Rule 26(a) Stipulations as Sufficient Basis for Adjudication When Children Are in the Parent’s Custody

Case: In re K.M. and L.M., No. 24-679 (W. Va. Oct. 14, 2025) — Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Disposition: Affirmed (memorandum decision under W. Va. R. App. P. 21)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re K.M. and L.M., affirming the termination of a father’s parental, custodial, and guardianship rights after upholding the sufficiency of his adjudication based on a Rule 26(a) stipulation. The decision clarifies that a properly crafted stipulation—admitting drug use impairing parenting and identifying deficiencies to be addressed—can, standing alone, satisfy adjudication requirements where the children were in the parent’s custody at the time of the alleged conduct.

The case arises from a May 2023 abuse and neglect petition alleging that the father, M.M., used illegal substances to a degree impairing his parenting and maintained unsafe conditions (including drug paraphernalia and white powder within the children’s reach). The father waived a preliminary hearing and stipulated at adjudication (July 2023) that his substance abuse impaired his parenting skills, and he expressed willingness to engage in an improvement period. The circuit court accepted the stipulation, adjudicated the children abused/neglected and the father abusive/neglectful, and later terminated parental rights at disposition (September 2024). On appeal, the father challenged adjudication, arguing the stipulation was deficient and the adjudicatory order lacked sufficient findings, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction to proceed to disposition.

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the stipulation met the requirements of Rule 26(a) as articulated in In re Z.S.-1 and that, given the children were in the father’s custody, the court’s findings were sufficient to confer jurisdiction to proceed to disposition.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Standard of review: Findings of fact reviewed for clear error; conclusions of law reviewed de novo (Syllabus point 1, In re Cecil T.).
  • Stipulation sufficiency: Under Rule 26(a) and In re Z.S.-1, an adjudication stipulation must include (1) agreed facts supporting court involvement concerning the respondent’s conduct or condition and (2) a statement of the respondent’s problems/deficiencies to be addressed at disposition. The father’s on-the-record and written stipulation satisfied both prongs by admitting substance abuse impaired his parenting and enumerating issues (substance abuse; need for parenting/adult life skills) to be addressed via an improvement period.
  • No additional evidence required: Because the father stipulated to abuse/neglect that impaired his parenting while the children were in his custody, DHS was not required to present additional evidence to prove how the conduct threatened the children’s welfare.
  • Findings and jurisdiction: While the circuit court’s adjudicatory findings “could have been more robust,” its explicit findings that the children were abused/neglected and the father abusive/neglectful sufficed to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite to proceed to disposition (citing In re B.V., In re C.S. and B.S., and the Court’s recent clarification in In re J.W.).
  • Distinguishing authorities:
    • In re J.L.-1 (2020) involved a contested adjudication and post-removal drug screens; not analogous to a knowing Rule 26(a) stipulation.
    • In re D.C. (2024) and In re B.V. (2023) require child-specific findings particularly where children are not in the respondent’s custody; here the children were in the father’s custody, so generalized stipulation-based findings were adequate.
    • In re D.A. (2022) required detailed findings in a contested adjudication; here, the father admitted his drug use impaired parenting, and the Court also invoked the presumption articulated in In re S.C. that a parent’s methamphetamine abuse threatens a child’s welfare.
  • Outcome: Adjudication affirmed; termination unchallenged on appeal and therefore stands; permanency plan is adoption by current placement.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) — Establishes the bifurcated standard of review: factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Court applies this framework to assess whether the stipulation and findings legally sufficed for adjudication.

Rule 26(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings — Governs adjudication by stipulation. It requires (1) agreed facts supporting court involvement regarding the respondent’s conduct/condition and (2) a statement of the respondent’s problems/deficiencies to be addressed at disposition. The Court relies on In re Z.S.-1 for the two-prong articulation and enforces it here.

