Date: Aug 7, 2026

Rule 12(b)(6) Use of Body-Camera Video: “Blatant Contradiction” Can Defeat Plausible Inferences of Surrender in Deadly-Force Pleadings

I. Introduction

In Legacy Spencer v. Edward Glaser, III, the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of Fourth Amendment and North Carolina tort claims arising from a fatal deputy-involved shooting. The plaintiff, Legacy Spencer, as administrator of the estate of Sylvester Demetrius Selby, sued Deputy Edward Glaser III (individual capacity) and Sheriff Doug Doughtie (official capacity). The estate alleged that Selby—who had called for medical assistance after suffering a stab wound—was shot unjustifiably during an encounter on the porch and yard of the family home.

The appeal presented two central issues:

Pleading-stage evidence: whether, and to what extent, a district court may consider body-camera footage on a motion to dismiss.
Constitutional and state-law sufficiency: whether the complaint plausibly alleged excessive force under the Fourth Amendment (and, derivatively as argued, North Carolina assault/battery and wrongful death).

The court’s most practically significant contribution is its application of the Fourth Circuit’s developing “video-on-a-motion-to-dismiss” doctrine: a video may be considered only to the extent it blatantly contradicts not merely a pleaded fact, but also a favorable inference the plaintiff asks the court to draw (here, an inference of “compliance/surrender”).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit (Rushing, J.) affirmed the district court’s dismissal. It held:

The body-camera videos were properly considered in two limited respects because they blatantly contradicted (i) an inference that Selby was complying and surrendering when first shot, and (ii) the pleaded assertion that Selby “did not lunge” toward the deputies before the second and third shots.
On the Fourth Amendment claims, the complaint—as constrained by the two video contradictions—did not plausibly allege excessive force. The first shot was not challenged on appeal (forfeiture), and in any event the totality of circumstances supported probable cause to perceive an imminent threat. The second and third shots were also reasonable because Selby rose and lunged toward Deputy Glaser moments after previously advancing with a knife.
The plaintiff’s state-law claims failed because her appellate theory treated them as rising or falling with the Fourth Amendment theory; once the federal claims failed, the state claims failed on the argument presented. Official-capacity claims against the sheriff also failed because they were premised on imputing Deputy Glaser’s allegedly wrongful conduct.

The court noted that the district court “crossed the line” in some places by drawing factual conclusions from the video that were not “clearly depict[ed]” (e.g., uneven terrain causing stumbling), but the appellate court affirmed based on its own de novo review limited to the two contradictions that met the governing standard.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Pleading standards and what materials may be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Supplies the baseline plausibility requirement—facts must permit a reasonable inference of liability. The court repeatedly anchored its review in Iqbal’s framing of plausibility.
Doriety ex rel. Est. of Crenshaw v. Sletten, 109 F.4th 670 (4th Cir. 2024): The controlling Fourth Circuit standard for considering video at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The court quoted Doriety’s two-part limitation: the video must be integral and authentic, and it may be used only where it “clearly depicts” facts contrary to the complaint or “blatantly contradicts” the allegations so that the plaintiff’s version is “utterly discredited.”
Bermeo v. Andis, 163 F.4th 87 (4th Cir. 2025), Halscott Megaro, P.A. v. McCollum, 66 F.4th 151 (4th Cir. 2023), and Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2016): These cases supply the ordinary “four corners” rule and its exceptions (documents attached, incorporated, or integral). The opinion used them to situate Doriety as a narrow, video-specific application of these pleading principles.
Wells v. Fuentes, 126 F.4th 882 (4th Cir. 2025) and Lewis v. Caraballo, 98 F.4th 521 (4th Cir. 2024): Reinforce the “very difficult” nature of the “blatantly contradicts” standard and the consequence—contradicted allegations are dismissed as implausible.
Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., 97 F.4th 995 (6th Cir. 2024): Cited via Doriety as persuasive authority for the formulation that video may be considered only to the extent it contradicts pleaded facts.

