments are less likely to succeed; future suppression litigation will likely focus more on (i) whether the later copying/review exceeded the warrant’s scope, (ii) whether probable cause became stale (a Fourth Amendment argument the panel flagged but the defendant did not pursue), or (iii) whether delays were so extreme as to become “unreasonable” in a staleness sense.
  • Suppression remedies narrowed: the panel’s dual reliance on good faith and Nicholson’s “prejudice/intentional disregard” test makes suppression particularly difficult absent evidence of deliberate rule evasion or a concrete showing that the search would not have occurred.

Beyond Rule 41, the opinion reinforces: (i) conspiracy convictions may be sustained through a blend of admissions, cooperators, and corroborating digital artifacts; and (ii) maritime navigation can readily qualify as a “special skill” enhancement in smuggling- and transport-adjacent offenses.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Execution” of a digital search warrant (Rule 41): for electronics, the “execute within 14 days” concept is primarily about timely taking custody or making an initial copy; the detailed forensic work—copying again, unlocking, indexing, and reviewing—often occurs later.
  • “Off-site copying” vs. “review”: “copying” is making a forensic image/extraction; “review” is examining what was copied (searching chats, photos, location artifacts). Rule 41(e)(2)(B) contemplates both occurring after the deadline.
  • Probable-cause staleness (Fourth Amendment): even if a rule allows later forensic work, the Constitution can still require the warrant be carried out within a “reasonable time” so probable cause remains fresh. With seized phones held by the government, staleness is often harder to show because the data is preserved.
  • Good faith exception: even if a court later finds a technical legal defect, evidence is often not excluded when officers reasonably relied on a warrant or on governing legal authority.
  • “Jointly undertaken criminal activity” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): sentencing accountability is not limitless—courts must determine what criminal conduct the defendant actually agreed to jointly undertake, and then assess whether others’ acts were in furtherance of that activity and reasonably foreseeable.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Javier Hernandez cements a practical, text-driven interpretation of Rule 41(e)(2)(B): post-expiration off-site cellphone extractions may be lawful when they are part of the warrant-authorized digital copying/review process. The decision also signals that suppression is unlikely absent staleness, scope overreach, prejudice, or deliberate disregard—especially where agents obtained a warrant and acted consistently with Rule 41’s digital-forensics design. On the merits and sentencing, the court’s affirmance underscores the evidentiary power of admissions, corroborated cooperator testimony, and digital communications, while reaffirming established Eleventh Circuit sentencing principles on loss estimation and “special skills” in maritime navigation.