Discretionary, Reasonableness-Based Limits on Surveillance-Video Preservation and Spoliation Remedies

Case: Rosen v. Community Healthcare System d/b/a Community Hospital (Supreme Court of Indiana)
Date: March 11, 2026
Author: Justice Molter (Rush, C.J., and Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur; Goff, J., dissents)

1) Introduction

Caryl Rosen sued Community Hospital for premises negligence after she tripped and fell over a lobby entryway mat while leaving the hospital. The dispute on appeal did not turn on traditional premises-liability elements (duty, breach, notice) so much as on litigation process: Rosen claimed the hospital failed to preserve potentially helpful surveillance footage, amounting to spoliation. She argued the trial court’s “no spoliation” finding tainted the trial in two downstream ways—(i) refusal of an adverse-inference instruction and (ii) exclusion (via motion in limine and trial objections) of testimony about unpreserved video and additional cameras.

The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed a defense verdict, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges in spoliation determinations and relevance-based evidentiary rulings, especially where the preserved footage was remote/pixelated and the hospital presented unrebutted sworn testimony that the unpreserved cameras did not capture the fall.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by:

• finding the hospital did not spoliate evidence by failing to preserve (a) more time from the camera that captured the fall and (b) any footage from two other cameras that, according to the security supervisor, did not capture the fall;
• refusing Rosen’s proposed adverse-inference instruction (premised on spoliation); and
• excluding at trial references to “other cameras” and “other footage,” where the trial judge reasonably deemed that footage irrelevant and the line of questioning misleading.

The Court also reiterated that a preservation letter is not a “safe harbor”: a party’s duty to preserve discoverable evidence may exist even if that evidence is not identified in the letter.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1. Standards of review and judicial discretion

• Abbas v. Neter-Nu — Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of jury instructions and evidentiary rulings. This anchored the Court’s insistence that appellate courts do not re-try close calls on relevance, prejudice, or instruction framing.
• N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aqua Env't Container Corp. — Cited both for abuse-of-discretion review of spoliation and for the spoliation elements. The Court relied on it to frame Rosen’s burden (duty + negligent/intentional destruction/alteration/concealment) and to reinforce trial-court primacy in tailoring spoliation outcomes.
• Expert Pool Builders, LLC v. Vangundy — Supplied the general definition of “abuse of discretion” (“unlawful, illogical, or otherwise unreasonable”), which the Court repeatedly used to justify affirmance even if alternative interpretations were plausible.

2. Indiana spoliation doctrine: definition, duty, and remedies

• Cahoon v. Cummings — Provided the baseline definition of “spoliation” as destruction/material alteration/concealment of evidence subject to a duty to preserve for pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.
• Miller v. Fed. Exp. Corp. — Cited for the scope of the duty to preserve: evidence in a party’s control that it knows or reasonably should know is discoverable. The Court used this to pivot from what might have been useful to what was reasonably foreseeable as discoverable and relevant under the circumstances.
• Howard Reg'l Health Sys. v. Gordon — Cited for the goals of spoliation sanctions (deterrence, allocating risk of erroneous judgment to the spoliator, restoring the prejudiced party). The Court used this not to impose sanctions, but to contextualize that sanctions are discretionary and tethered to culpability and prejudice.

3. Persuasive authorities and scholarly sources on reasonableness and the spoliation inference

• Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge — Used for the “reasonable care” formulation in preservation and as a prominent example emphasizing trial-court management to keep juries focused on merits rather than satellite spoliation disputes.
• Montana State Univ.-Bozeman v. Montana First Jud. Dist. Ct. — Quoted for the proposition that once litigation is foreseeable, the duty to preserve extends only to then-existing information reasonably likely to be relevant (and may require suspending routine recycling/overwriting).
• DR Distrib., LLC v. 21 Century Smoking, Inc. — Cited for the general obligation of good faith in discovery conduct, supporting the Court’s framing that reasonableness includes good-faith preservation protocols.
• Emerald Point, LLC v. Hawkins and Bass-Davis v. Davis — Used to illustrate a split of authority on whether negligence alone supports a spoliation inference (Virginia requiring intentional destruction; Nevada allowing an inference for negligent loss). The Court expressly left this question open for Indiana because the parties did not brief it and it was unnecessary to resolve the case.
• Scholarly sources (Andrew S. Pollis; Margaret M. Koesel & Tracey L. Turnbull; Laura A. Adams) — These were used to highlight (i) the fact-intensive uncertainty surrounding the “trigger” and “scope” of preservation obligations and (ii) the practical reality that preservation cannot be “everything,” reinforcing the Court’s preference for trial-level discretion over appellate line-drawing.

