Rule 12 “Good Cause” Requires Prompt Action: Inadvertence and Late Discovery Do Not Excuse Untimely Wiretap Suppression Motions

Case: United States v. Alberico Crespo (11th Cir. June 10, 2026)  |  Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit  |  Disposition: Affirmed convictions and 97-month sentence

1) Introduction

This appeal arises from the prosecution of Alberico Ahias Crespo, an HHS special agent assigned to the Southern District of Florida’s Health Care Fraud Strike Force. The government alleged Crespo used his law-enforcement position to protect his roommate, Jorge Diaz, a participant in an oxycodone distribution network, by feeding Diaz investigative information and by taking steps designed to hinder the investigation and anticipated prosecution.

After a jury trial, Crespo was acquitted of the drug-conspiracy count (Count One) but convicted of:

• conspiracy to commit witness tampering (Count Five),
• three counts of witness tampering (Counts Seven through Nine), and
• conspiracy to obstruct justice (Count Ten),

Crespo challenged (among other things) the denial of a late-filed motion to suppress Title III wiretap evidence, the refusal to grant mistrials after false testimony and a purportedly bad-faith question, limits on recross, admission of “past acts” evidence (PPE sales), cumulative error, sufficiency of the evidence on several counts, refusal to give a “good-faith” instruction, and the guideline calculation that tied his obstruction-related sentence to drug quantities in the underlying trafficking offense.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. The court held:

• The motion to suppress was properly denied as untimely; neither attorney inadvertence nor later production of an FBI report constituted “good cause” under Rule 12(c)(3) given Crespo’s additional delay and failure to justify it.
• Even under plain-error review of suppression merits, Crespo failed—particularly because the wiretap application was not in the record, and he did not establish a viable Franks theory.
• Denial of mistrial motions was within the district court’s discretion because prompt curative instructions were given and presumed effective.
• There was no entitlement to recross absent a “new matter” on redirect, and none was shown.
• PPE evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) as probative of intent/state of mind and was not unfairly prejudicial in light of limiting instructions.
• There was no cumulative error because no meritorious individual errors were identified.
• Sufficient evidence supported Crespo’s convictions on the challenged counts.
• A “good-faith” defense instruction was properly denied: it lacked legal support in this context, was substantially covered by mens rea instructions, and lacked evidentiary basis.
• The sentence was correctly calculated under the obstruction/accessory framework (U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1 via § 2J1.2(c)(1)), using the underlying drug-trafficking offense level tied to the obstructed investigation.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1. Untimely suppression motions and “good cause”

The opinion’s most practically important holding is procedural: strict enforcement of suppression-motion deadlines. The panel relied on United States v. Gyetvay, 149 F.4th 1213, 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Andres, 960 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2020) to reaffirm that Rule 12 deadlines matter, and that “good cause” is narrow.

• United States v. Andres: “Neither a strategic decision nor inadvertence constitutes good cause.” The court treated Crespo’s “we forgot to extend deadlines” explanation as classic inadvertence, foreclosed by Andres.
• United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2013) (cited via Andres): reinforces that when a defendant has the information needed to move on time but does not, denial as untimely is not an abuse of discretion.
• United States v. Gyetvay: even when the government produces material late, the defendant must still act promptly and must explain any additional delay. The Crespo panel treated Gyetvay’s warning—“[a] district court’s scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of paper”—as directly controlling.

This framework did more than justify deadline enforcement: it also dictated the appellate lens. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion on timeliness, the panel reviewed suppression merits only for plain error (again under United States v. Andres).

