Rule 106 After the 2023 Amendment: Completeness Admits Only What Is Necessary to Cure Misleading Context—Not Duplicative or Standalone Exculpatory Interview Narrative

1. Introduction

United States v. Alexander Alli (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2026) arises from an alleged COVID-19 relief fraud involving the Small Business Administration’s Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) program created and expanded under the CARES Act. Almar Sales and Services, Inc. obtained an $80,500 EIDL loan based on assertedly false application information. A jury convicted Almar’s principal owner, Alexander Alli, of conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349) and two counts of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343).

The appeal presented three principal issues:

  • Evidence (Rule 106): Whether the district court should have admitted additional parts of Alli’s recorded interviews under the “rule of completeness,” especially after the 2023 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 106.
  • Sufficiency: Whether evidence was sufficient to prove Alli knowingly and voluntarily joined a wire-fraud conspiracy.
  • Jury instructions: Whether the district court properly instructed the jury on Pinkerton liability and deliberate ignorance.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all convictions. Chief Judge William Pryor wrote the majority opinion; Judge Tjoflat concurred, sharply disputing the majority’s treatment of the evidentiary question.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held:

  • Rule 106: The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Alli’s requested additional interview excerpts because they were duplicative of what the Government already introduced or unrelated to curing any misleading impression. Rule 106 is not a device to present a defendant’s preferred narrative. The 2023 amendment permitting completeness “over a hearsay objection” did not change the outcome because the court found Rule 106 not satisfied.
  • Sufficiency: Evidence supported the conspiracy conviction: Alli signed loan documents restricting use to pandemic-related working capital, received proceeds, and benefited from the loan; the jury could disbelieve his professed ignorance and treat false exculpatory statements as evidence of guilt.
  • Pinkerton instruction: Proper because sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy and the instruction required the jury to find the conspiracy first.
  • Deliberate-ignorance instruction: Supported by evidence suggesting Alli likely avoided learning the loan’s conditions; in any event, any error was harmless given the actual-knowledge path and accompanying good-faith and “not negligence” language.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Rule 106 / “Completeness” doctrine

  • United States v. Macrina, 109 F.4th 1341 (11th Cir. 2024): The court treated Macrina as its central Eleventh Circuit articulation of Rule 106 limits: completeness does not render an entire recording admissible; the defendant must identify the specific parts sought; and the additional material must be “necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context” what was introduced.
    Alli’s use: The panel relied on Macrina to reject completeness where the Government already introduced similar statements (duplication) or where the defendant sought to add new topics (unrelated narrative).
  • United States v. Simmons, 122 F.4th 1256 (11th Cir. 2024): Cited for the proposition that Rule 106 applies only when there is something actually “to complete.”
    Alli’s use: The panel held Rule 106 did not apply to Special Agent Pierre’s testimony about investigative steps (e.g., truck registrations) because that was not a partial “statement” introduced from a recording needing contextual completion.
  • United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2011): Used to reject completeness requests that are unnecessary because the introduced testimony already covers the same point.
    Alli’s use: The court treated Alli’s proposed “additions” as unnecessary where the jury already heard the “gist” via Government-played excerpts.
  • United States v. Herman, 997 F.3d 251 (5th Cir. 2021): Not binding but persuasive for a limiting principle: Rule 106 corrects misleading impressions; it is not to “affirmatively advance” an alternative theory.
    Alli’s use: The panel adopted this framing to characterize Alli’s request as narrative-building rather than context-correcting.
  • 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW & the Psalm 14:1 illustration (and Algernon Sidney's Trial): These historical references underscored the core completeness concern—preventing a distorted meaning from selective quotation—while reinforcing the narrow corrective purpose.

2) Hearsay and “self-serving” statements; the 2023 amendment interplay

  • United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1985), and United States v. Cunningham, 194 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1999): These cases stand for the traditional rule that a defendant generally cannot introduce his own exculpatory out-of-court statements through another witness’s testimony absent a hearsay exception.
    Alli’s use: Alli argued the 2023 amendment to Rule 106 “abrogated” these precedents; the panel rejected that claim and held Willis and Cunningham remain consistent with amended Rule 106 because the amendment removes the hearsay obstacle only when Rule 106 is actually satisfied.
  • United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited against using post-hoc statements to law enforcement to prove earlier intent under Rule 803(3).
    Alli’s use: The majority used De La Cruz Suarez to reject the concurrence’s suggestion that Rule 803(3) could admit Alli’s later interview statements to prove his mental state at the time of the loan application.

