Rule 35(b) Substantial-Assistance Reductions Keep § 3582(c)(2) Eligibility in Play and Trigger § 1B1.10(c)’s Mandatory-Minimum Disregard When a Retroactive Amendment Lowers the Range

I. Introduction

United States v. Brandy D. Hilton (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 2026) addresses a recurring sentencing-modification problem: when a defendant originally faced statutory mandatory minimums, later received a Rule 35(b) substantial-assistance reduction, and then seeks a further reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) after a retroactive Guidelines amendment.

Parties. The United States (Plaintiff-Appellee) opposed a sentence reduction for Brandy D. Hilton (Defendant-Appellant).

Key issues. The Sixth Circuit confronted two threshold questions under § 3582(c)(2):

  1. Whether Hilton’s sentence was “based on a sentencing range” notwithstanding mandatory minimums and a later Rule 35(b) reduction.
  2. Whether retroactive Amendment 821 (made retroactive by Amendment 825) “lowered” her applicable Guidelines range, including the role of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) (mandatory minimums disregarded when a prior substantial-assistance reduction exists).

The district court denied relief twice, reasoning Hilton’s sentence rested on statutory minimums rather than a Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that Hilton satisfied § 3582(c)(2)’s threshold requirement: her sentence was “based on” a Guidelines range, and Amendment 821 “lowered” that range. The court emphasized that both the original sentence and the later Rule 35(b) modification were expressed and implemented in Guidelines-range terms.

On the “lowered range” inquiry, the court applied U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) and § 1B1.10(c) to conclude that, because Hilton previously received a Rule 35(b) substantial-assistance reduction, the mandatory minimums are disregarded when recalculating the post-amendment range. As a result, Hilton’s post-Amendment 821 range becomes 106–117 months, which is lower than the pre-amendment 120–131 months.

The court vacated the denial of Hilton’s first motion and remanded for the district court to consider the remaining § 3582(c)(2) steps (the § 3553(a) factors and consistency with Sentencing Commission policy statements). Because that disposition afforded the relief necessary to address the second appeal, the second appeal was dismissed as moot.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Watkins, 625 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2010))
    Role in Hilton: Established the Sixth Circuit’s de novo review of § 3582(c)(2) eligibility determinations. This mattered because the appellate court did not defer to the district court’s characterization of what the sentence was “based on.”
  • Hughes v. United States, 584 U.S. 675 (2018)
    Role in Hilton: Provided the controlling framework for “based on” analysis: the Guidelines range is typically the starting point and remains “a relevant part of the analytic framework” even if the sentence departs or varies. The Sixth Circuit used Hughes to conclude that when the judge uses the range “as the beginning point” to explain a deviation (here, the Rule 35(b) reduction), § 3582(c)(2)’s “based on” requirement is met.
  • Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) and Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016)
    Role in Hilton: Cited via Hughes for the proposition that the Guidelines range is the “starting point” for sentencing. These cases reinforced the Sixth Circuit’s reluctance to treat the Guidelines as irrelevant merely because mandatory minimums constrain part of the range.
  • Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (plurality opinion)
    Role in Hilton: Quoted via Hughes to support the idea that the Guidelines can remain part of the “analytic framework” even when the ultimate sentence results from a different procedural mechanism.
  • Koons v. United States, 584 U.S. 700 (2018) (and the underlying United States v. Koons, 850 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2017))
    Role in Hilton: Central to the government’s opposition. Koons held that a sentence is not “based on” a Guidelines range when the statutory mandatory minimum is wholly above the top of the otherwise-applicable Guidelines range, causing the court to disregard the range. The Sixth Circuit distinguished Koons: Hilton’s mandatory minimums constrained the bottom end, but did not eliminate the court’s ability to sentence within a Guidelines range that still had an operative upper end (120–131 months initially). The court also emphasized Koons did not address § 1B1.10(c), because Koons resolved the case at the “based on” threshold.
  • United States v. Payne, No. 24-5353, 2025 WL 475225 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 2025)
    Role in Hilton: Used to frame Koons as dealing with situations where a mandatory minimum effectively “becomes the new range” because it dictates disregard of the advisory range—again, not Hilton’s circumstance.
  • United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam), and United States v. Riccardi, 989 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2021)
    Role in Hilton: Provided limits on using Guidelines commentary: commentary cannot add to or override the Guideline text. The Sixth Circuit invoked these cases to validate reliance on § 1B1.10 cmt. n.4(B) only because it merely confirmed what the court found clear in the text of § 1B1.10(c).
  • United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427 (6th Cir. 2025)
    Role in Hilton: Addressed the Sentencing Commission’s obligation to act consistently with statutes, including mandatory minimums. The Sixth Circuit used Bricker to reject the argument that § 1B1.10(c) conflicts with mandatory minimums, emphasizing that Congress itself authorizes below-minimum sentences for substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
  • Sueing v. Palmer, 503 F. App’x 354 (6th Cir. 2012), and Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 2006)
    Role in Hilton: Supported mootness dismissal of the second appeal once the first appeal’s resolution supplied the operative relief.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. “Based on a sentencing range”: Guidelines remained the analytic anchor

The district court viewed Hilton’s sentence as based on statutory minimums. The Sixth Circuit rejected that characterization by focusing on how the sentencing and post-sentencing record actually functioned:

  • Hilton’s initial Guidelines computation (after applying mandatory minimum interaction rules) produced a final Guidelines range of 120–131 months, and the court imposed 120 months—a within-range sentence.
  • The government’s Rule 35(b) motion explicitly requested a “one level reduction” to “a sentencing guideline range of 100 to 125 months.”
  • The district court adopted the same framing, stating it was applying a “one-level reduction” to an “effective guideline range of 100 to 125 months,” and then imposed 100 months.

