Rolle v. JCDecaux: Untimely Cross-Motions Cannot Dispose of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6) Claims Absent Good Cause or Nearly Identical Grounds

1) Introduction

Case: Rolle v JCDecaux St. Furniture N.Y., LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 02859 (2d Dept May 6, 2026).
Parties: Plaintiff Lamont Rolle (employee of Dynaserv Industries, Inc.) sued JCDecaux Street Furniture New York, LLC, CEMUSA NY, LLC, the City of New York, and the New York City Department of Transportation (DOT), among others.
Background: While power-washing a bus shelter, an interior panel allegedly fell and struck plaintiff’s head.
Claims: Negligence and Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6).
Key issues:

  1. Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applied to a worker standing on the sidewalk when a shelter panel fell during power-washing.
  2. Whether defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6) claims—filed after the Kings County Civil Term deadline—could be granted absent “good cause” or “nearly identical grounds.”

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Second Department affirmed dismissal of the Labor Law § 240(1) claim: the incident was not an elevation-related hazard covered by the statute, and the panel was not being hoisted/secured or required securing for the power-washing work.

The court reversed (procedurally) the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the Labor Law § 241(6) claim (as to all moving defendants) and the Labor Law § 200 claim (as to the City and DOT), holding those portions of the cross-motion were untimely under the Kings County Supreme Court Uniform Civil Term Rules and therefore had to be denied without reaching the merits because defendants showed no good cause and the issues were not “nearly identical” to plaintiff’s timely § 240(1) motion.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

i. Labor Law § 240(1): scope, elevation differential, and falling-object doctrine

  • Andrade v Bergen Beach 26, LLC and Joseph v 210 W. 18th, LLC: Cited for the foundational principle that § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty on owners/contractors to provide safety devices against elevation-related risks.
  • Krarunzhiy v 91 Cent. Park W. Owners Corp. and Nieves v Five Boro A.C. & Refrig. Corp.: Used to emphasize that § 240(1) is limited to a “narrow class of special hazards” and does not cover every gravity-related injury in a loose sense.
  • Carlton v City of New York and Escobar v Safi: Supply the “single decisive question”: whether injury directly resulted from inadequate protection against a physically significant elevation differential. Carlton is also relied on for the proposition that falling-object injuries do not automatically trigger § 240(1) absent a missing/inadequate enumerated safety device.
  • Broggy v Rockefeller Group, Inc. and Zoto v 259 W. 10th, LLC: Allocate the burden to plaintiff to show an elevation-related risk and inadequate safety devices.
  • Fabrizi v 1095 Ave. of the Ams., L.L.C., Quattrocchi v F.J. Sciame Constr. Corp., and Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc.: These Court of Appeals authorities frame when a falling object can support § 240(1): the object must be in the process of being hoisted/secured or must have required securing for the purposes of the undertaking.
  • Wright v Pennings: Cited as a recent Appellate Division application of the falling-object principles.
  • Ramos v Kent & Wythe Owners, LLC and Flores v Fort Green Homes, LLC: Applied as closely analogous Appellate Division cases supporting dismissal where a falling item was not being hoisted/secured and did not require securing for the plaintiff’s work.
  • Toefer v Long Is. R.R.: Reinforces limits on § 240(1) where the hazard does not arise from the type of elevation-related risk targeted by the statute.

ii. Untimely summary judgment/cross-motions under Kings County Civil Term Rules

  • Souffrant v M&K Real Estate Assoc., LLC: Confirms enforceability of the Kings County Supreme Court Uniform Civil Term Rules deadline (Part C, Rule 6) in cases where the City is not represented by the Tort Division of Corporation Counsel.
  • Wittenberg v Long Is. Power Auth. and Sikorjak v City of New York: Provide the controlling procedural rule: absent “good cause” for delay, an untimely summary judgment motion/cross-motion must be denied without considering merits—unless it is on “nearly identical grounds” as a timely motion.
  • Dojce v 1302 Realty Co., LLC: Used to illustrate the “nearly identical grounds” limitation; a timely motion on one claim does not open the door to untimely dispositive motions on different claims presenting different issues.

