Date: Feb 22, 2026

Rule 4(m) Requires a Two-Step Dismissal Analysis (Good Cause and Then Permissive Extension) and Personal-Jurisdiction Dismissals Can Collaterally Estop Refiling

Introduction

In Juliette Moon v. Sony/ATV Music Publishing (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), pro se plaintiff Juliette Moon brought copyright infringement claims alleging that defendants copied “unique elements” of her unpublished poems to create and profit from the Michael Jackson song You Are Not Alone. The suit named multiple entities, including Sony Music Entertainment (“Sony”), Wayne T. Williams, and four additional defendants: Sony/ATV Music Publishing, MJJ Productions, R. Kelly Publishing, and Jive/Zomba Group.

The appeal presented two procedural issues that often control outcomes before merits are ever reached: (1) whether Moon’s claims against Sony and Williams were barred by collateral estoppel based on a prior dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction; and (2) whether the district court properly dismissed the remaining defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) for untimely service.

Summary of the Opinion

Collateral estoppel / personal jurisdiction: The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Sony and Williams, holding Moon was barred from relitigating the same personal-jurisdiction question after the earlier case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court also noted Moon abandoned the collateral-estoppel issue by failing to brief it in her opening brief.
Rule 4(m) service dismissal: The court vacated the Rule 4(m) dismissal of Sony/ATV Music Publishing, MJJ Productions, R. Kelly Publishing, and Jive/Zomba Group, and remanded because the district court addressed only “good cause” and did not perform the required second step—considering whether a permissive extension was warranted even absent good cause.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Pro se briefing rules and abandonment

Jacob v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, 40 F.4th 1329 (11th Cir. 2022): cited for liberal construction of pro se filings. The panel used it to frame leniency in interpretation—while still enforcing rules.
Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2007): emphasized that pro se litigants must follow procedural rules. This underwrote the court’s refusal to overlook briefing defaults.
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008): supplied the abandonment doctrine (issues not raised in the opening brief are abandoned; arguments first raised in reply are generally not considered). The panel relied on Timson to conclude it could affirm on abandonment alone as to collateral estoppel.

2) Issue preclusion and jurisdictional determinations

Sellers v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 968 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2020): provided the definition of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) and the de novo standard for reviewing its application.
Richardson v. Miller, 101 F.3d 665 (11th Cir. 1996): used for the “clear error” standard when reviewing whether an issue was “actually litigated” in the prior action.
Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998): defined “actually litigated” (raised in pleadings, submitted for determination, and determined). The panel used it to confirm that personal jurisdiction was actually litigated in Moon’s first action.
N. Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Calhoun, 989 F.2d 429 (11th Cir. 1993): critical authority establishing that, although a jurisdictional dismissal is not a merits adjudication, it does preclude relitigation of the same jurisdictional issue in a later suit. The panel extended that logic to personal jurisdiction (“successive litigation on the same question of personal jurisdiction”).
Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1980): quoted in N. Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. and carried through here to express the preclusion concept in classic terms: a second complaint cannot command a second consideration of the same jurisdictional claims.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): explained why a former Fifth Circuit case (Boone) binds the Eleventh Circuit (pre-October 1, 1981 decisions adopted as precedent).
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 327 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) and I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1986): supplied the four-element test for collateral estoppel, which the panel methodically applied to Moon’s repeat filing.
Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007): defined “clear error,” reinforcing the deferential review of the “actually litigated” finding.

3) Rule 4(m) service dismissals and extensions

Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903 (11th Cir. 2020): provided the governing two-step framework (good cause; then discretionary/permissive extension analysis), as well as the “outside factor” gloss on good cause. The panel treated Bilal as controlling on how district courts must structure Rule 4(m) decisions.
Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll Cnty. Comm'rs, 476 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2007): the foundational Eleventh Circuit decision requiring district courts to consider “any other circumstances” warranting extension even absent good cause, and labeling dismissal “premature” when courts fail to do so. The panel applied that same “premature” logic to Moon’s case.
Horenkamp v. Van Winkle And Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 1129 (11th Cir. 2005): cited for the proposition that district courts retain discretion to extend time for service absent good cause.
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734 (11th Cir. 2010): provided the abuse-of-discretion definition used to evaluate the Rule 4(m) dismissal.