2. Wiretaps, probable cause, and Franks challenges

On the merits, Crespo’s wiretap attack failed for record and substantive reasons:

• Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1349 n.10 (11th Cir. 2005): the panel invoked abandonment principles where a party fails to support arguments with record citations. The wiretap application itself was not in the appellate record, and Crespo relied on quotations embedded in motions rather than the document.
• Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178, 1197 (11th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009): the court recited the demanding standard—intentional/reckless falsity or omission plus materiality to probable cause—and concluded Crespo’s purported contradiction (informant uncertainty about Diaz’s boasting) did not establish a falsehood or material omission.
• United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 900 (11th Cir. 1990): a wiretap requires the same probable cause as a search warrant.
• United States v. Domme, 753 F.2d 950, 954 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985): a wiretap application need not establish probable cause as to every named person; probable cause as to the wiretap target suffices. That principle undermined Crespo’s attempt to recast himself as the “true target.”
• United States v. Goldstein: cited additionally to rebut Crespo’s “true target” theory by explaining wiretaps may be valid even after a crime is complete if there is probable cause evidence will be found, especially in ongoing conspiracies.

3. Mistrials and curative instructions

The denial of mistrials was anchored in a line of cases emphasizing trial-court vantage point and the presumed efficacy of curative instructions:

• United States v. Delgado, 321 F.3d 1338, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 2023): district courts are best positioned to assess prejudice; reversal is warranted only if evidence is so prejudicial it is incurable.
• United States v. Gallardo, 977 F.3d 1126, 1138-39 (11th Cir. 2020): juries are presumed to follow curative instructions; prejudice must be unusually extreme to overcome that presumption.

Those precedents supplied the decisive presumption: once the judge struck the “present at drug sales” statement and instructed the jury to disregard the insinuating question, Crespo had to show incurable prejudice—a burden the panel found he could not meet, particularly given the acquittal on Count One.

4. Recross-examination limits

The court relied on United States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d 1247, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2017) and its roots in United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1517-18 (11th Cir. 1994): there is no constitutional right to recross; only a limited right if redirect brings up “new matter.” The panel concluded the redirect merely contextualized timing/proximity evidence already in the record and responded to cross-examination’s theory—therefore, no “new matter,” no recross entitlement.

5. Rule 404(b) “other acts” evidence

The panel used the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part admissibility test:

• United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1046 (11th Cir. 2001) (three-part inquiry),
• United States v. Elysee, 993 F.3d 1309, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021) (articulating the prongs), and
• United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1060 (11th Cir. 1987) (extrinsic acts to show intent; comparison of state of mind).

Under those authorities, selling PPE without approval (though not charged) was deemed relevant to intent/state of mind and to rebut a defense portrayal of Crespo as an exemplary agent; the limiting instructions reduced unfair prejudice.

6. Cumulative error doctrine

Crespo’s aggregation theory was governed by:

• Morris v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117, 1132 (11th Cir. 2012) (method: evaluate each claimed error, then aggregate), and
• United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Where there is no error …, there can be no cumulative error.”).

Because the panel found no individual reversible (or even meaningful) errors, the cumulative claim necessarily failed under Gamory.

7. Sufficiency of evidence on the challenged counts

For sufficiency review, the court relied on:

• United States v. Gamory (standard of viewing evidence and inferences in government’s favor), and
• the conspiracy framework in United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1426 (11th Cir. 1998) (circumstantial proof is common in conspiracies).

For § 1512(b), the panel used United States v. Gatlin, 90 F.4th 1050, 1062 (11th Cir. 2024) for the elements and held a reasonable jury could infer knowing misleading conduct and corrupt persuasion from Crespo’s conduct (e.g., instructing Diaz how to present pill use, urging public meeting, and the July 8 COVID claim).

For § 1512(c)(2) obstruction conspiracy, the panel relied on United States v. Beach, 80 F.4th 1245, 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2023), quoting United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1292 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011), and reinforced by McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1040 (11th Cir. 2000): an “official proceeding” includes a grand jury proceeding, and it need not be pending at the time of obstruction. The Strike Force’s indictment-oriented investigative purpose supported foreseeability.

8. “Good-faith” instruction

The refusal to give Crespo’s requested instruction was framed by the three-part test: United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999), as implemented through whole-charge review in United States v. Horner, 853 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2017). The court also invoked United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1030 (11th Cir. 2001) for the requirements that a requested instruction have legal support and an evidentiary basis.

