Rule: A Rule 65(c) Injunction Bond Does Not Satisfy § 6-6-591(b) Quo Warranto Security—Absent Separate Cost Security, the Circuit Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Case: Moore v. State of Alabama ex rel. Mayor Sims, as informant (Supreme Court of Alabama, Apr. 24, 2026)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a municipal governance dispute in the City of Lipscomb. Mayor Robin Sims, purporting to proceed “on behalf of the State of Alabama,” sought to remove three sitting city-council members—Barbara Moore, Vanessa Reed, and Christine Burrell—on the ground that they allegedly failed to satisfy district-residency requirements under § 11-43-63, Ala. Code 1975. Sims pursued relief styled as (i) an application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and permanent injunction and (ii) a “Complaint for Writ of Quo Warranto” under § 6-6-591, Ala. Code 1975.

The factual backdrop included contested redistricting: the city council rejected a proposed redistricting plan (via Resolution No. 2025-15), yet the August 26, 2025 municipal election was conducted using the proposed map according to the Jefferson County Board of Registrars. The trial court ultimately entered orders removing the council members and declaring their seats vacant.

On appeal, the council members did not primarily litigate the merits of residency or the legality of the map. Instead, they focused on a threshold question: whether the trial court ever acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over the quo warranto action given the statutory requirement that an informant provide “security for the costs of the action” at commencement.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed. It held that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the record showed no security for costs was given to commence the quo warranto action as required by § 6-6-591(b). The $1,500 bond posted for the TRO was not a substitute: it was imposed “in relation to the TRO” under Rule 65(c) and served a different legal function than quo warranto cost security.

Because the absence of § 6-6-591(b) security is a jurisdictional defect, the trial court’s judgment was void. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment, following the remedial approach stated in Douglas v. Griggers, 401 So. 3d 288 (Ala. 2024).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Controlled the Outcome)

A. Quo warranto is strictly statutory; § 6-6-591 supplies exclusive “commencement” paths

The Court anchored its analysis in the statutory structure of § 6-6-591 and reiterated the exclusivity principle:

This framing mattered because Sims proceeded as an informant (not under a judge’s direction). That choice triggered the security-for-costs condition as a prerequisite to the court’s power to hear the case.

B. Security for costs is jurisdictional in quo warranto

A line of Alabama cases treats § 6-6-591(b) security as a condition precedent to jurisdiction, not a waivable procedural step. The Court relied heavily on:

• Burkes v. Franklin, 370 So. 3d 235 (Ala. 2022): Explicitly states the “absence of such security deprives the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a quo warranto action,” synthesizing earlier precedents.
• Riley v. Hughes, 17 So. 3d 643 (Ala. 2009): Reaffirms that the absence of security is a “jurisdictional defect” and quotes the maxim that without security the relator “usurps the authority of the State.”
• Brannan v. Smith, 784 So. 2d 293 (Ala. 2000): Collects older authorities and reiterates the “condition precedent” nature of security for costs.
• State ex rel. Radcliff v. Lauten, 256 Ala. 559, 56 So. 2d 106 (1952): States security “must be given before the commencement of the suit” and is “a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the court.”
• Wenzel v. State ex rel. Powell, 241 Ala. 406, 3 So. 2d 26 (1941): Treats failure to give security as “jurisdictional and fatal.”
• Birmingham Bar Ass'n v. Phillips & Marsh, 239 Ala. 650, 196 So. 725 (1940): Supplies the oft-quoted concept that without security the relator “usurps the authority of the State.”
• Evans v. State ex rel. Sanford, 215 Ala. 61, 109 So. 357 (1926): Early statement that failure to give security “at the institution” of quo warranto is “fatal.”

Collectively, these cases made the dispositive point straightforward: if the record does not show § 6-6-591(b) security for costs, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and any resulting judgment is void.

C. Injunction-bond jurisprudence confirms a separate doctrinal track

The Court contrasted quo warranto cost security with Rule 65(c) injunction security. It explained the injunction bond rule through:

• City of Gadsden v. Boman, 143 So. 3d 695 (Ala. 2013): discusses Rule 65(c) and mandatory security absent specified exceptions.
• Spinks v. Automation Pers. Servs., Inc., 49 So. 3d 186 (Ala. 2010): emphasizes that Rule 65(c) security is mandatory unless the trial court makes a specific finding that an exception applies.
• Anders v. Fowler, 423 So. 2d 838 (Ala. 1982) and Lightsey v. Kensington Mortg. & Fin. Corp., 294 Ala. 281, 315 So. 2d 431 (1975): sources for recognized exceptions and the “mandatory” nature of the rule.
• Milton v. Haywood, 393 So. 3d 1156 (Ala. 2023): referenced regarding exceptions to the injunction security requirement.

These authorities supported the Court’s key analytical distinction: even if both contexts use the word “security,” Rule 65(c) security exists to protect a party against wrongful restraint; § 6-6-591(b) security is the gateway that authorizes a private informant to litigate in the State’s name.

