Rule 11 Sanctions for Frivolous Civil Conspiracy Pleadings and No Recusal Based on Sanctions/Trial Frustration (11th Cir.)

Introduction

In Kenneth Carey v. Jonathan Kirk (consolidated Nos. 25-10866 and 25-11748), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed two clusters of post-trial rulings from the Southern District of Florida: (1) the imposition of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel (but not the plaintiffs) arising from an asserted “marketing plan” civil conspiracy theory; and (2) the denial of a late-filed motion to recuse the district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

The underlying dispute began as a commercial-performance conflict: plaintiffs (music event planners) contracted with defendant Jonathan Kirk (a/k/a “DaBaby”) for a January 2020 appearance and promotion. A payment altercation occurred shortly before the event, leading to a multi-claim lawsuit, including a sweeping conspiracy allegation that defendants profited from orchestrated violence for publicity.

The central appellate issues were whether the district court abused its discretion by finding the conspiracy claim sanctionably frivolous—especially in light of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine—and whether sanctions and in-trial judicial frustration required recusal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions on counsel because counsel failed to supply admissible facts or viable law supporting the civil conspiracy allegations and advanced a conspiracy theory barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The court also affirmed denial of recusal, concluding that neither the sanctions order nor the cited trial remarks would cause an objective observer to doubt the judge’s impartiality.

The court additionally treated any challenge to the amount of attorney’s fees as abandoned due to perfunctory briefing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc., 34 F.4th 935 (11th Cir. 2022)
  • Used for the standard of review (abuse of discretion) and for Rule 11’s “reasonable inquiry” duty and the two-part framework: (1) objective frivolousness and (2) whether the signer should have known.
  • Also supplies the definition that a legal claim is frivolous when it has “no reasonable chance of succeeding,” and a factual claim is frivolous when it has “no reasonable factual basis.”
• Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2010)
  • Frames what constitutes abuse of discretion: incorrect legal standard, improper procedure, or clearly erroneous findings.
• Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 1996)
  • Enumerates circumstances supporting Rule 11 sanctions, including pleadings with no reasonable factual basis or no viable legal theory.
• McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2000)
  • Provides the controlling articulation of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine: a corporation cannot conspire with its employees, and employees acting within the scope of employment cannot conspire among themselves.
  • The panel applied this principle to counsel’s theory that Kirk and his solely owned company (BDBE) “conspired,” concluding that Kirk—“as the sole employee”—cannot conspire with himself.
• Mancinelli v. Davis, 217 So. 3d 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)
  • Mentioned for the “personal stake” exception argument raised for the first time on appeal. The panel found the exception unsupported by facts and therefore still frivolous under Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc..
• Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014)
  • Supplies the abandonment doctrine: perfunctory, unsupported briefing abandons an issue on appeal. The panel applied it to counsel’s undeveloped objections to the fee award.
• Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
  • Provides abuse-of-discretion review for recusal denials and the “extrajudicial source/personal bias” limitation for § 455(a) disqualification.
• Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988)
  • Sets the objective-observer test: whether a fully informed, disinterested lay observer would harbor “a significant doubt” about impartiality.
• Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)
  • Central to rejecting recusal: adverse rulings “almost never” establish bias, and ordinary courtroom frustration (“impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger”) is not disqualifying absent “deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism.”
• Carey v. Kirk, No. 23-10308, 2024 WL 3200475 (11th Cir. June 27, 2024) (per curiam)
  • Not a substantive driver of the sanctions analysis, but supplies procedural posture: the merits appeal had been affirmed before the district court entered the sanctions award.

Legal Reasoning

1) Why Rule 11 sanctions were upheld

The panel applied the settled Rule 11 framework drawn from Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc. and Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal: attorneys must investigate facts and law before filing; sanctions are appropriate for pleadings lacking a reasonable factual basis or a viable legal theory.

