Rogers Compliance Without Express PSR Adoption: Incorporation of Standard Supervised-Release Conditions by Specific Reference, and Corroborated Controlled Buys as Relevant Conduct Despite Informant Recantation

1. Introduction

In United States v. Jonathan Anderson (4th Cir. Aug. 24, 2026) (unpublished), Jonathan Edward Anderson appealed a 78-month sentence imposed after he pled guilty (without a written plea agreement) to possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The appeal raised three procedural challenges:

  • Whether the district court improperly increased the advisory Guidelines range by treating three methamphetamine controlled buys as relevant conduct, despite attacks on the confidential informant’s credibility and a recantation letter.
  • Whether the court denied defense counsel a meaningful opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(i).
  • Whether the court violated United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), by failing to orally pronounce (or properly incorporate) discretionary supervised-release conditions and by not expressly adopting the presentence report (PSR).

The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding no reversible procedural error occurred.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Applying deferential review for overall sentencing reasonableness, the court held:

  • The district court did not clearly err in finding the controlled buys were relevant conduct under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3, and it did not abuse its discretion in calculating the Guidelines range.
  • Although the judge imposed the sentence before hearing the entirety of counsel’s sentencing argument, the record did not establish a Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i) violation—certainly not plain error—because counsel later indicated he had covered what he intended and briefly argued for a lower sentence.
  • The court satisfied Rogers by specifically incorporating “the standard conditions set forth in Section 5D1.3 of the sentencing guidelines” and those “outlined on pages 20 through 22 of the [PSR],” after confirming defense counsel had reviewed them and had no objections. No express adoption of the PSR was required on these facts.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Sentencing framework and standards of review

  • United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743 (4th Cir. 2021): Reinforced the abuse-of-discretion framework for reviewing sentences and the division of review between legal determinations (de novo) and factual findings (clear error) in Guidelines disputes. Anderson’s relevant-conduct challenge was therefore constrained by clear-error review as to the key factual determinations.
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Supplied the procedural reasonableness checklist; the Fourth Circuit “first ensure[s]” no significant procedural error occurred.
  • United States v. Jackson, 127 F. 4th 448 (4th Cir. 2025): Provided an updated articulation of procedural reasonableness, including proper Guidelines calculation and opportunity for party argument.
  • United States v. Wooden, 887 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2018), and United States v. Ferebee, 957 F.3d 406 (4th Cir. 2020): Clarified how hard it is to overturn a plausible district-court factual account under clear-error review—critical to affirming the district court’s reliance on corroborated controlled-buy evidence despite credibility attacks.

Relevant conduct doctrine

  • United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2004): A core Fourth Circuit precedent on using prior controlled transactions as relevant conduct. The Anderson panel used Hodge both for the governing standard (same course of conduct/common scheme) and as an analogy: controlled buys can be counted where evidence shows a continuing drug-trafficking pattern.
  • United States v. McDonald, 28 F.4th 553 (4th Cir. 2022): Emphasized the “identifiable pattern” concept and that relevant-conduct determinations are fact-specific, guided by similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity (as reflected in USSG § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii)). This helped justify the panel’s focus on the two-week span and the third buy occurring the same day as the search.

Rule 32 allocution for counsel and plain-error review

  • United States v. Covington, 65 F.4th 726 (4th Cir. 2023): Set the review posture—unpreserved Rule 32 objections are reviewed only for plain error.
  • United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638 (4th Cir. 2013): Supplied the four-part plain-error framework, including the substantial-rights/outcome requirement and the discretionary “fairness, integrity or public reputation” prong.

Pronouncement of supervised-release conditions

  • United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020): Required oral pronouncement of all nonmandatory supervised-release conditions but allowed “incorporation” by reference (e.g., incorporating Guidelines “standard” conditions and later detailing them in the written judgment).
  • United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021): Provided the remedy rule—conditions appearing for the first time in the written judgment are “nullities,” requiring remand. This framed the stakes of Anderson’s Rogers argument.
  • United States v. Smith, 117 F.4th 584 (4th Cir. 2024): Confirmed de novo review of Rogers claims.
  • United States v. Turner, 122 F.4th 511 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1894 (2025): Supported the panel’s conclusion that incorporation is adequate when the court references conditions as set forth in the PSR and confirms counsel reviewed them with no objections—used as the closest procedural analogue.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Relevant conduct and drug-weight calculation

The panel applied USSG § 1B1.3 and its commentary, focusing on whether the controlled buys were part of the “same course of conduct” as the cocaine offense of conviction. The district court’s key factual and inferential steps—affirmed as not clearly erroneous—were:

  • Temporal proximity: the buys occurred within a two-week window; the third buy occurred the same day as the search warrant execution that yielded the cocaine.
  • Pattern inference: the closeness in time and the linked investigative timeline supported an “ongoing series of offenses,” consistent with United States v. McDonald.
  • Proof by preponderance: the court accepted PSR facts and sentencing testimony as establishing, by a preponderance, that Anderson committed the controlled-buy conduct.
  • Corroboration despite informant credibility issues: even if officers lost sight of the informant at times and even if the informant’s credibility was “destroyed,” the court credited law enforcement controls (pre- and post-buy searches), audio recordings (with the agent recognizing Anderson’s voice), and direct observation of the third meet. The unauthenticated recantation letter—viewed as likely fabricated and not overcoming corroboration—did not compel a contrary finding.

