Rule 32 “Good Cause” Permits Late PSR Objections to Correct Material Guidelines Errors; Express Agreement to the Guidelines Calculation Waives Appellate Challenge

I. Introduction

United States v. Atoris Jaquez Slater (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026) addresses two recurring sentencing problems: (1) whether a district court may entertain an untimely objection to the Presentence Report (“PSR”) when the objection materially affects the Sentencing Guidelines range, and (2) whether a defendant can later challenge a Guidelines calculation after affirmatively agreeing to it at sentencing.

The case arose from a Rock Island, Illinois traffic stop that turned into a high-speed chase and ended with police finding a loaded handgun, marijuana, cannabis edibles, and (after arrest) crack cocaine. Slater pleaded guilty to: 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (drug trafficking), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession), and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime).

The central sentencing dispute concerned the drug-conversion ratio applied to cannabis edibles under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 app. n.8(D). The initial PSR used a 1:1 marijuana/cannabis ratio; just before sentencing the government asserted the edibles were THC mixtures subject to a 1:167 ratio, sought a continuance for lab testing, and ultimately obtained a revised PSR that substantially increased the advisory range. Slater appealed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held:

  • Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(1)(D), a district judge may allow an untimely PSR objection for “good cause,” and the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government’s late objection because the court had to ensure the Guidelines range was correctly calculated and the error was material.
  • Slater’s argument that the 1:167 THC ratio did not apply to the edibles was waived because he withdrew objections and affirmatively agreed at sentencing that the revised PSR correctly calculated the Guidelines range. Even if treated as forfeiture, he could not satisfy plain-error review because his proposed reading was novel and “subject to reasonable dispute.”

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standard of review and Rule 32 “good cause” discretion

  • United States v. Acox, 595 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2010): The court anchored its deferential review in Acox, emphasizing that whether circumstances amount to “good cause” under Rule 32 is committed to the district court’s discretion. This framing largely determines the outcome: once discretion is recognized as broad, reversal requires a clear misjudgment rather than a mere disagreement.
  • United States v. Henderson, 159 F.4th 213 (4th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2017): These out-of-circuit citations reinforce that other circuits likewise treat Rule 32 good-cause rulings as discretionary, supporting the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to rigidify “good cause” into a bright-line test.

2. The sentencing court’s duty to calculate the correct Guidelines range

  • Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018): Cited for the proposition that the district court has the “ultimate responsibility” to ensure the Guidelines range is correct. This case supplies the normative backbone for allowing correction of a material Guidelines issue even when procedural deadlines were missed.
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Cited for the rule that an incorrect Guidelines calculation is serious procedural error. The Seventh Circuit uses Gall to show that ignoring a potentially incorrect ratio is not merely optional; it risks reversible error—an institutional incentive to permit late correction when warranted.

3. The elasticity of “good cause” as a legal standard

  • United States v. UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2020): Quoted for describing “good cause” as “uniquely flexible,” “fact-specific,” and “capacious.” This supports affirmance despite the district judge not using the precise words “good cause”; the concept can be satisfied by the substance of the court’s reasoning and the factual context.

4. Continuance principles (addressed in a footnote)

  • United States v. Smith, 562 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2009): Provides the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard for continuances and the need for actual prejudice. Although the panel focuses on Rule 32 good cause, Smith signals that reframing the issue as a continuance challenge would not help Slater.

5. Deadline-enforcement concerns and judicial discretion to refuse late objections

  • United States v. Chung, 261 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2001): Slater invoked Chung to argue that treating all Guidelines errors as good cause would render Rule 32 deadlines meaningless. The Seventh Circuit accepts the premise as a caution but distinguishes the remedy: judges retain discretion and are not compelled to hear late objections.
  • United States v. Overholt, 307 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2002): Cited to support the same point—courts are not “obliged to entertain” untimely objections—helping the Seventh Circuit reconcile robust discretion with the existence of deadlines.

6. The THC-ratio argument and its weak appellate footing

  • United States v. Koss, 831 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 2016) (Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc): Slater’s substantive argument relied solely on this dissent’s view that the 1:167 ratio should apply only to “pure, isolated organic or synthetic THC,” not edible products derived from cannabis. The Seventh Circuit did not adopt or engage the dissent on the merits because Slater had waived the claim and, alternatively, could not show plain error based on a novel dissenting position.

