Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Bargained Sentences and Anders Appeals: Limited § 3742 Review and Enforceable Appeal Waivers
Nonprecedential posture. The panel expressly states the Order and Judgment is “not binding precedent” (except under law-of-the-case/res judicata/collateral estoppel), though it may be cited for persuasive value.
1. Introduction
United States v. Bailey arises from a string of armed robberies committed in Albuquerque, New Mexico, between July and September 2023.
A federal grand jury ultimately charged Demetrius Antonnie Bailey in a second superseding indictment with ten counts, including Hobbs Act robbery-related
offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, a firearm count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and felon-in-possession under
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924.
Bailey entered a guilty plea to all counts pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) agreement recommending a specific sentencing range:
10 to 22 years’ imprisonment. The district court imposed 264 months (22 years) plus five years of supervised release, and ordered restitution calculated
using wholesale values after the parties addressed an initial dispute.
On appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting there were no non-frivolous grounds to challenge the conviction or sentence.
Bailey did not file a pro se response, and the Government declined to respond.
The key issues became (i) the scope of appellate review for a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742,
(ii) whether any legal or Guidelines error appeared in the record, and (iii) whether Bailey’s appeal waiver independently foreclosed the appeal.
2. Summary of the Opinion
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California.
After conducting a de novo review of the record, the court concluded there were no viable appellate issues because:
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Under
18 U.S.C. § 3742(c)(1), appellate review of a sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement is limited where the sentence
does not exceed the agreed sentence; the remaining review is confined to whether the sentence was “imposed in violation of law” or resulted from an
“incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.”
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The sentence was not “imposed in violation of law” because Bailey “bargained for it,” relying on United States v. Armendariz-Reza.
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The Guidelines were correctly applied on this record; restitution was adjusted to wholesale values by agreement, and nothing suggested a miscalculation.
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As an alternative basis, the record indicated the appeal waiver in the plea agreement was enforceable under United States v. Hahn,
and the court stated a motion to enforce would be granted.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
Anders supplies the procedural framework when appointed counsel concludes an appeal is “wholly frivolous.”
Counsel must submit a brief “referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal,” and the court must independently review the
proceedings. In Bailey, the panel applied this template: counsel flagged sentencing reasonableness/procedure as the only conceivable category,
and the court independently reviewed the entire record before dismissing.
United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005).
The panel cited Calderon for the Tenth Circuit’s description of what an Anders filing represents—counsel’s conscientious examination
and conclusion that the appeal lacks any non-frivolous grounds. This reinforces that dismissal follows only after judicial, not merely attorney, scrutiny.
United States v. Kurtz, 819 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2016).
The court relied on Kurtz for the standard of review: when an Anders brief is filed, the appellate court reviews the record de novo.
In practice, this de novo examination is the safeguard against overlooking a colorable issue (e.g., an unlawful sentence, an incorrect Guidelines
computation, or an involuntary plea).
United States v. Armendariz-Reza, 502 F. App'x 810, 812 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
This unpublished decision is used for a recurring proposition in the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) context: where the defendant receives the agreed sentence, it is
ordinarily not “imposed in violation of law” because the defendant “bargained for it.”
In Bailey, that principle narrowed the already limited appellate lane under § 3742.
United States v. Ballard, 713 F. App'x 748, 750 n.3 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished).
Ballard is cited for a technical but important statutory interpretation point: 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c)(1) refers to “rule 11(e)(1)(C),”
which was renumbered to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) without substantive change. This clarifies that the statutory limitation on appellate review applies fully to
modern 11(c)(1)(C) pleas.
United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam).
Hahn provides the canonical Tenth Circuit test for enforcing appellate waivers:
(1) the appeal falls within the waiver’s scope, (2) the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and (3) enforcement does not result in a miscarriage of justice.
The Bailey panel applied these factors to the plea agreement language waiving appeal of the convictions and “any sentence imposed in conformity with”
the agreement (including the manner of determination).
United States v Gonzalez, 62 F.4th 954, 958-59 (5th Cir. 2023).
In a footnote, the panel referenced Gonzalez to note a circuit split on whether a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreed sentence can be challenged as
procedurally/substantively unreasonable (and thus “imposed in violation of law” under § 3742(a)(1)).
The panel did not resolve that question for the Tenth Circuit because, even assuming such a challenge were available, nothing in this record suggested
procedural or substantive unreasonableness—particularly given the sentence was below the advisory career-offender range yet within the bargained range.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
The decision is best understood as a three-layer screen that collectively rendered the appeal frivolous under Anders:
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Statutory limits on appellate sentencing review for Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas.