Legal Reasoning

1) Collateral estoppel barred re-litigation of personal jurisdiction over Sony and Williams

The court’s analysis proceeded in two layers:

Procedural default (abandonment): Moon did not brief collateral estoppel in her opening appellate brief and raised it only in reply. Under Timson v. Sampson, that meant she abandoned the issue, permitting affirmance on that basis alone.
Merits of issue preclusion: The panel nevertheless confirmed that collateral estoppel applied because: (a) the issue was identical (whether the Northern District of Georgia had personal jurisdiction over Sony and Williams); (b) it was actually litigated (raised, submitted, and decided in the first case); (c) it was necessary to the prior judgment (the first case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction); and (d) Moon had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it (she filed multiple pleadings on jurisdiction). The panel also highlighted the limited “escape hatch” recognized in N. Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Calhoun: issue preclusion may not apply if the second complaint corrects the deficiency identified in the first. Here, changing an allegation about Williams’s residence did not amount to curing the jurisdictional defect already adjudicated.

2) Rule 4(m) required a two-step inquiry; the district court completed only step one

The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that Rule 4(m) analysis is structured and sequential:

Step one—good cause: The district court found no good cause because ~193 days elapsed with no proper service, and Moon’s response did not specify concrete service efforts as to the four unserved defendants (instead focusing on unrelated disputes and prior rulings). The Eleventh Circuit agreed this was within the district court’s discretion.
Step two—permissive extension: Even without good cause, the district court was still required by Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll Cnty. Comm'rs and Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC to consider whether other circumstances justified more time (e.g., limitations consequences, evasion of service, or defendants obscuring service issues). Because the dismissal order did not indicate that the district court engaged this second-step analysis, the Eleventh Circuit deemed the dismissal “premature,” vacated it, and remanded for the limited purpose of considering a permissive extension.

Impact

District-court practice under Rule 4(m): The decision reinforces that Rule 4(m) dismissals should create a record reflecting both steps: not only whether good cause exists, but also whether discretionary extension factors warrant relief. Even where plaintiffs perform poorly, failure to document the second-step evaluation risks vacatur on appeal.
Repeat filings after jurisdictional dismissals: The opinion underscores that a prior dismissal for lack of jurisdiction can still have strong preclusive bite as to the jurisdictional issue itself. Plaintiffs cannot “reset” jurisdiction by refiling the same case in the same court without materially curing the jurisdictional deficiency.
Appellate briefing discipline for pro se litigants: The abandonment ruling highlights that pro se appellants must identify and argue the dispositive legal issues in their opening briefs, or risk affirmance regardless of underlying merit.
Limits of the decision: The opinion is designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” which generally limits its precedential value, but it applies and operationalizes published Eleventh Circuit standards (Lepone-Dempsey, Bilal, N. Ga. Elec. Membership Corp.) that remain binding and frequently litigated.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion): A rule that prevents a party from re-arguing the same issue after a court has already decided it. Here, the “issue” was personal jurisdiction, not whether copyright infringement occurred.
Personal jurisdiction: The court’s power to require a particular defendant to litigate in that forum. Even a strong claim can be dismissed if the court lacks this authority.
Rule 4(m) service deadline: A federal rule requiring service of the summons and complaint within 90 days after filing. If not served, the court must dismiss or order service within a set time.
Good cause: A legally sufficient reason for missing the service deadline—typically something outside the plaintiff’s control (not mere oversight or delay).
Permissive (discretionary) extension: Even without good cause, the judge may allow more time for service if fairness and case-specific factors support it (for example, if refiling would be time-barred). Eleventh Circuit law requires judges to at least consider this step.
Standards of review: The “lens” an appellate court uses: collateral estoppel is reviewed de novo (fresh), while Rule 4(m) dismissals are reviewed for abuse of discretion (highly deferential). Some sub-findings (like “actually litigated”) are reviewed only for clear error.
Abandonment on appeal: If an appellant does not raise an issue in the opening brief, the appellate court generally treats it as forfeited—even for pro se litigants.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s disposition delivers two procedural lessons with immediate practical force. First, a prior dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction can collaterally estop a plaintiff from relitigating that same jurisdictional question in a refiled action against the same defendants in the same forum. Second, when service is untimely under Rule 4(m), a district court must do more than find “no good cause”; it must also consider whether a discretionary extension is warranted under the facts—otherwise, dismissal is vulnerable to vacatur and remand.