Two failures were decisive:

1. No competent factual support for the conspiracy narrative. The opinion emphasizes that on appeal counsel offered no record-based, admissible evidence supporting the alleged “marketing plan and scheme/show.” Instead, counsel relied on inadmissible character-type material (the opinion references Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)), unrelated criminal cases, and speculation—none of which supplies a “reasonable factual basis” for a civil conspiracy theory in this record.
2. A legally foreclosed conspiracy theory under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Counsel argued Kirk conspired with BDBE, but the panel applied McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp. to hold that a sole owner/employee and his company cannot form the plurality of actors required for a conspiracy when acting in that unified corporate capacity. The court also noted counsel offered no “reasonable” argument to change the doctrine.

The panel further rejected a newly raised appellate fallback—the “personal stake” exception—because, even assuming the exception’s availability under Mancinelli v. Davis, counsel supplied no facts to support it, leaving the claim with “no chance of succeeding” under Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc..

2) Why the fee-amount challenge failed (abandonment)

The court treated any challenge to the fee award’s amount as abandoned under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., because counsel made only conclusory assertions (“extraordinarily harsh,” “improper”) without developed argument or authority. Notably, the panel declined to afford leniency on briefing standards because counsel was “a barred Florida attorney,” not a typical pro se litigant.

3) Why recusal was properly denied

Applying 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) through Parker v. Connors Steel Co. and Loranger v. Stierheim, the panel asked whether a fully informed objective observer would harbor a significant doubt about impartiality, with emphasis that disqualifying bias must be personal/extrajudicial.

The panel then applied Liteky v. United States in two steps:

• The sanctions order, as an adverse ruling, “almost never” supports recusal; here it was “replete with well-reasoned arguments” and record-based examples of counsel’s deficiencies.
• The cited trial comments reflected frustration at most—falling within Liteky’s category of non-disqualifying impatience/annoyance and not demonstrating “deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism.”

Impact

• Heightened practical risk for conspiracy pleadings against integrated corporate actors. The decision underscores that conspiracy allegations must grapple with the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine; failing to do so can convert a weak theory into a sanctionable one—particularly where the alleged conspirators include a person and his wholly controlled entity.
• Rule 11 as the primary remedial tool where § 1927 is also sought. Although the district court denied § 1927 sanctions on the ground that Rule 11 already “redressed” the harm, the appellate affirmance signals that Rule 11 alone can justify substantial fee shifting when a discrete claim is found frivolous and counsel persists without evidentiary support.
• Appellate briefing discipline in sanctions appeals. The explicit application of Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. to a fee challenge illustrates that sanctions appellants must separately and fully brief entitlement and amount; conclusory objections risk total forfeiture.
• Recusal remains difficult to obtain based on courtroom management and adverse rulings. By anchoring its reasoning in Liteky v. United States, the panel reiterates a high threshold: frustration and sharp comments typically do not create an appearance of partiality absent extrajudicial bias or extreme antagonism.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11 (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11)

A rule requiring attorneys to investigate facts and law before filing. If a claim lacks a reasonable basis, the court may order sanctions—often including attorney’s fees—aimed at deterrence.

Objectively frivolous

Not merely “unlikely,” but lacking a reasonable chance of success (legal) or a reasonable factual foundation (factual).

Intracorporate conspiracy doctrine

A principle that a corporation and its employees (acting within their roles) are treated as a single actor, so they generally cannot “conspire” with each other in the way conspiracy law requires (which presupposes multiple independent actors).

Personal stake exception

A narrow concept (invoked here via Mancinelli v. Davis) suggesting an agent might be treated as separate from the principal if the agent has a distinct personal interest. The Eleventh Circuit rejected its application in this case due to lack of supporting facts.

28 U.S.C. § 455(a) recusal

A judge must step aside when impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The test is objective and typically requires more than adverse rulings or ordinary judicial irritation.

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)

A rule generally barring evidence of other acts solely to show a person’s propensity or character. The panel noted counsel’s reliance on such material as part of why the conspiracy “support” was inadequate.

Issue abandonment on appeal

Under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., a party can lose an issue by failing to develop it with argument and authority, even if the issue is mentioned.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision reinforces two practical rules: (1) civil conspiracy allegations must be grounded in admissible facts and viable law—especially where the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine collapses alleged conspirators into a single actor—otherwise Rule 11 sanctions may be affirmed; and (2) recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) is not triggered by sanctions or routine expressions of courtroom frustration absent extrajudicial bias or extreme antagonism under Liteky v. United States.