7. Waiver and plain-error doctrine

  • United States v. Coffin, 23 F.4th 778 (7th Cir. 2022): Provides the “textbook waiver” principle: when a defendant affirmatively agrees with a sentencing calculation, the issue is waived on appeal.
  • United States v. Venturella, 585 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2009): Supports the rule that withdrawing an objection generally waives the argument for appeal.
  • United States v. Harris, 102 F.4th 847 (7th Cir. 2024) and Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009): Supply the “clear or obvious” requirement for plain error and the notion that an issue “subject to reasonable dispute” cannot satisfy that standard—fatal to Slater’s newly raised interpretation of § 2D1.1’s conversion scheme.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why “good cause” existed for the late PSR objection

The panel’s logic proceeds in three steps:

  1. Rule structure: Rule 32 sets a 14-day objection deadline (FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(1)), but expressly authorizes new objections “at any time before sentence is imposed” for “good cause” (FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(1)(D)), and permits changing time limits for good cause (FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(2)).
  2. Institutional obligation: The district court must correctly calculate the Guidelines range (Rosales-Mireles v. United States), and failure risks procedural error (Gall v. United States).
  3. Materiality of the issue: The ratio change (1:1 to 1:167) increased the advisory range by about three years on counts one and two, making the objection consequential rather than technical.

The court acknowledged the district judge did not explicitly label her finding “good cause,” but treated that omission as non-fatal because “good cause” is flexible (United States v. UCB, Inc.) and the district judge’s reasoning matched the concept: ensure a correct, materially affected Guidelines calculation before imposing sentence.

2. Why Slater’s counterarguments failed

Slater argued that accepting the government’s late objection would effectively nullify Rule 32’s deadlines and that the government “waived” the objection by earlier acquiescence. The Seventh Circuit responded:

  • Deadlines still matter: The court agreed in principle with the concern reflected in United States v. Chung, but emphasized discretion cuts both ways: judges may decline to entertain late objections (United States v. Overholt). This preserves Rule 32’s deadline while still allowing correction when circumstances warrant.
  • Waiver doctrine is the wrong lens: Rule 32 supplies the governing standard—“good cause”—for late PSR objections. A party’s earlier position may be relevant to whether good cause exists, but it does not categorically bar consideration where the court reasonably finds good cause.

3. Why the THC-ratio argument was not reviewable (and not plain error)

Slater’s merits challenge—that the 1:167 ratio for “THC” and “THC mixtures” should not apply to his cereal bars—collapsed for two independent reasons:

  • Waiver: Slater withdrew remaining objections and affirmatively agreed the revised PSR accurately calculated the range, triggering “textbook waiver” under United States v. Coffin and United States v. Venturella.
  • No plain error: Even if treated as forfeiture, his reading—derived from a dissent in United States v. Koss—was not “clear or obvious” under United States v. Harris and Puckett v. United States, because no controlling precedent (and no embraced sister-circuit authority) adopted that interpretation.

C. Impact

  • Greater practical latitude to correct Guidelines-affecting PSR errors: The decision confirms that, in the Seventh Circuit, a district court may find “good cause” to consider an untimely PSR objection when the objection is tied to the court’s obligation to get the Guidelines range right—especially where the range shift is substantial.
  • Litigation-position changes are not automatically disqualifying: Even where the government initially accepted a PSR calculation, the court may still entertain a later correction if the judge reasonably views the record as reflecting uncertainty or mistake and the correction is material.
  • Sentencing-record discipline becomes decisive: Defendants who withdraw objections and expressly agree to Guidelines calculations will face waiver on appeal. The opinion encourages counsel to preserve disputes explicitly (or to clarify they are not conceding) if future appellate review is desired.
  • THC conversion-ratio challenges remain unsettled on the merits: The panel did not resolve the interpretive question suggested by the Koss dissent. But it signaled that, absent on-point precedent, such arguments are unlikely to succeed under plain-error review if not preserved.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • PSR (Presentence Report): A probation officer’s report that calculates the advisory Guidelines range and summarizes offense conduct, history, and other sentencing factors.
  • Drug-conversion ratios / converted drug weight: When multiple drugs are involved, the Guidelines convert each drug into a common metric using specified ratios (here, in § 2D1.1 app. n.8(D)) and then add them to determine the base offense level.
  • Rule 32 objection deadlines and “good cause”: Parties usually must object within 14 days, but the judge may allow late objections before sentencing if there is a legally sufficient reason (“good cause”).
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is an intentional relinquishment (e.g., withdrawing objections and agreeing a calculation is correct), which typically ends the issue on appeal. Forfeiture is a failure to raise an issue, which may still be reviewed only for plain error.
  • Plain-error review: A demanding standard requiring an error that is clear or obvious under existing law. Novel arguments—especially those supported only by a dissent—rarely qualify.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Atoris Jaquez Slater reinforces two sentencing rules with immediate practical consequences: (1) district courts have broad, deferentially reviewed discretion to find “good cause” under FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(1)(D) to consider untimely PSR objections when needed to ensure a materially correct Guidelines calculation, and (2) a defendant who withdraws objections and affirmatively agrees with the Guidelines calculation commits waiver that forecloses later appellate challenges to that calculation. While the opinion leaves the underlying THC-ratio interpretive debate unresolved on the merits, it makes clear that such disputes must be preserved in the district court to be meaningfully reviewable on appeal.