The key move was doctrinal: Crespo cited good-faith instructions from tax and civil fraud contexts, but the panel found no authority making “good faith” a defense to § 1512(b)(3) witness tampering or § 1512(c)(2) obstruction. Because the jury was fully instructed on “knowing,” “willful,” “corrupt persuasion,” and “misleading conduct,” the proposed instruction was also “substantially covered.”

9. Sentencing for obstruction tied to underlying offense

Crespo’s sentencing claim was rejected by distinguishing drug-conspiracy relevant-conduct principles from obstruction/accessory guideline principles. The panel emphasized:

• United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 974 (11th Cir. 2015) (individualized findings for co-conspirator liability) was the wrong rubric here.
• United States v. McQueen, 86 F.3d 180, 182 (11th Cir. 1996) and United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997): for obstruction of an investigation/prosecution, U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact) supplies the base offense level pegged to the severity of the “underlying offense” that the defendant sought to obstruct.

Applying that framework, the panel concluded the district court did not attribute all of Dr. Gonzalez’s distribution to Crespo; it used only the portion distributed to Diaz reflected in the PSI’s calculation, and it properly used the underlying trafficking offense (the investigation Crespo attempted to impede) as the reference point for § 2X3.1.

B. Legal Reasoning (How the Court Reached Its Conclusions)

The opinion is methodical and standard-of-review driven. The court repeatedly asked: (1) what standard applies; (2) whether the district court’s call falls within discretionary bounds; and (3) if not preserved, whether any mistake was plain and outcome-affecting.

• Procedural default as outcome determinant: By affirming the suppression denial as untimely, the panel shifted merits review to plain error, where Crespo’s incomplete record (no wiretap application) and non-material contradiction theory could not succeed.
• Trial management deference: For mistrial, recross, and evidence admission, the court leaned heavily on trial-court discretion, especially where limiting instructions were given and where defense counsel did not preserve objections.
• Mens rea coverage substitutes for “good faith”: The panel treated Crespo’s “I was helping a friend” theory as an argument that he lacked the statutory mens rea (knowing, willful, corrupt). Because the jury was instructed on those mental states, a separate “good-faith” label was deemed both unsupported and unnecessary.
• Obstruction sentencing focuses on what was obstructed: In rejecting Moran’s individualized-scope logic, the panel framed Crespo’s culpability through the guideline specifically designed for obstructing another crime’s investigation (Accessory After the Fact), thus centering the seriousness of the underlying drug offense rather than Crespo’s personal drug-dealing conduct.

C. Impact (Why This Opinion Matters Going Forward)

Although the panel largely applied existing doctrine, the decision is consequential in practice for federal criminal litigation in the Eleventh Circuit in three ways:

• Rule 12(c)(3) “good cause” is demanding and time-sensitive: The opinion underscores that even when discovery is voluminous or produced late, defendants must (a) promptly alert the court, (b) explain delay with specificity, and (c) connect the late-produced material to a suppression theory that could not reasonably have been raised earlier. Mere neglect or post-production delay will likely be fatal.
• Appellate record discipline: By treating the absence of the wiretap application as effectively dispositive, the court signals that suppression issues—particularly Franks theories—must be record-supported. This encourages meticulous appellate preparation and discourages quotation-by-brief rather than citation-by-record.
• Obstruction sentencing exposure: Public-corruption/obstruction defendants face guideline exposure tethered to the underlying offense they sought to obstruct (here, drug trafficking). Even when acquitted of the substantive drug conspiracy, Crespo’s obstruction-related guideline calculation still leveraged the drug quantities associated with Diaz’s trafficking that was the subject of the obstructed investigation.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

5) Conclusion

United States v. Alberico Crespo is a comprehensive affirmance that reinforces procedural rigor and trial-court discretion. Most notably, it reiterates that “good cause” for an untimely suppression motion is narrow: inadvertence is not enough, and late discovery does not excuse additional unjustified delay. Substantively, the court upheld the effectiveness of curative instructions, approved limited use of extrinsic-acts evidence to show intent, rejected a free-standing “good-faith” instruction in § 1512 cases where mens rea instructions suffice, and confirmed that obstruction sentencing can be pegged to the underlying offense’s severity under U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1.