3) Sufficiency of the evidence (conspiracy and wire fraud)

  • United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019): Provided the elements for § 1349 conspiracy and the appellate lens for sufficiency review.
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013): Provided the elements of wire fraud (scheme to defraud + use of wires).
  • Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2005): Reinforced that circumstantial evidence can prove agreement and intent, and the question is whether a rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018), United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312 (11th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Hughes, 840 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2016): Established that disbelieved exculpatory statements can be treated as substantive evidence of guilt, especially for subjective elements like knowledge and intent, including when made pre-trial.
  • United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139 (11th Cir. 1993): Cited for deliberate ignorance as the equivalent of knowledge (as part of the knowledge/intent analysis).

4) Pinkerton liability

  • Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946): The foundational rule of vicarious liability for substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of a conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable.
  • United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018): Provided the Eleventh Circuit’s modern articulation and rejected the same “backwards extrapolation” concern Alli raised.
  • United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2011): Reinforced the presumption juries follow instructions—critical to rejecting the claim that the Pinkerton charge invited improper reasoning.

5) Deliberate ignorance

  • United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991): Set the standard: instruction is proper where evidence supports awareness of a high probability plus purposeful avoidance; improper where evidence shows only actual knowledge.
  • United States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2017): Permitted giving both actual-knowledge and deliberate-ignorance theories when evidence supports both.
  • United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2003): Supported the “insulation” concept: a defendant confronted with suspicious circumstances who fails to inquire may be found deliberately ignorant.
  • United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 1993): Used for harmlessness analysis: where actual knowledge is sufficiently supported, a deliberate-ignorance instruction is unlikely to require reversal.
  • United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2011): Again used to presume the jury followed limiting language (“negligence isn’t enough”) and the good-faith instruction.

6) Standards of review / harmless error

  • United States v. Carthen, 906 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2018), and United States v. Taylor, 480 F.3d 1025 (11th Cir. 2007): Provided review standards for evidentiary rulings and sufficiency.
  • United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005): Used to conclude that even if evidentiary error occurred, it had no “substantial influence” on the outcome.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The central evidentiary rule announced/clarified

The opinion’s most consequential doctrinal clarification is its application of Rule 106 after the December 1, 2023 amendment (which states the adverse party “may do so over a hearsay objection”). The panel’s reasoning yields a practical two-step:

  1. Step 1 (Scope): Determine whether the additional material is actually required “in fairness” to prevent a misleading impression created by the portion introduced.
  2. Step 2 (Hearsay barrier removed only if Step 1 is met): Only if Step 1 is satisfied does amended Rule 106 permit admission “over a hearsay objection.”

Because Alli’s proposed excerpts were duplicative or not tied to correcting a misleading impression, the panel held Rule 106 was not satisfied, and the hearsay-removal aspect of the 2023 amendment never became operative.

2) Duplication and “unrelated narrative” as completeness limits

The court drew a sharp line between: (a) completeness material needed to avoid distortion, and (b) extra material a defendant wants to add to support his own “alternative theory of the case.” Where the Government already introduced excerpts conveying Alli’s claims (e.g., he said Sostre filled out the application; he signed without reading; he didn’t supply the revenue figure), the court treated further additions as unnecessary. Where Alli sought new subjects (e.g., he leased trucks to Brave Freight, lost money, planned to sell trucks to repay), the court treated that as advocacy narrative, not contextual repair.

3) “Nothing to complete”: Rule 106 does not attach to independent investigative testimony

The panel distinguished between playing a snippet of a recording (which could be misleading if truncated) and a witness testifying to investigation results (e.g., inability to find truck registrations). The latter is not a “statement” being partially introduced from a recording, so Rule 106 is inapplicable.

4) Rule 106 and Eleventh Circuit hearsay precedents survive the 2023 amendment

The court rejected the claim that the amendment displaced United States v. Willis and United States v. Cunningham. It characterized the amendment as a clarification about hearsay objections, not an expansion of what “in fairness” must be admitted. Thus, when Rule 106 is not met, the traditional hearsay limitations remain and defendants cannot use cross-examination to introduce self-serving out-of-court statements.

5) The concurrence’s Rule 803(3) theory—and the majority’s rejection

Judge Tjoflat argued Rule 106 should have been irrelevant because Alli’s exculpatory statements were admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) as evidence of then-existing state of mind, supporting a good-faith defense. The majority rejected that view, emphasizing the 803(3) exclusion for “statement[s] of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed,” and concluding post-interview statements to law enforcement could not prove Alli’s earlier intent when the loan was obtained, citing United States v. De La Cruz Suarez.