How these precedents shaped the result: The court treated the video issue as a gatekeeping question: it accepted the complaint’s allegations and inferences except where the video made them implausible under Doriety. Critically, the court did not allow the video to become a general factfinding device; it confined its use to two narrow “contradiction” points that directly mattered to reasonableness.

2. Fourth Amendment excessive force and deadly force

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): The “objective reasonableness” framework. The court used Graham as the doctrinal foundation for evaluating deadly force without regard to the officer’s intent.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985): Confirms deadly force is a “seizure” governed by the Fourth Amendment.
Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353 (2025), with Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) and Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420 (2017): Barnes was pivotal for two reasons: (i) it re-centers “reasonableness” as the touchstone, and (ii) it emphasizes that there is “no time limit” on the circumstances a court may consider—earlier facts can inform what a reasonable officer would perceive in the moment of the shooting. The Fourth Circuit relied on this to treat the initial knife-holding advance as highly relevant to the later shots.
Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200 (4th Cir. 2022), Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2013), and Hensley ex rel. North Carolina v. Price, 876 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 2017): These cases supplied the Fourth Circuit’s formulation that deadly force is reasonable when the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm. Hensley also provided language about noncompliance and movement after commands increasing objectively reasonable suspicion about intent.
Rambert v. City of Greenville, 107 F.4th 388 (4th Cir. 2024): Functioned as the closest factual analog in principle: if a suspect continues to rise/move toward the officer after being shot, a reasonable officer may conclude the threat has not passed and prior shots did not abate the threat.
Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227 (4th Cir. 2022) and Melgar ex rel. Melgar v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2010): Reinforced the “reasonable officer in the situation” lens and the principle that reasonableness must be judged based on what officers knew at the time, not post hoc intent narratives.
Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782 (4th Cir. 1998): Used to validate the proposition that advancing with a knife after failing to heed commands can create probable cause supporting deadly force.
McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994), Caraway v. City of Pineville, 111 F.4th 369 (4th Cir. 2024): Supported rejection of the “unarmed means unreasonable” argument; officers need not see a weapon to reasonably perceive danger and need not “confirm” a suspect is unarmed when forced to make split-second judgments.

3. Appellate forfeiture and argument framing

Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int'l LLC, 856 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2017): The court applied Grayson O to hold Spencer forfeited any challenge to the district court’s ruling on the first shot by failing to contest it on appeal.

4. North Carolina law: deadly force, public official immunity, and respondeat superior

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-401(d)(2)(a) and Turner v. City of Greenville, 677 S.E.2d 480 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009): Provide the statutory rule and interpretive framing for when deadly force is (or appears) reasonably necessary for self-defense or defense of others.
State v. Irick, 231 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 1977): Cited (via Knibbs) for the idea that the statute codifies and clarifies circumstances where deadly force may be used without fear of criminal or civil liability.
Wilcox v. City of Asheville, 730 S.E.2d 226 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) and Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200 (4th Cir. 2022): Establish and apply the public official immunity test (scope of authority, malice, corruption).
Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782 (4th Cir. 1998) and Turner v. City of Greenville, 677 S.E.2d 480 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009): Used to support the official-capacity/respondeat superior analysis: if the deputy’s conduct is lawful/reasonable, the sheriff cannot be held liable on an imputation theory premised on wrongful conduct.

5. An emerging tension: can videos supplement, not just contradict, the complaint?

Doriety ex rel. Est. of Crenshaw v. Sletten, 109 F.4th 670 (4th Cir. 2024) (footnote) and Harrold v. Hagen, 174 F.4th 393 (4th Cir. 2026) (footnote): The court flagged (but did not resolve) a doctrinal tension. Doriety contains a footnote suggesting courts may rely on video-depicted facts even when the complaint is silent (i.e., supplementation). Harrold contains a footnote suggesting the opposite (unpleaded video facts are “left for discovery”). Spencer did not require resolution because the plaintiff did not argue warnings (or their absence) made the shooting unreasonable.

