Rule 32.1 Revocation Hearings: Courts Must Make Explicit “Good Cause” Findings Before Admitting Hearsay and Must Narrowly Tailor Computer/Internet Monitoring Conditions

1. Introduction

Reinaldo Davis, previously convicted (by guilty plea in the District of Vermont) of distributing cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 841(b)(1)(C), was serving a term of supervised release after completing an 18-month prison sentence. His supervision was transferred to the Eastern District of New York, where Probation alleged four violations. The centerpiece allegation (Violation One) was that Davis committed rape/sexual misconduct—despite no state charges—thereby violating the “no new crimes” condition.

At the revocation hearing, the government sought admission of four categories of out-of-court statements tied to the alleged rape: (1) a 911 call; (2) body-worn camera footage capturing the complainant’s statements hours after; (3) statements to a U.S. Probation Officer a week later; and (4) text messages between the complainant and Davis shortly after the incident. Over Davis’s objection, the district court admitted the statements and relied primarily on them to find a rape/sexual-misconduct violation by a preponderance of the evidence, revoked supervised release, imposed 18 months’ imprisonment plus 24 months’ supervised release, and added conditions including compliance with Probation’s Computer and Internet Monitoring Program (“CIMP”), authorizing monitoring that can “capture and analyze all data” on devices and geolocation.

The appeal raised three interrelated issues: (i) whether admitting the out-of-court statements complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C); (ii) whether the resulting sentence was sound; and (iii) whether the CIMP conditions were properly justified and tailored.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit vacated in part and remanded. It held the district court abused its discretion by admitting the four out-of-court statements without making adequate “good cause” findings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C). Because this evidentiary error could have affected the violation finding and the sentence, the panel:

• Vacated the finding as to Violation One (rape/sexual misconduct) and vacated the sentence and additional supervised-release conditions (including CIMP) tied to that determination.
• Affirmed the judgment as to the three other violations (unchallenged on appeal).
• Directed that on remand the district court must (a) apply proper Rule 32.1 balancing and findings; (b) avoid considering 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release; and (c) ensure any intrusive monitoring conditions are supported by particularized findings and are narrowly tailored.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

The panel’s holding is best understood as an enforcement of a line of Second Circuit (and Supreme Court) authority requiring procedural rigor in revocation hearings when the government seeks to substitute hearsay for live testimony.

• United States v. Diaz, 986 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2021) — Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard governing admissibility determinations at revocation hearings. It frames the appellate lens: the question is not whether the appellate court would admit the evidence, but whether the district court applied the correct legal framework and made reviewable findings.
• United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2006) — Central to the Rule 32.1 analysis. The panel invokes Williams for two propositions: (i) the required balancing factors in the “good cause” inquiry (government’s reasons for nonproduction, reliability, and defendant’s confrontation interest), and (ii) the abuse-of-discretion standard for the district court’s Rule 32.1 balancing.
• United States v. Harris, 838 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016) — Restates Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C)’s guarantee: the defendant may “question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear.” This anchors the panel’s insistence that the district court must actually perform (and articulate) the “interest of justice” analysis.
• United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2012) — Provides the doctrinal bridge between due process and revocation procedure: revocation defendants lack “the full panoply of rights,” yet retain confrontation rights absent a specific good-cause finding. Carthen supplies the operative test: if hearsay would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court must balance confrontation interest vs. government’s reasons and reliability.
• Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) — The constitutional foundation: revocation requires minimum due process, including confrontation/cross-examination unless the court “specifically finds good cause.” Davis is an application of Morrissey’s “specific finding” requirement to a record the panel found essentially silent on the required factors.
• United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2002) — Cited via Carthen for the abuse-of-discretion formulation, emphasizing that an admissibility decision must fall within “the range of permissible decisions.” The panel used this standard to characterize the absence of findings as outside that range.
• United States v. Peguero, 34 F.4th 143 (2d Cir. 2022) — Important as a contrast case. Peguero shows that hearsay can be admitted when the government demonstrates a legitimate basis for nonproduction (e.g., fear of reprisal supported by a defendant’s domestic-violence history) and the district court makes the needed findings. Davis does not reject hearsay categorically; it rejects hearsay admitted without articulated good cause.

The panel also cited sentencing and supervised-release condition cases that shape the remand instructions:

• United States v. Brooks, 889 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2018) — Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of the sentencing determination.
• United States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69 (2d Cir. 2025) — Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of conditions of supervised release, setting the frame for evaluating CIMP.
• Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025) — A key substantive constraint on revocation sentencing: the district court “cannot consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release.” The panel flagged this as a must-follow rule on remand.
• United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2024) and United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015) — Require “particularized findings” when a special condition burdens a “cognizable liberty interest,” and that the condition not impose “a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary.”
• United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024) and United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2019) — Emphasize that computer monitoring/internet restrictions implicate constitutional rights and therefore must be “narrowly tailored” and “robustly supported.” They also require courts to explain why less intrusive alternatives are insufficient when such options appear viable.
• United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 2020) and United States v. McAdam, 165 F.4th 688 (2d Cir. 2026) — Set standards for plain-error review when objections were not properly preserved. While not the driver of the disposition, these cases situate the appellate framework.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The dispositive reasoning is procedural: Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) requires a court to decide—on the record—whether “the interest of justice” excuses the government from producing an adverse witness. When the government offers hearsay in lieu of testimony, and the hearsay would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Second Circuit law requires a three-factor balance:

• (1) Defendant’s confrontation interest (how important cross-examination is to testing the accusation and credibility);
• (2) Government’s reason for nonproduction (e.g., inability to locate the witness, safety concerns, trauma, fear of reprisal); and
• (3) Reliability of the hearsay (corroboration, consistency, contemporaneity, indicia of trustworthiness).

The panel found the district court recited the standard and listed the statements, but did not actually perform the balancing in a reviewable way. Specifically:

• The district court did not identify the reasons for any declarant’s unavailability—a threshold point because “good cause” requires knowing what “cause” is being asserted.
• The district court did not analyze the strength of Davis’s confrontation interests, even though the violation finding depended “primarily” on these statements and the allegation (rape/sexual misconduct) turned heavily on credibility.
• The district court offered at most “passing” or “glancing” remarks about reliability, without tying reliability indicators to each statement or explaining why reliability offset the lack of cross-examination.

This absence mattered because Rule 32.1 is not a mere evidentiary technicality: it is the procedural expression of the limited-but-real due process protections recognized in Morrissey v. Brewer. Without explicit findings, the appellate court cannot evaluate whether the “interest of justice” truly justified dispensing with confrontation.

Importantly, the panel did not hold that these four items could never be admitted. It noted, for example, that hearsay may be admissible when the record shows witness fear and safety concerns, as in United States v. Peguero. The error was the lack of articulated good-cause findings and balancing, not a categorical bar.

Because the rape/sexual-misconduct finding was vacated and could have influenced the sentence (both custody length and supervision terms), the panel also vacated the sentence and conditions and remanded. In doing so, it underscored two guardrails:

• Under Esteras v. United States, the court must not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) (retribution-type purposes such as “just punishment”) when revoking supervised release.
• Under United States v. Sims, United States v. Matta, United States v. Oliveras, and United States v. Eaglin, intrusive digital monitoring (like CIMP’s ability to capture “all data” and geolocation) must be justified with particularized findings, be narrowly tailored, and be supported by an explanation of why less intrusive alternatives are insufficient.

3.3. Impact

Even as a nonprecedential summary order, the decision’s practical impact is likely to be felt in three ways:

• Revocation-hearing record-building: District courts are reminded that simply citing Rule 32.1 and asserting “good cause” is inadequate. Courts should expect closer scrutiny where the government’s proof of a serious alleged new crime hinges on hearsay.
• Government witness-production decisions: The government is incentivized to either (a) produce adverse witnesses, or (b) create a robust record documenting unavailability (fear, safety, inability to locate, trauma-related inability to testify) and explaining why hearsay is reliable enough to substitute for cross-examination.
• Digital-surveillance conditions: The remand instructions reinforce that broad device monitoring and geolocation tracking require individualized justification. In cases lacking a technology nexus, courts should expect to justify scope, duration, trigger conditions (if any), and why narrower tools cannot accomplish supervision goals.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Supervised release revocation”: A post-incarceration supervision term can be revoked if a judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not), that conditions were violated.
• “Hearsay”: An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts (e.g., the complainant’s statements offered to prove the assault occurred). Hearsay is often restricted at trials, but revocation hearings can admit it only after proper Rule 32.1 “good cause” analysis when confrontation is denied.
• Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) “good cause” / “interest of justice”: The judge may allow the government to rely on hearsay instead of live testimony only after balancing the defendant’s need for cross-examination, the government’s reason for not producing the witness, and the hearsay’s reliability.
• “Particularized findings” and “narrow tailoring” (conditions of release): If a condition significantly burdens liberty (like comprehensive device monitoring), the judge must explain—based on the defendant’s circumstances—why the condition is needed and why a less intrusive condition would not suffice.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A): One of the general sentencing purposes (e.g., “just punishment”). After Esteras v. United States, it is not a permissible consideration for revocation sentencing.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Davis reinforces a core procedural discipline in supervised-release revocation: when the government seeks to prove an alleged new crime through hearsay, the court must make explicit, reviewable Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) “good cause” findings by balancing confrontation interests, reasons for nonproduction, and reliability. Because the district court failed to do so, the Second Circuit vacated the rape/sexual-misconduct violation finding and, consequentially, vacated the sentence and supervision conditions (including broad CIMP monitoring) for reconsideration under the correct standards—while also reminding the district court that § 3553(a)(2)(A) may not be considered in revocation sentencing and that intrusive digital-monitoring conditions must be narrowly tailored and robustly supported.