The split matters: future litigants may press for admission of interview excerpts via 803(3), but Alli signals skepticism toward using later interview explanations as proof of earlier innocence, especially where the statements function as retrospective justification rather than contemporaneous intent.

6) Sufficiency, Pinkerton, and deliberate ignorance: integrated intent analysis

Across sufficiency and instruction issues, the court treated knowledge/intent as provable by: (i) documentary commitments (Alli signed use-restriction loan papers), (ii) benefit from the fraud (receipt of proceeds; nonpayment), (iii) relationship evidence (dating/accountant dynamic undermining “arms-length reliance”), and (iv) credibility inferences (jury could treat false exculpatory claims as evidence of guilt under United States v. Shabazz).

C. Impact

1) Evidence practice in interview-excerpt trials

United States v. Alexander Alli meaningfully constrains defense use of amended Rule 106 in a common prosecutorial pattern: the Government introduces only the defendant’s incriminating admissions from an interview. After Alli, in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Defendants must show the omitted portion is necessary to prevent the played portion from being misleading—not merely helpful to the defense.
  • Additional interview segments that are duplicative of what the jury already heard will not qualify as “necessary.”
  • Segments adding new facts (e.g., post-event explanations) risk being treated as “alternative theory” narrative, not completeness.
  • Counsel must specifically identify the parts sought (reinforced by United States v. Macrina).

2) Continued vitality of Willis/Cunningham post-amendment

The decision is also a precedential reassurance for prosecutors: the 2023 amendment does not, by itself, create an “open door” to a defendant’s exculpatory hearsay if Rule 106 necessity is not established.

3) Instructional practice: deliberate ignorance with good-faith safeguards

On deliberate ignorance, the court’s approach encourages district courts to pair that instruction with: (a) explicit “not negligence” language, and (b) a good-faith instruction, to reduce appellate risk and bolster harmlessness findings (citing United States v. Steed and United States v. Stone).

4) COVID-relief fraud prosecutions

Substantively, Alli fits a broader pattern: EIDL/CARES Act cases often turn on intent, knowledge, and claimed reliance on preparers. The court’s endorsement of inferences from signed certifications, benefit receipt, and disbelieved denials provides a template for sufficiency in similar fraud prosecutions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 106 (rule of completeness): If one side plays only part of a statement/recording in a way that could mislead, the other side can require related parts needed to prevent the distortion. It is not a right to play everything or to add extra favorable details.
  • Hearsay / self-serving statements: A defendant’s own out-of-court statements offered by the defendant to prove they’re true are usually hearsay. The Government can offer the defendant’s statements against him as admissions.
  • 2023 amendment to Rule 106: If completeness truly requires an omitted portion, the court may admit it even if it would otherwise be hearsay. But you still must meet the “in fairness ought to be considered” threshold first.
  • Rule 803(3) (state-of-mind exception): Allows statements showing a person’s then-existing intent/motive/plan, but generally not retrospective explanations offered to prove what happened earlier. The majority treated Alli’s interview explanations as the latter.
  • Pinkerton liability: If you are in a conspiracy, you can be guilty of certain crimes committed by co-conspirators to advance the conspiracy, so long as they were reasonably foreseeable—even if you didn’t personally commit them.
  • Deliberate ignorance (“willful blindness”): The law can treat someone as having “knowledge” if he strongly suspects a fact (e.g., fraud) but purposely avoids confirming it so he can later claim ignorance.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Alexander Alli solidifies a post-2023-amendment Rule 106 framework in the Eleventh Circuit: completeness is a narrow corrective tool, not a mechanism for defendants to introduce broad exculpatory interview narratives, particularly when the proposed additions are duplicative or merely supportive of an alternative defense story. The decision also confirms that United States v. Willis and United States v. Cunningham remain good law when Rule 106 necessity is not met.

Beyond evidence doctrine, the court’s affirmance reinforces familiar fraud-prosecution building blocks—signed certifications, benefit receipt, credibility-based inferences, and the permissible pairing of deliberate-ignorance and good-faith instructions. The concurrence highlights a live evidentiary debate (Rule 803(3) in interview settings), but the majority opinion sets the controlling rule: retrospective law-enforcement interviews generally will not be treated as admissible state-of-mind proof of earlier innocent intent.