B. Legal Reasoning

i. Why § 240(1) did not apply

The court focused on the statutory target: protection against elevation-related hazards and certain falling-object scenarios tied to the need for enumerated safety devices. Two facts were decisive:

  1. No elevation differential in plaintiff’s work position: Plaintiff stood on the sidewalk at all times and did not use a ladder. This supported defendants’ showing that the accident was not the type of elevation-related risk § 240(1) addresses.
  2. The panel was not within the “being hoisted/secured” or “required securing” category: The interior panel was not being hoisted or secured, nor did it require securing for the power-washing undertaking. Therefore, the falling-object doctrine did not convert the incident into a § 240(1) case.

With that prima facie showing by defendants, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue. Separately, plaintiff also failed to carry his own burden on his affirmative motion for summary judgment on § 240(1).

ii. Why §§ 200 and 241(6) dismissals were reversed (procedural bar)

The opinion draws a sharp line between (a) the merits and (b) the court’s ability to reach them when motion practice violates governing deadlines. Under the Kings County Supreme Court Uniform Civil Term Rules (Part C, Rule 6), summary judgment motions must be made within 60 days of the note of issue (where the City is not represented by the Tort Division).

Here:

  • Note of issue filed: May 17, 2023.
  • Defendants’ cross-motion filed: September 6, 2023—after the deadline.
  • No “good cause” excuse was offered.

The court applied the “nearly identical grounds” safety valve in a claim-specific way:

  • Defendants’ untimely cross-motion as to § 240(1) could be considered because it matched the issue raised by plaintiff’s timely § 240(1) motion (a nearly identical issue).
  • Defendants’ untimely cross-motion as to §§ 200 and 241(6) could not be considered because plaintiff had not moved on those claims; thus, the cross-motion did not mirror a timely motion on nearly identical grounds.

Result: dismissal of § 240(1) stands (merits reached), but dismissal of §§ 200 and 241(6) was vacated (merits not reached) and those claims were reinstated as against the relevant defendants.

C. Impact

i. Substantive impact (Labor Law § 240(1))

The decision reinforces a practical boundary: injuries from a component falling from a structure during routine cleaning/power-washing—while the worker remains at ground level—will not necessarily implicate § 240(1), even though gravity is involved. Plaintiffs must connect the accident to (1) a physically significant elevation differential and (2) the absence or inadequacy of an enumerated safety device, or satisfy the narrow falling-object criteria tied to securing/hoisting requirements for the work.

ii. Procedural impact (summary judgment motion practice in Kings County)

Rolle underscores strict enforcement of the Kings County Civil Term summary judgment deadline and confirms that:

  • The “nearly identical grounds” exception is not a general permission slip to add late dispositive arguments on different claims.
  • Parties must treat each Labor Law claim as potentially presenting distinct issues (e.g., § 240(1) elevation-device analysis vs. § 241(6) Industrial Code predicates vs. § 200 negligence/control), requiring timely motion practice for each if dispositive relief is sought.

Strategically, defendants cannot assume that opposing a plaintiff’s timely motion on one claim will allow late dismissal attempts on additional claims; absent good cause, those additional branches are vulnerable to denial without merits review.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Labor Law § 240(1) (“Scaffold Law”): A worker-protection statute requiring owners/contractors to provide specific safety devices (e.g., ladders, hoists) against certain elevation-related risks. It is not a catch-all workplace injury statute.
  • “Physically significant elevation differential”: The height-related gap must be meaningful in causing the injury (not merely that something fell).
  • Falling-object liability under § 240(1): Applies when the object was being hoisted/secured or needed securing for the work being performed, and the injury occurred because an appropriate enumerated safety device was missing or inadequate.
  • Note of issue: A filing that signals the case is ready for trial; it triggers (in many courts) deadlines for summary judgment motions.
  • Untimely summary judgment motions and “good cause”: If a motion is late, the court generally cannot consider it unless the moving party shows a valid reason for the delay.
  • “Nearly identical grounds” exception: A court may consider an untimely cross-motion if it addresses essentially the same issue as a timely motion already before the court. In Rolle, that applied to § 240(1) but not to §§ 200 and 241(6).

5) Conclusion

Rolle v JCDecaux St. Furniture N.Y., LLC delivers two key takeaways. Substantively, it reaffirms that § 240(1) does not cover every gravity-related injury: a panel falling during ground-level power-washing is outside the statute absent a qualifying elevation differential or a securing/hoisting-based falling-object scenario tied to enumerated devices. Procedurally, it tightens the message that Kings County’s summary judgment deadlines matter: without good cause, defendants cannot use an untimely cross-motion to win dismissal of distinct Labor Law claims (§§ 200 and 241(6)) that were not placed in issue by a timely, nearly identical motion.