4. Preservation-letter scope and forfeiture principles

• Finnegan v. State — Cited for forfeiture: Rosen could not newly argue on appeal that the jury (not the judge) should decide whether spoliation occurred because she did not press that position in the trial court.

5. Evidentiary impeachment rules

• Collins v. State — Cited for the general rule that prior inconsistent statements may be used for impeachment with a proper foundation. The Court invoked it to reject Rosen’s impeachment theory because it found no actual inconsistency in the witness’s statements about cameras and what captured the fall.

6. The dissent’s supporting authorities

• In re Paternity of A.J., Synergy Healthcare Res., LLC v. Telamon Corp., and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC — In the dissent, these sources reinforced a broad view of preservation duties and the fact-sensitive nature of spoliation determinations.
• Rodriguez v. Webb — Cited by the dissent as an example where the jury could weigh competing narratives about why evidence was destroyed and what inference to draw.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Spoliation requires a duty to preserve discoverable evidence—and that duty is bounded by reasonable foreseeability

The Court accepted the standard spoliation elements (duty + culpable loss) but resolved the case largely at the “duty/foreseeability” and “reasonableness” layers. It emphasized that the duty to preserve is not a duty to preserve all possibly interesting material, but what the party “know[s], or reasonably should know,” is discoverable and relevant (or likely to lead to relevant evidence).

2. The “double reasonableness” frame and the abuse-of-discretion filter

A central move in the opinion is what it effectively describes as a layered inquiry: (i) whether the hospital’s preservation choices were reasonable under the circumstances, and (ii) whether the trial court’s conclusion that they were reasonable was itself reasonable. That structure matters because it transforms Rosen’s appeal from “could additional footage have helped?” into “was it unreasonable for the trial judge to credit the hospital’s account and reject spoliation?”

3. Why the Court found no abuse of discretion on the preserved camera’s length

Rosen argued the hospital should have saved earlier footage from the camera that captured the fall because earlier frames might show the mat’s condition before she stepped on it. The Court responded that the preserved footage itself undermined the claimed value of earlier video: the camera was about seventy-five feet away and became pixelated near the mat, making it difficult even to see the fall clearly. From that, the trial court could reasonably infer earlier footage would be no more informative.

The Court acknowledged the Court of Appeals’ contrary inference (that an obstructing object—possibly a wheelchair—might have moved, revealing the mat), but held the trial court was not required to adopt that inference, especially where it credited the security supervisor’s sworn statement that he preserved all footage shedding light on the fall.

4. Why the Court found no abuse of discretion on the other two cameras

Rosen also asserted that a camera “within mere feet” would have shown the defect, the fall, and duration of the defect. The Court focused on the record the trial judge had: the security supervisor reviewed all three cameras and swore that only one captured the fall, while the other two did not show the fall “or any part thereof.” Rosen did not attack the affidavit as false or inaccurate. Given that framework, and given the small claimed “defect” (a raised area about the size of a foot), the trial court could reasonably conclude the unpreserved footage was not discoverable because it was not useful or relevant.

5. Reasonableness of the hospital’s preservation protocol and timing

The Court treated the hospital’s evidence preservation as a routine, articulable protocol: preserve from when the person enters the frame until the incident ends/they leave the frame; preserve footage that shows the fall and aftermath; do so promptly because of limited system memory and automatic overwrite. The Court found it significant that the hospital preserved and produced what it had, invited further requests, and that Rosen’s counsel did not ask for more until more than a year later—supporting the trial judge’s conclusion that expecting the hospital to foresee broader relevance was not compelled.

6. The adverse-inference instruction and the Court’s “open question”

Rosen’s requested instruction would have permitted the jury to infer missing evidence would be unfavorable. Because the trial court found no spoliation, it refused the instruction; the Supreme Court affirmed that refusal as a reasonable consequence of the no-spoliation ruling.

Importantly, the Court flagged—but did not decide—whether mere negligence suffices for an adverse-inference instruction in Indiana, noting disagreement nationwide and citing Emerald Point, LLC v. Hawkins and Bass-Davis v. Davis. This leaves Indiana litigants without definitive guidance on the mens rea threshold for the inference, even as the Court underscored trial-court discretion.