In re Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621 (2023) — Clarified the content Rule 26(a) stipulations must contain. The Court finds the father’s oral and written stipulation tracked Z.S.-1’s requirements: (i) admission of drug abuse impairing parenting (agreed facts supporting court involvement), and (ii) identification of deficiencies and issues to address (substance abuse; parenting and adult life skills) as the plan for disposition.

In re B.V., 248 W. Va. 29, 886 S.E.2d 364 (2023) and In re C.S. and B.S., 247 W. Va. 212, 875 S.E.2d 350 (2022) — These cases address jurisdiction at adjudication and the adequacy of findings, especially when some named children are outside the respondent’s custody (e.g., in legal guardianships). B.V. clarifies that general findings applicable to all children are insufficient when at least one child is outside the respondent’s custody; the court must make specific, child-by-child findings explaining how each child’s health/welfare is harmed or threatened by the conduct. In K.M. & L.M., both children were in the father’s custody, making generalized adjudication findings (based on the father’s admissions) adequate under B.V.

In re D.C., No. 23-410, 2024 WL 4026060 (W. Va. Sept. 3, 2024) (mem.) — Applied B.V. and found adjudication insufficient where the children were not in the mother’s custody and the court failed to make child-specific findings connecting stipulated drug use to harm or threatened harm. The Court distinguishes D.C. because, here, the children were in the father’s custody and subject to his admitted conduct at the time of the petition.

In re D.A., No. 22-0151, 2022 WL 16549292 (W. Va. Oct. 31, 2022) (mem.) — Vacated an adjudication order after a contested hearing for lack of findings tying the parent’s substance abuse to parenting impairment and harm/threatened harm. The Court distinguishes D.A. because the father in K.M. & L.M. specifically admitted his substance abuse impaired his parenting, satisfying the nexus requirement via stipulation.

In re S.C., 248 W. Va. 628, 889 S.E.2d 710 (2023) — Holds that a parent’s methamphetamine abuse threatens a child’s health and welfare and renders the child “neglected” under W. Va. Code § 49-1-201; the Court recognized a presumption of attendant risks from illegal drug abuse in abuse/neglect proceedings, where the civil standard of proof is lower than in criminal cases and courts err on the side of caution to protect children. The Court in K.M. & L.M. invokes S.C. to underscore why, coupled with the father’s admission of parenting impairment, DHS did not have to prove more at adjudication.

In re J.L.-1, No. 20-0168, 2020 WL 6482940 (W. Va. Nov. 4, 2020) (mem.) — Involved a contested adjudication with findings linked to post-removal drug screens. The Court notes J.L.-1 is inapposite; K.M. & L.M. centers on the sufficiency of a knowing stipulation when the children were in the parent’s custody.

In re J.W., No. 23-712, 2025 WL 1262342 (W. Va. May 1, 2025) (mem.) — Emphasizes that the dispositive trigger for proceeding to disposition is the court’s finding that a child is abused/neglected and the respondent is abusive/neglectful. The Court uses J.W. to confirm that even if adjudicatory findings could be “more robust,” the necessary finding was made here, permitting the case to proceed to termination.

Statutes and rules:

