Rule 11 Sanctions for Frivolous Civil Conspiracy Allegations Barred by the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine; Late Recusal Denied Absent Extrajudicial Bias

Case: Kenneth Carey v. Jonathan Kirk (11th Cir. Mar. 26, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished; Non-Argument Calendar)
Appeals: No. 25-10866 & No. 25-11748 (consolidated)
Key holdings: Affirmance of Rule 11 sanctions against counsel for frivolous civil conspiracy claims; affirmance of denial of recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

1. Introduction

This consolidated Eleventh Circuit decision arises from a high-profile dispute between music event planners Kenneth Carey and Steve Anyadike (plaintiffs/appellants) and rap artist Jonathan Kirk (a.k.a. “DaBaby”) and related entities (defendants/appellees), including Universal Music Group, Inc. and Interscope Records. The underlying litigation stemmed from a January 2020 performance contract and an hours-before-the-event altercation at a hotel over payment.

The appeal did not revisit the merits of the contract/tort claims tried to a jury. Instead, it focused on post-merits enforcement mechanisms: (i) whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel for pursuing civil conspiracy allegations; and (ii) whether the district judge should have been recused under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) based on asserted partiality, raised more than two years after trial.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board.

  • Rule 11 sanctions affirmed. The court held the district court acted within its discretion in sanctioning plaintiffs’ counsel because the civil conspiracy allegations were objectively frivolous and counsel should have known so. The opinion underscores two independent defects: a lack of admissible factual support and a fatal legal barrier—application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine where Kirk and his solely owned company could not conspire as a matter of law.
  • Fee-amount challenge treated as abandoned. To the extent counsel attempted to contest the amount of fees, the court found the issue inadequately briefed and therefore abandoned on appeal.
  • Recusal denial affirmed. The court held that adverse rulings (including sanctions) and ordinary courtroom irritation do not establish personal, extrajudicial bias, and an objective observer would not reasonably question the judge’s impartiality on this record.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Rule 11 standard and appellate review framework

  • Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc., 34 F.4th 935 (11th Cir. 2022)
    The opinion uses Gulisano as the primary modern statement of Rule 11’s “affirmative duty” of reasonable pre-filing inquiry and its two-part test: (1) objective frivolity and (2) whether the signer should have known. The panel leans on Gulisano both to define “frivolous” (no reasonable chance of success / no reasonable factual basis) and to justify deference to the district court’s sanctions determination.
  • Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2010)
    Peer supplies the abuse-of-discretion yardstick: a district court errs if it applies the wrong legal standard, uses improper procedures, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings. The panel’s affirmance is explicitly framed as a finding that none of those error types occurred.
  • Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 1996)
    This case provides the Eleventh Circuit’s canonical list of three sanctionable circumstances (no reasonable factual basis; no reasonable legal chance of success; or bad faith/improper purpose). The panel uses it to situate the district court’s finding in the “no reasonable factual basis / no reasonable chance of success” lanes rather than requiring an express finding of subjective bad faith.

B. The dispositive substantive law barrier: intracorporate conspiracy

  • McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2000)
    The panel applies McAndrew to reject counsel’s theory that Kirk could conspire with BDBE, a company he solely owns. Quoting McAndrew, it reiterates the core rule: a corporation cannot conspire with its employees acting within the scope of employment, and employees cannot conspire among themselves. The opinion’s practical punch is that counsel’s conspiracy pleading was not merely weak—it was structurally foreclosed absent a plausible exception or a materially different set of actors.
  • Mancinelli v. Davis, 217 So. 3d 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)
    Invoked in a footnote, Mancinelli is used to describe the “personal stake” exception—where an agent has a personal stake separate from the principal’s interest. The panel rejects counsel’s late attempt to rely on that exception because it was raised for the first time on appeal and, critically, was unsupported by facts that would make the exception plausibly applicable.

C. Appellate briefing consequences: abandonment

  • Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014)
    The panel uses Sapuppo to hold that a perfunctory, unsupported challenge to the fee award is abandoned. This matters because it narrows the appeal: even if the fee total ($984,451) was practically significant, the court would not engage the issue without developed argument and authority.

D. Recusal standards: objective observer, extrajudicial bias, and “judicial rulings almost never” suffice

  • Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 1994)
    Loranger supplies both the standard of review (abuse of discretion) and the principle that § 455(a) disqualification generally requires personal bias stemming from an extra-judicial source.
  • Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988)
    The panel applies Parker’s “objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts” test and concludes that such an observer would not harbor a “significant doubt” about impartiality based on the cited trial comments and sanctions ruling.
  • Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)
    Liteky is the Supreme Court anchor: adverse rulings “almost never” establish bias; in-court impatience/annoyance generally does not require recusal absent “deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism.” The panel uses Liteky to classify the judge’s remarks as, at most, permissible frustration rather than disqualifying animus.

E. Related proceedings referenced

  • Carey v. Kirk, No. 23- 10308, 2024 WL 3200475 (11th Cir. June 27, 2024)
    Referenced to note the merits appeal had already been affirmed, contextualizing why sanctions were addressed after the main dispute was resolved.
  • Carey v. Kirk, No. 21-20408-CIV, 2025 WL 850256 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2025)
    The district court order is described as “well-reasoned” and is relied upon for its detailed finding that counsel should have known the conspiracy claims were frivolous.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why the conspiracy claim triggered Rule 11

The panel’s reasoning is straightforward: Rule 11 requires reasonable investigation of both law and fact before filing. Here, the civil conspiracy theory failed both.