The Fourth Circuit’s affirmance is driven less by a categorical rule about informants and more by the interaction of (i) the low burden of proof at sentencing (preponderance), (ii) the wide latitude to consider reliable information, and (iii) clear-error deference where the district court’s account is “plausible,” per United States v. Ferebee.

(B) Opportunity for counsel to argue under Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i)

The panel acknowledged the awkward sequencing: after resolving the relevant-conduct objection, the judge moved immediately to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis, allowed Anderson to allocute, and imposed sentence before hearing the full defense presentation. However, because the issue was not preserved, the panel applied plain-error review under United States v. Covington and United States v. Webb.

On this record, the panel found no error—“plain or otherwise”—because defense counsel, after sentence was announced, stated he believed he had gotten in everything he intended, and he briefly argued for a 51-month sentence (referencing the sentencing memorandum and earlier arguments). The implicit logic is that the record did not show the denial of a meaningful opportunity that affected the outcome—an essential component of plain-error relief under United States v. Webb.

(C) Rogers pronouncement and incorporation of “standard” conditions

Anderson’s Rogers claim hinged on the absence of an express PSR adoption and the lack of an item-by-item oral reading of standard conditions. The panel rejected both contentions, emphasizing Rogers’s incorporation pathway:

  • The district court stated it would impose the standard conditions “set forth in Section 5D1.3 of the sentencing guidelines” and “outlined on pages 20 through 22” of the PSR.
  • The court confirmed defense counsel had reviewed those conditions and had no objections.

Citing United States v. Turner, the panel treated this combination of (i) specific reference to an identifiable written source and (ii) confirmation of review/no objection as sufficient “incorporation,” meaning the written judgment’s conditions were not appearing “for the first time” as prohibited by United States v. Singletary.

3.3. Impact

Practical impact on sentencing litigation (drug relevant conduct)

  • Recantation is not dispositive: Even dramatic informant credibility problems may not defeat relevant conduct where law enforcement corroboration is strong (search procedures, surveillance, audio, agent recognition), and where the district court finds the record supports reliability.
  • Deference matters: The decision underscores that appellate challenges to relevant conduct often fail on clear-error review when the district court’s account is “plausible.”
  • Temporal linkage is powerful: A controlled buy on the same day as the search/warrant execution can strongly support “same course of conduct” under USSG § 1B1.3.

Procedural sequencing under Rule 32

  • Preservation is critical: Unpreserved Rule 32 claims face the high bar of plain-error review; counsel’s on-the-record statement that he covered his points can be fatal to relief.
  • Record-building: If counsel believes the court cut off argument, the decision illustrates the need to object clearly and state what additional arguments would have been made and how they could change the sentence.

Rogers compliance and drafting the sentencing record

  • No magic words of PSR “adoption” required (on these facts): The opinion signals that a court can avoid Rogers error by specifically incorporating standard conditions by reference to USSG § 5D1.3 and to particular PSR pages, coupled with confirmation of review.
  • Template for district courts: The approach provides a practical script to reduce Rogers/Singletary remands: identify the source document and confirm parties have reviewed it.

Note: The opinion is unpublished and expressly “not binding precedent in this circuit,” limiting its formal precedential force, though it may still be persuasive and indicative of how the Fourth Circuit applies established doctrine.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Relevant conduct” (USSG § 1B1.3): At sentencing, the judge can consider certain uncharged (or not-of-conviction) conduct when it is part of the same overall pattern as the convicted offense. For repeated drug dealing, that often means other buys/sales close in time and similar in nature.
  • “Converted drug weight”: The Guidelines convert different drugs into a common unit so multiple substances can be aggregated into a single drug quantity for offense-level calculation.
  • “Preponderance of the evidence” at sentencing: The government generally must show a fact is more likely true than not—not “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • “Clear error” review: On appeal, factual findings are upheld if the district court’s view is plausible; the appellate court does not reweigh evidence as if it were the trial judge.
  • Rogers “incorporation”: A judge does not have to read every discretionary supervised-release condition out loud if the judge clearly says he is imposing a known set of conditions (like the Guidelines “standard” conditions) and the written judgment later lists the same conditions.
  • Plain error: If counsel did not object at sentencing, the defendant must show an obvious error that likely changed the outcome; otherwise, the appellate court will not reverse.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jonathan Anderson affirms a within-Guidelines sentence by applying settled procedural-reasonableness principles to three recurring sentencing disputes. First, it illustrates that controlled buys may count as relevant conduct under USSG § 1B1.3 despite informant recantation when independent safeguards and corroboration make the transactions reliable. Second, it shows that an imperfect sequencing of sentencing argument does not necessarily establish a Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i) violation—particularly under plain-error review when counsel indicates his arguments were effectively presented. Third, it clarifies a workable path for Rogers compliance: a district court can validly impose discretionary “standard” conditions by specifically incorporating USSG § 5D1.3 and identified PSR pages after confirming counsel’s review and lack of objections, without needing an express PSR adoption formula.