  • W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i): Requires the court at adjudication to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the child is abused/neglected and whether the respondent is abusing/neglecting.
  • W. Va. Code § 49-1-201: Defines “abused child” and “neglected child.”
  • W. Va. R. App. P. 21: Authorizes resolution by memorandum decision without oral argument where appropriate.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Threshold: Standard of review. The Court reviews the sufficiency of the adjudication and related findings under a clear error/de novo framework. Whether a Rule 26(a) stipulation meets legal requirements is a question of law reviewed de novo.
  2. Stipulation content under Rule 26(a) and In re Z.S.-1. The father’s adjudicatory stipulation was made in open court, reduced to writing, and signed. It contained:
    • An admission that he abused illegal substances to the point of impairing his parenting skills—an agreed fact supporting court involvement as to his conduct when the petition was filed.
    • An express statement identifying issues and deficiencies to be addressed at disposition (substance abuse; need for parenting and adult life skills) and a willingness to engage in an improvement period.
    The Court held this satisfies both Z.S.-1 prongs.
  3. No additional DHS proof required where the respondent stipulates to the nexus and children were in custody. Because the father conceded not only drug use but also the critical nexus—impairment of parenting—while the children were in his care, DHS did not need to present additional evidence of harm or threatened harm. This aligns with In re S.C.’s presumption that illegal drug abuse threatens a child’s welfare and with the civil standard that prioritizes protection.
  4. Findings sufficiency and jurisdictional prerequisite. Adjudication is a jurisdictional prerequisite. The circuit court’s adjudicatory order expressly found K.M. and L.M. to be abused/neglected and the father abusive/neglectful. Although the Court acknowledges the order’s findings “could have been more robust,” it concludes they were legally sufficient to confer jurisdiction. The child-by-child specificity requirement in B.V. and D.C. is triggered when children are outside the respondent’s custody; here, both children were in the father’s custody, so general findings based on the father’s admissions sufficed.
  5. Distinguishing contested-adjudication cases. In contested adjudications like D.A. and J.L.-1, the state must prove the nexus between parental conduct and harm/threatened harm. Where a respondent stipulates under Rule 26(a), and the stipulation itself identifies the nexus and deficiencies to be addressed, the court may adjudicate without additional evidentiary development.
  6. Proceeding to disposition. Citing In re J.W., the Court reiterates that once the court makes the requisite abused/neglected finding, it may proceed to disposition. The father did not assign error to the termination decision itself; consequently, affirmance of adjudication ends the appeal.

Impact and Practice Implications

Immediate doctrinal effect. The decision reinforces—especially in custody cases—that a properly drafted, on-the-record and written Rule 26(a) stipulation admitting the nexus between parental conduct (drug abuse) and parenting impairment is sufficient to adjudicate abuse/neglect without additional DHS proof. Circuit courts may rely on such stipulations to find the jurisdictional predicate satisfied and proceed to disposition.

For DHS and petitioners’ counsel.

  • Ensure stipulations explicitly satisfy both Rule 26(a) prongs: (i) agreed facts tied to the petition date explaining court involvement; (ii) a clear statement of problems/deficiencies to be addressed at disposition.
  • Where drug use is at issue, include an express admission (if appropriate) that the use impaired parenting and endangered the children. Doing so avoids later challenges that the stipulation lacked the required nexus.

For respondent parents’ counsel.

  • Advise clients that a Rule 26(a) stipulation admitting parenting impairment will likely preclude DHS’s need to present further adjudicatory evidence and will enable the court to proceed to disposition.
  • Negotiate stipulation terms carefully. If disputing the nexus or custody context, consider a contested adjudication rather than a stipulation that concedes the core elements.
  • Confirm the record reflects the stipulation was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that the written stipulation mirrors the oral admissions.

For circuit courts.

  • Continue to conduct a robust colloquy to ensure Rule 26(a) stipulations are informed and voluntary and that both prongs are satisfied.
  • Even when a stipulation exists, it remains best practice to make concise, child-specific findings—particularly where any child is not in the respondent’s custody—to avoid “generalized findings” pitfalls identified in B.V. and D.C..
  • Document expressly that the children are abused/neglected and the respondent is abusive/neglectful under § 49-4-601(i), thereby satisfying the jurisdictional prerequisite to proceed to disposition.

Systemic clarification. This decision harmonizes several recent strands:

  • From Z.S.-1: the content demanded by Rule 26(a) stipulations;
  • From B.V./D.C.: the need for child-specific findings when custody is elsewhere;
  • From S.C.: the presumption that illegal drug abuse (especially methamphetamine) threatens children’s welfare; and
  • From J.W.: the centrality of the abused/neglected finding to move a case forward.
The Court thereby offers a stable pathway for adjudication by stipulation in custody cases while preserving heightened findings requirements for non-custodial contexts.

