Room-and-Board Counts as “Remuneration for Services” (and Mixed Questions Remain Reviewable) in § 1255(k) Unauthorized-Employment Bars

3.1. Precedents Cited

The panel’s analysis is built around modern Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit jurisdiction doctrine distinguishing unreviewable factfinding from reviewable legal questions and mixed questions:

3.1.1. Mixed questions are “questions of law” for § 1252(a)(2)(D)

• Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020): The court relied on the Supreme Court’s holding that “questions of law” include the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. In Singh, this principle supplied the gateway to judicial review even though the dispute had a factual feel (what food/lodging meant in context).
• Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): The panel treated Wilkinson as confirming that Guerrero-Lasprilla’s definition applies even in the adjustment-of-status review-limiting framework of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Wilkinson also supplied the key nuance Singh uses: the amount of “immersion” in facts affects the standard of review, not jurisdiction.

3.1.2. The fact/law distinction and what remains unreviewable

• Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982): Quoted for the “vexing” fact/law line and for the classic definition of mixed questions where historical facts are established and the issue is whether they satisfy a statutory standard. Singh uses Pullman-Standard to classify the “employment” question as mixed.
• U.S. Bank N.A. v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387 (2018), and Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995): These were used to describe “basic” or “historical” facts—who did what, when, where, how, and why—contrasted with legal effect.
• Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022): Cited as an example of factual findings (including intent) remaining unreviewable. In Singh, it underscores that courts cannot reweigh core factual determinations.
• Gulomjonov v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 601 (7th Cir. 2025): Used as an example that “timing” can be a factual finding. This helps demarcate what Singh could not appeal as a “question of law.”
• Cruz-Velasco v. Garland, 58 F.4th 900 (7th Cir. 2023): Cited as an example of a reviewable mixed question—whether facts satisfy “good moral character.”

3.1.3. Deferential review of primarily factual mixed questions

• Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland, 34 F.4th 603 (7th Cir. 2022): Reinforced that when a mixed question is “primarily factual,” appellate review is deferential. Singh applies that approach to the remuneration determination.

3.1.4. “Remuneration” can be non-monetary; immigration “employment” is broadly construed

• Matter of Hall, 18 I. & N. Dec. 203 (BIA 1982): The merits discussion leans on this Board precedent to support that remuneration is not limited to fixed salary and that lack of “fixed salary or remuneration” can be immaterial, reinforcing a functional view of compensated service. Singh uses Hall to validate treating in-kind support as potentially constituting employment.

Notably, the cited cases do not redefine “employment” in the abstract; rather, they structure (1) the reviewability of the question and (2) the deference owed to the agency’s application of the standard to the record.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

3.2.1. Statutory and regulatory frame

• Adjustment bar: 8 U.S.C. § 1255(k)(2) bars adjustment (for otherwise eligible applicants) if they have engaged in more than 180 days of “unauthorized employment” before applying.
• Judicial review limits and preservation: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) limits review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under § 1255, but 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves review of “constitutional claims or questions of law.”
• Employment definition (regulatory): The panel looked to DHS regulations defining “employee” as one who provides services “for wages or other remuneration,” 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f). The opinion treats the parties as effectively agreeing that “employment” turns on “remuneration for services.”

3.2.2. Jurisdiction: why this is a mixed question

Singh’s appellate theory was understood as challenging the IJ’s conclusion that in-kind benefits (food and lodging) were “remuneration for services.” The panel characterized the “historical facts” as established: Singh performed priestly duties at non-Wisconsin temples and received food and lodging there. The only dispute was whether those established facts satisfy the legal standard for “employment.” Under Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr and Wilkinson v. Garland, that application-of-standard-to-established-facts inquiry is a reviewable “question of law” even if it is “primarily factual.”

3.2.3. Merits: room and board as remuneration, and exchange for services

Applying deferential review, the court found the agency’s conclusion “entirely reasonable” on two linked points:

1. Remuneration includes non-monetary benefits. Because remuneration is not limited to cash wages, room and board can qualify. The panel cited Matter of Hall to support that the absence of a fixed salary does not defeat a finding of compensated work.
2. The record supported that the benefits were received “for” the services. Singh argued that food and lodging were generally available to the public in some capacity, so they were not “for” his work. The court rejected that inference: general availability does not negate that Singh received these benefits because of his service—especially given his testimony that he received a special room designated for the head priest.

3.2.4. What the court declined to reach: “control” and organizational identity

Singh also suggested the Wisconsin temple controlled his work at a higher level. The panel refused to entertain this as a meaningful legal argument because he did not explain its relevance to “remuneration” and did not develop the more pertinent theory: whether the California and Indiana temples were part of the same “employer” or petitioning entity. The court referenced the employer definition at 8 C.F.R. § 274.a1(g) and emphasized Singh raised “no argument at all” on that point.

3.3. Impact

Although labeled NONPRECEDENTIAL, the disposition is instructive in three practical ways:

• Reviewability framing matters: Petitioners challenging adjustment denials can sometimes obtain judicial review by identifying a genuine mixed question—application of a legal standard to established facts—rather than disputing historical facts. Singh operationalizes Wilkinson v. Garland in the § 1255 context by separating jurisdiction from standard-of-review.
• In-kind support is litigation-risky under “employment” concepts: The opinion affirms a broad, functional understanding of remuneration: room and board linked to service may be enough, even absent cash wages and even if similar benefits exist for others. This is especially salient for religious-worker and volunteer-like arrangements where compensation is often non-monetary.
• Entity/“same employer” theories must be developed: The panel signals that arguments about supervisory control are not substitutes for proving organizational unity. Future litigants who need to show continuity of authorized employment should be prepared to brief employer identity and organizational structure with regulatory precision.