7. Exclusion of “other footage” references at trial (motions in limine, impeachment, and “opening the door”)

After concluding the trial judge reasonably found the unpreserved footage irrelevant, the Court upheld exclusion of related questioning. Rosen advanced three theories:

• Impeachment of a maintenance witness: The Court found no prior inconsistent statements to trigger Collins v. State; the witness’s testimony evolved from “I know of one camera” to “security confirmed additional cameras but only one captured the fall,” which the Court deemed consistent.
• Cross-examining the defense expert about not reviewing other video: The Court rejected this as irrelevant because Rosen did not explain how footage that did not show the fall or the relevant mat area would affect the expert’s opinion.
• “Opening the door” / jury misimpression: The Court held there was no misimpression to correct; under the trial judge’s reasonable relevance determination, the preserved video was the only relevant video.

C. Impact

1. Practical preservation rule for surveillance video (fact-bound, but consequential)

The decision effectively reinforces a pragmatic preservation standard: where an organization promptly preserves the portion of surveillance video that it reasonably believes captures “the fall and aftermath,” and it has evidence (especially sworn testimony) that other cameras do not capture the incident, trial courts have wide latitude to find no spoliation and to keep “missing footage” arguments away from the jury as irrelevant or misleading.

2. Litigation strategy: earlier, sharper requests and faster motion practice

The Court did not make timeliness dispositive, but it treated the long delay before complaining about video length as relevant to what was “reasonably foreseeable.” Plaintiffs’ counsel in similar cases will likely respond by (i) making immediate, explicit requests for time windows (e.g., “X minutes before and after”) and all cameras in the area, and (ii) promptly litigating preservation disputes before overwrite occurs.

3. Trial-court centrality and appellate deference

The opinion underscores that spoliation and related trial management are discretionary. Even where an appellate panel could draw different inferences (as the Court of Appeals did in Rosen v. Cmty. Healthcare Sys.), the Supreme Court will not substitute its view if the trial judge’s decision is within the range of reasonableness.

4. Interaction with Indiana Trial Rule 37(D) (effective Jan. 1, 2026)

While not applied as the governing rule in this case, the Court highlighted new Trial Rule 37(D), which authorizes sanctions for failure to take reasonable steps to preserve relevant electronically stored information that is lost and cannot be restored or replaced, where prejudice results or there is intent to deprive. The Court’s emphasis on “reasonable steps” dovetails with the rule’s text and signals that future Indiana spoliation practice will increasingly be argued through the rule’s structured prerequisites (reasonable steps, irreplaceability, prejudice/intent).

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

• Spoliation: Losing or destroying evidence (intentionally or negligently) when you had a duty to preserve it for litigation.
• Duty to preserve: Once litigation is pending or reasonably foreseeable, parties must take reasonable steps to preserve evidence they know (or should know) is relevant or likely to lead to relevant evidence.
• Adverse-inference instruction: A jury instruction allowing (not requiring) jurors to infer that missing evidence would have hurt the party who failed to preserve it.
• Motion in limine: A pretrial request to exclude certain topics or evidence from being mentioned in front of the jury.
• Abuse of discretion: A highly deferential appellate standard; the appellate court affirms unless the decision was unlawful or clearly unreasonable—not merely because the appellate judges would have decided differently.
• Trial Rule 30(B)(6) deposition: A deposition where an organization designates a representative to testify about specified topics on the organization’s behalf.
• Errata sheet: A post-deposition mechanism allowing a witness to correct or change deposition testimony (often scrutinized for substance and consistency).

5) Conclusion

Rosen v. Community Healthcare System cements a strongly discretionary approach to spoliation and spoliation-adjacent trial issues in Indiana. The Court did not adopt a bright-line preservation window for surveillance video, and it refused to second-guess a trial judge’s reasonable determination that unpreserved footage was irrelevant and not foreseeably discoverable. The decision also clarifies that preservation letters do not cap preservation duties, while leaving unresolved the important statewide question of whether negligence alone can justify an adverse-inference instruction. Going forward, the case signals that (i) detailed early preservation demands and prompt follow-up matter, (ii) organizations benefit from documented, good-faith preservation protocols and sworn explanations, and (iii) trial judges retain broad authority to keep speculative “missing footage” narratives away from juries when relevance is not shown.