Why this matters: The Spencer panel implicitly reinforces a cautious approach: it affirmed by using the video only where it directly falsified the complaint (or an inference drawn from it), avoiding any broad endorsement of supplementation.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The video gatekeeping holding: contradiction can defeat favorable inferences

The court applied Doriety in a notably precise way. Spencer’s complaint alleged Selby “proceeded down the steps” and was shot while his arms were raised “above his head.” The Fourth Circuit did not treat this merely as a contested detail; it identified the inference Spencer sought: that Selby was “complying” and “surrendering.” The body-camera footage “blatantly contradict[ed]” that inference by showing Selby leaping down the steps, closing distance, still holding the knife, and raising arms only as a landing brace.

That move is doctrinally important: it confirms that Doriety’s contradiction principle polices not only explicit fact statements, but also “reasonable inferences” that would otherwise be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor at 12(b)(6). In other words, plaintiffs cannot preserve plausibility by pleading facts in a way that invites a pro-plaintiff inference the video clearly disproves.

2. Fourth Amendment reasonableness: “totality,” “no time limit,” and sequential shots

The court divided the shooting into (1) the first shot and (2) the second and third shots, consistent with the district court’s approach. Even though Spencer forfeited any challenge to the first shot, the court analyzed it because Barnes v. Felix allows earlier circumstances to inform what a reasonable officer would perceive later.

First shot: The court emphasized (i) Selby’s visible chest wound and bleeding (suggesting recent conflict), (ii) noncompliance with commands to drop the knife, and (iii) rapid movement down the steps toward the deputies. Relying on Hensley (movement after commands heightens suspicion), Rambert (noncompliant charging can be seen as imminent threat), and Sigman (knife + advance + noncompliance supports deadly force), the court concluded a reasonable officer had probable cause to believe Selby posed a threat of serious physical harm.

Second and third shots: The central pleaded dispute was whether Selby “did not lunge” and was merely trying to flee. The video “clearly show[ed]” Selby lunged toward Deputy Glaser. Combined with the fact that moments earlier Selby had advanced with a knife, the court held it was objectively reasonable to view Selby’s renewed movement as continuing aggression and a continuing threat. Rambert supplied the key logic: if a suspect rises and moves toward an officer after being shot, a reasonable officer may believe the threat persists and that prior shots did not abate it.

3. Rejecting “unarmed” and “escape” narratives at the pleading stage

The plaintiff argued Selby was unarmed when the second and third shots were fired. The court answered with two strands of precedent:

Officers “need not see” a weapon to reasonably perceive danger (Stanton v. Elliott; Caraway v. City of Pineville).
Officers are not required to “confirm” a suspect is unarmed when facing split-second danger (McLenagan v. Karnes), especially where the suspect might have another weapon or might attempt to seize the officer’s gun (Rambert).

The plaintiff also argued Selby was “attempting to escape.” The court treated this as an intent-based reframing that did not fit the objective reasonableness inquiry (Melgar ex rel. Melgar v. Greene), especially in light of video showing a lunge toward the officer.

4. Qualified immunity: bypassed because no plausible constitutional violation

The district court addressed qualified immunity’s “clearly established” prong, but the Fourth Circuit did not reach it. Applying the two-step framework described in Rambert v. City of Greenville (and linked cases such as Robles v. Prince George's Cnty.), the panel “start[ed] and end[ed]” with the first prong: no plausible Fourth Amendment violation was alleged.

5. State-law claims: decided through the plaintiff’s “a fortiori” framing

For North Carolina assault and battery and wrongful death, the court did not conduct a fully independent, element-by-element analysis because Spencer’s appellate theory did not meaningfully differentiate the state claims from the federal excessive-force theory. She argued only that if the Fourth Amendment claim survives, then the tort claims necessarily do as well. Once the Fourth Amendment claim failed, the court rejected the state claims on that same “hinged” theory.