Limitations. As a memorandum decision under Rule 21, the Court does not purport to announce a novel rule; rather, it applies and clarifies existing doctrine. The holding is cabined to situations where (1) the Rule 26(a) stipulation truly satisfies both prongs and (2) the children were in the respondent’s custody when the conduct occurred. Different outcomes may follow in contested adjudications or where any child is outside the respondent’s custody.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication versus disposition: Adjudication is the phase where the court decides if a child is “abused” or “neglected” and whether the respondent is an “abusing” or “neglecting” parent. Disposition is the remedial phase (e.g., improvement period, termination) that follows only if adjudication is established.
  • Jurisdictional prerequisite: The court cannot reach disposition unless it first adjudicates the child abused/neglected (per § 49-4-601(i); see also B.V. and J.W.). Without an adjudication, the court lacks authority to impose dispositional remedies.
  • Rule 26(a) stipulation: A formal admission at adjudication that must include (1) agreed facts justifying the court’s involvement tied to the respondent’s conduct or condition and (2) a list of problems/deficiencies to be addressed at disposition. It must be knowing, voluntary, and typically reduced to writing and acknowledged on the record.
  • Nexus between conduct and harm: In abuse/neglect cases, it is not enough to show parental misconduct in the abstract; the conduct must harm or threaten the child’s health/welfare. A stipulation can establish this nexus by admitting parenting impairment. For illegal drug use, the Court recognizes a presumption of risk to children (see S.C.).
  • Child-specific findings: When any child is not in the respondent’s custody at the time of the petition (e.g., in a legal guardianship), the court must make specific, child-by-child findings linking the respondent’s conduct to harm/threat for each child (B.V., D.C.). If all named children were in the respondent’s custody and the respondent admits impairment, generalized findings may suffice.
  • Standard of proof: Abuse/neglect adjudications are civil and require the court to find the allegations by clear and convincing evidence, a standard lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases. This informs the Court’s willingness, consistent with S.C., to err on the side of protecting children at risk.
  • Improvement period: A court-approved timeframe during which a respondent engages in services (e.g., substance abuse treatment, parenting education) aimed at remedying deficiencies identified at adjudication.

Conclusion

In re K.M. and L.M. solidifies the practical sufficiency of Rule 26(a) stipulations as an adjudicatory foundation where the children are in the parent’s custody and the respondent admits drug-related parenting impairment and identifies deficiencies to be addressed. The Supreme Court’s analysis integrates and distinguishes recent authorities: it applies In re Z.S.-1 to enforce the content of stipulations, respects B.V. and D.C. by limiting the need for child-specific findings to non-custodial contexts, leverages In re S.C.’s presumption regarding the dangers of illegal drug abuse, and reiterates via In re J.W. that the essential adjudicatory finding unlocks the disposition phase.

The decision’s key takeaways include:

  • A Rule 26(a) stipulation that admits drug use impairing parenting and lists deficiencies for disposition is sufficient to adjudicate abuse/neglect without additional DHS proof, when the children were in the respondent’s custody.
  • Courts must make adjudicatory findings that the children are abused/neglected and the parent abusive/neglectful; while more detailed findings are best practice, such findings are adequate to confer jurisdiction to proceed to disposition in custody cases with valid stipulations.
  • Child-specific findings remain essential when any child is outside the respondent’s custody at the time of the petition.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores the importance of carefully drafting Rule 26(a) stipulations and crafting adjudicatory orders that explicitly track statutory findings. For courts, it offers a clear, administrable path to adjudication and disposition in cases where the respondent’s admissions satisfy the rule and the children were in the respondent’s care. In the broader legal context, the case advances coherence in West Virginia’s abuse-and-neglect jurisprudence, ensuring both procedural rigor and child protection goals are served.

Concurred in by Chief Justice William R. Wooton, Justice C. Haley Bunn, Justice Charles S. Trump IV, Justice Thomas H. Ewing, and Senior Status Justice John A. Hutchison.