The court started with jurisdiction and the governing review statute:
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
Because Bailey’s sentence did not exceed the 11(c)(1)(C) cap, § 3742(c)(1) restricted the appeal to claims that the sentence was
“imposed in violation of law” or due to “incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.”
This framing forecloses broad “reasonableness” review that typically accompanies open pleas or non-binding recommendations.
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No “violation of law” where the defendant received the bargained sentence.
Relying on Armendariz-Reza, the panel treated the negotiated 264-month sentence as presumptively lawful in the relevant sense:
Bailey asked for, and obtained, a sentence within the negotiated range, and the district court imposed it after accepting the plea.
The opinion also emphasized that—even under the footnoted circuit-split approach—nothing indicated procedural error (e.g., miscalculation, failure to
consider the statutory factors, or reliance on clearly erroneous facts) or substantive excessiveness.
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No Guidelines misapplication shown; restitution issue was cured.
The only concrete sentencing-related dispute reflected in the opinion involved restitution valuation.
The Government conceded the appropriate figure absent retailer information, and the district court ordered restitution based on wholesale price by agreement.
On the Guidelines, the district court adopted the PSR’s calculations, including career-offender status and an advisory range higher than the imposed
264 months; the panel found no sign of computational error.
Finally, the court identified an additional, independent barrier: the plea agreement’s appellate waiver.
Although the Government did not file a response or move to enforce, the panel concluded the Hahn conditions were satisfied on the record and stated
such a motion “would be granted.” In effect, the opinion signals that even if a colorable appellate issue had existed, the waiver would likely have
extinguished it absent a miscarriage-of-justice showing.
3.3 Impact
While nonprecedential, Bailey is a clear, practitioner-facing illustration of how multiple doctrines converge to limit appellate litigation after a
Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea:
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Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas materially narrow sentencing appellate review.
The opinion underscores that defendants who secure a negotiated range and receive a sentence within it have little room to appeal under
§ 3742,
absent illegality (e.g., statutory maximum issues, constitutionally invalid predicates) or demonstrable Guidelines misapplication.
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Anders practice in negotiated-sentence cases is streamlined.
Where the record shows a properly conducted plea colloquy, a sentence within the agreed disposition, and no evident computational error, the Tenth Circuit
is likely to deem an appeal frivolous after de novo review.
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Appeal waivers remain potent—even as “alternative grounds.”
By walking through Hahn and concluding enforceability, the panel signals that waivers are not merely boilerplate; they are a substantive,
often decisive, limitation on appellate options.
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Restitution valuation disputes may be “non-issues” once corrected.
The opinion highlights that when the parties and court adjust restitution (here, to wholesale value) and the record reflects the correction, it becomes
difficult to craft a non-frivolous appellate challenge.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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Anders brief: A filing by appointed counsel stating that, after careful review, there are no arguable appellate issues. The appellate court
must independently review the record before allowing counsel to withdraw and dismissing.
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Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement: A plea deal in which the parties agree to a specific sentence (or range). If the judge accepts the plea,
the judge is generally bound to impose the agreed disposition.
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18 U.S.C. § 3742(c)(1) limitation: When the court imposes a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence that does not exceed the agreed sentence,
appellate review is restricted—generally to illegality or Guidelines misapplication.
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Career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A Guidelines status that substantially increases the advisory sentencing range when the defendant has
qualifying prior convictions and the instant offense meets criteria. Here, it yielded an advisory range (292–365 months) above the bargained sentence cap.
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Appeal waiver: A plea-agreement term where the defendant gives up the right to appeal (often with limited exceptions). Under Hahn,
courts enforce such waivers if they cover the appeal, were entered knowingly and voluntarily, and enforcement is not fundamentally unjust.
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Wholesale vs. retail restitution valuation: Restitution aims to compensate the victim’s loss. When the record supports wholesale cost as
the proper measure (or the parties agree to it), a retail-based figure may be adjusted downward to reflect actual loss rather than consumer price.
5. Conclusion
United States v. Bailey dismisses an appeal under Anders after the Tenth Circuit’s de novo review found no non-frivolous issue where
(i) the defendant received a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence within the agreed range, (ii) no Guidelines misapplication or legal error appeared in the record,
(iii) restitution was resolved on an agreed wholesale-value basis, and (iv) an appellate waiver satisfied the Hahn enforceability framework.
The decision’s broader significance lies less in doctrinal novelty than in its integrated demonstration of how negotiated sentencing, statutory limits on
review, and appeal waivers together sharply restrict post-plea appellate pathways.