D. Record-on-appeal boundaries (secondary but instructive)

While not central to the holding, the opinion also reiterated limits on appellate consideration of extra-record materials:

• Etherton v. City of Homewood, 700 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1997)
• Roberts v. NASCO Equip. Co., 986 So. 2d 379 (Ala. 2007)
• Ex parte Ruggs, 10 So. 3d 7 (Ala. 2008)

This mattered because Sims pointed to a filing-fee receipt attached to a response in the appellate court. The Court declined to decide filing-fee issues, and decided the appeal on the absence of quo warranto security.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The statutory condition: “giving security for the costs of the action”

Because Sims proceeded as an informant, § 6-6-591(b) required him to give “security for the costs of the action, to be approved by the clerk of the court in which the action is brought.” The Court treated this as a hard jurisdictional prerequisite—not a pleading formality, not substantial-compliance territory, and not something that could be inferred from other bonds posted for other purposes.

B. The attempted substitute: a TRO bond

The record did show a $1,500 bond posted by The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company “in consideration of the premises and the issuance of said Temporary Restraining Order.” The Court reasoned that:

• The TRO bond was required by the trial court as a condition of injunctive relief (Rule 65(c)).
• The quo warranto security is required at the commencement of the quo warranto action (§ 6-6-591(b)).
• The two obligations have different sources, timing, purposes, and consequences.

The Court thus articulated (and effectively formalized) a non-substitution principle: the posting of Rule 65(c) security does not satisfy § 6-6-591(b), even if the TRO was sought at the outset and even if the injunction claim travels alongside the quo warranto claim.

C. Consequence: voidness for want of subject-matter jurisdiction

Because the record contained “no indication” that Sims provided quo warranto cost security, the trial court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court treated the entire judgment—including removal from office and declarations of vacancy—as void and ordered vacatur on remand. It applied the remedy described in Douglas v. Griggers, 401 So. 3d at 297.

D. What the Court did not decide (but the opinion implicitly flags)

• Election contest vs. quo warranto: The parties argued whether the dispute functioned as an untimely election contest under § 11-46-69, Ala. Code 1975. The Court did not reach that question because the jurisdictional defect ended the case.
• Validity of the redistricting map and procedures under § 11-46-23, Ala. Code 1975: The trial court itself voiced skepticism that the new map was lawful, but the Supreme Court likewise did not decide the redistricting merits.
• Post-appeal record “supplementation” controversy: The opinion noted reasons to doubt authenticity and discrepancies in competing “complaints,” but treated those disputes as unnecessary to resolve because, even assuming simultaneous filing, the TRO bond still did not satisfy quo warranto security.

3.3 Impact

• Bright-line procedural gatekeeping in quo warranto: Parties seeking removal of public officials via quo warranto must ensure that § 6-6-591(b) cost security is posted and approved by the clerk. Failure is not curable by arguing “substantial compliance” through other bonds.
• No “bond blending” across remedies: Even where injunction relief is requested in the same litigation, Rule 65(c) security is not interchangeable with § 6-6-591(b) security. Practitioners must treat them as independent checklists.
• Municipal-office litigation can turn on jurisdictional mechanics: The decision underscores that courts may never reach high-stakes merits (residency, redistricting legality, voter disenfranchisement) if the initiating party fails to satisfy quo warranto’s statutory commencement requirements.
• Administrative practice in clerk’s offices and trial courts: The holding effectively pressures trial courts and clerks to confirm quo warranto security at filing (or before proceeding), because later discovery of the defect voids all downstream orders.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Quo warranto: A special statutory action used to challenge whether someone is unlawfully holding a public office (among other uses). In Alabama, it is governed by § 6-6-591, Ala. Code 1975.
• Informant/relator (“on relation of”): A private person permitted, under conditions, to sue in the name of the State. Because the State’s name and authority are invoked, Alabama law requires safeguards—most notably the posting of security for costs.
• Security for costs (quo warranto): A statutory prerequisite under § 6-6-591(b). It is not about the merits; it is about whether a private person has authority to initiate the proceeding in the State’s name. Without it, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Rule 65(c) injunction bond: A bond posted so that if a party is wrongfully restrained by a TRO or preliminary injunction, they can recover certain costs/damages/fees. It protects the restrained party; it is not a license to sue on the State’s behalf.
• Subject-matter jurisdiction and a “void” judgment: If a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, its orders are legally null. Appellate courts treat such judgments as void and require vacatur.
• Ore tenus rule: When a trial court hears live testimony, its fact findings get deference. But legal conclusions—like whether a statute confers jurisdiction—are reviewed de novo. The Court cited Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Prichard v. Synovus Bank, 404 So. 3d 202 (Ala. 2024) for this standard framework.

5. Conclusion

Moore v. State of Alabama ex rel. Mayor Sims, as informant reinforces and sharpens Alabama’s strict jurisdictional approach to quo warranto. The Court held that when a private informant brings quo warranto in the State’s name, § 6-6-591(b) requires separate security for the costs of the quo warranto action at commencement; a Rule 65(c) TRO bond is not a substitute. Absent that statutory security, the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and any removal-from-office judgment is void and must be vacated on remand.