As to the sheriff (official capacity), the complaint relied on respondeat superior/imputation of Deputy Glaser’s allegedly tortious conduct. The court reasoned that if Deputy Glaser’s use of force did not violate North Carolina law, there was no wrongful act to impute (citing Turner v. City of Greenville and Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill).

C. Impact

1. Pleading-stage litigation strategy in police video cases

Spencer strengthens a practical rule: where body-camera footage is integral and authentic, it can defeat not just pleaded facts, but also plaintiff-friendly inferences that would otherwise support plausibility. This will likely:

Encourage defendants to move to dismiss earlier when video exists, focusing on a small number of decisive, clearly depicted contradictions.
Encourage plaintiffs to plead with greater specificity about what the video shows, and to avoid characterizing movements in ways that the video can readily falsify (e.g., “arms raised above his head” implying surrender).
Push district courts to articulate carefully which specific allegations are “utterly discredited” and to avoid using video to resolve ambiguous or not-clearly-depicted factual propositions (the panel’s critique of the “uneven terrain” finding is a cautionary example).

2. Deadly-force doctrine: renewed emphasis on sequence and persistence of threat

On the merits, Spencer reinforces a line of Fourth Circuit authority (Rambert, Sigman) treating noncompliance, rapid approach, and renewed movement toward an officer as powerful threat indicators— especially when events unfold within seconds. The opinion also operationalizes Barnes v. Felix by expressly using earlier moments (knife possession and advance) to inform the reasonableness of later shots (lunge after being shot).

3. An unresolved doctrinal fault line: supplementation vs. contradiction

By noting Doriety and Harrold v. Hagen in tension, the court highlighted an issue likely to recur: may courts use video to add “gap-filling” facts not alleged in the complaint, even if not contradictory? Spencer avoids deciding this; future cases may need to resolve whether “integral video” can operate like an “incorporated document” for completeness or only as a contradiction tool. Until then, Spencer suggests the safest approach is narrow: use video as a scalpel, not a sword.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss: A procedural request to dismiss a complaint for failing to allege enough facts to make a legal claim “plausible.” Courts generally assume the complaint’s facts are true at this stage.
“Integral” document/video: Material so central to the complaint that the claim effectively depends on it. If integral and authentic, it may sometimes be considered without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.
“Blatantly contradicts”: A high standard from Fourth Circuit precedent: the video must “clearly depict” the contrary facts and “utterly discredit” the plaintiff’s allegation (or inference). If it does, the contradicted allegation is treated as implausible.
Objective reasonableness (Fourth Amendment): The legal test for police force: what a reasonable officer would do under the circumstances, without considering the officer’s subjective intent and without using hindsight.
Probable cause of threat in deadly-force cases: In this context, it means sufficient basis for a reasonable officer to believe the suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others.
Qualified immunity: A doctrine protecting officers from suit unless (1) they violated the Constitution and (2) the violated right was “clearly established.” If no constitutional violation is plausibly alleged, courts can stop at step one.
Public official immunity (North Carolina): A state doctrine shielding public officials from personal liability unless they acted outside authority, with malice, or corruptly.
Respondeat superior / official-capacity liability (as used here): A theory that an employer or office (here, the sheriff in official capacity) can be liable for an employee’s torts. If the deputy’s conduct is not tortious, there is nothing to impute.

V. Conclusion

Legacy Spencer v. Edward Glaser, III affirms dismissal of a deadly-force case at the pleading stage by applying a tightly constrained rule for body-camera footage: courts may use video on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only where it blatantly contradicts the complaint—including where it defeats a plaintiff-favorable inference (such as an inference of compliance or surrender). Substantively, the decision reinforces that noncompliance, rapid approach, and renewed movement toward an officer—especially within seconds and against the backdrop of an earlier armed advance—can make deadly force objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The opinion also signals an open doctrinal question about whether video may “supplement” unpleaded facts, teeing up a likely future clarification in the Fourth Circuit.