  • Factual deficiency: The opinion faults counsel’s reliance on inadmissible propensity-type material (referencing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)), unrelated high-profile criminal cases, and speculation. The panel emphasizes the district court gave “ample time” to investigate and produce relevant facts—yet counsel did not. That failure supported the finding that the claim had “no reasonable factual basis.”
  • Legal impossibility (as pleaded): Even if facts had been stronger, the specific alleged conspiracy between Kirk and a solely owned company ran into the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as stated in McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp. Without a plausibly supported exception, the legal theory had “no reasonable chance of succeeding.”

B. Late-raised “personal stake” exception did not save the claim

The panel addresses counsel’s new appellate argument that the “personal stake” exception (as described in Mancinelli v. Davis) applied. It rejects the attempt on pragmatic Rule 11 grounds: even assuming the exception exists in the relevant doctrinal space, counsel offered “no factual support” for a separate personal stake apart from the principal’s interests. A purely conceptual exception, without pleaded/proved facts to invoke it, does not rehabilitate a frivolous filing.

C. Abandonment limited appellate review of the fee amount

Notably, the opinion treats any challenge to the attorney’s fee amount as abandoned under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. The court’s emphasis that counsel was a barred Florida attorney (not a lay pro se party) signals a stricter expectation of professional-grade appellate briefing, especially when attacking a substantial fee award.

D. Recusal: sanctions + sharp remarks ≠ disqualifying bias

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the question is public confidence: would an informed lay observer reasonably question impartiality? The panel’s application is orthodox:

  • Sanctions order as “adverse ruling”: Under Liteky v. United States, adverse rulings alone almost never show bias. The panel reinforces this by pointing out the sanctions order was “replete with well-reasoned arguments and specific examples,” i.e., grounded in litigation conduct, not personal animus.
  • Trial comments as ordinary courtroom management: The cited remarks were categorized as impatience/annoyance rather than “deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism.” The opinion also stresses context: frustration may be evident, but frustration is not bias.
  • No extrajudicial source: Following Loranger v. Stierheim, the panel found no extra-judicial source of bias.

3.3. Impact

A. Practical reinforcement of Rule 11 discipline in “narrative-heavy” conspiracy pleading

The decision warns against pleading sensational conspiracy narratives untethered to admissible, case-specific facts—particularly where counsel attempts to import notoriety or other incidents as substitutes for proof. In cases involving public figures, the temptation to plead expansive “scheme” allegations can be high; the opinion signals that courts in the Eleventh Circuit will treat such pleadings as sanctionable when not supported by concrete facts and viable legal theory.

B. Intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as an early gatekeeper

The opinion underscores how the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine can make certain conspiracy configurations legally nonstarters—especially allegations that an individual conspired with his wholly owned entity absent well-supported exceptions. Future litigants should expect heightened scrutiny where the alleged “agreement” is functionally internal to a single actor.

C. Appellate briefing rigor—especially for attorneys

The abandonment holding under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. has concrete consequences: substantial fee awards may become practically unreviewable if not challenged with specific factual record citations, legal standards, and developed argument. The opinion signals little patience for cursory assertions that a sanction is “harsh” or “does not make sense.”

D. Recusal motions: timing and evidentiary quality matter

Although the panel did not rest its decision on timeliness, the posture—recusal sought more than two years after trial—illustrates the uphill nature of late recusal efforts. Substantively, the opinion reinforces that litigants must show something more than unfavorable rulings and judicial irritation; without extrajudicial bias or extraordinary in-court antagonism, § 455(a) relief is unlikely.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 11 sanctions (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11): A penalty the court may impose when a lawyer files papers without doing a reasonable investigation of the facts or the law, or files claims that are objectively baseless.
  • Objectively frivolous: A claim is frivolous if it has no reasonable chance of success (legal defect) or no reasonable factual basis (evidence defect).
  • Intracorporate conspiracy doctrine: The rule that a company and its employees (acting within the scope of their roles) are treated as a single actor for conspiracy purposes; “you can’t conspire with yourself.” The opinion applies this to a sole owner and his company.
  • Personal stake exception: A potential carve-out where an agent is pursuing a personal interest separate from the company’s interest—but it must be supported by concrete facts, not asserted as a label.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) recusal: A judge must step aside if an informed reasonable person would doubt the judge’s impartiality.
  • Extrajudicial bias: Bias coming from outside the courtroom proceedings (personal knowledge, relationships, outside events), as opposed to opinions formed from managing the case.
  • Abandonment on appeal: If an appellant does not adequately brief an issue with supporting argument and authority, the appellate court treats it as waived/abandoned and will not decide it.

5. Conclusion

Kenneth Carey v. Jonathan Kirk is best read as a procedural accountability decision. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed severe Rule 11 consequences where counsel pursued a civil conspiracy theory lacking admissible factual support and running into a clear doctrinal bar under McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp.. The opinion simultaneously reinforces that recusal requires a showing of bias beyond adverse rulings and courtroom frustration, consistent with Liteky v. United States, Parker v. Connors Steel Co., and Loranger v. Stierheim. For practitioners, the message is concrete: investigate, plead with evidentiary grounding, account for doctrinal blockers like intracorporate conspiracy, and brief appellate issues with precision— or risk both sanctions and forfeiture of meaningful review.

Note: The opinion is marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION.” While unpublished, it still provides a clear window into the Eleventh Circuit’s application of established Rule 11 and recusal standards to conspiracy pleading and post-trial motion practice.