Under Hughes v. United States, when the court uses the range “as the beginning point” to explain a deviation, the sentence is “based on” the range for § 3582(c)(2). The Sixth Circuit treated the Rule 35(b) reduction as a continuation of that Guidelines-based framework rather than a wholesale replacement of it.

Importantly, the court also used a practical consistency check: adopting the government’s view would perversely penalize Hilton for originally receiving the bottom of the Guidelines range (120 months), while someone who received 121 months might be eligible. The Sixth Circuit found that outcome hard to reconcile with § 3582(c)(2)’s text and structure.

2. Distinguishing Koons: mandatory minimums constrained, but did not supplant, the range

The government’s primary doctrinal move was to analogize Hilton to Koons v. United States. The Sixth Circuit drew a clear line:

  • Koons scenario: the mandatory minimum sits entirely above the top of the calculated Guidelines range, forcing the court to discard the range.
  • Hilton scenario: mandatory minimums set the floor (and require consecutiveness), but the resulting sentencing framework still yielded a Guidelines range with a meaningful upper bound (120–131 months) that could have been selected by the court.

In short, Hilton’s range was not displaced; it was shaped by statutory minimums using Guidelines rules (notably §§ 5G1.1 and 5G1.2).

3. “Lowered by the Sentencing Commission”: § 1B1.10(c) removes mandatory minimums from the recalculation after substantial assistance

On the “lowered range” requirement, the Sixth Circuit treated the Guidelines’ own policy statement as dispositive:

  • § 1B1.10(b)(1) requires recalculating the range “as if” the amendment had been in effect at the time of sentencing.
  • § 1B1.10(c) instructs that, where a defendant previously received a substantial-assistance reduction (including via Rule 35(b)), the amended-range calculation is performed without regard to the statutory mandatory minimum.

Applying Amendment 821 lowered Hilton’s criminal-history category from IV to III. Disregarding mandatory minimums per § 1B1.10(c), Hilton’s amended range became 106–117 months. That was “indisputably lower” than the original 120–131 months.

The court also relied on § 1B1.10 cmt. n.4(B), an example closely tracking Hilton’s situation. Citing United States v. Havis and United States v. Riccardi, the court clarified that it was not letting commentary expand the Guideline; it was using the note only as confirmation of what § 1B1.10(c)’s text already required.

4. Rejecting the “Koons silently overruled § 1B1.10(c)” argument

The Sixth Circuit rejected the government’s attempt to convert Koons into a limitation on § 1B1.10(c): Koons expressly did not reach § 1B1.10(c) because it disposed of the case on the “based on” requirement. And on the statutory-conflict point, the court invoked United States v. Bricker and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e): Congress itself authorizes sentences below mandatory minimums for substantial assistance, so § 1B1.10(c) merely supplies the recalculation method once such authority has been triggered.

C. Impact

The decision clarifies (and, in practical terms, broadens) § 3582(c)(2) eligibility in the Sixth Circuit for defendants who: (i) were sentenced under a Guidelines range influenced by mandatory minimums, and (ii) later received a substantial-assistance reduction under Rule 35(b).

Key forward-looking implications include:

  • Eligibility does not evaporate merely because mandatory minimums affected the bottom of the Guidelines range, so long as the range was not wholly displaced in the Koons sense and the court used the range as part of its analytic framework.
  • § 1B1.10(c) has real bite: once a defendant has a substantial-assistance reduction, the amended-range recalculation for retroactive amendments must be performed without regard to mandatory minimums, which may create a lower amended range even when mandatory minimums would otherwise dominate.
  • Remand posture matters: even after clearing the eligibility gate, defendants still face the district court’s discretionary assessment of § 3553(a) factors and policy-statement constraints.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • § 3582(c)(2) sentence modification: A limited procedure allowing a court to reduce a sentence when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the Guidelines range that the sentence was based on. It is not a full resentencing; it is a constrained recalculation-plus-discretion inquiry.
  • “Based on” a Guidelines range: A sentence is typically “based on” the Guidelines if the range served as the starting point or anchor for the judge’s decision—even if the judge later departs, varies, or adjusts the sentence (for example, through a Rule 35(b) reduction expressed in offense-level/range terms).
  • Mandatory minimums and the Guidelines: Mandatory minimums can set the floor (and sometimes the ceiling) for sentencing. Under the Guidelines, they can alter the operative range. But they do not necessarily erase the Guidelines range unless they fully supplant it (as in Koons).
  • Rule 35(b): A post-sentencing mechanism allowing the court to reduce a sentence based on the defendant’s substantial assistance after sentencing, typically on a government motion.
  • U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c): A policy rule telling courts that, when recalculating the amended range for § 3582(c)(2) and the defendant previously received a substantial-assistance reduction, the recalculated range is determined without regard to statutory mandatory minimums.
  • Mootness (second appeal dismissed): If a court’s decision in one appeal makes it unnecessary (or impossible) to grant additional effective relief in a second, the second becomes moot and is dismissed.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Brandy D. Hilton establishes a clear Sixth Circuit roadmap for § 3582(c)(2) eligibility where mandatory minimums and substantial-assistance reductions intersect with retroactive Guidelines amendments. The court held that Hilton’s sentence was “based on” a Guidelines range because the district court anchored both the original sentence and the Rule 35(b) reduction in Guidelines-range terms, and it held that Amendment 821 “lowered” her range because § 1B1.10(c) requires disregarding mandatory minimums in the recalculation after a prior substantial-assistance reduction.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its disciplined separation of (i) Koons’s narrow “mandatory-minimum wholly supplants the range” scenario from (ii) the more common situation where mandatory minimums constrain but do not replace the Guidelines framework—while reaffirming that § 1B1.10(c) governs the amended-range calculation once substantial assistance has already opened the door to below-minimum sentencing.